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Beyond Foreign Aid: 
Managing the Wealth of Nations as an International Imperative for Global Wellbeing 
 
 




The taxonomy and architecture of foreign aid today is the result of a chaotic evolution 
that has made it into a flawed concept and project. The extensive literature on its 
effectiveness, dating almost as far back as aid’s own formal inception, has made issue of 
aspects related to volume, allocation and delivery; much less so of its paradigmatic 
conception. This literature has had little impact, so far. As a result, aid is increasingly 
considered to be relatively irrelevant as an agent of development, with perhaps a more 
tangible role in regard to humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. 
 
Based on the assessment that aid’s current paradigm rests on a dated economic growth 
model, an alternative model is proposed, leading to a new paradigm of “concerted wealth 
management.” A Wittgensteinian epistemological and ontological approach is followed, 
leading to a demarcation of what should or should not be the subject of the new 
paradigm. The resulting conceptual framework is built on the idea that it is through the 
management of wealth (i.e., its formation and use, and the prevention of its degradation, 
depletion, or destruction) that countries can achieve a self-reinforcing state, in which the 
wellbeing of the majority of its citizens is satisfied both in the short- and long-run. Value 
and wellbeing are conceived as an inter-temporal identity. The process through which 
wealth is managed, as well as the critical-paths that bound it, are situated in a possibility 
space defined by natural and socio-material limits (determined through a dynamic of 
rules and routines setting). These limits ensure that the physical realities of human 
existence (ecosystem) explicitly frame human activity. The actualization of value from 
wealth is contextual, and, long-term cycles (e.g., Kondratiev long-waves) provide such 
context. The wealth of nations is not defined by the monetary present value of the output 
expected from it over time, but by its increasing inter-temporal potential value 
(wellbeing) generating gradients. 
 
The ultimate goal of concerted wealth management is to achieve the convergence of 
better-off and worse-off countries in their respective capabilities and freedom to attain 
self-reinforcing state. Considerable practical implications result from the proposed new 
paradigm. 
 
July 26, 2017  
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“We—the middle classes, I mean not merely the rich—we have neglected you; instead of justice we have 
offered you charity.” 
Arnold Toynbee (1883), Progress and Poverty: A Criticism of Mr. Henry George—Mr. George in England 
 
 “I am a collection of water, calcium and organic molecules called Carl Sagan… 
But the essence of life is not so much the atoms and simple molecules that make us up as the way in which 
they are put together... If we did not know better, we might be tempted to take all the atoms that make us 
up, mix them together in a big container and stir. We can do this as much as we want. But in the end all we 
have is a tedious mixture of atoms. How could we have expected anything else?” 
Cosmos (1980), Episode 1, The Shores of the Cosmic Ocean 
 
"I have long thought about sustainability in terms of balance sheets. The idea is that our economies and 
lifestyles are underpinned by a set of assets, not just the conventional ones like infrastructure, but a broader 
set that includes the ecology of the planet and the knowledge base on which we function. If we run those 
assets down over time, then one way or another, material well-being and quality of life will suffer. We will 
have damaged the opportunities of future generations, possibly in different dimensions. At the very least we 
will have imposed costs on future generations that we ourselves did not have to bear to the same extent. 
Most of us think that there is a moral imperative not do that."  
Michael Spence (2011), The Next Convergence 
 
“…the sickness of time is cured by an alteration in the mode of life of human beings, and it was possible 
for the sickness of philosophical problems to get cured only through a changed mode of thought and of life, 
not thought a medicine invented by an individual…” 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1978), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics  
iv 
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Before I joined the World Bank in 2004, I had spent 14 years working directly in 
the private sector, or in the public sector in areas that dealt primarily with private sector 
issues. My background is in business and during those 14 years my motto used to be: “if 
we are going to make it happen, let’s make it happen right now.” 
Rhetoric and office politics exist in every business, and, in general, in every 
organization. The World Bank and the many other multilateral and bilateral organizations 
within, and with which I interacted, were not the exception. They were not much 
different either. The difference, however, was that contrary to what happens in the private 
sector, and as it is the case of other public and non-for-profit organizations, they did not 
have an unequivocal and irrefutable benchmark of success. In the private sector, rhetoric 
and office politics can only go so far; there is always a point where profits show the real 
colors of what is going on. If you make the right things happen, the achievement of 
success is clear. Without such an unequivocal and irrefutable benchmark, other types of 
organizations struggle. 
Without a development background or much non-for-profit or public sector 
experience, I approached my new job at the World Bank with the same attitude and with 
the same objectives I did in the private sector: I aimed at getting things done; as soon as 
possible.  
It was precisely in discussing what needed to be done, when and where I finally 
experienced the biggest difference I was now facing vis-à-vis my experience in the 
private sector: the theories on which decisions about what needed to be done were, for the 
xi 
most part, too narrow in reach, too general in terms of cause-effect connections, too 
atomized, and too disconnected from each other.  
Furthermore, and given the characteristics of its theoretical basis as described 
above, the crafty dimension that according to my private sector experience needs to 
accompany the more scientific part of management theory, seemed perhaps even more 
important in development than it was in business. However, such crafty interpretation and 
adaptation was severely discouraged. Institutional and personal reputational risks deterred 
many forms of informed risk taking and innovation. The incentives at all levels within the 
aid world favored little risk taking and solutions within the confines of established 
theories (even when they did not provide the micro-level solutions required). There were 
macro decisions that would frame some real variables, although their main effect was to 
create rhetorical boundaries. Within these boundaries, micro decisions would align, 
rhetorically, with the macro rhetorical boundaries but will ultimately align, technically, 
within the safety net that “proven” approaches (based on experiences that showed not to 
lead to trouble, not necessarily to success) and widely accepted theories could provide. If 
failure ensued, the micro and macro actors following such approach, would demonstrate 
rhetorical alignment, and, if the question arose, they would further demonstrate 
replication or escalation from past success and/or alignment with widely accepted theory. 
Exogenous factors would then be blamed for any shortcoming or failures, and both micro 
and macro actors would be safely acquitted from any responsibility. 
At the core of this dynamic, there was yet another disturbing characteristic: in 
spite of the distance between the theory and the praxis, as well as between design and 
results, the culture demanded absolute self-assurance both inside and outside the aid 
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organizations. Aid policy makers and practitioners pretended to know, without any doubt, 
how to make development happen; no qualms; no questions. Lack of self-assurance 
became extremely unappealing in securing the political and economic support from the 
stakeholders of aid. 
When I turned to the literature in hopes of finding more solid bearings for my 
“make it happen right now” enterprise, I also found disillusionment. Besides William 
Easterly (a former employee of the World Bank) and Angus Deaton (a recent winner of 
the Nobel Prize in Economics), who have stood up and denounced some of the nonsense 
going on, an important number of academics played the same game as the rest, some 
because in the end, they were also part of an aid machinery; a machinery about which 
Milton Friedman (1995) once bitterly complained because it was immorally benefiting 
from the misfortunes of those in more need. 
I am glad I waited 10 years to pursue my Ph.D. and that in that period (8 years at 
the World Bank and 2 years at The Jane Goodall Institute), I could accumulate a lot of 
practical experience. I am glad to have sat in silence and observed, as I am glad to 
sometimes have rebelled against the status quo and experienced, first hand, the 
consequences of doing so. Over those years, I visited more than 60 countries, 14 of them 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the remaining taking me to every other continent but 
Antarctica. Over the last 5 years of my career at the World Bank, I had veto authority 
over a portfolio of 190 projects spread across 70 countries, and worth about US$200 
million. The department for which I was leading the monitoring and evaluation practice 
was funded through a multi-donor facility. This also allowed me to establish and maintain 
close links with 15 bilateral donors who financially contributed to our programs. The 
xiii 
breath of such experience compelled me to finally go back to academia and try to build 
on what I had learned, hoping that, perhaps, I could try and “make things happen” from 
that end as well. 
The main purpose in recounting these antecedents before the reader embarks in 
attending to my arguments, is to make it clear that I have dedicated the last four years of 
my life, passionately and uncompromisingly to get things done, and to try and break the 
vicious circle in which aid has been stuck for the more than 60 years that have passed 
since its formal inception. In this spirit, I have purposely avoided the conventional and 
fruitless debates; shifted the ideologically charged language that no longer allows for 
fresh and productive conversations; pointed to the skeletons in the closet about which 
very few people want to talk; framed aid within an alternative epistemological and 
ontological framework that can help setting the limits between the sensical and the 
nonsensical (the latter, within which a considerable part of the aid debate has taken 
place). I have focused on the praxis of aid, and on the axis of that praxis, and not on the 
impractical or the snobbish, or the many times futile intellectualism of the last 60 years 
that are all denounced as such by the needless deaths of millions of people who waited 
for its fruitful resolve, but instead, were left with thousands of pages hammering, over 
and over again, on the same aid (in)effectiveness problematic that never seems to get 
fixed. In this spirit, my citations are heavy in number, trying to convey this nonsensical 
hammering of the same issues. Likewise, my discussion of previous “high development 
theories” and their relationship to aid (in)effectiveness is untraditional and 
unaccommodating, as they have only proven to “muddy the waters”. In all of this, I have 
followed the approach of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who rebel against traditional philosophy, 
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in the same way in which we need now to rebel against the nonsensical debates about aid 
(in)effectiveness of the last 60 years. 
Keeping the distances between his achievement and the humbler effort I have 
made through the following pages, the preface Keynes (1957), wrote for The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (which reflects the intellectual influence 
Keynes’s friendship with Wittgenstein had on him), captures perfectly my objective, my 
own struggles, and the struggles I expect the readers of this dissertation to have: 
For if orthodox economics is at fault, the error is to be found not in the 
superstructure, which has been erected with great care for logical consistency, but 
in a lack of clearness and of generality in the premises… I have though it 
important, not only to explain my own point of view, but also to show in what 
respects it departs from the prevailing theory. Those, who are strongly wedded to 
what I shall call “the classical theory”, will fluctuate, I expect, between a belief 
that I am quite wrong and a belief that I am saying nothing new. It is for others to 
determine if either of these or the third alternative is right…  
The composition of this book has been for the author a long struggle of escape, 
and so must the reading of it be for most readers if the author’s assault upon them 
is to be successful,—a struggle of escape from habitual modes of thought and 
expression. The ideas which are here expressed so laboriously are extremely 
simple and should be obvious. The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in 
escaping from old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have 
been, into every corner of our minds. (Keynes, 1957, pp. v–viii) 
This dissertation does not present a case against aid as a concept or as an enterprise. In 
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fact, it proposes untested avenues to make it better. It does, however, present a strong 
case against continued pretending that we know more than we do, or that 60 years is not 
more than enough to know by now that that there is something inherently wrong with our 
approach to the task. 
To the reader used to the mainstream aid literature, as well to those who approach 
the issues of aid effectiveness from the political science or political perspectives, it will 
seem odd that I seem to say little about the operationalization of the conceptual 
framework I propose. From these perspectives, it would be expected that a plan that 
suggests changes to the institutional basis of aid would be included. It would also be 
expected that an analysis of the power structures and their balance or unbalance would be 
factored in to such plan, as otherwise it would be perceived as unrealistic or potentially 
ineffective. 
Yet, I would have not been consistent with my ontological and epistemological 
approach if I had done so. Following such an expected path would have contradicted 
what I arduously argued over the several hundred pages that follow. 
Instead, I offer a somewhat odd solution that might seem unrelated and 
inconsequential. Judged from such perspectives as the ones mentioned above, this 
assessment would make sense. Yet effectively if escaping from the ontological and 
epistemological basis on which these perspectives are constructed, the proposed solution 
might not be as odd as it seems. When it is believe that there is little that has not been 
tried or that there is little space to try what has been proposed over and over again, even 
if in different shapes and forms, there is almost no space for the kind of traditional 
solutions expected from those perspectives. Chapter 6 offers considerations as to the 
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operationalization of the conceptual framework proposed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. 
Nevertheless those considerations might seem technocratic and devoid of social or 
political considerations. They are, indeed, in appearance, because they are not meant to 
contemplate those types of considerations beyond what the equations proposed in 
Chapters 4 and 5 have already made endogenous into the proposed conceptual 
framework. The point made is that, as we do today with GDP, the calculations behind the 
proposed conceptual framework are also technocratic. 
The reader will be left then with a proposal to move forward with the adoption of 
the United Nations System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA), as well as 
their integration into a new set of labelling standards that capture the wealth of nations 
embedded in products and services. Chapters 3, 5, 6, and the Epilogue will all build an 
argument supporting why such a seemingly innocuous and detached solution might make 
more sense than some of the traditional ones proposed over the last 70 years or so. The 
solution is conceived as a Trojan Horse and, as a Trojan horse it should also startle and 
surprise the reader of this dissertation. 
If any success comes from this research, it would be not because I finally graduate 
but because it makes a contribution in stopping what does not make any sense continuing, 
and because, instead, it put us on our way to getting things done, right now! This much 
we owe to those we claim we want to help.
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Chapter 1  
Framing Aid Effectiveness 
 
Chapter Summary 
Chapter 1 briefly outlines the assessment of the problematic being addressed 
through this dissertation, and the literature supporting such assessment. Both will be 
explored in much more detail over Chapters 2 and 3. 
The effectiveness of aid has been questioned since its very inception. A 
complicated origin, beset by different traditions and a mix of conflicting motives, 
established an almost insurmountable constraint to its effectiveness. Furthermore, the 
theoretical basis on which its praxis was slowly built was itself plagued with limitations. 
The theory of economic growth on which it was conceived, as well as the tools of 
development planning and national income accounting that emerged from it, became the 
language of aid; a language that defined its limits and constrained its world. Within the 
limits of its world, aid became entrenched in a vicious circle of endless debates regarding 
its effectiveness. These limits situated it away from the more relatively relevant role other 
contextual variables played in influencing the outcomes it pursued; away from a realistic 
consideration of the timelines by which the achievement of its objectives were bound; 
and, in between the two ends of the effectiveness debate that, not being conclusive 
enough in favor of one or the other, let aid developed according to its conceptually 
ineffective inner logic. Today, more than 60 years later, the problems related to its 
volume, allocation, and delivery that plagued its effectiveness almost from its inception 
remain awfully similar. This, in itself, is perhaps a much stronger signal of its 
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ineffectiveness, and definite proof of the ineffectiveness of the effectiveness debate itself. 
Aid’s theoretical underpinnings situate the origin of growth and development in 
the accumulation of capital, the growth of population, and the increased knowledge that 
translates into higher factor productivity and, therefore, economic growth. These 
underpinnings do not consider the existence of any limits to such growth (its logic rests in 
maximizing growth), nor do they give much consideration to other contextual variables, 
considered exogenous (e.g. remittances, trade, corruption, financial flows, intellectual 
property, and others). Perhaps they do so only rhetorically, but the world we live in, and 
our praxis, is much more tangible for sure. 
Drawing from this assessment and using a Wittgensteinian epistemological and 
ontological approach, this dissertation aims at “dissolving” the illusion that the 
problematic of aid effectiveness is due to issues related to volume, allocation, and 
delivery, by reinstating these issues, not as the causes but, instead, as the effects of the 
real cause of this problematic: a flawed conception of aid. It is suggested, then, that aid 
needs to be replaced by a broader concept and a simpler framework.  
Since it is through the effective and efficient use, and overall management of their 
wealth that countries can fulfill the wellbeing of their citizens and sustain, or even 
increase, their capacity to do so, wealth management is central in the process of 
development. Given that most countries are not isolated from others, but in fact share 
many public goods and one global ecosystem, the management of each country’s wealth 
requires global coordination. This coordination is also required given that, despite the 
monetary denominations and the social structures that might conceal them, every local 
and global transaction and exchange conveys a transfer of real wealth between the 
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parties. The idea of concerted wealth management is proposed, then, as the broader but 
simpler conceptual framework that can replace aid. 
To argue in support of the proposed conceptual framework, this dissertation relies 
on the development of an alternative understanding of economic growth and development 
that draws from Wittgenstein’s epistemological and ontological approach. The proposed 
understanding is built on the setting of clear limits that separate those variables about 
which something meaningful can be said and done, from those about which we should 
remain silent or passive. Methodologically, a quasi-counterfactual will help establish the 
superiority of the proposed conceptual framework or new paradigm over the old-
paradigm aid. This quasi-counterfactual will require the derivation of volume, allocation, 
and delivery consequences from the proposed conceptual framework, leading to a 
typology of actions that would be justified as part of the concerted wealth management 
approach proposed as a replacement for aid. This typology would then allow for a 
comparison with the taxonomy of actions that are currently justified through the old 
paradigm of aid. Through such comparison, this dissertation will aim at demonstrating 
the advantages of the new paradigm proposed. Although this demonstration will be only 
theoretical in reach due to time and resource limitations, it will hopefully pave the way 
for future empirical validation. 
The Problematic 
As a concept and as a global project, foreign aid (from now on, “aid”), has been in 
crisis almost since its inception in the late 1940s (see for example, Montgomery, 1967; 
Pearson & Council on Foreign Relations, 1970; Tinbergen, 1958; Wiggins & Schoeck, 
1958). Its critics are many and the numerous facets from which it is criticized cover 
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almost every aspect of it; yet, this criticism keeps going in circles, being almost as 
ineffective in bringing about considerable change as aid itself seems to be, particularly 
development aid. This vicious circle is particularly evident when the criticisms made in 
the past are virtually identical to those made today (Independent Commission on 
International Development Issues, 1980; OECD, 1981; White, 1974; Whitfield, 2009). 
The most important inquiry about aid—that is, whether it achieves its many times 
conflicting economic, humanitarian, political, and moral objectives (Picard & Buss, 
2009)—cannot be accurately and positively argued for except in a very specific cases 
(Banerjee & Duflo, 2011; Claessens, Cassimon, & Van Campenhout, 2009; May, 1989; 
Schabbel, 2007). Hence, not only it is unlikely that this criticism will diminish, but most 
importantly, that under its current form (one that makes it almost impossible to 
disentangle those many conflicting objectives), aid will hardly ever be considered 
unequivocally effective (see among others Bjørnskov, 2013; Mosley, 1987; Riddell, 
1987). In fact, some scholars argue aid might carry pernicious consequences for the 
recipient countries (Bauer, 1973; Deaton, 2013; Easterly, 2006; Friedman, 1995; Nunn & 
Qian, 2013).  
The problematic of assessing the effectiveness of aid, as mentioned above, not 
only lies in the complexity and conflicting nature of its motives and objectives. It lies as 
well in the resulting entanglement of these motives and objectives with the many other 
factors that influence the variables aid aims to impact—for example, economic growth 
and poverty (Bjørnskov, 2013). Likewise, the conflicting nature of some of the donor 
objectives vis-à-vis those of the recipient complicates even further any attempts of 
assessing aid effectiveness. This entanglement of purpose and delivery in the evaluation 
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of aid has been used by both its defenders and its critics to substantiate their arguments. 
Defenders claim the purpose of aid is defensible despite its seemingly ineffective delivery 
(given that delivery can always be improved); critics have used aid’s seemingly 
ineffective delivery to dismiss its purpose (Deaton, 2013; Easterly, 2006; Mosley, 1987; 
Riddell, 1987). Both of these sides have been able to accumulate solid and abundant 
enough evidence to apparently refute each other. Ultimately, this has helped maintain the 
status quo. 
Despite this confusing situation, if donors were to be consistent with the rhetoric 
of aid and, more importantly, with its theoretical foundations, as problematic as they are, 
it would be far more appropriate to conceive, develop, deliver, and evaluate aid in line 
with recipient objectives, rather than the motives and objectives of the donors. These 
recipient objectives are the same as those that also underpin, for the most part, the 
theoretical foundations of development economics. If aid is meant to help aid-receiving 
countries to develop and converge towards the levels of wellbeing of the aid-giving 
countries (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Gerschenkron, 1962; Warsh, 2006), there should 
not be any room for other motives or objectives that could only dilute its contribution 
towards these goals; at least, not in theory or rhetoric—we unfortunately know that praxis 
do often deviate from both (see the following for countless number of examples, Arndt, 
1987; Crewe & Axelby, 2012; Cukierman, Hercowitz, & Leiderman, 1992; Mosley, 
1987; Riddell, 1987; Schabbel, 2007; Warsh, 2006). 
When looked at from the perspective of aid-receiving countries, aid can, broadly 
speaking, take two forms based on distinct families of objectives: (a) humanitarian- and 
emergency-related aid (usually short-term), aimed at helping a country protect the 
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integrity of its wealth (including its citizenry) by addressing both actual and potential 
damage; or, (b) development-related aid (usually long-term), aimed at helping a country 
ensure the present and future wellbeing of its citizens by enabling or facilitating a 
sustainable process of social, economic, and political change (Bjørnskov, 2013). Aid-
giving countries are not only able to deal with emergencies and to sustain a more stable 
development path (despite the occasional short-term disturbances), but they can also, 
without disrupting their capacity to fulfill these roles for themselves, afford to provide the 
financial assistance that aid-receiving countries seem to require in dealing with some of 
these challenges on their own (Benson & Clay, 2004; Chenery & Strout, 1966a; Managi, 
2015; Stirk, 2014). 
While the distinction between emergency- and development-related aid is 
imperative when considering its effectiveness given how different these two objectives 
are, many of the debates on aid effectiveness do not keep a clear distinction between 
them (Bjørnskov, 2013). Emergency-related aid tends to be much more narrowly focused 
and requires shorter-term interventions, while development-related aid is extremely broad 
and usually requires interventions over the very long-term (after all, more than 60 years 
have already passed since it started). This latter form of aid plays a role among an 
invariably broader set of exogenous policies, actions, and events, all shaping together 
progress towards the same development objectives. Therefore, determining and assessing 
its catalytic role, if any, and its individual contribution, if any, becomes essential in 
determining and assessing its (in)effectiveness.  
In spite of the murkiness of these aid-effectiveness debates, critics like Easterly 
(2001, 2006, 2014) and Deaton (2013) insist that besides the narrowly focused 
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humanitarian- and emergency-related aid, which according to them have been and can 
potentially be effective in specific circumstances, any other forms of aid are, on the 
contrary, mostly ineffective and sometimes even detrimental to its recipients (see also, 
among others, Bauer, 1973; Deaton, 2013; Easterly, 2006; Friedman, 1995; Nunn & 
Qian, 2013). As Krugman (1998) has pointed out, aid driven interventions (which were 
often inspired by high development and economic growth theories) failed in achieving 
the outcomes that were predicted, or actually achieved outcomes that were not predicted 
or expected. 
A basic stylized fact is that a country’s capacity to deal with emergencies 
depends, to a high degree, on its wealth or balance sheet—broadly understood as the 
value of, among others, its institutions, infrastructure, tangible and intangible capital, 
people, and natural endowments, relative to both its local and global relative worthiness 
(Benson & Clay, 2004; Managi, 2015; Spence, 2011; UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2012, 
2014, World Bank, 2006, 2011). Within this local and global context (particularly 
considering the wealth value transfers that inter-country flows convey (Managi, 2015; 
Sengupta, 2013), the wealth of a country depends, in turn, on how well it manages to 
create, first of all, enough output to sustain the wellbeing of its citizens, and second, to 
save and reinvest some of this output, while achieving both tasks without diminishing, 
but hopefully increasing its overall wealth over time (Spence, 2011).  
Reinvesting and ensuring long-term sustainability are necessary for a country to 
maintain, or preferably increase its wealth. In turn, increasing its wealth is essential for a 
country, particularly when there is a need to improve the levels of wellbeing of its 
population further, or when there is a need to sustain the same levels of wellbeing for a 
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growing population—both usually typical situations for aid-receiving countries (UNU-
IHDP and UNEP, 2012, 2014, World Bank, 2006, 2011). All of this, of course, 
considering that the country also manages the distribution of wealth in a manner that 
contributes to improving the levels of wellbeing of most of its citizens and not just a few 
(Deaton, 2013; Milanović, 2016; Piketty, 2014; Stiglitz, 2013). 
The process of social, economic, and political change, or perhaps in more 
practical terms, the process through which a country manages its wealth in order to 
ensure the wellbeing of its citizens—the main subject of this dissertation—are pointed 
out by Douglas North (2005), Michael Spence (2011) and, Joseph Stiglitz (Stiglitz & Lin, 
2013), all Nobel Prize winners in economics, not only to be the single most important 
factor behind economic growth and development, but also, the factor about which we 
know the least (see also Campbell, 2004). 
In light of what is discussed in previous paragraphs, even if we acknowledged that 
aid-receiving countries might need assistance from aid-giving ones in dealing with 
emergency or development related issues, conceiving aid as one of the main drivers and 
catalysts for both these two major task areas—considerably larger and much more 
complex than what aid can realistically address—seems not only odd but inaccurate, 
particularly in the case of development-related aid (Cassen, Sewell, Jolly, & Wood, 1982; 
Deaton, 2013; Easterly, 2006, 2014; Goldin, 2016). Indeed, when compared, among 
others, to volumes of trade, private investments, royalties paid for intellectual property, 
and flows of migration and remittances that take place between aid-giving and aid-
receiving countries, aid is just a minuscule fraction (for example, as reported by the 
OECD and the World Bank (2017) low income countries’ net overseas development 
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assistance—ODA—as a percentage of gross national income—GNI—went from 17 to 9 
percentage from 1994 to 2014, while, in the case of middle income countries went from 
0.83 to 0.25 percent from 1990 to 2014). Even when no serious scholar or practitioner of 
aid would dare formally claim aid to be the main driver, or automatically give it a 
categorical catalytic role in the process of development, the truth is that it only suffices to 
pay attention to the rhetoric surrounding aid, as well as its praxis, to know that they carry 
an undeniable self-impose blindness about how truly important and effective aid is (i.e., it 
is widely affirmed, many times implicitly, that we can end poverty), and how sure they 
are about what to do and how to do it (i.e., it is also widely affirmed, many times 
implicitly, that we know how to end poverty). 
Moreover, when compared to arms trade, corruption, drug trafficking, shuffling of 
financial flows, transfer-pricing arrangements within transnational corporations, 
international tax-avoiding or minimizing strategies, and other activities that operate 
within or outside of the boundaries of the formal and informal global social, economic, 
and political architecture, development-aid can hardly compete with the effects and 
destabilizing nature of these activities, the inter-country flows they create, and the wealth 
value transfers they convey (see for example, Bruszt & McDermott, 2006). Given their 
relative and considerably superior weight, all of these variables, among others, exert a 
more considerable impact on the wealth of aid-receiving countries than aid can and does 
exert on it (Wickstead, 2015, pp. 76–77). Often, these other variables result in unbalanced 
and unjust wealth value transfers between countries, as well as in situations where the 
capacity and freedom of aid-receiving countries to manage their wealth is greatly 
constrained (Picciotto, 2009)—all, far beyond what aid can and aims to achieve. And 
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while, through initiatives like the European Union’s Policy Coherence for Development 
(Carbone, 2009) or the Center for Global Development’s Commitment to Development 
Index (Birdsall & Roodman, 2003; Roodman, 2012), these issues are increasingly being 
considered, the practical impact of such efforts is still limited (Barder, Clark, Lépissier, 
Reynolds, & Roodman, 2013; Barry, King, & Matthews, 2010; Picciotto, 2005). 
Furthermore, when considering the impact the current international monetary and 
financial systems have in creating asymmetries between the prices of different product 
groups and between countries, as well as the impact these asymmetries have on the 
fairness of the wealth-value transfers that take place through inter-country flows, the 
potential relative role of aid in helping aid-receiving countries is further diminished 
(Meikle, 1995; Norrlof, 2014; Stiglitz & United Nations General Assembly, 2010). 
Finally, when compared to the scope of the challenges faced by aid-receiving 
countries in managing emergencies and achieving a self-sustained process of 
development, the funds provided by aid are, relatively speaking, even less relevant 
(Picciotto, 2009; Picciotto & Weaving, 2004; Wickstead, 2015). 
The above are some ways in which the current global social, economic, and 
political architecture influences—in more relevant manners than those in which aid does 
and can do—the nature of inter-country flows, the wealth value transfers they convey, 
and their impact both on aid-receiving countries’ wealth, and on their capacity and 
freedom to manage this wealth. It is evident, then, that the assistance required by aid-
receiving countries from aid-giving ones should not be limited to the traditional transfers 
of wealth, in aid funds or knowledge, but should also include efforts to create and 
maintain a balanced global social, economic, and political architecture that is conducive 
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to the convergence in wellbeing of both groups of countries (Spence, 2011). 
Ultimately, as explained above, a country’s capacity to deal with emergencies and 
development issues depend on its wealth, and wealth is itself impacted in much more 
relevant and sizeable ways by all these other variables discussed above, than it is by aid.  
Even so, the underlying and unspoken assumption behind some aid literature is 
that the catalyzing effect that it can have is prominent—far beyond what it seems to have 
been and what could be, even more so when looked at it from a theoretical point of view 
(Chenery & Strout, 1966a, 1966b; Mikesell, 1968; Riddell, 1987). Reinforcing this 
assumption and despite rhetoric directing to the contrary, there is yet another working, 
but usually unspoken assumption behind long-held attitudes towards aid, that the problem 
of development is an endogenous one (Dasandi, 2014). The focus of aid efforts seems to 
rest much more heavily on the internal dynamics of aid-receiving countries, their savings 
level, corruption, capacity, institutions, among other things, the local ingredients on 
which economic growth theory is based (Commission on Growth and Development, 
2008), and not nearly enough on the impacts that the global social, economic, and 
political architecture has on aid-receiving countries’ wealth through the above-mentioned 
inter-country flows, as well as the wealth value transfers they convey.  
The underlying and often unspoken view behind the above-mentioned 
assumption, which is reflected through aid’s praxis, is that aid can help accelerate 
development (Riddell, 1987), even if not much else in the global context in which aid-
receiving countries operate changes (think for example, of aid-giving countries subsidies 
to farming or carbon fuels, and intellectual property’s implications in terms of the pricing 
of pharmaceuticals or overall access to knowledge), and even if the ways in which 
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countries relate and interact with each other remain unchanged—hence the usual silence 
about these contextual factors when discussing or implementing aid (Birdsall & 
Roodman, 2003; Deaton, 2013; Picciotto, 2004, 2009; Roodman, 2012). This view has 
meant that, in practice, aid could be viewed as an indirect way to compensating aid-
receiving countries (only partially) for the mostly unacknowledged and unspoken 
imbalances in the global social, economic, and political architecture, rather than 
correcting such imbalances so that there would be no need for them to be compensated in 
the first place (e.g., eliminating trade restrictions, relaxing immigration rules for displace 
people, regulating arms trade, and many others). For example, Chenery and Strout 
(1966a, 1966b), in what is considered one of the most thorough theoretical accounts of 
the role of aid, suggests that aid could fill the gap in reserves created by the trade 
imbalances commonly carried by aid-receiving countries. However, their paper does not 
suggest addressing the global causes of these imbalances, so that this gap would be 
minimized or eliminated—it can only be imagined, due to the unspoken held assumption 
that trade competitiveness and the direction of financial flows are mostly endogenously 
led.  
In a sense, if one were to apply Sen’s (2000) ideas about development-as-freedom 
at the country level, we would have to admit that under the current global social, 
economic, and political architecture, not all countries enjoy the same degree of freedom, 
or the capabilities that underlie it. In fact, it is aid-receiving countries that are often 
grossly unfree, in Sen’s terms, and therefore constrained, rather than enabled, by the 
global social, economic, and political architecture in their development efforts (Amin, 
1976; Commission on Global Governance, 1995; Elson, 2011, p. 211; Independent 
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Commission on International Development Issues, 1980; see several of the articles in the 
edited volume by Kaul, Grunberg, & Stern, 1999; Spence, 2011; Stiglitz, 2010; The 
South Commission, 1990). 
Furthermore, aid has unrealistically been portrayed as a relatively effective, short-
term solution to development issues. (See, for example, Millikan & Rostow (1976) who 
proposed in 1957 that, if about US$3.5 billion of aid were provided to aid-receiving 
countries every year, all would be in a stage of self-sustained growth in less than twenty 
years—an evidently unrealistic proposal, when almost 60 years and more than US$1 
trillion of aid later, this has not yet been achieved.) It has barely been acknowledged by 
aid’s theory and praxis, that aid cannot override the also often ignored critical-path to 
development determined by the natural, social, and material limits constraining the 
process of change behind it (Campbell, 2004). 
The effectiveness of aid has also been inhibited by the relative narrow 
concentration of economic growth and development economics literature on labour, 
capital, and technological progress as the drivers of growth—the ingredients mentioned 
above—and on the market as the institution that fosters it (Commission on Growth and 
Development, 2008; Galor, 2011; Helpman, 2004; Salvadori, 2003a, 2003b; Schabbel, 
2007, p. 194). In today’s radically different world economy, intangible capital, such as 
knowledge, institutions, and social arrangements, including the less tangible components 
of produced capital, like software and similar types of intellectual property, have far 
surpassed the importance of physical capital (Ugur, 2013; World Bank, 2006, 2011). As 
Thirlwall (2002) argues, even what is called “new growth theory” is, ultimately, not that 
different from the “old” one, nor considerably more helpful in understanding how growth 
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occurs or can be influenced. 
It is an anachronism that severely limits the understanding of development, as 
well as of its different paths, to continue modelling economic growth on: (a) the broader 
categories of labour, capital and innovation (hence, limiting our understanding of the very 
different policy choices available to influence very different kinds of wealth) (Hartmann, 
2014; Spence, 2011; Warsh, 2006); (b) the emphasis on maximization rather than 
optimization, including the focus on increasing total factor productivity (TFP) that leads 
to the perception that there are established development paths (e.g., industrialization) and 
to the denial of physical and environmental limits to growth (Alpert, 2014; Helpman, 
2004; Miller & Page, 2007; Page, 2011; Sengupta, 2013); and (c) the assumption that 
markets are, for the most part, driving the process through which these “ingredients” are 
engaged in a maximizing growth producing combination (rather than reliance on a 
broader set of institutional arrangements for managing a country’s wealth that result from 
the interaction of human beings and their efforts to address the coordination and control 
issues that arise from cooperation) (Arrow, 1974; Reynaud, 2002; Roth, 2015).  
While economic growth theory has shown the relationship between the 
“ingredients” and growth, it has not demonstrated a causal connection between them 
(Easterly, 1997, 2001; Jones, 1998; Montgomery, 1967; Toye, 1987). Furthermore, it has 
narrowly focused on the relationship between flows and not enough on the relationship 
between the flows and stocks of wealth—a focus that is absolutely essential in 
understanding the workings of the complex systems underlying the process of social, 
economic, and political change (N. B. Forrester, 1973; Meadows & Wright, 2008; Miller 
& Page, 2007). 
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This narrowness in the thinking about economic growth has pervaded aid praxis. 
Consequently, the design and delivery of aid has gravitated towards approaches resting 
on these long-held mechanistic and technocratic paradigms about economic growth—
what was termed above, an “ingredient-based” understanding of development, rather than 
a “process-based” one. These paradigms have led to a belief that if the appropriate 
“ingredients” were put in place with the help of aid, they would combine and interact 
through the invisible hand of the markets and, as a result, create economic growth, and 
more generally development (H. A. Arndt, 1984, 1987; Chenery & Strout, 1966a; 
Easterly, 1997). Even when some development theorist such as Hirschman (Alacevich, 
2011) suggested increased attention needed to be given to the “process” of development 
and towards an “unbalanced” rather than “balanced” understanding of this process, 
ultimately, the praxis of aid was increasingly shaped by the “balanced approach” which 
relied on a macro understanding of the development process based on neoclassical 
economic growth theory which was mostly focused on increasing the “ingredients” 
behind growth (Black, 1960; Dalgaard, Hansen, & Tarp, 2004; Easterly, 1999, 2001). 
Likewise, neo-Marxist thinkers such as Amin (1976), Wallerstein (1976), and Frank 
(Cockcroft  Frank, Andre Gunder,, Johnson,Dale L., 1972), among others, gave more 
emphasis as well to the “process” rather than to the “ingredients”, however, their ideas 
had little impact on the actual delivery of aid. 
In this context, it is easy to see why, when motivated by this theoretical 
understanding, mostly driven by a neo-classical economics understanding of the world, 
aid’s praxis has for so many years concentrated on improving the quality of these 
“ingredients”—be it tangible capital at first, intangible capital and human capital later, or, 
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more recently, the market mechanism and other institutions (as exemplified in the 
Washington Consensus). As discussed above, this concentration on the “ingredients” was 
further ingrained into the praxis of aid through the institutionalization of national income 
accounting and development planning techniques (both also based on the same 
neoclassical growth theory) as the tools of choice for allocating resources and priorities 
(Boettke, 1994; Dollar & Easterly, 1999; Easterly, 1999, 2001). (See Chapter 2 for 
further discussion on this subject) 
In the face of the lack of broader and more solid economic growth theory 
foundations, the conception, design, delivery, and evaluation of aid, its praxis, was 
shaped, then, not only within the confines of this limited understanding, but more 
importantly, by all the other elements that filled this theoretical void: conflicting ideas 
behind objectives and motives of different stakeholders; the politics behind them; 
ideologies; economic and financial crises, and; the wide variety of historical contexts 
through which aid grew into what it is today—a multi-billion dollar activity that, while 
still relatively small, has become much bigger and longer-lasting than what its original 
supporters ever envisioned (Deaton, 2013; Easterly, 2006, 2014; Lumsdaine, 1993). 
In summary, aid has been deeply shaped by narrow visions about the process of 
economic growth and development, as well as by an unrealistic, and perhaps politically 
induced rhetoric, about both its relevance and the timeframe in which it can exert 
considerable influence in jumpstarting and accelerating the process of development (e.g., 
big push). As a consequence, aid effectiveness has also been evaluated within the limits 
of this theoretical framework—that is, often isolated from other variables and from other 
structural features as if, regardless of its lesser relative size, it was nevertheless an 
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important catalyzer in improving the ability of aid-receiving countries to deal with 
emergencies, and to engage in a sustainable process of development. 
While the suite of problems surrounding aid effectiveness has been 
comprehensively examined from the perspectives of its volume, allocation, and delivery, 
it has been less so in the context of the above-mentioned process of social, economic, and 
political change (the process); in the context of other inter-country flows (the flows)—
among which it is a relatively minor and shrinking one; as well in relation to the size of 
the problems being addressed (the challenge). Aid has also been barely examined in the 
context of a country’s wealth (the stock), particularly if wealth is more broadly 
understood than how, up to now, economic growth and development economics theories 
have understood it (Easterly, 2007; Mosley, 1987; Riddell, 1987; Spence, 2011). 
Furthermore, the link between economic growth and development economics theories, as 
well as the ways in which aid has been conceived, designed, and delivered, have also 
rarely been considered as potential explanations for its apparent ineffectiveness (while 
Easterly (1999, 2001), among others, have made a strong case about how this connection 
shaped the praxis of aid, the literature on the impact this connection had in terms of aid 
(in)effectiveness has not been explored in more detail). 
If this seems to be the case, it is fair to ask how is it possible that after more than 
sixty years, whenever aid is conceived, debated, or evaluated, it is mostly done outside 
the context of the considerations summarized in the previous paragraphs? 
 Easterly (2014), among other critics of aid (e.g. Carothers & de Gramont, 2013), 
call this narrow approach “the technocratic illusion”—the underlying assumption behind 
some of the literature and attitudes in support of aid that we know how development 
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works, what role aid plays in catalyzing it, and how we can make it happen through the 
use of aid. Similarly, Deaton (2013), the winner of the Nobel Prize in economics in 2015, 
calls this idea or assumption the “hydraulic approach to aid,” that is, all we need to do is 
inject funding into aid-receiving countries to make development happen. Krugman 
(1998), another Nobel Prize winner in economics, argues more broadly, as previously 
discussed, that the practice of development economics, including aid’s praxis, has been 
mostly unsuccessful, with the few success stories we can account for being mostly 
unexpected and unpredicted surprises, rather than planned and expected outcomes. 
Montgomery (1967), Mikesell (1968); Mosley (1987); Lumsdaine (1993); Easterly 
(2006, 2014); Picard and Buss (2009), Riddell (1987, 2007); Carothers and Gramont 
(2013); Schabbel (2007) and Deaton (2013), among many others, capture some of the 
complexities of the debate surrounding aid that explain aspects of such narrow 
understanding, as well as of such a prolonged debate around its effectiveness. These 
complexities are partially explained by the historically-driven confusion and polarization 
of views about aid’s motives, objectives, and means, and, therefore, about what success 
looks and should look like. They are, of course, partially explained as well by the 
historical contexts in which these debates have taken place.  
As a result, between ups and downs, and mostly in struggling to survive, aid has 
been resilient in front of never ending debates that have yet to lend a clear winning hand 
to any of the different sides engaged in them. Likewise, aid has been conceived and 
devised, and has evolved, building organically from all these confusing pulls and pushes 
rather than building on a clear and robust understanding of its role in development—
perhaps too, because of our understanding of development is limited as well. The current 
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taxonomy and architecture of aid are, then, more of an accident of this convoluted debate 
and process, than a well thought out and substantiated enterprise to help its recipients 
(Lumsdaine, 1993). 
Elusive as it is, at least under the recurrent kind of criticism which has been 
dominant since its inception in the late 1940s, aid effectiveness is bound to remain a 
mystery. Unless the debate is shifted to include the other factors mentioned above that 
have been missing from it, the now old and recurrent criticisms will continue, and the 
prospect of a more effective aid enterprise will remain low. 
Posing the Problem: The Central Research Question 
The focus of this dissertation will be on reframing the received understanding and 
debate on the causes underlying the apparent ineffectiveness of aid, particularly since this 
current understanding and debate have had limited success in addressing this perceived 
ineffectiveness. 
This research intends to alter the current understanding of what aid 
(in)effectiveness is by focusing on two main gaps in the literature and debate that are also 
gaps in aid praxis, namely, the structural context in which aid takes place, and the role aid 
can play in the process of social, economic, and political change through which countries 
should manage their wealth, as the mean to deal with emergencies, and to create a 
sustainable process of development.  
These gaps, it will be argued, have led to the creation of an aid delivery 
architecture and taxonomy, as well as a global social, economic, and political architecture 
that: (a) is based on the assumption that, or at least built on the incentives to behave as if 
aid has a catalytic effect; (b) is constrained by a simplistic and mechanical ingredient-
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based rather than process-based conception of economic growth; (c) leaves out a whole 
range of other inter-country flows, as well as characteristics of the global social, 
economic, and political architecture that shape them, which, through the wealth value 
exchanges they convey, are much more relevant in fostering or hindering development 
than aid; and that (d) lends itself to a problematic combination of conflicting motives, 
interests, and ideologies that contribute not only to the creation of perverse incentives to 
maintain the status quo, but that also dilutes its effectiveness even further. 
In shifting the current understanding and debate of the causes underlying the 
(in)effectiveness of aid, it will be argued over the following pages that aid needs to be 
replaced by a broader concept of concerted wealth management, which will encompass 
the gaps mentioned above. Given that aid’s theoretical basis and praxis rely in turn on the 
existing mainstream theory of economic growth, a new and broader conception of aid 
requires a new theory or understanding of economic growth; without it, it is argued, the 
effectiveness and efficiency of aid can only change marginally, as the history of the past 
60 years or so has proven.  
From this starting point, more specifically, this research will be seeking to 
understand: 
1. What are the theoretical underpinnings of the process of social, economic, 
and political change through which a country manages its wealth in order 
to engage in a sustainable process of development, and in order to better-
handle emergencies? What are the main challenges this process presents to 
aid-receiving countries that seem to require or that could benefit from 
concerted wealth management? Which are the ways in which aid-giving 
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countries can cooperate with aid-receiving ones in dealing with these 
challenges? What are the ways in which these concerted efforts can be 
organized and delivered to effectively help aid-receiving countries dealing 
with these challenges?  
2. What is the impact that inter-country flows have in the process of social, 
economic, and political change through which a country manages its 
wealth in order to engage in a sustainable process of development and in 
order to better handle emergencies? What are the main challenges these 
inter-country flows present to aid-receiving countries that seem to require, 
or that could benefit from, concerted wealth management? Which are the 
ways in which aid-giving countries can cooperate with aid-receiving ones 
in order to address the challenges inter-country flows present to them in 
the process of managing their wealth? What are the ways in which these 
concerted efforts can be organized and delivered to effectively help aid-
receiving countries dealing with these challenges? 
Given the extent and complexity of the research problematic that this dissertation 
will be addressing, rather than exhausting it completely, its objective will be to provide a 
basic conceptual framework on which an initial basic response to the main research 
questions above can be constructed. Thus, this research will also contribute to the 
literature and the debate by not only providing a preliminary set of policy 
recommendations but also by proposing directions for future research. 
Thesis Statement 
Contrary to the mainstream literature, this dissertation will suggest that the most 
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important cause of aid (in)effectiveness does not rest as much on aspects relating to its 
volume, allocation, or delivery, but in the narrowness of its conception. It is this 
narrowness of conception that leads to ineffective practices related to volume, allocation, 
or delivery, and not the other way around. Effects have been mistaken for causes, and 
hence the ineffective circularity of the debate about aid (in)effectiveness. 
Aid has been conceived on the basis of a narrow understanding of economic 
growth (and the development theories that draw from this understanding) that focuses on 
the ingredients rather than on the process of social, economic, and political change 
through which development takes place—the recipe. It has also been conceived on the 
underlying assumption that economic growth and development are mostly endogenously 
led processes and, therefore, that the role of aid is to address the country-specific 
constraints faced during this process, rather than the aspects of the global social, 
economic, and political architecture that may play a part in it.  
To address its perceived ineffectiveness, aid would need to be replaced by a 
broader concept that does not solely focus, as aid has traditionally done, on transferring 
resources and knowledge to aid-receiving countries. A new paradigm is therefore needed. 
This new approach to understanding the process of development could be called wealth 
management, as it is through the managed extraction of value from wealth, as well as 
from the prevention of its degradation, depletion, or destruction that countries can 
develop. Wealth management—or the balance sheet approach (Spence, 2011)—is 
understood here as the process of extracting value from wealth that aims to ensure its 
long-term survival and capacity to sustain its citizens’ wellbeing. This process—a result 
of social, economic and political change—is based on a comprehensive management of 
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the different kinds of wealth available to a country (being countries a working unit of 
analysis that could easily be aggregated or disaggregated as needed), taking into account 
their nature, and the characteristics that result from their nature, all of this in the context 
of a global social, economic, and political architecture under which inter-country flows 
convey wealth value transfers that add or subtract to their wealth stocks. While wealth 
management is inherently an endogenously led process, it is constrained and shaped by 
the exogenous conditions imposed by the global social, economic, and political 
architecture. The link between these endogenous and exogenous factors shaping wealth 
management lie in the wealth value transfers that result from inter-country flows. 
Concerted wealth management, as opposed to our current understanding of aid, 
should, therefore, aim at enabling, enhancing, and safeguarding the freedom and 
capabilities of aid-receiving countries to manage their wealth in the most effective and 
efficient ways, so as to allow them to reach and sustain the level of wellbeing that they 
need and want. It should focus on two main issues: (a) how aid-giving countries can 
cooperate with the aid-receiving in their wealth management process, including 
preventing and managing emergencies; and (b) how aid-giving and aid-receiving 
countries can work together, and agree, on a global social, economic, and political 
architecture that ensures that all inter-country flows and the wealth value transfers they 
convey, do not disproportionately and negatively impact aid-receiving countries’ wealth, 
as well as the process through which they manage this wealth.  
Concerted wealth management should aim at enabling and facilitating the 
convergence between aid-giving and aid-receiving countries’ freedom and capabilities to 
reach their desired levels of wellbeing. 
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Methods and Data 
The main building block of this dissertation’s methodological approach is the 
elaboration of a conceptual framework for understanding the process of social, economic 
and political change through which a country manages its wealth in a global context—
more or less proactively—in order to better handle emergencies and engage in a 
sustainable development path. This conceptualization will be essential in order to 
understand how the proposed idea of concerted wealth management, as a substitute for 
aid, can contribute to both these objectives and therefore be shaped in terms of its praxis. 
As a starting point, an alternative epistemological and ontological frame of 
reference based on the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein will be used. His approach towards 
reframing long standing conceptual and theoretical confusions through the use of a 
particular methodology, as well as his minimalistic and strictly practical approach 
towards dissolving apparent issues (Horwich, 2012), can contribute immensely towards 
breaking the vicious circle in which the aid enterprise and the question of its 
(in)effectiveness have been trapped over the last 60 years or so. Building on 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical framework will allow for understanding how the words and 
meanings and the underlying understanding of knowledge, rules and causation that 
shaped aid, contributed in “limiting its world”, as well as the debate about it. It will also 
allow for a shift in the framing of the aid enterprise and the understanding of its 
effectiveness or lack thereof. Such a shift is required due to how charged the meaning of 
the words used in the debate have become, no longer allowing for a focus on the issues 
beyond axiomatic or ideological biases. Furthermore, the use of a Wittgensteinian 
approach, in particular his framing of rules and routines, knowledge and explanations, 
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and the dynamics of language games, will allow for a better alignment with the 
increasingly accepted realization about the complexity of the social, economic, and 
political order, as well as with the implications this complexity introduces in 
understanding the process of social, economic, and political change. Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical approach can help discern those areas about which it is worthwhile for aid 
saying and doing something to promote the process of development, and those about 
which it may need to remain silent and passive. While the choice of an epistemological or 
ontological framework is, in essence, an arbitrary decision, it is nevertheless considered 
that the choosing of Wittgenstein’s approach in this particular research, is the most 
appropriate given its unsettling features and how these features can fulfill the urgent need 
for disruption from the vicious circle within which debates about aid have remained 
trapped over the last 60 years. 
One of the practical implications of adopting the proposed epistemological and 
ontological framework is that, while in Chapters 1 through 3 the terms used will be 
extracted directly from the literature and, therefore, could potentially be assigned a range 
of meanings according to each authors’ intentions, starting in Chapter 3, a critical set of 
words and their meanings are proposed. They are meant to shift the debate and to allow 
for a framing of the issues discussed from a different analytical perspective. 
Consequently, Chapters 4 through 6 mostly rely on the new words and meanings 
provided in Chapter 3, rather than on those found in the literature (although when 
literature is cited, the terminology used in it is respected). 
This dissertation will approach the proposed research problematic by analyzing:  
1) Wealth and the different forms it takes—a country’s balance sheet. 
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2) The way in which these different forms of wealth (assets) relate to each other. 
3) The ways in which these assets are used and transformed through the process 
of social, economic and political change that underpins the explicit or implicit 
efforts of a country to manage its overall wealth—its balance sheet. 
4) The impact that inter-country flows and the wealth value transfers conveyed 
by them have on a country’s wealth. 
5) How global social, economic, and political architecture influences or 
determines the impact of those inter-country flows in a country’s wealth. 
6) The ways in which aid-giving countries can cooperate with the aid-receiving 
in ensuring that inter-country flows, and the global social, economic, and 
political architecture in which they are embedded, do not have adverse 
impacts (on the contrary, positive ones) on their wealth nor on the process 
through which they manage their wealth with the objective of both: dealing 
with emergencies, and engaging in a sustainable process of development. 
7) The possible mechanisms and architecture through which such concerted 
wealth management could take place. 
It is important to clarify first, that this dissertation will not engage in an attempt to 
reassess the effectiveness of aid by following mainstream debates centered or concerned 
with aspects related to its volume, allocation, and delivery. Instead, its starting point of 
reference will be that the increasing convergence of the literature towards the conclusion 
that aid seems to be relatively irrelevant at the macro level, is in itself, a sign of the more 
substantial structural problems it carries due to its conception, design, and delivery. 
Mixing motives and objectives, as well as the underlying weak theoretical foundations on 
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which aid is substantiated, makes it almost impossible to be conclusive about its 
effectiveness, and this, in itself, is a sign of its potential ineffectiveness. The apparent 
circularity of the debate about aid effectiveness—after more than sixty years, the same 
issues keep being recycled without arriving at conclusive evidence nor profound changes 
in effectiveness—points to the need to shifting the debate rather than deepen it. This 
dissertation’s starting point is, then, that the ineffectiveness of aid is not due to problems 
related to its volume, allocation or, delivery, but that the problems plaguing these 
dimensions are, in fact, the result of an inherently ineffective conception. Effects have 
been confused with causes.  
The proposed conceptual framework will allow for an exploration of the ways in 
which aid-giving countries could cooperate with aid-receiving countries given a much 
broader understanding of both the process and context in which development takes place. 
Delivery has to follow purpose, and it is this dissertation’s contention that the murkiness 
of our understanding of the purpose of aid has muddied its delivery. Through the 
proposed conceptual framework—rather than focusing on volume, allocation, and 
delivery—this dissertation will explore the causes behind aid (in)effectiveness by 
focusing, instead, on the broader role that aid-giving countries can have in cooperating in 
the development of aid-receiving ones. Through such an understanding, the volume, 
allocation, and delivery dimensions of concerted wealth management (as the proposed 
substitute of aid), can be then shaped to better serve its purposes. 
In order to substantiate this dissertation’s thesis that the ineffectiveness of aid is 
due to its deficient conception, the proposed conceptual framework will allow for an 
understanding of the potential role of concerted wealth management, void of confusion 
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regarding motives and objectives, with no other concern than the achievement of a 
sustainable process of development. The next logical step would be to devise a typology 
of actions that corresponds to this newly devised role—form (and delivery) following 
purpose, as it should be. By comparing this resulting typology with the existing 
taxonomy of aid, this dissertation will test the hypothesis that the discrepancies between 
the old and the new paradigm proposed can help explain the problematic (in)effectiveness 
of aid. 
This comparison would lead to a list of two different categories of aid related 
kinds of interventions: those in the taxonomy that do not exist in the proposed typology 
(old-paradigm aid exclusive interventions, identified as “X”), and those in the proposed 
typology that do not exist in the taxonomy (new aid exclusive interventions, identified by 
“Y”). Both these kinds of interventions could be then compared from empirical and 
theoretical perspectives to determine whether the proposed thesis of this dissertation 
could be proved or not: if there is empirical evidence about interventions of the kind “X” 
(old-paradigm aid interventions) that prove they have been ineffective in achieving the 
objectives of aid, this could point out to why the alternative typology emerging from the 
new paradigm did not include these, reinforcing the case in favor of the thesis proposed. 
Additionally, these items “X” could be analyzed using the logic of the new paradigm to 
understand the reasons why they are not part of the resulting typology. This 
understanding, when compared to that of the original theoretical justification of these 
items “X” emerging from the old paradigm, might also point out to theoretical 
weaknesses that could explain their ineffectiveness.  
With respect to interventions of the kind “Y” (those new-aid interventions in the 
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proposed typology that do not exist in the taxonomy of old-aid interventions), it is very 
likely that empirical evidence about these does not exist, given that since they are not part 
of the existing taxonomy, they probably have not been tried before or perhaps only 
marginally. Therefore, it might not be possible to validate or invalidate them with 
empirical evidence. The analysis could focus instead on evaluating these in terms of the 
theoretical foundation of the existing taxonomy. Such analysis could help elucidate 
whether the theoretical grounds on which they are justified through the new paradigm are 
sounder than those from the old one. This analysis could also point to weaknesses in the 
current theoretical conception of aid, thereby contributing to substantiating the thesis of 
this dissertation. 
To establish the quasi-counterfactual described above (Ehring, 1997; S. L. 
Morgan & Winship, 2007; Paul, 2013), a two-tiered methodological approach will be 
adopted. This two-tiered approach is essential: the first tier, the economic modelling, is 
the scaffolding through which the hypothesis emanating from the second tier, the political 
economy analysis, can be consistently and systematically tested (political economy is 
defined here as the interdisciplinary framework to understand the interaction and mutual 
influence between economics, sociology, and politics (Weingast & Wittman, 2006)). The 
resulting model allows not only for a comparison against the old paradigm using a 
common language (mathematics), but also for the building of conclusions by considering 
what-if political economy analysis scenarios through the consistency of a solid theoretical 
grounding. These what-if considerations also feed back into the model design and 
contribute to its fine-tuning. (Quasi-counterfactual is used here to denote that given most 
comparisons between the old-paradigm aid and the new one resulting from the proposed 
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conceptual framework will be theoretical and not empirical, they can’t be considered in 
full as counterfactual evidence.) 
One of the most significant criticisms by mainstream academics of the political 
economy analysis literature, particularly that of the left is that the analyst sometimes 
lacks the scientific basis to do the analysis (Popper, 1965, 1972, 1976). This is, there is an 
alleged lack of a basic understanding of economics, statistics, causality, and at times 
argumentative logic, as well as no resulting testable hypotheses (Ayer, 1964; Ebenstein, 
2015; Friedman, 1977; Keuth, 2005; Popper, 1972; Rodrik, 2015). On the other hand, one 
of the most important criticisms levelled against the mainstream economics literature is 
that it relies too much on its own theoretical constructions and the reduced worlds 
represented by their models; sometimes even falling in the trap of undeservingly 
considering that the simple use of mathematics gives scientific status to their work (M. S. 
Morgan, 2012; Rodrik, 2015; Sanguineti, 1977). Whether models are 90 percent or 10 
percent of the solution when compared to the political economy analysis or vice versa is 
up for debate. However, we cannot do one without the other: political economy analysts 
err as much as economist when they ignore each other (M. S. Morgan, 2012; Rodrik, 
2015). As Krugman (1998, p. 83) points out, development economists tend to get lost in 
their models, while non-economists are lost in the “fog” that results from not having 
models at all. 
Consistent with economic science practice, the approach to modelling will start by 
considering a one-country model through which the wealth management process can be 
understood isolated from any external influences (a closed economy). In this phase, 
consideration will be given to the natural, material, and social dimensions of different 
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classes of assets. This will serve as a stepping stone towards understanding the portfolio 
of wealth a country possesses and how the interrelations and interactions between the 
different classes of assets in it, changes the more simplistic considerations about them 
initially made. 
As the model becomes more complex, additional considerations will be added 
about the impact countries may have on each other in managing their wealth. Likewise, 
the idea that the value generating potential of wealth is dependent on how synchronous or 
asynchronous its lifecycle is with that of the context, as well as that of the wealth of other 
countries, will be incorporated into the model. 
Further modelling will be used to theorize about a potential typology of concerted 
wealth management efforts that could contribute to the convergence of aid-giving and 
aid-receiving countries towards a more balanced and stable situation. 
Throughout these phases of the modelling process, both the implications of the 
financial and monetary systems over the inter-country flows and wealth-value transfers 
they convey, as well as the country’s wealth management process, will be considered. 
This analysis will allow for the isolation of their potential effects on the different 
variables and the interactions between countries, as well as in the internal dynamics 
within a country.  
Given the time and resource limitations to explore an already broad and complex 
research topic, empirical data will not be used throughout this dissertation to test the 
model both for consistency and for explanatory and predictive powers. Instead, guidance 
for future research and empirical validation is provided in Chapter 6, including a list of 
testable and falsifiable stylized hypothesis. Nevertheless, a few examples from the 
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literature which are built on empirical evidence, will be cited when possible and, when 
relevant, to showcase and support the line of argumentation being followed throughout 
this dissertation. 
While the proposed economic modelling that will be produced as a result of this 
research will contribute by providing a starting point from which the relationship between 
relevant variables—inter-country flows, wealth value transfers, wealth, concerted wealth 
management, economic growth and development, and their interrelations—can be better 
understood, it will be beyond the scope of this dissertation to exhaust the understanding 
and theorization of all the potential relationships and interactions between these variables. 
The contribution of this research will be to relate variables in ways they have not been 
related before, rather than providing an exhaustive account of these relations. Instead, a 
research agenda to fill those gaps in knowledge will also be proposed in Chapter 6. 
It is expected that the proposed conceptual framework will provide basic elements 
that could be used in suggesting some foundations for: (a) a theory of wealth 
management; (b) a conceptual framework for understanding the nature of the value 
transfers resulting from different kinds of inter-country flows; (c) a basic understanding 
of concerted wealth management outlining a typology that corresponds to a new broader 
understanding of aid; (d) a better understanding of the relationship between the proposed 
typology for concerted wealth management and the existing taxonomy of aid, as well as 
the gaps between them; and (e) a better understanding of the implications of all of these 
considerations in terms of the architecture through which aid is currently being delivered, 
and any changes that might be required in this architecture in order to focus instead on 
the proposed broader concept of concerted wealth management. As explained before, this 
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comparison between taxonomy, typology, the architectures of aid and the proposed idea 
of concerted wealth management, will allow for the establishment of a quasi-
counterfactual against which the thesis and research questions put forward in this 
dissertation can be assessed. 
A limitation of the proposed methodology that arises from the nature of the 
economic modelling process, is that by definition, this modelling process relies on a 
selection of variables and the relationships between them that cannot fully represent 
reality. Given that during the process of modelling, decisions will be made about which 
variables to include, about the assumptions under which they are included, and about the 
ways in which each contribute to the interaction depicted by the model, the result will be 
bound by these choices, and, therefore, the theoretical conclusions deriving from it will 
be bound as well. As a consequence, the understanding of the theoretical findings of this 
research, as well as of its suggestions, will have to be framed and understood within the 
context of these limitations. 
Summary of the Chapters 
Chapter 2 will provide a review of the literature in the three main theoretical areas 
on which this dissertation is built upon, namely: aid effectiveness; theories of social, 
economic, and political change; and, wealth and endowment economics, including 
theories of economic growth and development. 
This chapter will also provide background on the gravity of the problem 
addressed by aid, and the history of aid in the context of economic growth theory. Special 
attention will be given to the debates that have shaped aid into what it is today, as well as 
to the ways in which these debates have determined its conception, design, delivery, and 
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evaluation at different points in time, particularly in the context of the evolution of the 
broader relationships between aid-giving and aid-receiving countries. In addition, this 
chapter will explore historically the various ways in which the theorization of aid has 
shaped its delivery, as well as the ways in which this delivery has been aimed at 
impacting the “ingredients” of economic growth and development, and the process 
through which economic growth and development takes place. The importance of 
economic-growth theories, development planning, and national income accounting as 
Trojan horses that helped institutionalized a certain idea and praxis of aid will also be 
showcased. 
Finally, the chapter will provide an epistemological and ontological framework 
based on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, which is used to approach the analysis 
of the issue of aid (in)effectiveness, as well as its potential solution. 
Overall, this chapter will provide a comprehensive reference point from which a 
conceptual framework underpinning the process of wealth management, as well as the 
idea of concerted wealth management, can be built. 
In Chapter 3, an alternative conceptual framework—concerted wealth 
management—will be elaborated. As a starting point, it will begin with the 
conceptualization of wealth management as a comprehensive process of social, 
economic, and political change, that leads to optimal value extraction and allocation, and 
most definitively to the achievement and sustainability of wellbeing for the majority of 
people. As an alternative to traditional economic growth theories and the development 
planning techniques and national income accounts on which aid praxis relies, the 
conceptual framework of wealth management will also include a conceptualization of 
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alternative development planning techniques that could be used as a Trojan horse to 
create a new paradigm of aid. 
The chapter will also explore a more encompassing and detailed definition of 
economic factors, or “ingredients”: the assets that compose a country’s wealth—its 
balance sheet. The nature of each type of asset will be explored in terms of their origins, 
as well as in terms of their characteristics with regards to both space and time 
dimensions. The dynamics behind their formation, use, and degradation will also be 
explored. The concept of a critical-path of development that frames realistic timelines 
based on the nature and characteristics of each one of the reviewed types of assets will be 
introduced. With this knowledge in hand, the chapter will then explore the ways in which 
all of these different kinds of wealth interact. The impact of inter-country flows in these 
various types of wealth will be discussed, as well as the potential implications these may 
have in terms of symmetry or asymmetry of the exchanges, and, therefore, in terms of 
wealth management and development. 
Using this conceptual framework, the chapter will also theorize about the options 
for national and international development policy, as well as concerted wealth 
management, that can be used to influence the ways in which inter-country flows and 
wealth management take place. 
Chapter 4 will proceed with the formalization of the conceptual framework and, 
when feasible, present some limited empirical evidence to partially substantiate the 
resulting model. The objective of this validation process will be to ensure that the model 
can more closely represent and explain reality. Particular care will be taken in 
considering the shortcomings of existing national income accounts in reflecting use and 
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exchange values of certain intangibles and public goods, as well as the fact that they do 
not separate, or even include, some of the types of wealth and exchanges that will be 
considered in previous chapters. The analysis of an alternative model that goes beyond 
the data reported through existing national accounts cannot, by definition, be empirically 
tested with the data available. 
Chapter 5 will finally turn to the role of concerted wealth management by 
situating it first, in the broader context of the different exchanges that take place between 
countries, and second, in the context of a country’s process towards the strategic 
optimization of its wealth: wealth management. Concerted wealth management, in this 
view, could play the role of reducing or eliminating existing imbalances in inter-country 
flows, or of contributing to a country’s wealth management process. A typology of 
mechanisms through which concerted wealth management could be delivered will be 
formulated based on the nature of inter-country flows, the nature of the types of wealth, 
and the nature of the process to manage a country’s wealth. Finally, starting from this 
proposed typology, the chapter will explore possible types of architectures and 
mechanisms that could improve the effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of 
different development actions proposed under the new paradigm of concerted wealth 
management (i.e., its praxis). Given the political complexities that usually surround the 
implementation of alternative models like the ones that will be proposed, this and the 
following chapter will also include analysis from a political science perspective, of the 
options and paths that might be available to influencing such implementation, and the 
potential success that a proposed new Trojan horse could have—a Trojan horse that will 
serve to replace the more traditional views of economic growth and development 
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planning introduced by the old one. 
Finally, Chapter 5 will also proceed to look at the existing taxonomy and 
architecture of aid and compare these against the proposed typology and architecture for 
concerted wealth management. This comparison will be grounded not only in economic 
theory but political science as well. The economic model constructed in previous chapters 
will help in theorizing about this comparison. The overall objective of the chapter will be 
to analyze how the new paradigm proposed addresses the widely-documented 
shortcomings of the status quo. The aim of this analysis is to obtain a further refined 
typology and architecture that better addresses any gaps between the old and new 
paradigms that had not yet been integrated into the proposed alternative.  
Chapter 6 will present a summary of the new paradigm and will provide an 
assessment of how well it responds to the set of requirements that were defined in 
Chapters 1 to 3. It will also propose some directions for future research. 
An Epilogue will present a brief discussion on a political strategy and the policy 
options to pursue its implementation plus discuss from a more practical perspective the 
tangible conclusions emanating from from this dissertation and the ways in which these 
can shape the praxis of concerted wealth management.  
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Chapter 2  
The Current State of Aid 
 
Chapter Summary 
There are still billions of people whose many needs, not even the basic ones, are 
yet to be fulfilled, and whose capabilities and freedom to confront the harshness of life 
are considerably lower than their human potential. There is no doubt about the existence 
of this challenge and the burden it imposes on the human race. Ultimately, what we do 
about it is a profoundly practical moral issue. 
The limitations from which the conceptualization and implementation of aid have 
suffered have made it into a flawed project, as its history and the mix of inconclusive 
evidence show. These limitations were almost instantaneously recognized after aid’s 
formal inception following World War II. They have been documented and debated ever 
since with little progress to show. Aid’s conception and praxis are narrow, too focused on 
the endogenous aspects of development, and too limited by the language of economic 
growth theory, and the tools of development planning and national income accounting on 
which it relies. Yet, these limitations are usually given less attention than preoccupations 
about its volume, allocation, and delivery. 
Given that aid’s conceptualization and praxis relies so heavily in the received 
understanding of economic growth and its tools, breaking the vicious circle in which the 
debate about its effectiveness has been enmeshed requires an alternative epistemological 
and ontological framework from which to reframe the debate and consider alternative 
solutions. Continuing the same line of argumentation and adding more volumes to the 
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already copious literature of the last 60 years or so, has proven ineffective. 
Wittgenstein’s strictly practical approach can provide such a required frame of 
reference. His method aiming at dissolving apparent from real problems through the 
questioning of their epistemological and ontological basis, can help separate those aspects 
of development about which aid could actually say and do something, from those about 
which it should remain silent and passive. Specifically, Wittgenstein’s ideas related to 
knowledge and explanation, words and meaning, and rules and causal change, offer a 
credible and useful link to the existing literature about the role of ideas in influencing 
social, economic, and political change. Ideas are apprehensions, and apprehending 
requires the above mentioned three categories: an idea reflects knowledge that can 
potentially serve to explain something; an idea is usually captured by words and their 
meanings; and an idea is frequently geared to action (its validity and potential is realized 
through practice). Practice is usually framed by rules, either endogenously implied as part 
of the formulation of the idea, or exogenously defined by the context in which the idea 
comes into place and is put into practice. 
Among other advantages, using a Wittgensteinian approach can lead to 
understanding the futility of the technocratic/hydraulic/clinical approach behind many of 
the interventions from the aid enterprise. Likewise, it can lead to debunking the rationale 
on the basis of which aid has aimed at spreading knowledge and best practice, including 
the unrealistic timeframes envisioned for their internalization that ignore the existence of 
critical-paths that cannot be short-circuited beyond a certain extent. It also provides 
support to the assessment that aid’s praxis towards ownership, coordination, and 
participation tend to be more rhetorical than practical, and hence ineffective. Finally, it 
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also allows us to assess the consequences resulting from the distance between theory and 
praxis embedded in the aid enterprise and how its instability, as reflected by its 
fragmentation, duplication, and unpredictability, leads to unstable and unproductive 
“language-games” that have a significant impact on its effectiveness. Ultimately, a 
Wittgensteinian analysis of aid leads to a better understanding of the role that the ideas, 
and the words and meanings behind them have played in shaping and limiting it. It 
provides as well an avenue to think about non-traditional ways to shift the debate, and 
hopefully, address the ineffectiveness of aid through alternative and more effective 
avenues. In essence, a Wittgensteinian approach allows for drawing boundaries between 
what should and should not be the subject of aid praxis. 
The neoclassical understanding of economic growth, and the development 
planning and national income accounting approaches that emerged from it, all worked 
together as a Trojan horse that impregnated the entire aid enterprise to its very core, 
particularly its praxis. In between ideological battles, macro rhetoric, and overall 
conflicting motives, the individuals who were faced directly with the challenges 
confronted by aid, resourced to developing a set of practical skills that allowed them to 
navigate their own limited world. They did this mostly rhetorically, while relying on a 
limited and many times flawed theoretical construct that was vetted by such a macro 
world. Macro aid decisions made by politicians were indeed key in setting the limits and 
overall framework on which aid was implemented. Nevertheless, those macro decisions 
said little about implementation and the very praxis of aid. Just like Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy about rules and routines argues, it was not the politicians who determined 
what happened on the ground, it was the aid workers who, taking general guidance from 
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politicians, construed this guidance within the frameworks they had, and came up with 
interpretations and routines that shaped aid praxis. Economic growth theory and the tools 
of development planning and national income accounting became the language of aid 
and, as such, set the boundaries for its world. 
It is argued, then, that the problematic of aid (in)effectiveness that continues being 
discussed is not really the cause, but the effect of an ineffectiveness that is embedded in 
its conception and in the ways in which this conception has permeated its praxis. 
Changing such flawed conception is required to break the vicious circle in which aid and 
the debate about its (in)effectiveness, has remained enmeshed over the last 60 years. 
Under the current circumstances, this might only be possible through the interjection of 
another Trojan horse: a change of language that includes a new conceptualization of 
economic growth, development planning, and new national income accounts. 
The Severity of the Challenge 
Over the last few years, the human race has made important strides in addressing 
suffering, death, and constrained possibilities for some: the number of children who die 
before the age of five has been reduced by six million since 1990; measles vaccinations 
have prevented more than fifteen million deaths since 2000; maternal mortality is now 50 
percent lower than that it was in 1990; between 2000 and 2015, more than six million 
deaths from malaria have been prevented; about thirty-seven million lives have been 
saved because of efforts to prevent, diagnose, and treat tuberculosis; since 1990, 2.6 
billion people have improved access to drinking water sources (United Nations, 2016). 
Yet, while progress has been made, enormous challenges remain: there are 836 
million people living in what has been defined as “extreme poverty” while 2.2 billion live 
42 
below the US$2 a day poverty line; one billion, it is estimated, go to sleep feeling hungry 
every night, while another one billion are undernourished; in contrast, about 2 billion 
people are overweight or obese, and about US$1 trillion worth of food is wasted every 
year—food that could feed all of the two billion people that need it. Maternal mortality in 
developing countries is about 14 times higher than that in developed countries, and 
women in rural areas are three times more likely to die giving birth than those living in 
urban centres; 3.1 million children below the age of five die each year due to poor 
nutrition, along with another 3 million who die from other preventable causes; one in 
every three children who live in developing countries suffer stunted growth and face 
limited opportunities because of it; about 57 million children do not attend school, while 
about 103 million young people do not have basic literacy skills; 1.4 billion people lack 
access to electricity; 800 million people do not have access to water; 2.5 billion people do 
not have access to toilets or other basic sanitation services; 828 million people live in 
slums; the emission of carbon dioxide has increased exponentially by 50 percent since 
1990; and developing countries lose about US$1.26 trillion per year due to corruption, 
bribery, theft, and tax evasion (United Nations, 2016). 
These are just some of the figures underlying the Sustainable Development Goals 
(United Nations General Assembly, 2015).  
While both this new attempt, and its predecessor, the Millennium Development 
Goals, have been instrumental in improving awareness about the scale of the issues faced, 
the variables that can be used to measure progress made, and the necessity to focus aid 
and development efforts on the most pressing needs, these attempts have not necessarily 
improved awareness about the complexity that lies behind efforts to make progress 
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towards any of these goals. 
For example, while the challenges embedded in the Sustainable Development 
Goals are portrayed as common global objectives, it is nevertheless made very clear that 
it is an individual task of each country to address them, even if some international help is 
provided. This means that, ultimately, these challenges are seen and portrayed as 
endogenously originated (Dasandi, 2014), with the role of the global context being hardly 
acknowledged. At most, the idea that the traditional transfer of resources in the shape of 
aid, as well as the partnerships that underlie it, is reaffirmed in just one of the seventeen 
goals (United Nations General Assembly, 2015). Yet, the whole framework contributes 
very little to increasing awareness about the idea that some of the challenges faced are 
products of international arrangements, structures, and the interactions they frame; and, 
therefore, that addressing them might require a much more comprehensive and 
unconventional sort of international coordination, than that which is currently taking 
place. Perhaps even more importantly, it does very little to increase awareness about how 
even if countries do all they can, there might be goals for which, without a change in 
these international arrangements, structures, and interactions, the progress they can make 
is only minimal. 
Likewise, the development goals framework has not been particularly good at 
increasing awareness about the relative size of current efforts to deal with the challenges 
faced, vis-à-vis the size of these challenges themselves; nor about the inequalities that 
exist among countries and within countries, as well as between present and future 
generations.  
As a consequence, it is unclear whether the general public understands that while 
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in the longer-run, everyone could potentially be better-off, in the short-run, those who 
have more, be it individuals or countries, might need to make a bigger effort, if progress 
is to be made more quickly, or if they are not to penalize future generations. This lack of 
awareness is particularly evident when one considers the attitudes of developed 
countries’ constituencies and politicians towards their tax contributions being used to 
support those living in other nations, or their jobs being “taken by” foreigners or 
immigrants, or their countries receiving refugees (May, 1989; Mosley, 1987; Riddell, 
1987). 
Ultimately, suffering, avoidable death, and hampered possibilities, or what could 
be called poverty, does not solely have immediate implications for those who experience 
it directly: these implications are carried forward in time by them and their descendants—
as much as they are by the societies they belong to. Many times these cannot be fully 
overcome—at least not after only one or two generations. Hence, the velocity with which 
progress in eradicating them takes place can be as important, or even more important, 
than the absolute amount of progress made (for example, as will be discussed later, 
ensuring that children are appropriately fed over their first two years of life, might be 
considerably more effective than other sorts of development interventions which—even 
when more substantial and over longer periods of time—involve children who are older 
than two years and already carry in them the lifetime consequences of malnourishment). 
This urgency is yet another ‘hidden’ aspect that the development goals framework fails to 
make evident. 
Nevertheless, and regardless of these blind spots that are recurrent in the rhetoric 
of international development efforts, one thing is clear: the human race is still facing a 
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huge challenge it cannot escape addressing. Either it will face it proactively, or the 
challenge’s presence will become so overwhelmingly strong that it would be impossible 
to no longer face its daring consequences—in the many unavoidable and potentially even 
more harmful ways in which they will be expressed (i.e., famine, disease, political 
instability, social division). 
The Complexity of the Challenge 
The challenges mentioned above are but a few of those behind the complexity 
involved in attempting to improve the wellbeing of the majority of human beings. There 
are many other challenges that add to this complexity, but two, in particular, play a 
crucial role. 
First, initial unequal endowments and initial conditions created by historical 
events (e.g., colonization, slavery, power distribution, war, technocratic ideas, and 
ideologies) tend to drag in time, with entrenched and lasting consequences. They partly 
contribute in explaining present differences among countries (there is considerable 
literature discussing the role of unequal endowments and initial conditions on 
development, among them: Costa, 2011; Galor, 2011; Helpman, 2004; Hubbard, 2009; 
Landes, 1998; Nayyar, 2013; Spence, 2011; Tinbergen, 1962; see also the literature by 
Acemoglu et al.: Acemoglu, Egorov, & Sonin, 2011; Acemoglu, Gallego, & Robinson, 
2014; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). 
Second, the human condition or human nature and how it shapes human 
interaction in its social, economic, and political spheres, are difficult to assess, 
understand, and influence, yet omnipresent (Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; D. Cohen, 
2012; Hubbard, 2009; Landes, 1998; Modelski & Thompson, 1996; Spence, 2011). 
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Among the complexities that make human interaction so difficult to assess, understand, 
and influence, there are: collective-action problems (Ostrom, Gibson, Shivakumar, & 
Andersson, 2002); various degrees and spheres in which elites exert influence (Amsden, 
DiCaprio, & Robinson, 2012); difficulties in establishing convincing theoretical proof to 
support cause-effect relationships (Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; Cartwright, 1999; 
Crewe & Axelby, 2012; P. R. Krugman, 1992, 1996, 1998; Riddell, 1987); intricacy of 
social dynamics, and formal and informal structures that underpin them (Campbell, 2004; 
Helpman, 2004; P. R. Krugman, 1992, 1998; Unsworth, 2009); path-dependence which 
seems to severely constrain prospects for change (Campbell, 2004; Carothers & de 
Gramont, 2013; Crewe & Axelby, 2012; Helpman, 2004); and, divergence between 
micro-motives and macro behaviours of societies and their members (J. Diamond, 2006; 
Schelling, 1978; Surowiecki, 2004). 
It is evident that the analysis of the complexities mentioned above, as well as the 
resulting understanding and codification of potential solutions aimed at achieving 
development goals, are also constrained by the epistemological and ontological 
limitations of the social, economic, and political sciences (Cartwright, 1999; Cartwright 
& Hardie, 2012). Some of the most relevant being: their extremely limited capacity to 
predict, and even when possible, to usually do so only for the very short-term (Popper, 
1972; Ryan, 1973); the limited set of generalizations they have been able to accumulate 
and that cannot be subjected to the kinds of rigorous testing that those from the natural 
sciences undergo (Ayer, 1964; Popper, 1972); and the many areas of knowledge for 
which very little is still known (Ayer, 1964; Campbell, 2004; Popper, 1972; Ryan, 1973). 
This is perhaps why the ideas of social welfare, aid, and international coordination 
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have, and continue to be, so passionately and widely debated—as well as ignored or 
rhetorically discussed—even when, as clearly shown by the figures supporting the 
Sustainable Development Goals provided at the beginning of this chapter, there is no 
doubt that a real, sizable, and extremely severe challenge exists and needs to be 
addressed.  
Given the lack of uncontestable evidence for or against its benefits and overall 
effectiveness, local and international welfare considerations have been supported or 
rejected largely on the basis of ideological views or, in the best case scenario, by deeply 
entrenched axiomatic theoretical constructs, particularly those of mainstream economic 
science, that provide some degree of rhetorical certainty (Athreya, 2013; Bourguignon, 
2004; Browne, 1999; Independent Commission on International Development Issues, 
1980; Jones, 1999; Nasar, 2011; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013). Historically, the problem has not 
usually been the recognition of the challenges of development directly, but the agreement 
on how to address them. 
The Origins of Aid as International Welfare 
The attempts and efforts of nations helping others in the form of international 
welfare, development assistance, aid, or whatever other forms and names it has taken, 
have also been affected by their own initial conditions, as well as from the path-
dependence that seems to affect every human enterprise (Campbell, 2004; Lumsdaine, 
1993). (Throughout this dissertation “aid” is used generically to refer to all of these past 
and existing forms of international transfer of funds between countries aimed at helping 
the recipient in dealing with problems of human wellbeing.) 
Montgomery (1967) and many others provide a historical account of how there is 
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no single unique event or proclamation behind aid, nor a grand design. A series of 
experimental responses to practical challenges built into each other from two different 
traditions to, later on, shape aid into what it is today. These traditions were: (a) an 
unsystematic humanitarian oriented tradition, and (b) a more systematic and 
commercially oriented technical assistance tradition—reinforced after World War II by 
the success of the Marshall Plan (Curti, 1954; Hogan, 1987; Hubbard, 2009; 
Montgomery, 1967; Picard & Buss, 2009; Riddell, 1987). Respectively, these came to be 
known as “humanitarian assistance” and “development assistance.” 
Having started simultaneously, among others, as: (a) a potential source of 
commercial and trade opportunities; (b) the source of one-sided expert and technical 
advice from one nation to another; and as (c) a one-sided morally motivated humanitarian 
enterprise with those in need, a mix of conflicting motives were embedded into the fabric 
of aid. To these origins, the growing importance of the nation state in the new 
international order created after World War II, added an overall diplomatic and geo-
strategic motivation behind many aid efforts (Black, 1960; Browne, 1999; Lumsdaine, 
1993; May, 1989; Montgomery, 1967; Neumayer, 2003; Pearson & Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1970; Picard & Buss, 2009; Thompson, 1992). None of these often conflicting 
motives can individually explain decisions about aid; as Piccard & Buss (2009, p. 5) 
clearly express it: “Different elements weigh in differently at different times.” 
The result, after the Bretton Woods agreement, the success of the Marshall Plan, 
and President Truman’s Point Four, was an increasingly consolidated and systematic aid 
enterprise (Montgomery, 1967; Picard & Buss, 2009; Riddell, 1987). Nevertheless, 
neither this consolidation nor the systematisation behind it removed the underlying 
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conflicts carried by its complex origins. 
Moreover, to make matters even more complex, supporting these initial aid efforts 
was a narrow and weak theoretical foundation. This foundation was, for the most part, 
built on the economic growth theory—particularly on the Harrod-Domar model 
(Alacevich, 2009; H. A. Arndt, 1984, 1987; Domar, 1957) and the pre-eminence it gave 
to physical capital as the main responsible factor for generating growth (H. A. Arndt, 
1984, 1987; Helpman, 2004; Mikesell, 1968). Additionally, this foundation put undue 
emphasis on the endogenous aspects of economic development, and, as a consequence, 
started a tradition of focusing on the “ingredients” responsible for economic and human 
development, rather than on the “recipe” through which they could be mixed or the 
international context in which the mixing took place (H. A. Arndt, 1984, 1987; 
Commission on Growth and Development, 2008; Dasandi, 2014; Helpman, 2004; 
Spence, 2011). 
The DNA of Aid 
This combination of historical, theoretical, and political forces and traditions 
resulted in an inherently flawed conception and architecture of aid. Specifically, the 
humanitarian and technical assistance traditions helped foster confusion about the 
motives behind aid (e.g., moral or commercial), while a weak theoretical foundation, 
which put too much emphasis on the endogenous aspects of development and the 
ingredients required, rather than on the recipe behind it or the context, gave excessive 
room for the political process and ideological forces to, chaotically and simultaneously, 
build and breakdown aid’s efforts, or, many times, simply leave aid to face its own 
destiny (Lumsdaine, 1993). As Montgomery (1967) has elegantly put it:  
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International development aid suffers from an irresistible, popular tendency to 
pull the plant up to see if its roots are growing. This chronic rootlessness increases 
its vulnerability to political accident. Understandably, the result changes in 
international development aid operations have not always been improvements. (p. 
87) 
Perhaps even more important, although less discussed, is how these origins meant that aid 
was, and continues to be conceived and treated, in practice, and through the underlying 
assumption behind the rhetoric surrounding it, as if it was sizeable enough to be relevant 
both in relation to the problems it is trying to resolve, as well as in connection with the 
other resources made internally or externally available to these countries (Bourguignon et 
al., 2012; Browne, 1999, 2006; Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; Cassen et al., 1982). As 
illustrated at the beginning of this chapter, this is consistent with the rhetoric that, many 
years later, is still behind the most recent development goals framework. 
The result of these traditional approach was, and continues to be, that the debates 
about aid usually start from the unspoken but clearly underlying assumption that it, most 
definitively, can make a difference (as the rhetoric of aid portraits) regardless of: (a) the 
size of the problem being addressed; (b) its relative contribution vis-à-vis the other 
resources available to address the problem, and, more disingenuously; (c) the 
international contextual factors that feed into the problem; and, therefore; (d) irrespective 
of whether these factors are addressed as part of the solution or not (Cassen, 1986; 
Deaton, 2013; Easterly, 2006; Mikesell, 1968; Norrlof, 2014; Picciotto, 2009; Picciotto & 
Weaving, 2004; Riddell, 1987; Spence, 2011; Stiglitz & United Nations General 
Assembly, 2010; White, 1974). This latter oversight was based on another working, but 
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hidden-under-the-rhetoric complementary assumption mentioned earlier: that the 
problems of development are, for the most part, endogenous by nature, and not created or 
deepened by exogenous conditions and factors (Dasandi, 2014).  
These realities discussed above and the assumptions they helped establishing 
within the praxis of aid, do not reflect the available knowledge, theoretical understanding 
of the issues, or empirical evidence. Yet, in spite of these shortcomings having been 
routinely recognized for almost as long as aid has existed (Black, 1960; Independent 
Commission on International Development Issues, 1980; Pearson & Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1970; Singer, 1984; Jan Tinbergen, 1962), they continue to be deeply 
embedded in the rhetoric, and, more importantly, in the daily praxis of aid (Browne, 
1999, 2006; Crewe & Axelby, 2012). 
To illustrate the point with just three examples, among many more that could be 
mentioned: first, Berthélemy, Beuran, & Maurel (2009) find that for countries with GDP 
per capita below US$7,300, the tightening of migration policies in the developed world 
could be considered to be equivalent to a reduction of 24 percent in their inflow of aid. 
(Coincidentally, the McKinsey Global Institute (2014) shows that over the last 30 years, 
the increase in long-term migrants has been barely in line with population growth 
precisely because of the thight grip kept on migration policies by developed countries.) 
More recently, Minasyan and Nunnenkamp (2016) find evidence of a link between more 
sensible immigration policy and aid effectiveness. Second, Picard & Bus (2009) and 
Picciotto (2009) call attention to the fact that, among others: (a) agricultural subsidies in 
OECD countries have usually exceeded the total amount of aid on a yearly basis by a 
factor of about two; and, (b) developing countries outflows to developed countries, due to 
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intellectual property royalties, are roughly equal to their inflows of aid. Third, Grubb 
(2013, p. 6) explains that, for least developed countries, each increase in the price of oil 
of US$10 per barrel, can bring down their GDP by about 1.5 percent. Energy imports cost 
more than 20 percent of export earnings in 35 countries with a combined population of 
2.5 billion; for another group of 15 countries with a combined population of 200 million, 
energy imports cost about 10 percent of GDP. Meanwhile, production subsidies for fossil 
fuels in the energy sector are estimated at around US$100 billion a year (close to the 
amount of yearly aid). This amount does not even include additional indirect subsidies 
that are difficult to track. 
Furthermore, the inter-country flows of people, services, finance, goods, data, and 
communications dwarf any level of aid provided. These global flows contribute to GDP 
growth an estimated US$250 to US$450 billion each year—this is, about two to three 
times the yearly flows of aid (flows which, in any case, do not necessarily result in the 
fostering of economic growth) (McKinsey Global Institute., 2014). In fact, the McKinsey 
Global Institute (2014) estimates that global flows are responsible for 15 to 25 percent of 
the world GDP’s yearly growth. Furthermore, it is estimated that countries that are most 
connected to the international network of global flows, mostly developed countries, 
benefit about 40 percent more than those that are not, mostly developing countries. When 
in the context of the previous fact, it is considered that South-South trade represents 
almost two-thirds of developing countries’ share of trade in the world economy (a total of 
about US$4.4 trillion), it is difficult denying that any claim that South countries receive 
unequal benefits from trade because they trade with North countries, might need further 
revision. There seem to be deeper systemic factors in the international framework for 
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trade that contribute to these inequalities regardless of whether South countries trade with 
North or South countries. 
Over the last few years, aid has averaged US$150 billion. Alternatively, in 2012, 
flows of goods were US$17.8 trillion, flows of services were US$4.2 trillion, and 
financial flows were US$3.9 trillion, for a total of about US$26 trillion (the respective 
shares of these amounts for developing countries were 39, 32, and 37 percent) (McKinsey 
Global Institute., 2014)—roughly 170 times the size of aid (or 65 times against the share 
of developing countries). Global flows related to international telecommunication 
revenues, business travelers, and intellectual property royalties and patents accounted for 
US$ 12.6 trillion in 2012 (about 100 times the size of aid). FDI amounted to US$1.4 
trillion in 2012 (about half going into developing countries and about 4 times the flows of 
aid they receive), while remittances reached US$ 523 billion (almost 3.5 times the flow 
of aid). Interestingly, already in the early 1960s, Tinbergen (1962) had suggested that the 
international community could impose balancing rules between the quantity of aid flows 
and the costs imposed by exchange controls and trade restrictions. 
There are wage differentials for low-skilled workers of up to 1,000 times between 
different regions of the world that are not matched by differences in prices of goods and 
services. This situation increases the incentives for long-term migration, while the 
barriers to doing so continue to be challenging for those who want to migrate (McKinsey 
Global Institute., 2014).  
In the same report, McKinsey Global Institute (2014) not only estimates the total 
amount of global flows could grow up to US$54 trillion or even US$85 trillion by 2025, 
but also that the volatility of these flows can spoil some of the positive effects this 
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increase could have on GDP growth (Lomborg, 2013b). Wickstead (2015) has recently 
illustrated the relative position of aid against all these other flows in a clear way (Goldin, 
2016 makes a similar argument): 
Overall, in 1990 total gross ODA amounted to just over $113 billion, or about a 
quarter of the total international resource flows to developing countries (which 
amounted to around $450 billion). And those international resources flows 
accounted for well over half of total domestic developing country government 
expenditure of nearly $777 billion. By 2012, total gross ODA had increased by 
nearly 25 per cent to around $140 billion, but total international resources had 
more than quadrupled to nearly $2 trillion, and domestic Government expenditure 
in developing countries had increased eightfold in the same period to over $6.4 
trillion. So overall, aid mattered much less in 2012 than it did in 1990. (p. 76-77) 
When compared to the size of the issues which aid is supposed to contribute to solving, 
the distance is more than significant: the time spent by people collecting water was 
estimated to be worth about US$60 billion in 1990, and, despite the progress made and 
expected, it is still estimated that this cost will be around US$45 billion by 2030 (about a 
third of aid flows); similarly, developing countries are projected to lose close to US$6 
trillion by 2050 because of air pollution—about 40 times the size of yearly aid flows 
(Lomborg, 2013a, 2013b). A study by the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2004), 
estimated that the global costs of eliminating child labor over a period of 20 years was 
about US$1,9 trillion, or about US$95 billion per year—which is rather close to the entire 
amount of aid in any given year (amount that is spread among a considerably large 
number of issues besides child labour). 
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Finally, in comparison to the about US$150 billion in yearly aid flows, global 
defense expenditures in 2012 amounted to about US$ 1.5 trillion, roughly ten times more. 
Expenditures in the US alone were in the order of US$600 billion, or about 20 times 
more than the country’s expenditures on aid, and four times global aid flows. (The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013). The US was responsible for US$56 
billion out of the total US$85 billion global arms transfer agreements in 2011 (from this 
overall total, the top ten recipient developing countries received about US$58 billion). 
This is about twice the amount the US allocated to aid (which in itself already included 
an important proportion of military aid). 
These flows of arms, which mostly benefit developed countries, tend to support 
and, many times, enable civil conflicts and war. The evidence suggests (Collier et al., 
2003) that when conflict happens, private wealth flows swiftly out of the country and 
that, on average, after seven years of civil war, per capita income decreases by about 15 
percent, while absolute poverty increases by about 30 percent. Additionally, the same 
study estimated that by the end of a typical war, the cumulative income loss accounts for 
about 60 percent of one year’s GDP. Furthermore, Cairns (1997) suggests that in more 
recent years, the victims of war have tended to be mostly civilians, and that this has 
stickier effects on social, economic, and political development when compared to the 
situation at the beginning of the twentieth century when the majority of the victims were 
soldiers. Finally, among many other impacts created by war and civil conflict fuelled by 
arms trade, is the issue of displaced populations and refugees, which according to the 
UNHCR (2015) amounted to 59.5 million in 2014 (19.5 million refugees, 38.2 million 
internally displaced, and 1.8 million asylum-seekers). 
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In short, aid is not more than a tiny speck in the reality of our world. 
Aid’s Track-Record 
At the outset, the world of aid is characterized among other features, by a high 
degree of fragmentation; suboptimal coordination among fragmented stakeholders; 
divergence in the discourse about its purpose, architecture, and potential impact, as well 
as in how this discourse is actually expressed in practice; decision-making processes that 
reflect conflicting political and technical objectives, as well as asymmetric information 
and unbalanced roles and power among different stakeholders; mounting pressure at 
many levels (subnational, national, supra-national) to demonstrate impact and the 
underlying efficient and effective use of the scarce resources available; and an increasing 
disenchantment, disbelief, and cynicism with regards to its effectiveness. These and other 
obstacles and concerns have been, and continue to be addressed, through stakeholder’s 
high-level meetings on the subject. The Monterrey Consensus (2002), the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), and the 
more recent Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2011), have all 
aimed at improving the current state of affairs by fostering transparency, selectivity, 
specialization, coordination, and ownership, among others. Results have been mixed at 
best, and very slow for sure (Annen & Moers, 2012; Bourguignon et al., 2012; Easterly, 
2007; Easterly & Williamson, 2011; Frot & Santiso, 2011; Gibson, Ostrom, & 
Shivakumar, 2001; Kindornay & Samy, 2012; Nunnenkamp, Öhler, & Thiele, 2013; 
Nunnenkamp & Thiele, 2013; OECD, 2008a; Wood & Betts, 2013)  
This bleak outlook does not seem to improve when taking into account the mixed 
and inconclusive evidence with regards to aid’s relevance and whether it actually 
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contributes towards the purpose(s) it is meant to serve (which, as discussed above, can be 
very different for different people and their own conflicting motives) (Akramov, 2012; 
Boettke, 1994; Bowen, 1998; Browne, 2006; Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; Crewe & 
Axelby, 2012; Lumsdaine, 1993; Mosley, 1987; Riddell, 1987; Schabbel, 2007; 
Whitfield, 2009).  
Scholars have researched aid effectiveness, at both the macro and micro levels, 
without being able to establish a clear link between success or failure at one or the other 
level (Dreher, Eichenauer, & Gehring, 2016). Deaton (2013) and Easterly (Easterly, 
2001, 2006, 2007, 2014), among others (see also Browne, 1999; Mosley, 1987), argue 
that we cannot easily translate micro solutions into macro ones, and that we still do not 
know what specific actions lead towards development. Hence, they argue, positive 
evidence at the micro level cannot be considered to be of relevance at the macro one, nor 
imply that micro-successes will translate into macro-ones. Ultimately, this means that we 
still do not have an understanding of the causal chain between micro-actions and macro-
behaviours and solutions (Schelling, 1978). Nonetheless, others, like Arndt, Jones, & 
Tarp (2010, 2015) or Bowen (1998), claim to have found partial evidence of a micro-
macro link between aid and economic growth. 
At the macro level, much of the literature has focused on its overall impact on 
economic growth as a source of poverty reduction, as well as on its overall impact on 
poverty. Bourguignon et al. (2012) argue in several chapters of this edited volume that 
the evidence concerning aid effectiveness is mixed at best, with more clarity regarding its 
impact at the micro level, but little evidence at the macro level (see also Sagasti, Alcalde, 
& International Development Research Centre, 1999; Schabbel, 2007). Specifically, 
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Boone (1996) claims that aid does not significantly increase investment and growth, and, 
therefore, does not benefit the poor as measured by more comprehensive measures such 
as the Human Development Index. He also finds that aid effectiveness is not dependent 
on the recipient country’s type of governance (i.e., democracy, dictatorship), although 
Burnside and Dollar (2004) find contradictory evidence on the role that quality of state 
governance and institutions have on aid effectiveness. Nunn & Qian (2013) find 
empirical evidence of food aid from the US being correlated to increases in the incidence 
and duration of civil conflicts. However, others like Tarp from UNU-WIDER and several 
of his co-authors (C. Arndt et al., 2010; C. Arndt, Jones, & Tarp, 2014; C. Arndt et al., 
2015; Dalgaard et al., 2004; Mekasha & Tarp, 2013), as well as Bearce & Tirone (2010), 
and Radelet (2006) find evidence of a positive relationship between aid and economic 
growth, although, specifically, Arndt, Jones, & Tarp (2015) conclude that even when 
positive, the magnitude of the effects are moderate, particularly when compared to the 
great expectations that were common in the 1960s and 1970s. In the end, both sides 
present convincing arguments and evidence, making it difficult to come to a conclusive 
position with regards to the macro evidence. 
At the micro level, research on aid effectiveness has focused on issues of volume, 
allocation, and delivery, as well as on the constraints that seem to reduce the overall 
impact of aid. In the edited volume by Bourguignon et al. (2012), some of these elements 
are summarized as: lack of convergence between the interests of donors and those of 
recipients; high delivery costs; incentives to spend aid budgets within a given timeframe, 
as well as according to political preferences in portfolio allocation; and, lack of 
coordination, considerable duplication, and herd behaviour on the part of donors. Kim 
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(2013), the current President of the World Bank, places much more emphasis on the 
science of delivery than on the macro considerations of policy design. In his view, the 
latter is an area for which countries and donors already have a much better handling, 
while with regards to the former, inefficiencies abound whenever aid is delivered. With 
regards to empirical evidence of aid impact at the micro level, Yontcheva & Masud 
(2005) find positive evidence about the relationship between NGOs efforts and 
reductions in infant mortality (NGOs being more effective than bilateral donors). They 
also find a positive effect in reducing illiteracy, although less significantly. Banerjee & 
Duflo (2011) and others (for example, Easterly, 2008) showcase several micro examples 
where scientific approaches have led to quantifiable successes, in areas like: increasing 
civic participation, reducing the incidence of HIV/AIDS, selecting more effective policy 
makers, among many others. These and many other examples in the literature, however, 
fall short in presenting and demonstrating a full causal chain between these micro and 
many times short-term successes, and macro long-term success reflected in political, 
social, and economic change towards development (Deaton, 2010; Deaton & Cartwright, 
2016). 
The lack of conclusive evidence with regards to aid effectiveness has polarized 
academics and politicians, with each group proposing radically different approaches, and 
none becoming robust enough to lead to a radical reform of aid (Engel, 2014). These 
range from substantially increasing aid to conducting comprehensive and concerted big 
interventions, and arguing that difficulties in proving its impact are inherent to the 
complexities of the field (Sachs, 2005); to rejecting the idea of big supply driven aid 
efforts, in favour of a more direct and specific approach towards solving specific 
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problems like malaria, AIDS, and other narrowly defined issues negatively impacting 
development (Deaton, 2013; Easterly, 2006, 2007; Easterly & Williamson, 2011; 
Hubbard, 2009). A more moderate group can also be identified (Howes, 2014), arguing 
either along the lines of Collier (2006, 2007), who proposes that aid should be directed 
towards addressing extreme poverty and conflict-affected and fragile states; or along the 
lines of those who proposed a more scientific approach towards problem solving, 
particularly using experimental methods (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011; Pritchett, Samji, & 
Hammer, 2012; Ramalingam, 2013). The inconclusiveness of this debate, as well as the 
continued polarization resulting from it has, in effect, helped to maintain the current 
status quo. 
Ultimately, this lack of conclusive evidence has resulted in ideologies filling the 
existing knowledge gaps (Crewe & Axelby, 2012; Riddell, 1987). In turn, this has made 
the debate about aid effectiveness even more complicated and inconclusive (the role of 
ideology will be revisited later in the chapter). 
Despite the polarization that exists with regards to how effective aid is, this 
polarization does not exist when it comes to agreeing about the array of issues currently 
plaguing its effectiveness; that is, the why it is or is not effective (the considerable 
number of citations supporting each one of these issues aims at showcasing a rather small 
fraction of the literature that has repeatedly dealt with them throughout the last 60 years 
or so):  
 Distance between rhetoric and praxis (Annen & Moers, 2012; Carothers & 
de Gramont, 2013, pp. 60, 163, 222; Carr, 1998, pp. 56–58; Crewe & 
Axelby, 2012; Easterly & Williamson, 2011; Scott, Mcloughlin, & 
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Marquette, 2012; Weaver, 2008, pp. 27, 29, 40; White, 1974). 
 Lack of transparency, wrong incentives, and corruption (Lomborg, 2013b; 
Pomerantz, 2004; Weaver, 2008; Woods, 2006). 
 Asymmetric power, leading to skewed rules of engagement (Carothers & 
de Gramont, 2013; Carr, 1998; Crewe & Axelby, 2012; Easterly, 2006; 
Eyben, 2007; Millikan & Rostow, 1976; Mosley, 1991; Mosse, 2011; 
OECD, 1981; Ostrom et al., 2002; Picard & Buss, 2009; Picciotto & 
Weaving, 2004; Pritchett, 2002; Ravallion, 2008; Riddell, 1987; Svensson, 
2003; White, 1974; Whitfield, 2009; Woods, 2006).  
 Disconnect between the short-term results expectations of donors and their 
constituencies, and the long-term nature of many of the development 
issues addressed (Barry et al., 2010; Carbone, 2009; Carr, 1998; Crewe & 
Axelby, 2012; Independent Commission on International Development 
Issues, 1980; Koch, 2009; Mosse, 2011; Pearson & Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1970; Picciotto & Weaving, 2004; Pomerantz, 2004). 
 Disproportionality between the resources required to address the problems 
aid tries to solve and the size of the interventions it can fund (Bourguignon 
et al., 2012; Chauvet & Collier, 2004; Independent Commission on 
International Development Issues, 1980; Lomborg, 2013b; Mosley, 1987; 
Picard & Buss, 2009; Picciotto, 2005, 2009; White, 1974). 
 Incompleteness of the aid market—including asymmetries in information 
and power, and uncertainty of supply and demand of resources, among 
others (AbouZahr, Adjei, & Kanchanachitra, 2007; Aspers, 2011; Browne, 
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2006; Easterly, 2007; Greenhill, Prizzon, & Rogerson, 2013; Kanbur, 
Sandler, Morrison, & Overseas Development Council., 1999; 
Montgomery, 1967; Mosley, 1987; OECD, 1981; Pomerantz, 2004; 
Tierney et al., 2011; Weaver, 2008; White, 1974; Wood & Betts, 2013; 
Woods, 2006). 
 A multitude of parallel duplicating structures due to dysfunctionality and 
path-dependence of existing ones (Bourguignon et al., 2012; Browne, 
1999; Eyben, 2007; Gibson et al., 2001; Greenhill et al., 2013; Kindornay 
& Samy, 2012; OECD, 2008a; Weaver, 2008). 
 High transaction costs (Hodler & Dreher, 2013; OECD, 1981, 2008a; 
Schulpen, 2011; Wood & Betts, 2013). 
 Difficulties in measuring (and pricing) opportunity costs and side effects 
resulting from aid (Barry et al., 2010; Carr, 1998; Cassen, 1986; Chauvet 
& Collier, 2004; Kanbur et al., 1999; Mosley, 1987; Mosse, 2011; Nunn & 
Qian, 2013; Riddell, 1987). 
 Lack of conducive innovation dynamics to improve effectiveness—
creative-destruction, that results from a process of failure/success, 
learning, and adjustment—a dynamic highly frowned upon within the 
existing aid architecture (Carr, 1998; Cartwright & Hardie, 2012; Mosley, 
1991; OECD, 2008a; Picciotto & Weaving, 2004; Woods, 2006). 
 Non-encompassing and non-coherent policies (Barry et al., 2010; Brooks, 
2014; Carbone, 2009; Carbonnier, 2012; Grabel, 2007; Picciotto & 
Weaving, 2004). 
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 Bundling of incommensurable issues related to humanitarian and 
development assistance which cannot be bundle due to radically different 
nature and characteristics (Crewe & Axelby, 2012; Easterly, 2007; High-
Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, 2016; Kanbur et al., 1999; 
Montgomery, 1967; Picciotto & Weaving, 2004; Stirk, 2014). 
 Coordination issues, including among others: fragmentation, duplication 
(as well as donor proliferation), unpredictability, fragility, incoherence, 
allocation inefficiencies, reduced additionality, unclear accountability, 
herding, inappropriate timing—by delivering aid in a pro-cyclical rather 
than counter-cyclical fashion (Black, 1960; Bourguignon et al., 2012; 
Bulíř & Hamann, 2008; Carbonnier, 2012; Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; 
Collier & Dollar, 2002; Commission on Global Governance, 1995; Frot & 
Santiso, 2011; Griesgraber & Gunter, 1996; Hausmann, Hidalgo, & 
Coscia, 2013; Hodler & Dreher, 2013; Independent Commission on 
International Development Issues, 1980; Kim, 2013; Kindornay & Samy, 
2012; Koch, Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2009; Lumsdaine, 1993; 
Metzger, Nunnenkamp, & Mahmoud, 2010; Mikesell, 1968; Mosley, 
1987; Mosse, 2011; Neumayer, 2003; Nunnenkamp et al., 2013; OECD, 
1981, 2008a; Jan Tinbergen, 1962; Wood & Betts, 2013). 
 Limited absorptive capacity (Burnside & Dollar, 2004; Carothers & de 
Gramont, 2013; Collier, 2012; Feeny & de Silva, 2012; Independent 
Commission on International Development Issues, 1980; Millikan & 
Rostow, 1976; Montgomery, 1967; Jan Tinbergen, 1962). 
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 A technocratic approach towards problem solving which assumes that the 
problems of development and poverty are linear and well known in their 
causal components, and therefore, their solutions known as well, and their 
implementation straightforward (Campbell, 2004; Carothers & de 
Gramont, 2013; Deaton, 2013; Easterly, 2014; Mosley, 1987; Mosse, 
2011; J. Sachs, 2005; Weaver, 2008; White, 1974; Whitfield, 2009; 
Woods, 2006).  
If these issues above have something in common it is that they are narrowly 
related to decisions about the volume, allocation, and delivery of aid. They often ignore, 
as well, the effects of the frequently implicit assumptions in aid’s praxis and the rhetoric 
surrounding it, suggesting that: (a) aid can make a difference regardless of its relative size 
vis-à-vis the challenges faced; (b) aid can be successful because we know what the 
solutions to these challenges are—and, therefore, we can solve them (the technocratic 
approach); and (c) aid can be effective even when not particularly addressing the 
international context in which aid recipients operate (because it is believed, or at least the 
aid enterprise acts as if, that the causes of the challenges are mostly endogenous to the 
countries being aided, rather than exogenous) (Dasandi, 2014). Nevertheless, the issues 
of volume, allocation, and delivery, and not the implications of the assumptions discussed 
above, are the ones that figure prominently in the Monterrey, Paris, Accra, and Busan 
declarations (OECD, 2008b, 2011; UNDESA, 2003)—declarations that have not been 
particularly effective (Chandy & Kharas, 2011; Easterly & Williamson, 2011; OECD, 
2008a; Whitfield, 2009). The lack of effectiveness of these declarations continues to taint 
as rhetorical some of the discourses and efforts to improve aid architecture and delivery 
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(Eyben, 2007), with some scholars even suggesting that improvements of coordination 
among donors are unattainable given the incentive of donors to maximize their relative 
achievements, rather than collective ones (Annen & Moers, 2012).  
Donor proliferation has only made all of these issues even more relevant and 
urgent. In 2008, there were already 23 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
members with a varying number of agencies, 47 UN agencies, 12 multilateral 
organizations (including the World Bank, IMF, European Commission, regional 
development banks, etc.), and about 31 international non-governmental organizations 
(INGOs)—without even counting the almost inordinate number of national or smaller 
international NGOs. Some of these INGOs are so big that their budgets exceed the aid 
budgets of countries like Italy, Greece, and Finland. Furthermore, additional bilateral 
donors like China have extended their reach both independently and as part of other 
multilateral initiatives along with Russia, India, and Brazil (OECD, 2008a, 2014, 2016). 
The resulting complexity of the donor landscape, and the fact that new donors do not 
formally adhere to any of the existing instruments and efforts to improve aid 
effectiveness, makes it even more difficult to achieve the objectives set forth by those 
instruments (Greenhill et al., 2013; OECD, 2008a; Overton, Murray, & McGregor, 2013). 
Wood and Betts (2013) estimate that the total global flows of aid that are not yet covered 
by the Paris Declaration might be just shy of US$30 billion—this is, about a quarter of 
those flows coming from established DAC members. 
The Never-Ending Circle of Aid (In)Effectiveness 
The literature references backing many of the known issues hampering the 
effectiveness of aid have something in common that is hard to obviate: we have 
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denounced, researched, analyzed, and offered solutions to these issues since almost as 
early as aid was born as a systematic international effort in the late 1940s (see for 
example, Godfrey, 2014; Hubbard, 2009; Independent Commission on International 
Development Issues, 1980; OECD, 1981; White, 1974; Whitfield, 2009). This empirical 
and theoretical analysis has had marginal impact in transforming aid towards improved 
effectiveness, or at least radically reducing the incidence of some of the recurring issues 
about its volume, allocation, and delivery pointed out in the previous section.  
For example, at the end of the 1950s, Millikan and Rostow (1976) suggested the 
need to avoid conditionality and the tying of aid, and clearly argued against the existing 
rhetoric of short-term solutions to long-term problems. In 1970, the Pearson Commission 
already pointed out to the same issues of tying aid, coordination, fragmentation, lack of 
transparency, and red tape that, more than thirty years later, were also captured in the 
Paris Declaration (OECD, 2008b; Pearson & Council on Foreign Relations, 1970). In 
1981, the OECD (1981) called attention to the high transaction costs; power and 
information asymmetries between donors and recipients, as well as diverging motives and 
incentives between them and their respective stakeholders; duplication; and lack of 
coordination, among others. In the 1960s, Tinbergen (1962) and Hirschman, among 
others (Carothers & de Gramont, 2013), pointed out to the futility of ignoring the politics 
behind aid, as well as the importance of ownership and inclusion by its recipients. Both 
the Independent Commission on International Development issues (1980) and the 
Commission on Global Governance (1995) also summarized many of the issues included 
in previous sections, and not only showed widespread acknowledgement and agreement 
about their existence and role, but vehemently proposed specific changes to address them. 
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Moreover, these reports themselves, also referenced much earlier attempts within aid 
institutions to address the same issues, going as far back as 1969. At the beginning of the 
1970s, White (1974) already denounced the ineffectiveness of aid, due to passing and 
many times contradictory fashions, that tended to flourish due to the skewed incentive 
systems and asymmetries embedded in the aid architecture. Constantly tried and 
discarded, these fashions created inefficiencies along the way, as well as trumped aid 
effectiveness. Even then, White already questioned the slow progress made by the aid 
community on issues that seemed to him, in 1974, long known and denounced. Finally, 
looking at the chronology of the aid enterprise put together by Fuhrer (1994), it is clear 
that starting as early as 1961, and not later than the early 1990s, most, if not all of the 
issues that are still listed as responsible for undermining aid effectiveness, had been long 
known, analyzed, and familiar proposals to address them had been suggested. 
Ultimately, the reaction to all the criticisms and the slow pace of improvement has 
resulted in an increased emphasis on measuring, monitoring, and evaluation of the 
success or effectiveness of aid interventions. This has been furthered by the adoption of 
randomized control trials in development, which, despite also creating controversy with 
regards to their applicability, soundness, and implications (see for example, Cartwright, 
2007; Cartwright Munro, Eileen, 2010; Deaton, 2010; Deaton & Cartwright, 2016), have 
become a potentially hopeful source of knowledge on what works and what does not, at 
least for some micro-level development issues (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011; Bourguignon et 
al., 2012; Easterly, 2008; Pritchett, 2002; Pritchett et al., 2012; Ravallion, 2008; Scott et 
al., 2012). 
Moreover, while this tendency to track, measure, and evaluate everything has 
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recently consolidated to become a pillar of aid delivery, it has also ironically come into 
conflict with the fact that, in spite of failure and experimentation being costly but 
necessary for progress to take place, they are absolutely frowned-upon in the aid world. 
There is little incentive to talk about failure when donors and recipients already are 
mobilizing the resources they need or want, and when they are constantly engaged in a 
never-ending quest to increase them (Pritchett, 2002). Constituencies and stakeholders 
who influence funding decisions are, to say the least, impatient about any failure as well 
as irrational about their expectations of continuous success (see as well, Cartwright & 
Hardie, 2012). 
This contradiction between the benefits of failure and experimentation and the 
way the aid enterprise rejects any failures, creates a lose-lose situation where investing in 
honest learning is minimal or not possible; and where, without new and more accurate 
knowledge, the prospects of raising aid effectiveness are reduced. Furthermore, the 
agenda concerning aid effectiveness is now polarized among those who claim that 
randomized experiments are the gold standard for demonstrating what works and what 
does not, and those who suggest a more cautious approach by resorting to a variety of 
methods (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011; Bourguignon et al., 2012; Jessica Cohen & Easterly, 
2009; Deaton, 2010; Deaton & Cartwright, 2016; Ravallion, 2008).  
A Preliminary Verdict 
So far, we know that regardless of motives, traditions, preferences, and realities, 
aid is needed. The sheer number of human beings who need help today is staggering. 
Ultimately, and regardless of any other motives, what we do with this fact is a profoundly 
practical, moral issue: do we help those that, without a doubt, need help, when it is 
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clearly possible for us to do so? 
Over the last sixty years or so, humanity has decided to do something about this 
undeniable need. Aid institutions have been created for this purpose; yet, as is the case 
with any other human endeavour, diversity of opinions, circumstances, and our 
paradoxical stances between our most selfish and our most selfless instincts and 
emotions, shape and limit our resolve and possibilities. Even those with the most 
utilitarian views have not recommended the use of aid to pursue ulterior motives, as they 
have argued, it has not and it will not serve them well (Bauer, 1974; Friedman, 1995). 
The moral response to our predicament, with all its insecurities and 
contradictions, is further constrained by our limited understanding of the complexities of 
the process of social, political, and economic change. Even if our motives and intentions 
were pure and selfless, the truth is we do not really know the nuts and bolts of how to 
make social, economic and political change happen. We have clues, but despite our 
technocratic claims, the track record of our actions shows, emphatically, that we still have 
much to learn. Moreover, learning takes time—sometimes much longer than what the 
urgency of the task allows for. 
As a fragile endeavor since its inception, aid has been shaped by cycles of in-
vogue theories claiming to have the last word, only to find later that they did not; by 
recurring volume, allocation, and delivery issues limiting its efficiency and effectiveness; 
by polarized ideologically-based pressures; and by an architecture and praxis that makes 
it keep trying to surface to gasp for air, while the weight of its history and DNA keeps 
pulling it towards the bottom. 
There are thousands of volumes numbering, analyzing, and addressing all the 
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pitfalls to which aid has been, and, most importantly, continues to be subjected. There is 
little new that can be said. In fact, books from the 1950s already discussed many of the 
issues that occupy us today. Nevertheless, we keep debating these issues without having 
much to show for the last sixty years—at least not if we accept that the list of challenges 
accounted for in the 1950s still looks awfully contemporary. 
There has to be something fundamentally flawed in our historical approach to the 
task, as well as in our approach to its solutions, as through all of this, six million children 
die needlessly every year; 1 billion people are undernourished while another 1 billion go 
hungry every night, despite the food required to feed them being available (albeit in the 
garbage cans of aid-giving countries); and one in every three children in developing 
countries is suffering from stunted growth, severely limiting her/his possibilities and 
hampering the quality of the future human capital that their countries desperately require 
in order to break the vicious circle of poverty. 
The following sections will offer an alternative view on these matters, drawing on 
the very practical philosophical approach of Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as other 
scholars who have more recently researched the role of concepts and ideas in the process 
of social, economic, and political change (who draw as well on some of Wittgenstein’s 
ideas on these issues). 
An Epistemological and Ontological Alternative for Reframing Aid 
Previous sections of this chapter have shown that the practice of aid has been 
handicapped by its isolation from a variety of historical and contextual factors. These 
factors seem to be more relevant in enabling or constraining development than what aid 
itself could possibly be. Aid has also been handicapped by the unproven assumption of its 
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catalytic role in various realms where its relative importance pales in relation to the 
challenges it faces. Finally, it has also been handicapped by the assumption—and the 
incentives to act as if it was not an assumption, but a fact—that we already know, 
unequivocally, how to make development happen. 
The practice of overlooking these handicaps has led to a strong focus, instead, on 
issues related to the volume, allocation, and delivery of aid as if they were the main 
culprits of its less than optimal performance. By focusing on these issues, the implicit 
message from the aid community to their stakeholders is: we do know what needs to be 
done, but as in every human endeavour, we are always struggling with improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of our efforts; that is, aid works although it could work 
better. Does it, however, at least in its current form? 
As we have also seen in the previous sections, evidence on whether aid actually 
works or not is inconclusive. Moreover, a consequence of this inconclusiveness has been 
that ideological views have taken over the disputed spaces. 
This clearly points to a situation in which we need to question our approach to the 
task. What do we mean by effective? What do we mean by poverty? And, what do we 
mean by development? There is an unspoken and presumed view of what these are, both 
in technocratic and ideological debates. However, are any of these views valid, granted, 
consistent, or sound? What are the points of reference, the absolute truths, if any, against 
which we hold them to be correct? Ferguson (2007), originally, and Chhotray (2011) 
among others, following him, have already argued on how discourse impacts 
development practice. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s strictly practical philosophical approach can provide an 
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alternative point of view, and is a very useful point of reference to deal with these issues. 
His ideas on knowledge and explanations, on words and meaning, and on rules and causal 
change will be explored in the next few sub-sections and will offer several useful points 
of reference for framing this dissertation’s discussion of its proposed research 
problematic. The objective is to use this reference point to re-examine the problematic of 
aid through a different lens and set of pictures—through an unorthodox epistemological 
and ontological perspective. 
Wittgenstein’s ideas have been the subject of a wide variety of competing 
interpretations and criticisms (Grayling, 1988; Hacker, 2001; Horwich, 2012; Read, 
2011), although more recent ones have broken with the usually held interpretations of 
him offering two distinct philosophies (the earlier and the later ones), by arguing there is 
just an evolving one that follows a common thread (Hintikka, 2000; Horwich, 2012; 
Read, 2010, 2011). These more contemporary interpretations also argue against the idea 
that his philosophy is about language and logic, instead of actually a meta-philosophy and 
a method based on a particular epistemological and ontological view of the world in 
which human beings live and act (Hacker, 2001; Horwich, 2012; Tyler, 2011). 
Among the chief criticisms about Wittgenstein’s work are: it oversimplifies the 
issues he addressed in a way that distort their true nature (Grayling, 1988); offer little in 
defence of some of the basic assumptions he makes, like for example, the existence of 
“forms of life” and perhaps more importantly, the underlying relativism to everything in 
life (Grayling, 1988); the lack of clarity and systematism in his work that leads to 
confusion about the points he is making, including the use of vague and metaphorical 
concepts and notions that might change their meaning depending on the context 
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(Grayling, 1988, p. 99); the way in which he linked the meaning and use of words, which 
while important, might not necessarily be as exhaustive as he claims (Grayling, 1988); 
the suggestion that through the sorting out of meanings, philosophical puzzlements might 
dissolve, and how this claim might not necessarily be satisfactory, as in fact, such sorting 
out might actually generate the opposite, that is, puzzlements of its own (Grayling, 1988, 
p. 102); and, the claim that language is essentially public, not private (given the need for 
a reference point), and how this claim might create inconsistencies with his claim that 
rule-following must also be based on such a reference point (Grayling, 1988, p. 110). 
Elucidating or taking a particular stance against these controversies not only goes 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, but ultimately, it is inconsequential precisely 
because there is an axiomatic nature behind different philosophical positions that cannot 
be reconciled. Wittgenstein himself said, 
Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one 
another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic. (Wittgenstein, 1969, 
para. 611, p. 81) 
Rather than such elucidation, what is important for the purposes of this dissertation is that 
the choosing of Wittgenstein’s epistemological and ontological approach responds to the 
desperate need to break the circularity of the problematic of aid in the same fashion in 
which Wittgenstein originally set himself to break what he perceived to be an entangling 
of philosophy into its own web. Wittgenstein’s approach can precisely provide a different 
vantage point from which the problems of aid can be reframed, from which the 
conception of aid can be reformulated, and from which the real problems behind it can be 
affirmed, while the apparent ones get dissolved. 
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Evidently, there will be those who, on the grounds of their disagreement with 
Wittgenstein, would then perhaps disagree with the arguments or conclusions of this 
dissertation. This is something that cannot be avoided, but is not either a factor that 
should prevent setting a clear epistemological and ontological basis for the analysis. In 
the end, it is expected that this dissertation will offer a plausible explanation of how aid 
could be improved and that such conclusion will demonstrate in itself the usefulness of 
the choice made to use Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach. 
Knowledge and explanation. 
In contrast to the logical, ahistorical, and empirical take on science of Locke and 
Hobbes, which posits the existence of certain truths lying beneath the surface that would 
be valid under any circumstances, Kuhn, Feyerabend, and others propose science to be a 
social enterprise. For the latter, knowledge is defined by the way the world is viewed: by 
the paradigm through which it was looked at (Phillips, 1977).  
Wittgenstein’s language-games and Kuhn’s paradigms have key similarities 
(Morawetz, 1978; Phillips, 1977). Scientific disciplines can be seen as special cases of 
language-games, seeking to construct a language that can be used to describe and explain 
the part of the world that is their subject. In doing so, they create an ordered 
understanding which focuses on certain aspects of the world and leaves other parts out. 
One could say that each discipline has a history and, through that history, it creates its 
own grammar to sort out the part of the world it focuses on. A paradigm, like a language-
game, represents a way to see and make sense of the world, as well as to communicate 
this knowledge. Paradigms and language-games influence what people can perceive and 
what they will consider compelling evidence. They come into existence, they change, 
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they become obsolete, or they are even forgotten (Bloor, 1983; Phillips, 1977, p. 43). 
Nonetheless, there are also differences between paradigms and language-games—
the most important being, while for Kuhn, paradigms were incommensurable and there 
was no logical way to break out from one into another, Wittgenstein’s language-games 
are not (Phillips, 1977). In fact, it is possible to play several language-games at the same 
time, because, according to Wittgenstein, all possible language-games have their origins 
in the same language-game of daily life which stems from our nature and biology—what 
Williams (2002) calls “bedrock practices.” This common language-game has, in 
Wittgenstein’s view, “epistemological and ontological primacy,” given that they 
represent “the very rock bottom of our knowledge and experience”; they are at such a 
basic level that there is “no transcendental criterion” against which a judgement could be 
made of them being true or false (Gier, 1981; Morawetz, 1978; Phillips, 1977, p. 89; 
Williams, 2002). Ultimately, these “bedrock practices” are what allow us to be sceptical, 
judge other’s ideas, and consider them reasonable, even if we do not necessarily accept 
them or understand them in full (Morawetz, 1978; Surowiecki, 2004). 
Wittgenstein’s conception of what he calls “forms of life” is, in a way, related to 
the timeless philosophical discussion about being and essence, and perhaps even 
surprisingly aligned with Aquinas’ conception of the “esse” (the act of existing) as 
undefinable but, ultimately, the source of every knowledge (Aquinas, 1949; Sanguineti, 
1977). In fact, Aquinas’ definition of “common experience” is strikingly similar to that of 
Wittgenstein’s “forms of life” (Aquinas, 1949, 1960, p. 238 para. 645; Gier, 1981; 
Morawetz, 1978; Phillips, 1977; Sanguineti, 1977, p. 251; Williams, 2002). 
This difference between paradigms and language-games allows, following 
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Wittgenstein, for the possibility to describe the world in different ways and for various 
explanations of the same phenomena to coexist through the existence of different 
language-games. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein remarked: 
the fact that it can be described by Newtonian mechanics asserts nothing about the 
world; but this asserts something, namely, that it can be described in that 
particular way in which it is described, as is indeed the case. (Wittgenstein, 2010, 
p.85 6.342) 
From his point of view, it is scientists who provide scientific explanations of phenomena 
and not, as scientist claim, the theories or laws they “discover,” the ones doing the 
explaining (see as well the considerable literature of Cartwright (1983, 1999; Cartwright 
& Hardie, 2012) which also supports the same line of argumentation). The knowledge 
that people acquire exists already the way it is. It is not found by a discovery of reason 
(Gier, 1981): “Our similar biology, rather than a cognitive achievement, is the origin of 
our practice” (Dromm, 2008, p. 83). Explanations, then, are mosaics put together with 
what we already know; they are ways of ordering the facts of the world we somehow 
already know (Bloor, 1983; Cartwright, 1999; Cartwright & Hardie, 2012; Dromm, 2008, 
p. 101; Phillips, 1977, pp. 19, 90–91).  
Building on the previous quotation from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, it was not until 
Albert Einstein’s theory of general relativity that the basis of Newtonian mechanics was 
revised, even if, until then, it had described the world in a way in which it could be 
described. With Einstein’s new theory, we had now to our avail a different description of 
the same world, explaining the same phenomena. It was just that Einstein’s explanation 
was considered to be a better, more comprehensive one. (This is also consistent with both 
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Aquinas’ views on scientific explanation (Aquinas, 1949; Sanguineti, 1977), as well as 
with those from Cartwright (Cartwright, 1983, 1999).) 
For Wittgenstein then, an explanation of a phenomenon is the result of a 
specialized language-game, which builds on the meta-language of daily life, and which, 
in turn, rests on our biological or common nature: the “forms of life” (Phillips, 1977). 
Such a specialized language-game allows the players to see and make sense of the world 
in a particular way, and, therefore, to set forth explanations for the phenomena they 
perceive. Players of other language-games may, within the limits of their own game, 
perceive the same phenomena in different ways and, therefore, provide alternative 
explanations for them (Cartwright, 1983; Sanguineti, 1977). The consequence of this is 
that, for Wittgenstein, there cannot be an “objective, mind-independent reality” (Phillips, 
1977; Temelini, 2015). His philosophy is meant to be a cure for our metaphysical 
obsession to look for “foundations, external stand points, or epistemologically certain 
explanations, to expose these as nonsense” (Dromm, 2008; Temelini, 2015, pp. 206–
207). This contrasts with Aristotle and Aquinas conception of science as pursuing the 
knowledge of beings and their causes (a metaphysical approach), although it coincides, in 
turn, in the distinction they all make between apparently knowing something by 
possessing some information about it, and truly knowing something by being able to 
relate it to specific actions. In this sense, Wittgenstein’s understanding of knowledge 
prevents the risk that both Aristotle and Aquinas saw in abandoning the singular 
expressions of being, in favor of an incorrect and impossible aim at only pursuing and 
holding universals. Both Aristotle and Aquinas argue that in losing sight of the singular, 
the knowledge of the “being” and its “esse” is lost and therefore the universals only 
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apparent (Sanguineti, 1977). 
Wittgenstein suggests that knowing is closely related to understanding, as well as 
“to be able to” (Bloor, 1983; Dromm, 2008; Phillips, 1977; Tyler, 2011). Knowledge not 
only is strictly practical. It is also a public and not a private affair. Ultimately, knowledge 
is a “publicly shared [set] of concepts which are social creations” (McGinn, 1984; 
Morawetz, 1978; Phillips, 1977, p. 200). We come to understand not only through 
education or initiation but as a result of our encounters with others and our joint efforts 
and struggles to make sense of the world (Dromm, 2008; Temelini, 2015). Understanding 
and knowledge are then the results of an ‘experimental state’ rather than just a physical 
state or a visual experience. Understanding is not only drawing lines connecting the 
ingredients we know; it is also connecting them with our feelings and thoughts, so our 
knowledge acquires depth (Aquinas, 1949; Dromm, 2008, p. 101; Tyler, 2011). (This is 
consistent with recent neuroscience discoveries, see for example (Eagleman, 2016).) 
Consequently, many times, we are not able to see reasons where others do; no matter how 
many additional facts we get, without sympathy or empathy, we cannot simply 
understand a practice, and, therefore, acquire knowledge (Dromm, 2008, p. 102).  
To know that one understands or knows, one has to have some outward criteria 
for validation: there have to be public rules that show one’s understanding by adhering or 
not to them. “Understanding a game …may mean knowing the rules, but it may also 
mean knowing how to play it” (Bloor, 1983; Phillips, 1977, pp. 49–50; Pitkin, 1972). For 
Wittgenstein, there is no divide between the conceptual and the empirical (Phillips, 1977, 
p. 100); knowledge comes from the particulars and not necessarily from our attempts to 
reduce any phenomenon to its alleged essence (Danford, 1978; Temelini, 2015; Tyler, 
79 
2011). 
Words and meanings. 
Just as knowledge and explanation are conceived by Wittgenstein as social 
creations, words and their meanings are too. However, they are not accidental nor 
arbitrary; they are based on the same “naturalness” that gives the language-game of life 
“epistemological and ontological primacy” (Danford, 1978; Phillips, 1977, p. 89; 
Temelini, 2015). This view, which is more in line with that of the classics, clearly differs 
from that of Hobbes and Locke, who aspire to derive general principles by looking 
beneath the surface of things—to unearth the simpler elements (Danford, 1978; Temelini, 
2015). Words and meanings, then, cannot be taken out of the social setting in which they 
are used, as well as the language in which they are articulated (Klagge, 2011). In On 
Certainty (1969), Wittgenstein illustrates this by proposing a community that having got 
rid of private property for too long for their members to understand what it means 
anymore, is studied by sociologists concerned with theft. Not having the concept of 
private property, the members of the community use their shared wealth in ways in which 
might be interpreted as theft by these sociologists. When questioning the members of this 
community about their behaviour, the sociologists would frame their arguments from the 
perspective that theft was happening, while the community members would not be able to 
grasp the idea of theft, since they cannot grasp the idea of private property (Phillips, 
1977). 
For Wittgenstein, words and their meaning cannot be separated from their use, the 
language in which they are used, and the social groups in which they are used; meaning is 
not an abstraction, meaning is use (McGinn, 1984; Reynaud, 2002; Williams, 2002). 
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Rules and causal change. 
Perhaps one of the most important points Wittgenstein made about rules is that 
rather than being causally connected to an action, they are simply likely reasons 
(Reynaud, 2002). Establishing causality would require complete knowledge of the 
process leading from rule to action, and, Wittgenstein argues, doing so is not possible 
(Dromm, 2008). Contemporary philosophers like Cartwright (1999; Cartwright & Hardie, 
2012) argue in a similar fashion about the limits of our knowledge and explanations. 
This impossibility comes from the four properties that are common to rules: 
generality, abstraction, permanence over time, and distance from the solution (Dromm, 
2008; Reynaud, 2002, p. 122). Rules are neither solutions nor decisions; a solution is 
specific, but a rule provides a frame in which to set an action—hence its generality and 
abstraction; a decision is made at a particular point in time, but a rule allows for actions 
to be taken over time. 
As discussed in previous sections with regards to knowledge and explanation, and 
words and meaning, rules as well can only have meaning in social practice. They also 
draw from the same epistemological and ontological primacy mentioned earlier (Phillips, 
1977). One cannot know if one is following a rule unless there is a point of reference 
through which the action can be seen and assessed as complying with a rule or not 
(Dromm, 2008; Reynaud, 2002). Wittgenstein is against the idea that understanding a 
rule is a mental process; he insists that such mental process may not be more than a 
signal, and that there is no substitute for the action of correctly following the rule as proof 
of understanding (Arnswald, 2009; Cartwright, 1999; Dromm, 2008, p. 73). The 
following or application of rules is then grasped through its teaching and through 
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people’s negotiation with the rule (i.e., interpreting, doubting, challenging, justifying). It 
is only through this social process of grasping through action, that participants can, over 
time, reach a tacit agreement, and ultimately sustain a routine, or even change it or drop 
it. Given that this process of negotiating with the rule is unique to different people and 
groups, rules can be said to lead to different practices. Furthermore, as this negotiation 
takes place within specific social institutions, the success of a rule in establishing a new 
practice would be influenced by how much support it can draw from these institutions 
(Arnswald, 2009; Dromm, 2008; Reynaud, 2002, pp. 132–133). Rules are followed 
because such institutional base provides certainty about “steady ways of living, regular 
ways of acting” (Dromm, 2008, p. 80). Still, Wittgenstein warns us that such certainty 
cannot be interpreted as the actions following the rule due to causality. At the most, they 
can show a speculative explanatory connection between them (Dromm, 2008, p. 97). 
Beliefs are necessary in order to take action (one does not speak to someone whom one 
believes cannot hear, or one does not walk into a room if one does not believe the floor 
can support one’s weight), yet, they are not causes—they are necessary but not sufficient 
(Cartwright, 1983, 1999; Morawetz, 1978, p. 25). 
Why Wittgenstein and What It Means for the Reframing of Aid? 
Wittgenstein’s ideas, discussed in the previous section, provide an alternative 
epistemological and ontological basis for revisiting the challenge of aid (in)effectiveness. 
In a nutshell, his approach requires conceiving the limits of what can and cannot 
be known, the realization of how things can be known, and the coming to terms with the 
setting of these limits as the best way to avoid epistemological and ontological confusion, 
which ultimately leads to ineffective practices (Arnswald, 2009). Furthermore, this idea 
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of limits is applied by Wittgenstein to the idea of language-games and their role in social 
interaction. Since language-games stochastic, their limits are always pushed and moved, 
in particular, when they come into contact with other language-games. As discussed 
above, this possibility of finding common ground between language-games always exists 
as, in the ultimate analysis, all of them share common “forms of life” grounding 
(Arnswald, 2009). Furthermore, the nature of language-games makes them time 
dependent: universalistic ideals of justification (Arnswald, 2009) are not possible as both 
context and people change. The following quotation clearly summarizes the points above, 
The entirety of these practices and reactions of the linguistic and non-linguistic 
kind belong to a particular language game that the actors actually control, yet 
without the game resting on a metaphysical guarantee, like reason. No rational 
structure is available that points beyond the contexts in which individual 
languages are used and that underpins the related purpose still further; and 
moreover, according to Wittgenstein, such a structure is superfluous. Likewise, as 
our own language game is neither rational, nor irrational, but merely there, like 
life itself, so too, is the language we use in our moral discourses, in Wittgenstein’s 
view, lastly governed by the fact that we rely upon something. (Kertscher, 2009, 
p. 96) 
Taking into consideration the previous discussion on the themes of knowledge and 
explanation, words and meanings, and rules and causal change and applying them to the 
subject of aid (in)effectiveness, let us start now by considering the importance of words 
and meaning. What are the meanings of the words used in aid, and how do they shape 
what aid does? What is development? What is aid? What is it meant by regulations, 
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institutions, or market? What does success look like for aid? How do we understand and 
evaluate its impact? Even more importantly, what does it mean for it to have “impact”? 
(Lin, 2012b; Riddell, 1987). 
These are all critical concepts, considered in every context in which aid is 
discussed. These discussions take place through the use of different language-games. Do 
all parties taking part in the discussion mean the same? Do all parts understand the rules 
of each one of these games in the sense that they can actually play them? Is it possible 
that part of the problematic with aid effectiveness is that stakeholders are mixing up 
different language-games? 
Take for example the word development. Back in 1970, the Pearson Commission 
in the document The Crisis of Development defined it as each country’s self-
determination of a balance between self-sustainable economic growth and social 
progress. Four years later, White (1974), was already criticizing how the aggregation of 
ideas had led to the impression that aid was one kind of resource, being administered by 
one kind of agency, implementing a coherent strategy called aid, aiming to achieve one 
single idea of what development was. In 1980, the North-South Report (Independent 
Commission on International Development Issues, 1980) shifted the focus of the notion 
of development from material progress and economic growth, to people—development 
had to be about the individual. The report also argued against single models of 
development, particularly foreign ones—the idea of development had to take into 
consideration culture, religion, traditions, endowments, and political patterns. Somehow 
it echoed the view of the Pearson Commission in 1970. In a study of the history of the 
idea of economic development, Arndt (1987) reminded the reader that, regardless of any 
84 
name or meaning given, development has been happening throughout the history of 
humanity; but that once it became a political objective after World War II, it went from 
material progress and modernization, to changes in power relations, changes in social 
justice, or a simple rejection of materialism and consumerism as a destructive force. For 
Friedman (1995), development was about giving people the freedom to change old into 
new ways. Crewe and Axelby (2012) show how development has been, at times, poverty 
reduction, at others rights, or science and technology, or growth, or freedom, among 
others; whatever way it was defined, they argue, the most current idea of development 
would be the one driving aid. Godfrey (2014) and Skidelsky & Skidelsky (2012) bring 
back the classical Greek idea of eudemonia to define development as the fulfilling of 
what is physically necessary, so people can be free to fulfill their non-material needs. 
Another example is the concept of markets. In particular, what does it mean for a 
market to be free or regulated? Harcourt (2011) makes a very strong case about the 
irrelevance of such a distinction by comparing the Parisian markets for grain in the 18th 
century with the Chicago Board of Trade (for similar examples see also Desan (2014) and 
Roth (2015)). He shows how confusion about the meanings of freedom and discipline has 
led us to the erroneous perception that today’s markets are freer than they were in the past 
when, in reality, they are not. Ultimately, he argues, all markets are created through 
regulations that determine how they operate and what their likely allocation results will 
be (Bruszt & McDermott, 2014; Hale, 1923). There are no unregulated free markets—the 
idea of free-market is a fiction. In fact, he shows how such artificial differentiation 
between free and regulated markets, which cannot be easily or accurately measured, is 
just a confusion of labels that hinder an accurate assessment and discussion of what is 
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really going on behind them. Harcourt (2011) argues that by attaching to the concept of 
free markets the idea that they occur naturally, as well as the idea that they operate as a 
matter of natural order, believers in free markets have claimed a self-given exception 
from political, social, and moral debates: they believe markets are the way they are, and 
that regulation only interferes with their natural state.  
The fact that the new and scientific language of equilibrium theory and Pareto 
improvements underlying the idea of free markets in economics, or that the countless 
definitions and emphases put on the idea of development, have both had such huge 
implications in the way aid is understood and delivered despite their inaccuracy, is a clear 
testament to the relevance of Wittgenstein’s ideas about words and their meanings, and 
how they are intrinsically linked to praxis. The Washington Consensus was, for example, 
a clear example of the role words and meanings (in this particular case “free” “markets”) 
in permeating the praxis of aid. 
However, who are the ones determining these meanings, and how do they go 
about it? Woods (2006) points out to the fact that when both the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund were created not only did their charters not provide 
guidance as to how to achieve their task. In fact, these organizations did not even have 
either the experience, or the economic or political theories to tell them what development 
was and how to achieve it. It was only through a process of competing policy objectives 
and economic theories bumping into each other, that the internal incentives of these 
institutions started shaping and evolving a vision of what development was and, as a 
consequence, what aid was (Alacevich, 2009). This process of internalization of rules 
through the creation of routines and standards within the aid enterprise is, coincidently, a 
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great example of the discussion above about Wittgenstein’s understanding of rules and 
causal change. In fact, the process of internalization that the aid enterprise had to go 
through, followed a similar logic like the one explained by Reynaud (2002) in her book 
Operating Rules in Organizations. Macroeconomic and Microeconomic Analyses. 
These processes of accumulating knowledge and devising explanations, or 
language-games, as Wittgenstein called them, is sometimes limiting. For example, 
Krugman (1998) shows how precisely at the point in time when the meanings of 
development and aid were starting to be shaped, a counter-revolution from mainstream 
economists wiped away a number of valuable ideas that could not be formalized using the 
mathematical models that, by then, had already become the instrument of choice of 
economics. While these ideas were not necessarily wrong, a lack of analytical clarity in 
the eyes of economists led to their rejection. At the time, many of the methodological 
instruments required to formalize such ideas were not available and therefore prevented 
their acceptance. As Krugman points out, in silent and probably unknown agreement with 
Wittgenstein, they were rejected because they were not codified in a way that made them 
intelligible to others in the professional field—they could not pass the test of social 
validation within the relevant group of gamers. In fact, this also illustrates Wittgenstein’s 
argument that the conceptual and the empirical cannot be separated: the practice of 
economics requires mathematics and, therefore, those not using mathematics simply 
cannot play the game. Furthermore, Krugman’s argument can also pinpoint the origins of 
the technocratic approach towards aid. As a social science, economics has been 
increasingly detaching itself from political or social considerations (in contrast to the idea 
of political economy, which was oriented towards the normative, economics aspired to 
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become a positive discipline). As Woods (2006) argues, these positive economic theories 
were confronted, within the Bretton Woods institutions, by political objectives, 
institutional constraints, and limited financial resources that, combined, helped shape the 
form aid would assume, and the way it would evolve over the years. 
The words and meanings that shaped and continue to shape aid are the result of 
these varied social, economic, and political language-games taking place between those 
who have the power to make decisions—usually the ones who provide or manage the 
financial resources. It is easy to think of a countless variety of language-games taking 
place in this context: conceptual/theoretical ones dealing with determining what works 
and what doesn’t in stimulating development (including within-disciplines and across-
disciplines); empirical ones dealing with decisions about volume, allocation, and 
delivery; political ones between donors and their stakeholders and constituencies, 
between recipients and their stakeholders and constituencies, between donors and 
recipients, between donors and the recipients’ stakeholders and constituencies, and 
between recipients and the donors’ stakeholders and constituencies, among others. 
Beliefs, motives, experiences, understanding, objectives, meanings, and many 
other categories vary widely among these language-games, and this makes it very easy 
for players to get lost and confused, and for the games to become unproductive. This is 
just another way to look at the pervasive issues created by the current cumbersome aid 
architecture: humanitarian aid is radically different from development aid, among other 
salient differences. Pursuing economic or diplomatic objectives is radically different from 
pursuing poverty reduction or institutional development. Nonetheless, as Wittgenstein 
proposes, there is no reason why a common ground cannot be achieved between all these 
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games and all their players, especially as all of them draw from “forms of life.” What is 
perhaps needed is a new language-game that can bridge all those differences, or that at 
least can facilitate a clearer distinction among real issues and those which need 
“dissolving” through the clearing of confusions created from the mixing of different 
language-games. 
It is at this point that we can bring to bear Wittgenstein’s ideas about rules and 
causal change discussed above. Aid has relied on the idea that rules imply causation, 
contrary to what Wittgenstein suggests. The technocratic approach to aid is largely based 
on the idea that increasing investment has causal implications; reforming institutions has 
causal implications; and, among many others, improving education and health has causal 
implications. Somehow, the technocratic approach has simultaneously portrayed these 
causal effects to be not only undeniable, but also almost immediate or at least attainable 
in the short-term (otherwise aid-giving stakeholders would be likely to withdraw their 
support), thanks to the particular choice of measures selected to showcase the effects of 
aid. For example, a reform of the education system may lead to higher enrolment (a 
measure of choice) or higher average number of schooling years (another measure of 
choice). While these causal relations between aid and such measures could be shown to 
be a probable description of what happened as a result of the reform of an education 
system, such description would be detached from the number of assumptions behind our 
understanding of the role of education in development; or behind our claims of how 
representative measures of enrollment or number of schooling years are as proxies of 
improvement in education; or how these particular improvements in education translate 
into something else that translates into something else, that at some point translates into 
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development. In this case in point, Hanushek (2015) provides solid empirical evidence to 
refute the importance we have given for so long to school enrolment and schooling years 
as explanatory of economic growth. 
Similarly, a language-game of technocratic justification shifts and shapes the 
debates about aid effectiveness within a particular realm, and by doing so, helps reject 
claims that become incomprehensible or inadequate within such a game. For example, in 
the case of education discussed above, the technocratic language-game of aid allowed for 
investments in a certain kind of education related achievements to go on, unquestioned, 
based on an assumption of causality that was incorrect, according to Hanushek (2015). 
The contestation of such assumption was incomprehensible or inadequate within such 
game, and therefore rejected if ever interjected. 
Another example to illustrate this point is related to welfare. When it comes to 
welfare, mainstream economics operate within a game that frowns upon any intervention 
in markets under the deeply entrenched belief that doing so will hinder the achievement 
of Pareto-optimal outcomes (first theorem of welfare) (Athreya, 2013). Economists 
playing this language-game know very well that Pareto-optimal distributions, which 
potentially can make everyone better-off, do not address issues of distribution and 
inequality. Yet, they believe that the only way to achieve distributional and equality 
objectives without upsetting the possibility of achieving Pareto-optimal outcomes is by 
changing the initial endowments of individuals through lump-sum transfers, and that not 
only will other redistribution tactics not work, but that as a result of them, everyone will 
end up being worse-off (second theorem of welfare) (Athreya, 2013). Evidently, none of 
these arguments will play well with those playing the language-game of socialism, or 
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with those playing that of social democracy. Even within mainstream economics, Nobel 
Prize laureates, like Joseph Stiglitz (Stiglitz & Arnott, 2003), question these theorems of 
welfare; yet, they continue to guide the economics language-game, as well as its 
influence in aid and other development efforts. Once again, the Washington Consensus 
was a clear example of how these technocratic ideas shaped aid’s praxis to its core. 
At this point it is useful to bring to bear two important aspects of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical approach discussed above: (a) the impossibility of separating the 
conceptual from the empirical (and, therefore, theory from practice), and (b) the 
grounding that all knowledge and explanation should have in the practical (philosophers 
like Cartwright (1999) argue similarly about the importance of not separating knowledge 
from practice). Both these ideas strengthen the arguments against a technocratic 
approach. As Woods (2006) has described, our delivery of aid has been based on very 
specific (technocratic) formulas and strategies that, once moved from the conceptual 
realm into the real world, showcase their difficulties or deficiencies in achieving the 
effects they were supposed to induce. Therefore, these failures debunk the idea that the 
delivery of aid—its praxis—was based on authentic and solid knowledge, and not on 
possible and partial explanations instead (otherwise aid would have attained its 
theoretical potential). 
Krugman (1998) agrees with this assessment. He criticizes the way in which 
development economics ideas have been used to justify policies that ultimately achieved 
the opposite results they were supposed to—like the excessive emphasis on capital 
accumulation under the Harrod-Domar model, or the import-substitution efforts 
implemented in Latin American countries (Meier, 2001a). In fact, he goes so far as to 
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state that even in places where rapid economic growth occurred, it did so in ways that 
were not anticipated by any of the development economics theorists. It is this evident 
distance between the theory of aid, the praxis of aid, and the results of aid, what shows 
how the explanations provided by the theorist, while possible within their own games, do 
not seem to be “practical” or “real” knowledge: we claim to understand how development 
and aid work, but we cannot actually succeed: we claim to know how to play these 
language games but we can’t, or perhaps more accurately, we are not skilled at playing it. 
The limits of such a theoretically driven aid practice have been discussed for 
many years, as has been shown earlier was also the case of many of the other issues that 
plague or limits its effectiveness. 
Over the last few years the Paris, Accra, and Busan declarations have put 
particular emphasis on the need for increased popular participation in the development 
enterprise. Ownership from the beneficiaries, as well as their validation of any policies 
and strategies to be pursued, have also been discussed and promoted as an integral part of 
such increased popular participation (OECD, 2008b, 2011; UNDESA, 2003). 
Nonetheless, given the incentives embedded in the architecture of aid, many times, 
efforts in this direction are more rhetorical than practical (Crewe & Axelby, 2012; Mosse, 
2011; Whitfield, 2009; Woods, 2006). Many of the proposed policies and strategies 
submitted to the vetting of the affected communities, still come from a technocratic 
tradition and culture, and the room for manoeuver given to these communities is, many 
times, reduced to a binary yes or no. 
This state of affairs is yet another reason why, following Wittgenstein’s 
reasoning, aid might not be effective. Delivery of aid, even when enhanced by some 
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degree of popular participation, still relies on a model of linear causality from rules to 
desired change. Even when communities might agree in principle with the 
implementation of certain policies and strategies, it is not until they start playing the 
language-game under the new rules that the interpretative and internalizing process will 
start, and that the trial and error and adjustment process will determine what the outcome 
of those new rules will be. Still, aid does little in this respect—and not unexpectedly, as 
the principle of ownership and political neutrality and independence embedded in its 
architecture requires them to avoid, in many ways, such realms of action.  
Furthermore, incentives in the architecture of aid promote that those who are 
responsible for its delivery, must be eager to achieve the expected theoretical results; 
while their recipients, understanding such incentives, will also be eager to perform as if 
this was the case (as given their own incentives, this would be key for ensuring continued 
aid support). On the other hand, donors’ constituencies expect them to provide 
information regarding outcomes resulting from their money, hoping that what actually 
happens remains aligned with the constituent’s original expectations based on the 
theoretical justification on which they agreed to provide the funding in the first place. 
The participatory approach to aid is then constrained by the institutionalized 
incentives that rig the language-game to respond to those incentives, rather than to the 
development outcomes that should have primacy. Even when incentives embedded in the 
aid architecture may seem to be aligned with the development outcomes desired, the track 
record of aid shows that there is, definitively, considerable distance between them.  
Ultimately, this disconnect and rhetorical distance between theory and practice 
severely limits the improvement of aid effectiveness given that, following Wittgenstein’s 
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logic, the real learning that leads not just to understanding the language-game, but to 
actually being able to play it successfully, does not occur in full within the aid enterprise, 
to say the least (Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; Roth, 2015). In this respect, Pitkin 
(1972) states: 
A Wittgensteinian approach makes possible, but also requires us, that we take 
other people, and other cultures, seriously, that we really listen, that we become 
able to see from the perspective of another. But it also makes possible, and 
requires of us, that we take ourselves seriously, that we be serious, that we accept 
our own perspective as our own, that we say what we really mean and live by 
what we say.” (p. 339-340) 
Language-games, then, can contribute to the creation of certainty by clarifying their rules 
through participants’ practice. Certainty, or at least reduced uncertainty, is essential for 
action to take place. Aid is afflicted with all sorts of uncertainties: how much of it will be 
available, for how long, and to whom (volume, allocation, and delivery issues), as well as 
changing rules on incentives driven by conflicting motives. These are not pitfalls faced 
only by recipients but also by the international institutions that serve as intermediaries 
between donors and recipients. These pitfalls are also faced by donors when facing their 
constituencies and stakeholders, or by recipients facing the same kinds of audiences. 
Rules are not stable nor clear, our knowledge and our ability to explain them are limited, 
and we are all confused by the many meanings given to the words that are essential for 
aid to operate. 
This epistemological and ontological interpretation of aid, drawing from 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, helps us reveal a fresh understanding of the reasons behind 
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the recurrent issues plaguing aid, as well as the reasons why efforts to address them have 
moved so little, so erratically, and so slowly. 
From the previous discussion, it is apparent that the multitude of language-games 
in the aid game, as well as their disconnect from the practical (which ultimately hinders 
our understanding of the explanatory power that rules might have in driving the desired 
change), is driven by a multitude of motives, but perhaps even more prominently, by 
ideology. 
Ideology can frame aid as pursuing modernization, control, empowerment, or 
discourse, among others (Crewe & Axelby, 2012). From the left, it can claim that aid is 
just a diversion or an enabler for maintaining an asymmetry in power distribution (H. A. 
Arndt, 1987; Mosley, 1987); a mechanism to intensify capital intensity to further pressure 
wages down and increase exploitation of labour (Mosley, 1987); that aid and its effects 
are not well understood and many times end up supporting those who have the greatest 
power and the most economic means (Hayter, 1985; Riddell, 1987); or, among many 
others, that aid is used to maintain an international order that works in favour of those 
who give aid (Amin, 1976; H. A. Arndt, 1987). From the right, it can claim that aid 
reduces the relative cost of ‘leisure,’ while increasing that of ‘effort’, and that this creates 
distortions in the market that, in turn, create internal inefficiencies, as well as the 
distorting of the international division of labour (Bauer, 1973; Friedman, 1995; Mosley, 
1987; Riddell, 1987; White, 1974); that economies of developing countries do not 
function in the same manner that those in developed ones do and that aid only forces 
institutions and actions that do not, and cannot create growth and development (H. A. 
Arndt, 1987); or simply, that development is a slow and endogenously driven process that 
95 
cannot be forced or engineered through aid (H. A. Arndt, 1987). 
The problem with many arguments from the left is that they tend to converge to 
the same problematic about classes and power. This also tend to lead to the argument that 
change can only occur through a shift of power, and, from there, to the argument that the 
only real alternative to achieve the required power shift is revolution or an approximation 
towards it. This rationale tends to isolate their arguments from mainstream debates, as 
revolution is not conceived in these debates as desirable, or realistic.  
As Horwich (2012) argues, following Wittgenstein, these ideological debates 
could be understood as pseudo-questions fueled by confusion rather than ignorance: 
These apparent questions are defective because the impression that each of them 
gives of pointing towards an answer presupposes assumptions that are products of 
muddled thinking. Thus a pseudo-question or pseudo-problem, is one that we 
should not attempt to answer—not because it is too difficult, but because there is 
every reason to expect that no objectively correct answer exists. (p. 170) 
Likewise, Kertscher (2009) provides considerable support to Wittgenstein’s view that 
differences in “world pictures” amount to an almost impossibility to agree: 
“Where two principles really do not meet which cannot be reconciled with one 
another, then, each man declares the other a fool and heretic.” (OC, 611). The 
argument implies, namely, that consensus must already exist in the judgements 
themselves, before the rules that hold sway in discourse ethics can even be 
effective in society. (p. 99) 
The issue is that, at the moment of truth, while the arguments provided from either side of 
the ideological spectrum or in between positions might sound more or less compelling, 
96 
once they are dissected and confronted with empirical evidence, they all run into 
problems, either because they cannot be validated or because there are cases that disprove 
or falsify them. They are, then, ultimately reduced to ideological stances that can be 
easily contested by opposite ideological stances (Alacevich, 2009; Cassen et al., 1982; 
Dopfer, 2005b; Sen, 1960; White, 1974). 
This is consistent with the practical epistemological and ontological approach that 
has been embraced in this chapter. As Phillips (1977) ascertains, in agreement with a 
similar argument made by Kishik (2008): 
Each of us is committed to certain ideas because ultimately these ideas are rooted 
in how we choose to live our lives. In terms of how I live my life, practise science 
and write about it, I must make various commitments as to what stands fast and 
what is certain for me. Some things that others might doubt would get a foothold 
… This certainty, as Wittgenstein would say, is not, based on agreement 
concerning opinions but on agreement in form of life. (p. 221-222) 
Further elaborating Wittgenstein’s idea of “forms of life,” Kishik (2008) states, 
I want to suggest that the notion of form may enable us to imagine a shared life—
a community if you wish—that is not based on the possession of a certain 
property or common denominator and has therefore nothing to do with the 
participation in a class. We can live together not because we all possess 
something, or some fact, but because we share a space of possibilities… Even 
though a form of life can never be defined, it still appears to be the adequate 
medium or the proper mean (which lacks an specific end) that enables us to share 
our lives with one another. (p. 25) 
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The epistemology and ontology for the aid enterprise adopted here provides an alternative 
view from the traditional one. Instead of being founded on the methods of natural 
sciences that could lead to the establishment of general or causal theories, it is based in a 
dialogical practice that allows for the understanding of discrete aspects of reality through 
cross-cultural encounters, conversations, open challenges, and revisions through 
compromise and negotiation (Friedman, 1970; Mäki, 2009; Popper, 1972; Temelini, 
2015, pp. 210–211). As discussed earlier in the chapter, there might be different valid 
descriptions of the world that derive from different language-games. 
All of this leads us to yet another important logical consequence of this newly 
embraced epistemological and ontological approach: change is, in the end, an individual 
affair that takes place in the company of others doing the same: 
It is not that we cannot change our concepts or our habits or our institutions, but 
that not every change is possible, and philosophizing will not change them. If they 
are to change, we must change them in our actions, in our lives; and ultimately 
that means that we cannot change them in isolation. (Pitkin, 1972, p. 340) 
As Wittgenstein himself put it in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, one 
person alone cannot invent change: 
The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of life of human 
beings, and it was possible for the sickness of philosophical problems to get cured 
only through a changed mode of thought and of life, not through a medicine 
invented by an individual. (Wittgenstein, 1978, p. 133, 23) 
For Wittgenstein, there is an inseparable correspondence between language, life, and 
being (particularly the “will” that results from such disposition to action; from such an 
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attitude towards living) (Arnswald, 2009). In The Moral Economy, Bowles (2016) argues 
too against the idea that change can be artificially created without real individual change. 
Hence, the plurality of individuality is a necessity of our reality and our attempts to 
change it, just as Isaiah Berlin reasoned and advocated (Crowder, 2004). 
Likewise, in Civilization in Transition (1970), Jung makes an even clearer point, 
linking private actions and social events: 
The great events of world history are at bottom, profoundly unimportant. In the 
last analysis, the essential thing is the life of the individual. This alone makes 
history, here alone do the great transformations first take place, and the whole 
future, the whole history of the world, ultimately spring as a gigantic summation 
from these hidden sources in individuals. In our most private and most subjective 
lives, we are not only the passive witnesses of our age, and its sufferers, but also 
its makers. We make our own epoch. (p. 149, 315) 
Ultimately, this confirms that approaching aid from a Wittgensteinian perspective 
requires making a clear distinction between those aspects about which aid should remain 
passive and silent (i.e., the actions that lead to the process of social, economic, and 
political change as such) and those about which it should be active (i.e., improving the 
conditions and dispositions that are behind social, economic, and political change). 
Ideas and Change 
The categories of knowledge and explanation, words and meaning, and rules and 
causal change adopted over the previous sections, have, as discussed, some 
commonalities that bind them together: they all share their origins in practice, social 
validation, and a common epistemological and ontological foundation. These categories 
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also provide a sound background for the understanding of ideas and the way they are 
connected to change. 
Ideas are apprehensions, and apprehending requires the above-mentioned three 
categories: an idea reflects knowledge that can potentially serve to explain something; an 
idea is usually captured by words and their meanings and is frequently geared to action—
its potentiality (and validity) is realized through practice. Practice is usually framed by 
rules, either endogenously implied as part of the formulation of the ideas that underpin it, 
or exogenously defined by the context in which the idea comes into place and is put into 
practice. 
What role do ideas play in social, economic, and political change? Scholars, like 
Blyth (2002), Goldstein (1993a, 1993b), Campbell (2004), and Hall (1989), provide a 
solid and comprehensive basis to answer this question. 
For Goldstein (1993a), ideas represent shared beliefs about causal relationships. 
These beliefs are based on values and normative concepts. Note that Goldstein, contrary 
to Wittgenstein, establishes causality between ideas and action. In fact, Hall (1989), 
Campbell (2004), and Blyth (2002) all agree with this view. However, the distinction 
between an idea having causal or explanatory value is not critical for the purposes of the 
argument pursued throughout this dissertation, given that what matters to our 
understanding of their role in social, economic, and political change is not their inherent 
causal effect, if any, but their general relationship with actors’ change-seeking actions. 
These four scholars have taken on the task of demonstrating the role of ideas in 
social, economic, and political change. Methodologically, they establish counterfactuals 
in the form of a null hypothesis stating that ideas play no role in change, and then, 
100 
proceed to conduct archaeological investigations of their institutionalization to, in a 
sense, unearth whether this null hypothesis is true or not (Goldstein, 1993a).  
Hall and others scholars (1989) provide an account of the role and impact of 
Keynes’ ideas across seven countries. They showcase the power of Keynes’ ideas and the 
channels through which they exerted considerable influence in these countries. Goldstein 
(1993a) looks at the history of US trade policy from 1870 to the 1980s and unearths how 
ideas enabled and constrained change through the years. Blyth (2002), building on 
Polanyi’s The Great Transformation (1957) and his idea of the double movement, shows 
how ideas not only are responsible for the creation of the welfare state, but also for its 
dismantling through another double movement during the 1980s and 1990s.  
Their conclusion is that ideas do matter. First, ideas help in bridging uncertainty 
and diverging interests (Blyth, 2002; Campbell, 2004; Goldstein, 1993a), as well as 
markets and institutions (Goldstein, 1993a). Through this bridging, they help smooth 
ideological differences and, therefore, allow for compromise by leaving room for 
practical manoeuvering (Mosse, 2011). They facilitate the understanding and framing of 
the past, the present (including the awareness of the existence or not of a crisis), as well 
as of the steps that need to be taken towards the envisioned future (Blyth, 2002; 
Campbell, 2004; Goldstein, 1993a). 
Evidently, as much as they can facilitate change, ideas can also constrain it, and 
this makes them even more significant (Campbell, 2004). In fact, ideas can have very 
negative consequences, like for example, import-substitution, or the indiscriminate 
application of the Harrod-Domar economic growth model to the realities of developing 
countries which the model was not conceived for (Meier, 2001b). 
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Ideas have long-lasting effects through their institutionalization (Goldstein, 
1993b). This means that while at a specific point in time (in the foreground) they might 
be agents of change, creating discussion, debate, and challenge to the status quo, at other 
times, when embedded in-between the institutional layers and private and public social 
arrangements (in the background), they might create path-dependency (Campbell, 2004; 
Goldstein, 1993a). When not constrained, ideas can transform intellectual environments 
and political discourses. They can even force a new language with words and meanings 
that challenge established conceptions of the world (P. Hall, 1989). 
Being such powerful instruments, ideas help policy-makers define policy goals, as 
well as fine-tuning the policies being implemented (Campbell, 2004; P. Hall, 1989). They 
can also drive social, economic, and political forces towards political objectives 
(Goldstein, 1993a), particularly since they can also alter how people conceive their own 
self-interest (Blyth, 2002). Ideas can also help policy-makers expand their consideration 
beyond traditional interest-based or rationalist-based causal models in which the beliefs 
of actors are presumed to be fixed, as in reality they are highly contextual (Campbell, 
2004; Goldstein, 1993b).  
Yet, in order to matter, ideas have to be socially appropriate—that is, they have to 
build on existing institutions, skills, and expertise (Campbell, 2004; Mosse, 2011). They 
have to fit by being ambiguous enough to allow them to be adapted to different contexts, 
and they have to provide a sense of certainty by providing roadmaps towards goals and 
the means to achieve them (Goldstein, 1993a, 1993b; P. Hall, 1989). Ideas need to be 
viable—economically, politically, and administratively (P. Hall, 1989); and, they need to 
bring closer both intellectuals and policy-makers, as well as foster coalition building and 
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compromise (Goldstein, 1993a; P. Hall, 1989). Ideas need supporters of different kinds—
theorists, decision-makers, and framers—who can communicate what they mean for 
various audiences; brokers who can bring dissenting parties together; and, constituents 
who back and validate the ideas (Campbell, 2004). Ultimately, ideas do matter when they 
succeed in effecting outcomes and when they leave their mark imprinted into institutions 
that extend, in time, their influence and permanence (Goldstein, 1993a, 1993b; Mosse, 
2011). 
However, while we know ideas matter, there is still a significant knowledge gap 
in our understanding of how ideas are connected to change (P. Hall, 1989; Manyin, 
2005). 
Ideas That Have Shaped Aid and its Effectiveness 
If ideas matter, then, which ideas have most influenced the conception, design, 
delivery, and evaluation of aid? How have these ideas been institutionalized, and how 
have they been embedded—or even hidden—in the fabric of aid? 
The answer to these questions is easy: regardless of fashions or phases, there has 
been one single and powerful idea that has been central to shaping aid praxis over the last 
sixty years, the idea of economic growth (H. A. Arndt, 1987). Economic growth became 
synonymous with development since the beginning of aid (Alacevich, 2009; Browne, 
1999) and has remained this way despite broader considerations of justice, ethics, and 
distribution having complemented it more recently, although without having been able to 
dethrone it (Hartmann, 2014), perhaps because the former considerations have been 
formulated in ways that makes it into a practical affair, while the latter have remained 
much more theoretical and aspirational. 
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Furthermore, the fact that ultimately and regardless of its motive, form, or 
objective, every aid intervention involves the use of physical resources and therefore 
have direct, indirect, and opportunity costs, has meant that a financial/economic 
framework needed to be used in deciding the allocation of limited aid funding. Such 
framework was aligned from the beginning, and continues to be with economic growth 
theory and the economic and financial tools that are deeply entrenched within the 
confines of this theory and its intellectual bearings. Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004) 
showcase, for example, the pervasive role that economics based models of decision have 
had in aid allocation, particularly through the institutionalization of the Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment index (CPIA), not only by the World Bank but also by 
bilateral agencies like the British one. Specifically, the CPIA provides a decision criterion 
to allocate aid based on the expectations of it generating economic growth. Likewise, and 
as it will be discussed later, the World Bank’s Revised Minimum Standard Model 
(RMSM), which is still in use today and is built on economic growth theory, is a key 
factor in shaping aid praxis through its direct use in influencing its volume, allocation, 
and delivery. The pervasiveness of these tools and the theories that underlie them is far 
reaching and therefore do influence not only multilateral or bilateral aid, but also INGOs 
as a considerable part of their funding tends to come from those same institutions. 
While there has been consistent and considerable criticism of equating economic 
growth with development (H. A. Arndt, 1987; Browne, 2006; Chang, 2003; Crewe & 
Axelby, 2012; Easterlin, 2014; Helm, 2014; Oishi, 2012; I. Sachs, 2000; UNU-IHDP and 
UNEP, 2012, 2014), it is hard to completely dismiss the fact that to be able to provide 
even the most basic material needs, a country with a growing population requires 
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economic growth, even more so if population growth is considerable—as has been, and is 
still the case of many aid-recipient countries. Growth might not be sufficient; 
nevertheless, it is necessary (Bruton, 1997; Millikan & Rostow, 1976; I. Sachs, 2000).  
Even if the alternative of redistribution from those who have more was politically 
and socially viable, redistribution could only go so far. In fact, in 2014, the world average 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita was about US$41, specifically, US$4 per day in 
low-income countries, US$27 in middle-income countries, and US$111 in high-income 
countries (World Bank, 2016a, 2016b). Redistributing for equality would mean a 63 
percent reduction in income per capita for high-income countries, 925 percent increase 
for low-income countries, and 52 percent increase for middle-income countries. 
However, given the more than proportional population growth in low-income countries 
versus the rest, population growth will continue eroding the above world average, even if 
total world GNI could be sustained at the 2014 level. It is unlikely, however, that in a 
world where there is little incentive for innovation or hard work, growth could be 
sustained. In fact, it is likely that GNI will drop, further eroding the per-capita figures 
above (Athreya, 2013). Moreover, growth is necessary as it allows paying for the interest 
on the accumulated public and private debt, as well as for replacing jobs that are 
substituted through technological progress (Kümmel, 2011) 
Consequently, there is little chance that development—in a much broader sense—
could be possible without economic growth, at least not for the time being and 
foreseeable future. 
Before aid became an institutionalized effort, economic growth theory, as 
understood by the classics, was the consequence of certain factors or characteristics being 
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present in an economy. For Adam Smith, these were specialization and trade, capital 
accumulation, and increased productivity (H. A. Arndt, 1984; Mikesell, 1968; A P 
Thirlwall, 2002). Like Smith, Marshall discusses growth by focusing more on the factors, 
than the process or the interrelation between these factors. In Marshall’s case, the list of 
factors was much more comprehensive; it included natural resources, climate, human 
character, political freedom, willingness and ability to save, improved transportation, 
external economies, increasing returns, existence of extensive markets, existence of a 
substantial middle class, an efficient and honest government, education, and social 
mobility (Mikesell, 1968). 
Contrary to Smith and Marshall, Ricardo and Marx both focus on the process of 
economic growth rather than on a list of the factors that might activate or enable it. In 
their case, profit was the key dynamic creating factor, although with some variants (H. A. 
Arndt, 1984; Mikesell, 1968). For Ricardo, the rate of profit directed the reallocation of 
resources from less productive to more productive enterprises, thus paving the way for 
increased growth. For Marx, it was not the rate of profit but the surplus value extracted 
from labour, which created increased growth and wealth. 
With the neoclassical synthesis, the focus turned to the understanding of the 
relationship between the factors, as a way to explain the process of economic growth. 
Growth was seen as a function of savings and technological progress, and dependent on 
flexible wages that could facilitate full employment and the avoidance of negative 
economic cycles (Mikesell, 1968). Joseph Schumpeter later criticised the neoliberal 
synthesis, on the grounds that growth and stability are always in tension and that 
economic cycles are creative-destructive. The broader understanding of factors involved 
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in the process of economic growth along the lines of that of Marshall was abandoned for 
many decades (H. A. Arndt, 1984; Mikesell, 1968; A P Thirlwall, 2002). 
The next two waves of economic growth and development theories—the first 
from 1950 to 1975 and the second from 1975 to the present—followed a similarly 
simplistic approach (Browne, 1999; Bruton, 1997; Meier, 2001b).  
The first wave. 
 During the first of these waves—from 1950 to 1975—John Maynard Keynes’ 
ideas and his macroeconomic grand-theory approach was the most influential point of 
reference (P. R. Krugman, 1998; Mosley, 1987; Riddell, 1987; Toye, 1987). Economic 
development was understood as economic growth, and economic growth was believed to 
be led by governments which take a proactive role, fostering savings, investment, 
consumption, and the creation of skilled labour (Alacevich, 2009; Riddell, 1987). Market 
efficiency and efficacy were highly doubted, particularly in developing countries. 
Nonetheless, this vision of government as an active agent of change was stripped down to 
its role in the economy, rather than a more comprehensive role in state-building, and 
specifically, in fostering social and political development (Carothers & de Gramont, 
2013). 
Keynes’ ideas, interpreted and formalized by Harrod and Domar between 1939 
and 1946, permeated almost every theory of growth and development during this first 
wave of theories—in some cases more explicitly than in others. The Harrod-Domar 
model became the transmission mechanism through which Keynes’ ideas got into 
development theories (Toye, 1987). The success of the Marshall Plan, which relied on the 
model, further solidified this status (Hogan, 1987; Sagasti, 1988; Sagasti et al., 1999). 
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The practical implication of the Harrod-Domar model is that the source of economic 
growth lies in the accumulation of capital (Helpman, 2004; Jones, 1998; Salvadori, 
2003a, 2003b). 
As Easterly (1997, 2001) thoroughly showcases, the Harrod-Domar model 
continues to be the most widely applied economic growth model in history. Today, it 
hides as a ghost, embedded into the Revised Minimum Standard Model (RMSM), which 
remains the tool-of-choice used by international financial institutions, bilateral donors, 
and aid recipients (the RMSM allows for the estimation of the financing gaps needed to 
be filled with aid, if economic growth targets are to be achieved) (Easterly, 2001; Nowak, 
2013; Schabbel, 2007). It remains embedded, as well, in most current economic and 
development planning models (Boettke, 1994; Dalgaard et al., 2004; Easterly, 1997, 
1999, 2001; Mosley, 1987; Nowak, 2013; A P Thirlwall, 2002; Toye, 1987; White, 
1974). 
 The other grand-theories of development that dominated the first wave, relied, 
one way or another, on Keynes’ ideas, and on the Harrod-Domar model’s insight that the 
accumulation of capital was key for economic growth. From Rosenstein-Rodan and 
Leibenstein’s big-push theory; the theories of balanced and unbalanced growth (Nurkse 
and Hirschman, respectively); Rostow’s stages of growth; Lewis’ dual-sector model; 
Singer and Prebisch’s ideas about periphery-center dynamics and declining terms-of-
trade (including the ideas of Myrdal with regards to the role of foreign exchange and 
exchange rates); to Chenery’s dual gap model; all these theories and ideas revolved 
around the role of capital (understood in very diverse ways) and the relations between 
savings, investment, and wages. In interrelating these variables, they all relied on Harrod 
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and Domar’s formulation or at least on the idea of increasing or repurposing productive 
factors which is at the core of Harrod-Domar’s formulation (Browne, 1999; Chenery, 
1969; P. R. Krugman, 1998; Meier, 2001b; Mikesell, 1968; Sagasti et al., 1999). Even 
when, in the 1950s, Solow devised an improved version of the Harrod-Domar model to 
include technological change as a key driver of economic growth, the main thrust of his 
model was still based on a similar formulation to the one used by Harrod and Domar (H. 
A. Arndt, 1984, 1987; Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; Helpman, 2004; Meier, 2001b). 
Alacevich (2009), quoting Sen (1960), as well as some related ideas expressed by 
Krugman (1992, 1998), showcases how, in the final analysis, many of these development 
theories had considerable common ground and did not differ from each other as radically 
as it was once thought. 
Before this first wave of economic development theories and ideas was replaced 
by a second one, a wave that shifted the emphasis from rate of growth to quality of 
growth, three significant consequences had already been deeply entrenched in the 
institutional framework of aid: (a) a focus on increasing the relative availability of a 
narrow number of “ingredients” or economic factors considered essential for 
development; (b) a technocratic approach based on the belief that increasing the relative 
availability of these ingredients will inevitably result in a correlated increase in economic 
growth; and (c) the consolidation of development planning and national income 
accounting as its only official “language” (H. A. Arndt, 1984, 1987; Browne, 1999; 
Easterly, 1997, 1999, 2001; Griesgraber & Gunter, 1996; Helpman, 2004; Spence, 2011). 
With regards to the “ingredients,” this first wave was responsible for reducing the 
long-list of broader factors influencing economic growth that had been proposed by 
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Marshall (see above), as well as abandoning his and Adam Smith’s comprehensive 
political economy approach, which did not take for granted the political and social 
aspects behind the process of development (H. A. Arndt, 1984, 1987; Browne, 1999; 
Mikesell, 1968). This list of ingredients had been, by 1970, reduced to labour, capital, 
land, and technological innovation. Solow’s celebrated discovery was that, for the most 
part, total factor productivity (TFP) and not capital accumulation, was the main driver of 
growth; yet, he was not able to make it endogenous in the model—this is, to provide a 
theory of how TFP led growth happened (Hartmann, 2014; Helpman, 2004; Stiglitz & 
Lin, 2013). 
Simplified models of economic growth using a very limited number of variables 
and a clear logic linking increases in economic factors to growth, engendered a 
technocratic belief in the praxis of aid (H. A. Arndt, 1984, 1987; Browne, 1999; Mikesell, 
1968; Toye, 1987). 
This dual and severe constraint imposed on development and economic growth 
thinking and theorizing (e.g., very limited set of ingredients and an extremely simplified 
but apparently strong causal explanatory effect), was further institutionalized by the 
widespread adoption of development planning techniques and national income 
accounting (including Leontief’s input-output model) as the means to understand, 
discuss, and influence most aid efforts (considerable evidence can be found, among 
others, in Browne, 1999; Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; Easterly, 1997, 1999, 2001; 
Helpman, 2004; Hubbard, 2009; Mosley, 1987; Sagasti et al., 1999; Thirlwall, 2002; 
Toye, 1987). As the official “language” of aid, they defined a paradigm or language-
game to conduct the technocratic task of fostering economic growth. In the words of 
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Wittgenstein, “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” (Wittgenstein, 
1979, p. 50). Development planning was further pushed as part of this new paradigm, as 
there was a perception in Western countries that the Soviet Union had achieved 
impressive growth, ahead of that attained by the West in the same period, precisely 
because of their planning approach (H. A. Arndt, 1984, 1987). The increasing spread of 
national income statistics which allowed for inter-country comparisons, further 
intensified an economic growth race between countries (H. A. Arndt, 1984; Easterly, 
1997, 2001). 
Three consequences emanating from the first wave of development and economic 
growth thinking—the embedding of simplistic economic growth models, adoption of 
development planning, and adoption of national income accounting—meant that 
development would become a target-setting enterprise. Technocratic beliefs and the 
availability of development planning and national income accounts meant that measures 
of success could be set (H. A. Arndt, 1984, 1987; Mikesell, 1968; Toye, 1987). Of 
course, more specific measures brought with them increased pressure to perform and 
deliver. In turn, this also shaped the strength and depth of the involvement aid has 
consistently tried to solidify, and hold on to for itself, in front of recipients and their 
shared development goals. As previously discussed, the possibility of setting such 
measures of success had been impossible at the beginnings of the aid enterprise. The lack 
of readily available techniques and direction on how to achieve their mandates led the 
Bretton Woods institutions to continuously struggle in establishing a clear language-game 
from the beginning (Woods, 2006), that is, until development planning and national 
income accounts were broadly institutionalized. 
111 
By 1970, they had finally succeeded. Together, the new Harrod-Domar-based 
models and national income account statistics, allowed the aid enterprise to determine the 
gap between available in-country economic factors and those required to achieve an 
economic growth target. Chenery and Strout (1966a, 1966b), drawing on the Harrod-
Domar model, provide a theoretical basis to formalize the role of aid as a filler of those 
gaps. They identify two: the savings gap and the foreign exchange gap. 
By encouraging all recipients of aid to implement development planning and 
national income accounting, the aid enterprise was able to shift its project-based modus-
operandi to a more comprehensive program approach (Alacevich, 2009; Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology and Social Science Research Council, 1961; Mikesell, 1968). 
This approach allowed them, instead of evaluating each project on its own, to evaluate 
the entire development program for consistency and greater overall effect (H. A. Arndt, 
1984, 1987; Mikesell, 1968; Toye, 1987). This approach also allowed the aid enterprise 
to track overall progress towards development goals; to have a bigger role in policy 
determination and coordination; to assess the absorptive capacity of the recipients; and to 
allow them to have unified and consistent programs (Hubbard, 2009; Jan Tinbergen, 
1962; Waterston, 1979). 
Both academics and donors greatly pushed planning and programming, as well as 
national income accounting to be adopted by all countries. Economists, like Tinbergen, 
Leontief, Stone, and Lewis, all of whom received the Nobel Prize in Economics for their 
related contributions, published extensively and provided guidance to adapt the idea of 
Soviet central planning to market-based economies in the form of development planning 
(Boettke, 1994; Chenery, 1984; Lewis, 1966; Jan Tinbergen, 1958, 1967). Institutionally, 
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the UN, World Bank, OECD, and the US government, all made significant efforts to 
ensure that all aid recipients used development planning and national income accounting; 
in fact, while it was widely understood to be a requirement to receive aid, in some 
circumstances, it even become an explicit prerequisite, as, for example, in the case of the 
Marshall Plan or of the Alliance for Progress—which included 20 countries in Latin 
America (Black, 1960; Easterly, 1997, 1999, 2001; Hubbard, 2009; Mikesell, 1968; 
OECD, 1967; Waterston, 1979).  
Contrary to what would happen later in the 1980s and 1990s with regards to the 
adoption of Washington Consensus ideas and tools, most countries willingly and readily 
adopted both development planning and national income accounting (Woods, 2006). By 
1970, virtually every country receiving aid had done so (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology and Social Science Research Council, 1961; Mikesell, 1968). By 1971, the 
World Bank had fully integrated and operationalized Chenery and Strout’s dual gap 
approach, as well as development planning and national income accounting statistics. The 
Minimum Standard Model (MSM) was by then computerized (Easterly, 2001). During 
the next decade, it was considered indispensable to follow this overall approach to aid 
and development (Independent Commission on International Development Issues, 1980). 
Currently, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and the Revised Minimum 
Standard Model (RMSM) that provides the basic tools for the economic analysis behind 
the PRSSPs, incarnate the development planning approach that started in the 1950s 
(Carothers & de Gramont, 2013)  
The second wave. 
While the first wave of economic growth and development theories was breaking, 
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there were already dissenting voices. By 1955, the idea of pursuing growth per se was 
being questioned, with calls to focus on its quality rather on its rate (H. A. Arndt, 1984). 
In 1962, The United Nations Development Decade: Proposals for Action report (United 
Nations, 1962) was explicit about economic growth not being sufficient nor equivalent to 
development, which the report defined as growth plus change—meaning social and 
cultural qualitative and quantitative improvements. By 1970, concerns about the impact 
of economic growth on the environment were already being voiced (H. A. Arndt, 1984), 
and the dual gap theory of aid had disappeared from the academic literature, although 
even today, it has not ceased to be used (Dalgaard et al., 2004; Easterly, 2001; Nowak, 
2013). 
The second wave of economic growth and development theories started around 
1975, and is still developing (Browne, 1999; Bruton, 1997; Meier, 2001b). In contrast 
with the macro-focus of the first one, this second wave paid attention to the micro issues 
and built on the ideas of neoclassical economics. It also incorporated the concerns about 
the quality of growth, poverty, and the environment already expressed during the 
previous wave (H. A. Arndt, 1987; Browne, 1999). Consistent with the neoclassical 
synthesis, most of the theoretical and practical work during this wave related to 
minimizing the role of the government, getting prices right, promoting innovation and 
exports, investing in the development of human capital, as well as the institutions 
supporting the markets. 
The models of economic growth elaborated by Harrod-Domar and Solow were 
further refined by endogenizing technological progress and human capital formation 
(Lucas, 1988, 2002; Romer, 1990). These models brought a realization that the allocation 
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of capital from low- to high-productivity sectors, rather than the accumulation of capital, 
was the key to economic growth. This insight also implied that initial endowments and 
conditions were irrelevant in explaining the differences between countries in terms of 
development and economic growth (Hartmann, 2014; Helpman, 2004; Jones, 1998; 
Salvadori, 2003a; Warsh, 2006). Furthermore, the work of Douglas North (Carothers & 
de Gramont, 2013; North, 1990), integrated into mainstream economics the consideration 
of incentives embedded in institutions, and this, in turn, made economists take politics, 
governance, and institutions more seriously, although, unfortunately, still using a 
technocratic approach that was also implanted into the delivery of aid programs aimed at 
improving governance (Carothers & de Gramont, 2013). His insights provided a more 
structured link between micro-behaviors and their overall development consequences. 
Likewise, the works of Ostrom (2010; 2002), provided insights into the links between our 
individual actions and our collective impacts on public goods and the ecosystem. 
This underlying economics approach was complemented by other political and 
social messages about poverty, as well as the shared desire of all stakeholders to, at least, 
ensure people’s basic needs were met. A stronger focus on redistribution placed growth 
rhetorically in a secondary place in what was termed “redistribution with growth” 
(Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; Sagasti et al., 1999). Focus on individual needs led to 
the reception of Sen’s ideas about “development as freedom,” and to a push for human 
rights, as well as for increased civil society participation in the process of development 
(Browne, 1999; Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; Crewe & Axelby, 2012; Hartmann, 
2014; Sen, 2000). It also led to an effort to broaden the indicators driving development 
theorization (i.e., gross domestic product), to include education and health, among others. 
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This lead to the creation of the Human Development Index (Hartmann, 2014). 
Complementing the economists’ realization about the importance of institutions, 
this new wave also focused on anticorruption efforts and on promoting democracy 
(Carothers & de Gramont, 2013). Yet, neither this nor the other dimensions added besides 
growth, were effectively integrated into any of the practical tools driving aid praxis, 
particularly those more influential in the determination of volume and allocation of aid. 
The DNA of Aid (Further Explained) 
As previously discussed, since the very moment aid became a systematic 
enterprise at the end of the 1940s, and even when complemented by broader messages 
about poverty, freedom, civil participation, corruption, redistribution, and the quality of 
growth, development has been, for the most part, equated with economic growth or at 
least, covertly driven in its practice by it. This, in turn, made development planning, and 
the set of national income accounts supporting it, indispensable for the whole enterprise.  
This reality means that, not only do models of economic growth and development drive 
aid’s conception, design, delivery, and evaluation (its praxis), but that, as a consequence, 
the aid enterprise mainstreams the shortcomings of these models and their tools to all of 
its recipients. What are these shortcomings, and what have they meant in terms of aid 
effectiveness? 
As argued before, economic growth models have severely simplified the number 
of factors explaining growth. From the long list of factors cited by Marshall (see above), 
growth became dependent only on labour, capital, land, human capital, and technological 
progress. While institutions have also been added as a relevant factor for development, 
they still have not been fully made endogenous into a widely accepted unified 
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mainstreamed model of growth (Helpman, 2004; Jones, 1998; Salvadori, 2003a). Galor 
(2011) has recently developed a unified growth theory that integrates, and further 
dissects, the role of more factors and that explores the process and mechanisms of 
change; however, his theory is not yet widely recognized or hasn’t yet replaced the 
neoclassical paradigm. 
Not only are these models of economic growth based on a very unrealistic 
assumption, like, for example, that factors can be substituted by each other; they also 
leave essential factors, like natural endowments and the environment, completely out of 
any consideration. (Elson, 2013; Emmott, 2013; Hartmann, 2014; Helm, 2014; Laperche, 
2012; White, 1974). This lack of consideration, leading to the illusion that there are no 
limits to growth, has quickly resulted in the current environmental crisis in which 87 
percent of ocean fish are fully or over-exploited, 70 percent of the Earth’s available fresh 
water is being used for agricultural irrigation, the CO2 absorption capacity of Earth can 
only deal with 50 percent of existing emissions, floods in Asia have increased from 50 
per decade to nearly 700 per decade since 1950, and major fires in the American 
continent have gone from only 2 per decade, to 50 per decade since 1950 (Emmott, 
2013). Furthermore, these models only deal with the available quantities of economic 
factors (which are mostly given exogenously) not with their qualitative characteristics, or 
even less with the process through which these factors interact to create growth 
(Salvadori, 2003a; A P Thirlwall, 2002). Likewise, they rely mostly on the analysis of 
flows or marginal changes, rather than on the stocks, seriously limiting the possibility of 
understanding the complexity of the social, economic, and political system (N. B. 
Forrester, 1973; Meadows & Wright, 2008; Miller & Page, 2007; Page, 2011).  
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These models showcase the “ingredients” required to produce economic growth, 
but they do not offer a clear “recipe” through which these ingredients can be used to 
create growth. All they offer is an understanding of the potential relationships between 
the factors but not any real causation (Aghion & Durlauf, 2005--see the considerable 
entries in this edited volume all related to the different growth models; Black, 1960; 
Boettke, 1994; Easterly, 1997, 1999, 2001; Elson, 2013; Giugale, 2014; Griesgraber & 
Gunter, 1996; Hanushek, 2015; Jones, 1998). In fact, research shows that about 70 
percent of growth comes from sources other than factor accumulation (Easterly, 2001; 
Friedman, 1995; Hartmann, 2014; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013). Overall, this makes it very 
difficult to learn much from the models about potential government actions or policies 
that could lead to growth or development. 
Finally, these models are also characterised by additional unrealistic descriptions 
of the world, like, for example, that supply creates its own demand (demand is not 
considered), that the world is always in equilibrium (models are not dynamic but static), 
that there is no trade (economies are closed), that growth is equal for everyone (fails to 
consider that growth tends to be unequal and that inequality has a proven negative impact 
on growth), and that the structural transformation that results from growth does not have 
an economic cost nor changes the parameters on which the models are built (Disdier, 
Fontagné, & Cadot, 2014; Helpman, 2004; Kregel, 1972; Mikesell, 1968; Salvadori, 
2003a; Spence, 2011; A P Thirlwall, 2002). 
Given that the role aid would have in economic growth (at least in theory) was 
derived from these models, their shortcomings have had considerable impact in the ways 
in which aid was conceived and delivered. The political economy analysis of the classic 
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economists was reduced to very little. First, excessive focus on the “ingredients” meant 
that aid was often about increasing the availability of such factors, although the exact 
meaning of what these factors encompassed was not unequivocal. For example, as 
discussed earlier, Hanushek (2015) shows clear evidence about how increases in 
mathematical and scientific skills, and not education enrolment or some of the other 
qualifiers of human capital traditionally used, are much better explaining factors of 
growth. In practical terms, this has meant that increases in economic factors supported by 
aid may have been directed towards quantitative aspects of these “ingredients” that might 
had been irrelevant for growth.  
Additionally, given the narrow number of factors considered in these models, 
aid’s scope was also narrowed (as Wittgenstein would say, its world being limited by its 
own “language”). First, through an artificial grand-vision that aid could have a 
meaningful impact at the macro level (i.e., transforming the structure of an entire 
economy). Second, through the focusing into macro areas in which aid could probably 
have limited impact (i.e., development aid), and away from very specific and limited 
tasks in which perhaps aid could be much more effective (i.e., humanitarian aid) (Deaton, 
2013; White, 1974, p. 117). 
Furthermore, given that, as discussed above, the models of economic growth did 
not consider the process or “recipe” through which growth is achieved, aid itself could 
not do and, in fact, did little about improving such a process (Hartmann, 2014; White, 
1974). The black-box in which the “ingredients” were mixed together according to the 
models (the “free” markets), gave little insight on the policy actions required to promote 
growth (Hartmann, 2014; Kregel, 1972). Improving the “free” markets became a proxy 
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for improving the process of economic growth and development. 
Perhaps an even more important consequence that came about from relying on 
these models of economic growth was that, through the dual-gap theory, aid was 
automatically ascribed a catalytic role for which the proof was tautological: increased 
availability of factors was assumed to automatically generate growth. Theoretically, this 
meant that every single dollar of aid had an impact on economic growth as long as it went 
towards engrossing the “ingredients” or preventing any savings and foreign exchange 
gaps that could prevent such engrossment (Chenery & Strout, 1966a; Griesgraber & 
Gunter, 1996; Kregel, 1972; Toye, 1987; White, 1974). Aid was given a free-pass on 
theoretically demonstrating its role and relevance in creating economic growth (Browne, 
1999; Montgomery, 1967; White, 1974). And, in spite of having only been a “theoretical” 
free pass, it seems to have been assumed, in praxis, that aid catalytic role was a given. 
Ultimately, determining which “gaps” to fill, how to fill them, and when to fill 
them had no theoretical bearings. As per the example above, increasing education or 
investing in capital are not unequivocal or linear tasks (e.g., what does it mean to invest 
in education? Increasing enrollment? Increasing math skills?). Perhaps, more importantly, 
these questions reflect a conflicting identity: is filling a temporal gap the ultimate goal of 
aid, or is it to create the structural transformation of an economy, so it can stop 
experiencing gaps? While these may be related, the real problem created by these 
economic growth models was that they contributed to shaping aid along lines that made it 
socially and politically inept. A more comprehensive theory of aid that could give it the 
tools to overcome these limitations did not exist, nor does it yet (Helpman, 2004; 
Mikesell, 1968). Having been framed by these economic growth models, aid started 
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relying more and more on development planning techniques to guide volume, allocation, 
and delivery decisions. In the course of this process, development planning added its own 
problems and limitations to those aid already had. 
Development planning, as well as the Harrod-Domar model that underlies it, 
paints a picture of development as if it was a linear enterprise (Bruton, 1997; Crewe & 
Axelby, 2012). Given its macro level reach, it also relies on a series of aggregations and 
simplifications that obviate the richness of social, economic, and political arrangements, 
as well as other characteristics that give development life (Blakely, 2013; Carothers & de 
Gramont, 2013). In the end, while a good institutional framework and good governance 
are essential for development, it is individual initiative in a collective setting, not 
aggregated macro planning, which drives it (Boettke, 1994; Hayek, 2007). 
The kind of uniformity development planning creates, serves more the interests of 
donors rather than those of recipients—a common “language” allows donors to 
consolidate knowledge and facilitate their own planning and influence (Toye, 1987). 
Additionally, development planning is conducted according to decision-making time 
intervals that are considerably shorter than the development processes about which it tries 
to guide decisions. For example, most development planning is done for three or five 
years intervals, yet building human capital may take a generation or two (Bruton, 1997). 
Even more, development planning does not consider the costs of these development 
processes, nor of the resulting structural transformation costs, nor the implications they 
have for all other economic factors (Spence, 2011).  
Finally, development planning is severely constrained at the technical level by the 
limited data available and its poor quality, as well as by the same tautological thinking 
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underlying the economic growth models on which it is built. Economic data is available 
only for the variables allowed for by the “language” created by economic growth theory 
and national income accounting. (There are no widespread official variables for natural 
endowments, social benefits and costs, intangible capital, and social cohesion, among 
many others.) Furthermore, the quality of this data and the limited availability of time 
series, make the conversion coefficients that are at the core of development planning 
inaccurate, to say the least (Browne, 1999; Mikesell, 1968). This has obvious 
implications in terms of the analysis and conclusions that can be arrived through it. 
Ultimately, this makes the allocation of resources and the limited policy choices derived 
from it, questionable (Bruton, 1997; Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Social 
Science Research Council, 1961; Mikesell, 1968). Specifically, Davidson (2015) 
showcases through a very clear argument, the negative impact of the ergodic axiom 
behind the calculation of the above mentioned coefficients. 
Given that one of the main purposes of development planning is to achieve the 
most efficient allocation of scarce resources in an economy, the technical shortcomings 
discussed above makes it a less than optimal tool for ensuring the effectiveness of aid, or 
development policy for that matter (Aspers, 2011; Black, 1960; Browne, 1999; Freeman, 
2008; Hayek, 2007; Hubbard, 2009; Mikesell, 1968). In fact, already by 1975, there was 
evidence that the alleged Soviet economic growth success driven by central planning, had 
been both inaccurate and mostly overstated (P. R. Krugman, 1996; Meier & Rauch, 
2005). A final, but important point about the allocation of resources is that, while the 
allocation of aid funds was itself informed at the technical level by planning techniques, 
frequently other non-technical motives and political factors also had considerable say in 
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such decisions (White, 1974). 
In addition to these limitations discussed above, there is the underlying 
epistemological and ontological debate about how effective development planning can 
possibly be. For those on the right, meddling with “free-markets” create distortions and 
inefficiencies (Boettke, 1994; Frydman, 2011; Hartmann, 2014; Hayek, 2007; Spence, 
2011); for those on the left, markets require government intervention, and, appropriately 
done, planning can help avoid economic cycles and improve the efficiency of the 
allocation of economic factors. The right believes, instead, that ensuring the rule of law 
creates a more effective allocation (Boettke, 1994; Hartmann, 2014). In the end, these 
debates were dependent on underlying axiomatic views about what markets are and about 
how they work. 
It is appropriate at this point, to revisit the discussion earlier in this chapter about 
the epistemological and ontological approach of Ludwig Wittgenstein—which was also 
shared by his cousin Friedrich Hayek (2007). In fact, Wittgenstein proposes there are 
things about which nothing can be said and only can be shown (Hintikka, 2000; Tyler, 
2011). Likewise, Wittgenstein argued in favor of the primacy of language-games over 
specific rules and the means through which they operate (Hintikka, 2000, p. 49); in many 
circumstances, it is much more productive to set limits to what can be said and known 
than to engage in confusing debates and arguments that draw from “confusion” rather 
than “ignorance” (Arnswald, 2009; Atkinson, 2009). For both Wittgenstein and Hayek, 
change was not only a very personal and practical affair; it was also a process bounded by 
social interaction. Language limits the world of participants, but markets give them other 
means to articulate and exchange information and knowledge through social interaction 
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that cannot be captured or expressed by language (Hayek, 2007). As Atkinson (2009) 
puts it, 
Reality cannot be expressed in words, but this does not mean to deny it. When all 
philosophical language has been rejected, including the propositions of the book 
[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus] we are left with “seeing” the world correctly, 
not understanding or knowing in a correct manner. (p.5) 
Better information and knowledge leads to better decisions; yet, the social process 
through which these decisions come, cannot be short-circuited: trial and error need to 
occur, just as it does in evolution, or as Schumpeter proposes through a process of 
creative-destruction (Schumpeter, 1934). Surowiecki (2004) also provides valuable 
insights into the wisdom of crowds, and how many times they can outperform single 
individuals even when these individuals are deemed to be better informed and skilled. In 
his book, The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science, Easton 
(1971) presents the “black-box” as a similar space bounded by social interaction in which 
inputs come to generate outputs through a process we cannot fully understand in terms of 
causes and effects, but only likely results. In fact, neuroscientists like David Eagleman 
(Cytowic, 2009; Eagleman, 2016) have demonstrated how our perception of reality is 
composed of several multi-sensorial dimensions that lie outside our consciousness. 
This all means that both the right and the left have something in common: they 
see waste, or perhaps, more appropriately, a social cost, in the process of development 
deriving from: (a) well-intentioned decisions from the central planner who fails to have 
perfect information—when seen from the right; or from (b) trial and error and its interim 
consequences for the members of a society—when seen from the left (Boettke, 1994; 
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Bruton, 1997; Hanushek, 2015; Hartmann, 2014; Hayek, 2007; Riddell, 1987; Spence, 
2011). The matter becomes axiomatic and ideological at this point. 
In summary, what is clear is that economic growth theory acted as a Trojan horse, 
which, once inside, at the core of the aid enterprise, embedded itself to the point that, in 
practice, there was little distinction left between one and the other. Although rhetorically, 
the aid enterprise continually tried to broaden the concept of development, it is argued 
here, based on the evidence presented in this chapter, that this broadening has been 
mostly rhetorical because, ultimately, the praxis of aid has been shaped for the most part, 
by development planning and national income accounting and the theories connected to 
them. While epistemological, ontological, and ideological debates take place at the macro 
level, the women and men who are responsible for making the day-to-day decisions about 
the volume, allocation, and delivery of aid, rely on the “language” of development 
planning and national income accounts to make those decisions (Alacevich, 2009). At the 
macro level, a decision could be made about allocating more aid towards improving 
governance or education; yet, it is in the specific design of the projects and the way in 
which they are implemented, as well as in their interpretation of what is meant by 
governance and education or the idea of “improvement”, where the seeds of success or 
failure lie; and these seeds come at least to an important degree from the technocratic 
tools of aid drawing from economic growth theory. 
In turn, this means that, for developing countries that were dependent on it, aid 
became the Trojan horse through which economic growth theories became ingrained into 
their fabric. To access aid, developing countries needed to speak the “language” of aid, 
and, in learning to speak this language they ended up limiting their own world by it. 
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Has Aid Crossed the Gates of Hell? 
At this point, it would be easy to get disheartened about the possibility to ever 
improve the aid enterprise, particularly if the prominent and traditional analytical view is 
taken. However, when the alternative epistemological and ontological approach of 
Wittgenstein is used, a more positive view of aid emerges. 
In the old view, a number of measures or recommendations could be offered to 
address the issues aid faces and that have been widely discussed in this chapter. Among 
these, there could be more innovative and technically sound solutions than the countless 
ones that already have been proposed over the last sixty years. There is indeed a lot that 
could be done, for example, about perfecting a market for aid: neutral and more 
transparent information; supply and demand allowed to float fully without non-
development interests driving them; embedding of pricing risks and innovation; and, 
fuller participation of constituencies and stakeholders in the market decision-making 
process, among others. 
However, why would any of these suggestions gain more traction than the 
hundreds already out there? Why would these new ideas be more successful than those 
that have already been waiting for sixty years or more to be implemented? The answer is 
that they will not, not because they might not be the best ideas ever developed, but 
because the architecture, knowledge base, and data on which aid praxis relies, will not 
allow it, just as it has not allowed older ideas to succeed. 
So, what about using the alternative view provided in this chapter? How does this 
look? To answer this question, the example of the adoption of development planning can 
be used as a clear and loud example. At the height of the Cold War when East and West 
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were the most antithetical, central planning, a tool of socialist pedigree and the darling of 
the enemy’s economic policy-making, was not only adapted and adopted in the West as 
development planning. The West even forced it upon its allies (e.g., the Alliance of 
Progress in the 1970s). How is it possible that when actual physical walls were dividing 
East and West, while they pointed at each other with the possibility of human 
annihilation, while they sabotaged each other, or lured allies to become enemies both 
through diplomatic and more violent means, development planning slid through such 
heavy physical, political, social, and ideological hurdles, into the soul of Western 
economies, and through the aid enterprise, into the economies of their allies? As 
discussed before, this was the work of a Trojan horse. 
Following this historic and practical lesson, it is here argued that what is needed 
in order to enact considerable change into the aid enterprise, and as a consequence on its 
effectiveness, is a new Trojan horse: a horse that can overcome the circularity of the 
(in)effectiveness debate, which is currently in an ideological lock-down, and that can slip 
into aid’s praxis as an alternative and better tool than the ones built and supported by our 
current models of economic growth, and the tools of development planning and national 
income accounting that emerged from them. 
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Chapter 3  
Concerted Wealth Management as an Alternative Aid Paradigm 
 
Chapter Summary 
Aid has remained trapped by the limits of its language (i.e., economic growth 
theory, development planning, and national income accounts). As the history of ideas and 
the social, economic, and political change they generate demonstrates, shifting words and 
meanings can help create new spaces and attitudes towards reform. This approach is 
consistent with the Wittgensteinian framework adopted throughout this dissertation. 
Central to the idea of concerted wealth management as an alternative paradigm of 
aid, is the concept of self-reinforcing state (state, understood as a condition, not as a 
political community), a state in which the levels of wellbeing wanted and needed by the 
majority of a country’s citizens can be fulfilled intertemporally. This means that, under 
the proposed new paradigm, development can be conceived as the process leading 
towards such a self-reinforcing state. 
Fulfilling the wants and needs on which the wellbeing of a population rests, 
requires extracting value from the wealth available, and, since some of this wealth is 
shared globally, the self-reinforcing state cannot really exist independently for a single 
country, unless the majority of them are in such a state simultaneously. 
Intertemporally, wellbeing and value are conceived as an identity. Wellbeing does 
not depend on continuous economic growth but on the intertemporal optimality of the 
value extraction from wealth. Due to incommensurability issues related to, among others, 
the multiple and differing timelines of each kind of wealth, relying only on the monetary 
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denomination of such value or wellbeing severely limits and biases social, economic, and 
political decision-making. Relying, then, on its physical realities as well, is less distorting 
for managing the wealth of nations than doing so exclusively using monetary 
denominations. 
Given that value and wellbeing come from wealth, the management of all the 
different classes of assets that conforms to it, is critical. The traditional bundling of 
wealth into land, capital, and labour (more recently, knowledge) is far from providing a 
useful and more thorough framework for managing the wealth of nations.  
Wealth management involves ensuring the intertemporal potential of wealth to 
sustain the wellbeing of humanity. Therefore, it aims both at preventing or minimizing 
the degradation, depletion, or destruction of wealth, as well as maintaining, promoting, 
facilitating and building-up wealth’s potential to derive value. Wealth management 
involves managing each class of assets, individually and as part of a portfolio. Function 
gradients determine the classes of assets’ potential to derive value, and critical-paths both 
determine the development of such function gradients, as well as constrain not only 
wealth in general but the other dimensions of wealth that are subjectable to management. 
Wealth management also involves dynamically managing and balancing natural, 
material, and social structures, as well as the limits they impose on human activity. 
In this context, rather than a limited number of discrete states in which countries 
can be said to be (e.g., developed, transition, developing, least-developed), there is a 
continuum of countries in a path towards self-reinforcing state, some of them better-off 
than others (i.e., closer than others), but not yet having reached such a state unless most 
countries have simultaneously converged towards it. 
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Due to the undeniable interdependence of countries through the wealth they share 
(wealth on which the wellbeing of their citizens depends), individual or country specific 
wealth management alone cannot lead to self-reinforcing state. Only concerted efforts 
among all countries to manage wealth collectively can ensure global wellbeing. 
Concerted wealth management involves ensuring the convergence of all countries 
towards the self-reinforcing state. 
The proposed conceptual framework aims at addressing a number of limitations 
that the current paradigm imposes on aid. These, among others, include: broadening the 
classes of assets considered; building on the stocks of these classes of assets and not only 
on the flows they generate; focusing on intertemporal optimization of value extraction 
rather than the maximization of growth or present monetary value of flows; considering 
the process of development rather than just the ingredients that may be behind it; 
broadening the solutions to the coordination and control problems of cooperation beyond 
the traditional formulations of markets; addressing the costs created by the process of 
development; integrating the real impact inter-country flows and other international 
factors have in the intertemporal potential to extract value from wealth; and moving 
beyond the linear/historical conception of the process of development and instead, 
embracing a highly contextual approach that can offer alternative unimagined pathways 
towards achieving self-reinforcing state. 
Towards a New Paradigm 
Economic growth theory, development planning, and national income accounting 
operated as Trojan horses that, once at its core, shaped the aid enterprise into what it is 
currently. They embedded into its institutions a logic, process, and language—a 
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paradigm—that has superseded in influence many of the initiatives and efforts aimed at 
reforming aid over the last sixty years. The strictly practical nature of this theory and the 
tools derived from it, ensured that any macro-debates and big ideas aiming at shaping 
aid’s praxis would trickled down into practice, filtered and interpreted through the narrow 
lenses and spaces they provide. When, for example, at the macro-level, the aid 
community would agree on the need to improve human capital, the doers had to interpret 
what this meant in practical terms, how to measure it, and how it would be placed into the 
broader picture of aid praxis. Rather than disrupting the paradigm imposed by this theory 
and its tools, these macro-ideas where, instead, absorbed and shaped by it. 
Trapped inside this paradigm, aid has had little chance to overcome the 
shortcomings and limitations it has faced in improving its effectiveness and efficiency 
throughout its history. 
A new paradigm of aid requires new words and meanings, new tools—a new 
language that can break the limits of the world it inhabits today, the limits imposed by 
words and numbers that do not seem to be able to take it further away from where it has 
stood for the last six decades. This new language must redefine the current meanings of 
the words and numbers that are central to aid, as well as to the process of development it 
aims at enabling and facilitating. (Dopfer (2005a) takes a similar method to contextualize 
its approach in the new field of evolutionary economics; as Keynes, a close friend of 
Wittgenstein, did too in order to shift classical economic thinking (Davidson, 2015; P. 
Hall, 1989; Wittgenstein, 1974).) The new language must include new measures and 
indicators that expand the realm in which it operates, and that, so far, has been restrained 
by the current national income accounts. The objective of this new language would be 
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both, (a) to expand the knowledge and potential explanations about the process of 
development and the role aid can have in enabling and facilitating it, as well as, (b) to 
shift the debate about aid from the lock-down position in which it is today, towards freer 
and more fertile grounds where a clear distinction is made between those aspects of 
development about which aid can say and do something sensible and useful, and those 
about which it should remain silent and passive. This new language should also allow for 
the framing of new rules, as well as for the practices of alternative processes of change. It 
should also set the ground for a new language-game to take over and substitute for the old 
one. 
This new aid paradigm also requires an alternative explanation about the process 
of development than that provided by existing theories of economic growth. Even when it 
is unavoidable that such an alternative explanation would also contain shortcomings and 
limitations of its own, it would be essential for a new paradigm of aid and development to 
be effective in enabling and facilitating social, economic, and political change, that its 
shortcomings and limitations will themselves be different from those of the old paradigm. 
The Conceptual Framework of Concerted Wealth Management 
New words and meanings. 
Self-reinforcing state and wellbeing. Self-reinforcing state will be understood as 
a social, economic, and political condition in which a country possesses the capability 
and freedom to, intertemporally, sustain the wellbeing for the majority of its citizens and 
succeeds at it. Note that “state” does not refer to a political community, and that to avoid 
any confusion, no other meaning than “condition” will be given to it throughout this 
dissertation. Also, note that country is used here as a standard unit of analysis that could 
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be aggregated or disaggregated further, that is, the idea of self-reinforcing state could be 
as applicable to an individual community, as it can be to the entire world. 
This state is one in which two different levels of wellbeing: the first, required by 
the physical and biological realities and needs of human survival and agency (i.e., 
capabilities and freedom); and, the second, corresponding to the country’s self-
determined aspirations and desires about the wellbeing it wants for its citizens, beyond 
that initial first level. In this sense, wellbeing can be understood as a two-tier concept 
composed by a basic level concerned with respect for the integrity of human life—since 
one has first to be alive, free, and capable, in order to have the life one wants; and another 
level that, respecting the differences in the perceptions and aspirations of different 
societies and cultures, is freely determined by the majority of its citizens as desirable. 
Self-reinforcing state is then focused on sustainability, survival, and self-determination. 
In essence, it is a state in which the value extracted from wealth is optimal, as it 
allows for the fulfillment of intertemporal wellbeing (optimal value extraction), and in 
which, simultaneously, the allocation of the value extracted among citizens is optimal 
too, as most of them, if not all, get their needs and wants satisfied intertemporally 
(optimal value allocation). While it should be, by definition, a fairly stable state, the self-
reinforcing state has to be pro-actively maintained; attaining it does not guarantee 
remaining in it. It requires constant effort and innovation. It cannot be fixed given that the 
ecosystem is not fixed. Furthermore, as all countries share the same planet, the self-
reinforcing state can only be attained as long as there is room for all other countries to 
converge towards it, and for the majority of countries to maintain it through time (see 
definition for concerted wealth management below).  
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It is important to note, however, that the self-reinforcing state is defined as the 
ultimate but very improbable state a country can achieve and, as a consequence, serves as 
an asymptotical mathematical limit to which different countries are at different distances 
from, although never exactly at it. What matters is how close countries get to this limit. 
Furthermore, by definition, and as stated in the previous paragraph, the self-reinforcing 
state is, in the final analysis, an intertemporal collective state. Even if one or a few 
country are at any given time close to the self-reinforcing state, such degree of closeness 
to the state is intertemporally illusory and unsustainable due to a majority of countries not 
being as close to such a state. 
Development and value. Development is a process of social, economic, and 
political change towards the achievement of self-reinforcing state that takes place within 
the possibility space delineated by the natural, material, and social structures, and the 
limits they impose (see below for the definitions of these terms). It is the result of the 
extraction of value from wealth through natural and social forces—value being defined as 
a relative, social and/or individual, fulfilment of a facet, or the totality, of social and/or 
individual wellbeing. The logical consequence of this is that in the self-reinforcing state, 
total value extracted and total wellbeing achieved are equivalent: this total value could be 
termed optimal value extracted, and could replace, or at the very least complement, the 
idea of economic growth. The self-reinforcing state does not result from continuous 
economic growth but from intertemporally sustaining optimal value extraction. Reasons 
why value and wellbeing might not be equal outside of self-reinforcing state are: (a) 
inequality in the distribution of value/wellbeing; (b) value extracted is not sustainable; 
and (c) not enough value is generated to satisfy the levels of wellbeing wanted and 
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needed. Given that tangible and intangible proceedings from the use of wealth are 
exchanged at varying rates in monetary or barter terms, both in national and international, 
and formal or informal markets, their potential to contribute in the attainment of 
wellbeing is given by their relative standing against all other proceedings from wealth, as 
well as against the value of the needs and wants that required fulfilment in order for 
wellbeing to be attained. This relative standing that the proceedings from wealth have, 
and that is represented through prices, will be called monetary denomination. Due to the 
incommensurability of the different elements embedded within these monetary 
denominations, as well as due to the multiple and differing timelines embedded in them, 
their role informing social, economic, and political decision-making is not only severely 
limiting but also bias inducing. 
Wealth and classes of assets. Wealth is the collection of entities, which will be 
called classes of assets (potential or actual, concrete or abstract, tangible or intangible), as 
well as the combinations and permutations of these classes of assets (potential or actual, 
concrete or abstract, tangible or intangible), from which individuals and their societies 
can extract value. Each class of assets is defined by its origins (e.g., mineral, soil, water, 
biological, social, produced or non-produced); spatial characteristics (e.g., fixed, mobile, 
dispersed, concentrated, scarce, accessible, inaccessible, rival, non-rival, excludable, non-
excludable, tangible, intangible); and time characteristics (e.g., formation, transformation, 
degradation, depletion, destruction—which vary depending on whether they are 
renewable on non-renewable). Some assets exist within the physical boundaries of a 
country, while some others are regional or global but accessible to all or a few countries. 
The collection of all the classes of assets is considered here as an “ecosystem.” 
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Wealth management. Wealth management is the process of ensuring the 
intertemporal subsistence of wealth’s capacity to sustain the wellbeing for the majority of 
the citizens of a country, that is, its capacity to lead to self-reinforcing state (again, 
country is used as a standard unit of analysis that could be aggregated or disaggregated as 
needed). Therefore, wealth management aims at both preventing or minimizing the 
degradation, depletion, or destruction of wealth, as well as maintaining, promoting, 
facilitating, and building-up wealth’s potential to derive value intertemporally. Wealth 
management is central in the achievement and maintenance of self-reinforcing state. 
Given that wealth is a collection of diverse classes of assets, wealth management involves 
both the management of each individual asset, of each class of assets, as well as of the 
portfolio of these classes of assets, and of the space in which they exist and are used. 
Taken all together, wealth management aims at ensuring the intertemporal capacity of 
wealth to underpin the self-reinforcing state. Wealth management involves, among other 
things: (a) ensuring that the natural, material, and social structures, and the natural and 
social forces that flow through the spaces the limits of these structures create, are well 
understood and managed in a way that optimizes wealth’s intertemporal capacity to 
generate value and, through it, wellbeing (this means ensuring that the limits imposed by 
such natural, material, and social structures are accurately and clearly defined and known, 
that they are fairly stable in time, and that the process through which they are adjusted 
and changed is transparent and as predictable as possible); (b) managing the risks posed 
to the integrity and characteristics of individual assets, classes of assets, or the entire 
portfolio; (c) managing the timelines and function gradients by which each class of assets 
and the portfolio of classes of assets are bound; and, (d) optimizing each class of asset’s 
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and the entire portfolio of classes assets’ potential to generate value (their function 
gradients). Likewise, wealth management involves optimizing and managing the natural, 
material, and social structures (being able to do so at different degrees, be they locally, 
regionally, nationally, and globally) with the aim of optimizing the contribution of natural 
and social forces in creating wealth, as well as in extracting value from wealth, and 
therefore satisfying wellbeing. That is, it aims at improving the characteristics of the 
possibility space (see definition below). Finally, wealth management involves 
dynamically balancing structures and forces in an ever-changing context, to ensure 
adaptation, resilience, coevolution, and, ultimately, survival and sustainability. Given that 
at the highest level of aggregation, wealth is not a country level affair but a global one, 
concerted wealth management (see definition below) is essential to the achievement of 
self-reinforcing state. 
Critical-path. The process of wealth management is constrained by the physical 
and temporal dimensions (i.e., space and time) of the classes of assets that form a 
country’s wealth. In practical terms, this means that the ability to extract value from a 
class of assets might be dependent on: (a) the availability and use of other classes of 
assets; (b) the available quantities and qualities of the class of assets and how they relate 
to the quantities and qualities of the other classes of assets in which the extraction of 
value from it might rely or depend on; (c) the qualities of the class of assets that are a 
result from its nature, formation, transformation, and degradation; and, (d) the contextual 
environment in which value is being extracted from the class of assets. In this 
perspective, critical-path refers to the space and time constraints introduced by the 
physical, temporal, and contextual realities of the classes of assets that create a minimum 
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timeline for their formation, maintenance, transformation, degradation, and use (both, 
individually and as part of a portfolio), and, therefore, for the potential to extracting value 
from them. 
Better-off countries. Better-off countries are those that are closer to achieving 
self-reinforcing state. 
Worse-Off countries. Worse-off countries are those that are farther from 
achieving self-reinforcing state. 
Natural and social structures, and rules and routines. The natural world has an 
order. Whether we know all the rules and routines that create such order, or whether we 
can explain them or not, they seem to exist (which is the logical conclusion resulting 
from the fact that we continuously discover evidence of such rules and routines). This 
order can be called natural structure. Natural forces operate within the natural structure 
and are bounded by it (this distinction between force and structure is notional only, as in 
the natural world it is because of the structure that the forces exist—they do not seem to 
be two separate realities, but one). 
While embedded and bounded by the natural structure, the social world has an 
order of its own too. Nevertheless, this order is in appearance more complex (it might be 
as well that we have yet not been able to make better sense of it). Both the interaction of 
the individual with itself, as well as with others—be it one or many, is influenced, and 
sometimes bound, by both the social and natural structures. There are implicit and 
explicit, and formal and informal rules and routines in a social structure. Rules and 
routines can facilitate or disrupt these interactions at different points in time and/or in 
different contexts. Human interaction, through trial and error, results in preferences for 
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certain rules and routines over others. This temporal state in which certain rules and 
routines have precedence over others for the majority of those interacting, can be called a 
social structure.  
Social structures embed all the different dimensions of human interaction: social, 
economic, political, and cultural, among others. Regardless of their immediateness, they 
also embed in them a collection of temporal choices made in the past and accumulated 
over time, which have created, among others, social, infrastructural, and technological 
rigidities that constrain how much and how radically these social structures can feasibly 
change in time, as well as the potential impact social forces can have on them (see 
material structures below). 
In fact, social forces tend to be bound by the natural, material, and social 
structures; yet, contrary to what happens in the natural world, material and social 
structures are not exact and serve only as reference points (they can be transgressed at 
different levels, creating or not consequences for those who transgress them, as well for 
other members of the society). Social structures can be simple or complex: they can have 
very specific or broad roles, they can be fleeting or enduring, among others. Yet, we 
know little about the causal relationships that lead to any of these characteristics. 
Specifically, social structures might be local, regional, national, or global; they might be 
based on written laws and regulations, and standardized instruments of exchange—like 
money; they might be based on explicit or implicit beliefs and moral values; they might 
be based on culture or tradition; and, they might create incentives and motivations that 
lead to specific social dynamics, as well as to their dismantling; among others. 
Ultimately, natural, material, and social structures impose limits that delineate a 
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possibility space through which the natural and social forces that are behind the process 
of development flow. 
(This notional description of natural and social structures is not meant to imply 
that a comprehensive logical construct of the world is intended or even possible. The 
point of conceiving such structures is to conceive the possibility of constructing limits, 
even if inexact, that, in turn, can help delineate the space in which the process of 
development takes place. Given the emphasis of the proposed conceptual framework on 
the physical aspects of the wealth of nations, as a consequence, this notional description 
of natural, material, and social structures aims at supporting the possibility of 
“materializing” them so the limits discussed above can be sketched and the possibility 
spaces delineated; both of these elements, central to the proposed conceptual framework.) 
Natural and social forces. Development is driven by natural and social forces, 
which alter the state of wealth in terms of its time (temporarily or permanently) and/or 
space (partially or fully) dimensions. Natural forces are, among others, climatological, 
biological, geological, and chemical; and overall, they are space-time-bounded. 
Alterations these forces can cause are, among others, erosion, decaying, aging, death, 
extinction, displacement, evaporation, solidification, destruction, and depletion. In turn, 
social forces are those that take place within existing natural, material, and social 
structures and the limits they impose, and that are initiated and carried forward up to a 
point in time, by an individual or group of individuals—consciously or subconsciously; 
purposely or aimlessly, and any other degrees within these categories or others.  
Both natural and social forces, theoretically, carry the same invariable causal 
effect: the same exact force, carried by the same exact agent, in the same exact space and 
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context, and in the same exact subjects, will have the exact same effect. However, in 
reality, since both the natural and social orders are complex in nature, there is barely 
anything exact about them, making both natural and social forces more or less 
unpredictable in terms of their impacts. Given that natural forces are bound by more 
ordered structures (e.g., thermodynamics, chemical reactions, physical properties, 
biological processes), planning and managing for their impacts is less uncertain than the 
planning and management of social forces (at least with the state of our current 
knowledge). Social forces seem to be less ordered and, therefore, less certain, particularly 
because their agents and the context in which they act are barely in comparable states 
through the space-time continuum. Certainty and uncertainty are linked to risks. From 
this perspective, social forces might offer more certainty at the macro level, as structural 
social change tends to be slow and gradual. Even when much faster and radical social 
change can take place at the micro-level, the progression towards tipping-points that 
could trigger much more uncertain structural changes, is potentially tractable. On the 
contrary, some natural forces are highly unpredictable and can potentially have 
devastating effects at a macro scale, all in a matter of minutes or even seconds (e.g., 
earthquakes, typhoons, tsunamis). Both forces are also highly sensitive to initial 
conditions and contextual factors, and their impacts in terms of space-time dimensions 
(e.g., scale, transientness or permanency, degree) vary accordingly. Natural and social 
forces flow through the possibility space that is delineated by the limits imposed by 
natural, material, and social structures. 
Material structures. The stock of fixed produced capital and mobile produced 
capital that, underpinned by the intangible produced capital that contributed to their 
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creation, provides human beings, individually and collectively, with a constrained 
physical space and skewed incentives towards maintaining the physical characteristics of 
such material structures (due to the fixed costs involved in changing them). Material 
structures tend to be defined not only by local physical and intangible choices, but also by 
international trade, which requires sharing certain material platforms, across countries (or 
across other levels of aggregation and disaggregation). The costs involved in contesting 
such material structures tend to be prohibitive, and increasingly so with the passage of 
time, as they embed and entrench themselves deeper and more broadly. Being of varied 
physical natures, material structures’ lifecycles tend also to be different, introducing 
further complexity into the kind of constraints they impose. Material structures are 
related to social, economic, and political power and its distribution. Those social actors, 
at different levels of aggregation, who are further ahead in possessing or having access to 
material structures that mimic or are highly matched and synchronized with those that are 
most common and pervasive, can draw power from this degree of similitude or 
approximation, particularly over those other social actors whose material structures are 
farther away from those common and pervasive ones. 
Possibility space. Natural, social, and material structures set each corresponding 
natural, social, and material limits. These limits, which mutually affect and impact each 
other, define and confine within them a possibility space within which natural and social 
forces flow. Within these possibility spaces is where human life takes place. Projected in 
time, the possibility space can be conceived in its intertemporal dimension, as a space-
time continuum for social, economic, and political interaction. 
Inter-country flows. Non-produced assets that are transferred from one country to 
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another (or between any other parties at different levels of aggregation) represent, in the 
final analysis, an exchange of wealth. Similarly, since tangible and intangible produced 
goods and capital come into life through the extraction of value from wealth, wealth ends 
up embedded in them, and therefore, when exchanged, they also actualize an exchange of 
wealth between the parties involved. Consequently, inter-country flows refer to the 
exchanges in physical units of wealth, directly or indirectly (through their embedding in 
goods and services), that take place between countries in a context of natural, material, 
and social structures and limits, within which natural and social forces flow and interact. 
Concerted wealth management. A concerted effort by a group of countries aimed 
at managing their individual and shared wealth in ways that ensure that the majority of 
these countries are in self-reinforcing state (that this, the number of worse-off countries 
among them, is minimal or zero). It involves: (a) continuous efforts to enhance the way in 
which countries’ and common global wealth is managed (improved wealth management); 
(b) continuous efforts to enable the majority of countries to engage in balanced inter-
country flows that do not impact their wealth in negative ways; and (c) continuous 
safeguarding of every country’s and common global wealth to minimize endogenous and 
exogenous negative effects. 
Public and private debt. Public and private organizations can issue debt to 
finance expenditure and investment. Given that most organizations keep a certain level of 
debt across generations, the stock of public and private debt represents an 
intergenerational transfer of wealth. The portion of this stock that has served to fund 
consumption from previous generations, represent a negative transfer of wealth—future 
generations will have to pay for current consumption with questionable benefits to 
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themselves. The portion of the stock of debt that has served to accumulate produced 
tangible and intangible capital or to form or improve other classes of assets, while to be 
paid by future generations, also might benefit them. Furthermore, extremely high levels 
of public and private debt may constraint the possibility of future generations to issue 
debt, as well as the resources available to them (given that a portion of these resources 
will have to be used to pay the stock of debt and its interests), reducing the flexibility 
they will have to manage the process of development (debt facilitates and enables a 
smoother process of development given the diverging timelines involved in the 
formation, use, and degradation of wealth). High levels of public and private debt might 
as well influence the country’s international social, economic, and political relative 
standing. That is, excessive relative stocks of debt introduce rigidities that constrain the 
choices, capabilities, and freedom of individuals and societies over time. 
Local and global social, economic, and political relative standing. Social, 
economic, and political power are all linked to each other. This power is, however, not 
absolute but relative. It is defined in relation to others, as well as in relationship to 
context. Unequal power is a characteristic of any human collective, as it is unequal in 
terms of health, cognitive, and behavioural characteristics. This inequality is one of the 
problems of coordination and control presented by cooperation. Different collectives deal 
with these problems in different ways, some being more successful than others in 
establishing checks and balances that minimize the negative consequences these 
inequalities may have in the collective. Unchecked inequalities lead to asymmetries that, 
in turn, translate into formal and informal institutional arrangements that embed 
mechanisms, from which, in turn, a likely outcome will be to produce unequal benefits to 
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different groups or individuals in the collective (usually reinforcing the inequalities that 
created these mechanisms in the first place). The still incomplete global social, economic, 
and political global structure of today has lent, and continues to lend itself for inequalities 
that keep reinforcing each other. This has created differences in the relative standing of 
countries that do not correspond to either the population or the geographical extension of 
the countries but to the social, economic, and political power that has, in turn, attached to 
it. This relative standing has allowed a reduced number of countries to set and 
continually influence, more than proportionally, the global social and material structures, 
further entrenching such unequal relative standing. The process of development and the 
conditions under which wealth management can take place are thoroughly influenced by 
the social and material limits these local and global structures influence and, sometimes, 
even determine. Therefore, a country’s relative standing influences how enabling or 
disabling the global structure can be in its efforts to attain the self-reinforcing state, that 
is, its capabilities and freedom to develop are influenced by its local and global social, 
economic, and political relative standing.  
The requirements. 
An alternative conceptualization of the process of economic growth that allows 
for an alternative conceptualization of development planning and national income 
accounting, and, hence, a new vision and paradigm of aid, has to overcome the main 
shortcomings of the existing paradigm (for several accounts of these shortcomings see, 
Browne, 1999; Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; Deaton, 2013; Easterly, 1997, 2014; 
Easterly & Pfutze, 2008; Godfrey, 2014; Riddell, 2007; Schabbel, 2007; Spence, 2011). 
As a result, the new paradigm would have to (the following points draw on a considerable 
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amount of literature about aid (in)effectiveness and hence the considerable number of 
citations supporting each one): 
 Go beyond the broader categories of labour, capital, and knowledge and 
innovation to incorporate the more specific and much more relevant 
classes of assets that form the wealth of nations in the twenty first century. 
This would include consideration of public goods. It would also ensure 
sufficient understanding of the characteristics of these types of wealth in 
terms of their origin, and both their space-time dimensions. The latter 
include an understanding of the ways in which wealth can be used and 
transformed, as well as ways in which it comes into existence, is created, 
or remains idle when not used or transformed (Common, 2014; Godfrey, 
2014; Sengupta, 2013; Spence, 2011; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013). 
 Consider, as a starting point, the stocks of wealth and then build on their 
understanding, to, in turn, identify the flows that both derive from and 
impact on these stocks. The new paradigm would have to explore the 
relationships between stocks of wealth, between these stocks and different 
types of flows, as well as between flows—always focusing on their 
ultimate effects on wealth (Albala-Bertrand, 2013; Common, 2014; 
Richardson, 2014; Sengupta, 2013; Spence, 2011; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013). 
 Focus on the intertemporal optimization of wealth rather than on the 
maximization of present outcomes or present value (recognizing that there 
are physical limits to growth). The new paradigm would also have to 
consider that this optimization also requires the planning and management 
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of potential emergencies and other externalities that could impact the 
stocks of wealth (Athreya, 2013; D. Cohen, 2012; Common, 2014; 
Ermisch, 2012; Laperche, 2012; M. S. Morgan, 2012; Sengupta, 2013). 
 Not only rely on the ingredients that may impact economic growth but 
also be built on a more solid understanding of the process of social, 
economic, and political change through which these ingredients get mixed 
(Campbell, 2004; Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; Crowder, 2004; 
Fligstein, 2001; Gérard-Varet, Kolm, Mercier Ythier, & International 
Economic Association, 2000; Goldstein, 1993a, 1993b; Reynaud, 2002; 
Roth, 2015; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013; Jan Tinbergen, 1962). 
 Rely not only on market forces as the main means for mixing the 
ingredients for growth, but on the role of government and society as 
creators and enablers of alternative methods to address the coordination 
and control problems of cooperation (Arnon, 2011; Carothers & de 
Gramont, 2013; Crowder, 2004; Finnemore, 2013a; Fligstein, 2001; 
Goldstein, 1993a, 1993b; Hubbard, 2009; Kaul, Grunberg, & Stern, 1999--
several of the chapters in this edited volume are quite relevant; Krugman, 
1996; Michalos, 2010; Reich, 2015; Roth, 2015; Szirmai, Naude, & 
Alcorta, 2013; Turner, 2016). 
 Address the costs of transformation resulting from the process of 
development (Athreya, 2013; Barnett, 1998; Campbell, 2004; Commission 
on Global Governance, 1995; Common, 2014; Goldstein, 1993a, 1993b; 
Goodspeed, 2012; Grossman & Helpman, 2014; Hartmann, 2014; 
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Independent Commission on International Development Issues, 1980; P. 
R. Krugman, 1996; Sengupta, 2013; Spence, 2011; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013; 
Szirmai et al., 2013; Jan Tinbergen, 1962; Woods, 2006). 
 Consider levels of aggregation and disaggregation of social interaction, as 
well as the forces this interaction creates and releases, both at micro and 
macro levels (Bourguignon, 2004; Ermisch, 2012; Sengupta, 2013; 
Slanina, 2014). 
 Give consideration to the local, regional, national, and global social and 
material structures in which the process of development takes place, 
particularly through the wealth value transfers that result from all inter-
country flows (Campbell, 2004; D. Cohen, 2012; Commission on Global 
Governance, 1995; Elson, 2011, 2013; Finnemore, 2013b; Gérard-Varet et 
al., 2000; Independent Commission on International Development Issues, 
1980; Kaul et al., 1999--a very relevant edited volume with several 
chapters supporting the importance of the point made above; Krugman, 
1996; Lall, 1981; Laperche, 2012; McKinsey Global Institute., 2014; 
Nayyar, 2002; Sachs, 2000; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013; Jan Tinbergen, 1962; 
Wall, 2014).  
 Integrate both the endogenous and exogenous factors that impact the 
capabilities and freedom of countries to develop (Barnett, 1998; Dasandi, 
2014; Laperche, 2012; Modelski & Thompson, 1996; Perez, 2002; Sen, 
2000; Spence, 2011; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013; Szirmai et al., 2013). 
 Allow for a drawing of a roadmap for a new vision of concerted wealth 
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management that does not assume a catalytic effect and that focuses on 
supporting countries to manage their wealth. In doing so, lay down a clear 
mandate with only one driving motive and one architecture with consistent 
incentives. Also, provide a typology of specific activities and actions 
(mechanisms) that can be taken to achieve its ultimate objective of 
enabling most countries to attain the self-reinforcing state. 
 Not rely on an underlying assumption that the process of development is a 
linear enterprise, driven first by countries’ primary, then secondary, and, 
finally, tertiary sectors (D. Cohen, 1998). 
The process of development. 
Attaining self-reinforcing state requires of a country that it has enough potential 
(in the form of wealth) and actual value (extracted from wealth) to be able to satisfy, 
intertemporally, the levels of wellbeing needed and wanted by the majority of its citizens. 
Value is derived from wealth through the process of development, which, in turn, relies 
on wealth management, resulting in optimally extracting value from wealth. 
This process of development, a result of social, economic, and political change, is 
then based on a comprehensive management of the different classes of assets that 
compose the wealth of nations, taking into account their nature and the characteristics 
that result from this nature—the natural and material structures. This management of 
wealth takes place in the context of local and global natural, material, and social 
structures. Within these structures, inter-country flows (or exchanges at every other level 
of aggregation) convey wealth-value transfers, which add or subtract to the wealth stocks 
and flows of countries. While wealth management is inherently an endogenously-lead 
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process, it is constrained and shaped by exogenous conditions imposed by the global 
natural, material, and social structures. The link between these endogenous and 
exogenous factors shaping wealth management lies in the wealth-value transfers that 
result from inter-country flows, as well as in the constraints the global natural, material, 
and social structures impose in the corresponding local ones. Ultimately, since there are 
certain classes of assets from which all countries draw, and since there are actual 
exchanges of wealth between them, the possibility for all countries to converge towards 
the self-reinforcing state is dependent on concerted wealth management. 
In order to manage its wealth, a country has to understand the origins and nature 
of each class of assets composing its wealth, and how these determine space and time 
characteristics that govern their use. It also has to understand how wealth can be 
impacted, not only by the use countries make of it by extracting value from it, but also by 
how natural and social forces may transform, degrade, deplete or destroy it. These two 
dimensions: 1) use and the maintenance of wealth to create value, and 2) managing of its 
integrity and the risks to it, are very distinct from each other. Both, however, are essential 
to the process of wealth management. Ultimately, management of wealth’s integrity and 
risks to which this integrity is subjected to, is dependent on the possession of wealth 
itself. This is why countries that possess more wealth are better able to deal with the risks 
of potential emergencies, and the costs of real ones. This capability, of course, is 
characteristic of the self-reinforcing state. 
Wealth management also aims to balance the natural and social forces behind the 
process of social, economic, and political change, as well as managing the structure 
through which these forces flow and interact (the possibility space). Besides being based 
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on the understanding of wealth’s origin, nature, and characteristics, wealth management 
means balancing the natural structures, as well as the local and global material and social 
structures through which wealth is owned, used, exchanged, and shared—among others. 
It also means balancing natural and social forces that come into play through the above-
mentioned structures; for example: path dependence; social, economic, and political long-
term cycles; global dynamics; conflicts; preferences; comparative advantages; social, 
economic, and political shocks; and natural disasters—among others. As these forces are 
dynamically changing, the space in which they interact require adjusting (through the fine 
tuning of socio-material limits). It is also through management of these structures that 
countries can influence forces behind the process of development, or, at least, their 
relative importance in the process of development. Both structures and forces feed into 
and from each other, exercising influence into each other that can result in them 
changing. This is why the local and global social, economic, and political relative 
standing of a country is so relevant: the better its relative standing is, the more it is able to 
influence all of the above structures that, in turn, are so crucial to its own survival and 
development. This also means that an objective of concerted wealth management should 
be to continuously balance the relative standing of countries to ensure all of them have a 
voice and that such voice is relevant in shaping the global material and social structures. 
In achieving this balance between forces and structures, wealth management aims 
to fill the shortcomings and limitations within the current paradigm by, among others: 1) 
considering the critical-paths by which the process of development is bounded; 2) 
addressing market failures due to the intertemporal complexities of managing wealth; 3) 
devising tools and policy instruments to shape the elasticities that govern the 
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complementarity, substitution, and transformation of wealth; 4) coordinating stocks and 
flows of wealth and optimizing wealth as a portfolio, rather than focusing instead on 
sectors, projects, and simple allocation of labour and capital; 5) managing aspects of the 
local and global material and social structures that influence the process of development; 
6) actively managing the distribution of outcomes and wealth, as well as the distribution 
of the costs of the structural transformation that result from the process of development; 
and 7) achieving intertemporal optimization of the value generating capacity of wealth 
(optimal value extractions), as well as of its distribution, in ways that are sustainable and 
that create an equitable society where the levels of wellbeing needed and wanted by the 
majority are met (optimal value allocation). 
Contrary to the neoclassical understanding of economic growth, wealth 
management is built on the idea that physical limits exist, and that if these are not 
considered, the resulting degradation, depletion, and destruction of wealth will mean that 
intertemporally, the country, and the world (or any other unit of analysis), will not be able 
to achieve nor sustain a desired level of wellbeing, or even worse perhaps, the level of 
wellbeing that it needs. The neoclassical model assumes that markets usually have full 
information and, therefore, that decisions made through them include these intertemporal 
considerations. While this understanding has been challenged with the introduction of the 
idea of asymmetrical information and incomplete contracts, its implications in terms of 
the management of wealth, particularly in terms of its intertemporal dimension, have not 
been yet fully considered nor integrated into neoclassical or new-growth models. The 
proposed alternative approach to wealth management considers and integrates the idea 
that a different kind of government and or societal role, both at the local and global 
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levels, would be needed in order to ensure that this intertemporal optimization of value 
extraction from wealth and its optimal allocation can take place, in spite of these market 
imperfections. Furthermore, this different role will also be needed to ensure that the 
natural tendency of the current approach to economic growth to foster inequality, 
resulting from the structural transformation that enables it, is addressed in a timely 
manner so the majority of the citizens of a country can actually enjoy the levels of 
wellbeing they need and want. If we consider human capital as a kind of wealth, its 
management means ensuring not only that it is not degraded, depleted, or destroyed, 
which is more likely in highly-unequal societies plagued with poverty or more vulnerable 
to emergencies, conflicts, or disasters, but that it is also equally and thoroughly built, 
maintained, and enhanced. This is unlikely to happen across the board in very unequal 
societies. 
A different government and societal role does not necessarily mean restricting or 
intervening on certain actions, redistributing output or wealth, or other traditional ways in 
which it has been understood (although some of these might be needed and legitimate). 
What it means is to proactively manage (e.g., designing, fine-tuning, modifying) the 
possibility space through which natural and social forces can create and innovate (among 
others), by relying on both traditional and/or alternative or modified market mechanisms 
that can improve the ways in which society deals with the problems of coordination and 
control that are created through cooperation. 
Wealth management, while also notionally related to the concept of development 
planning, is not to be confused with it. The latter is narrower and less strategic, and, it is 
also based on the same outdated understanding of economic growth in which 
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development economics and aid are based. Wealth management focuses on wealth, both 
stocks and flows, while development planning focuses on sectors, projects, and, the 
configuration of labour and capital—mostly in the form of flows, not stocks (Anthony P 
Thirlwall, 2011). More specifically, development planning relies, for the most part, on a 
‘black box’ in the sense that it is markets and prices (and through them, the public and 
private sectors), which drive a great deal of the decisions with regards to resource 
allocation and investment. 
The Harrod-Domar understanding of economic growth that underpins 
development planning provides the theoretical basis for programming the future based on 
coefficients that determine the needed levels for capital formation based on the desired 
targets of economic growth. While the concept of managing wealth is a form of 
developing planning, it is only in as much it involves the allocation of stocks of wealth 
and of the flows that result from the use of these stocks of wealth. Ultimately, 
development planning is not directly concerned with the explicit management of wealth 
per se, but with the narrow idea of allocating scarce labour and capital in ways in which 
output is maximized. The assumption under development planning is, for the most part, 
that the role of a government is limited to: (a) providing public goods; (b) addressing 
market imperfections by correcting them and providing the institutional environment for 
them to thrive; (c) protecting citizens, particularly those who are most vulnerable, and, 
(d) ensuring an intra- and inter-temporal equitable distribution of income (Anthony P 
Thirlwall, 2011). 
On the contrary, the proposed concept of wealth management underpinning the 
process of development, aims at helping governments deal with, among others, some of 
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the most difficult limitations of traditional markets (Athreya, 2013; Claessens et al., 
2009; Independent Commission on International Development Issues, 1980; Sengupta, 
2013; Szirmai et al., 2013). For example: 
 Diversity of the time-horizons that, given the different nature of the 
classes of assets a country possesses, need an intertemporal coordination 
that no single market can provide. This includes management and 
coordination of the critical-paths by which each kind of wealth is 
constrained in terms of its formation, transformation, and degradation. 
This also implies managing other temporal and physical limits of wealth, 
including any global coordination required by virtue of these limits—
coordination that is made possible through the local and global material 
and social structures (Common, 2014; Goodspeed, 2012; Landes, 1998; 
Jan Tinbergen, 1962). 
 Coordination of uncoordinated markets through the provisioning of 
consistent and systematic intertemporal signals that can extend the 
effective time dimensions under which markets operate (through the 
shaping of a possibility space). Markets’ functioning relies on information. 
In the long run, it is government policy and regulation, as well as the 
natural, material, and social structures, which provide markets with more 
information about an uncertain future than any independent organizations 
or forecasting methods could. Government policy and regulation, when 
intertemporally backed-up by a solid social contract, represent a willful 
conscious commitment and, therefore, is not as unstable and unpredictable 
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as micro-behaviours are (Goodspeed, 2012; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013; Jan 
Tinbergen, 1962). 
 The process of shaping, through policy, of the elasticities of different 
classes of assets, so their formation, complementarity, substitution, and 
transformation can be strategically managed so as to enable the attainment 
of the self-reinforcing state. (This implies managing both stocks and flows 
of wealth.). Markets cannot do this without proper government 
information and regulation, given the wide and complex dispersion of 
wealth across space and time. No one single market deals with all assets 
and dimensions of wealth at once; nor do any of the assets relate 
exclusively, in all its dimensions, to only one single market (Common, 
2014; Goodspeed, 2012; Independent Commission on International 
Development Issues, 1980; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013). 
 Management of the time-dimensions of flows and stocks of wealth (e.g., 
formation, transformation, improvement, maintenance, degradation, 
idleness, etc.), based on an understanding of the critical-paths to which 
different kinds of wealth are bound (Common, 2014; Crewe & Axelby, 
2012; Goodspeed, 2012; Landes, 1998; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013). 
 Management of the entropy created by uncoordinated markets, and by the 
structural transformation of the economy that ultimately degrades the 
relative stocks of wealth and that generate shifts in the material and social 
structures, which create winners and losers (Common, 2014; Goodspeed, 
2012; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013). 
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 Coordination and management of the implications of the global material 
and social structures on local and global structures; on countries’ flows 
and stocks of wealth; as well as on the flows and stocks of public local and 
global goods (Common, 2014; Independent Commission on International 
Development Issues, 1980; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013; Jan Tinbergen, 1962).  
 Management of the process of influencing a more equal distribution of a 
country’s stocks and flows of wealth among its citizens, as well as of the 
value obtained from them, which have proven not to occur naturally or 
automatically (Gérard-Varet et al., 2000; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013). 
 Minimization of excessive upswings and downswings in the functioning 
of a society that create social costs, which, in turn, are not necessarily 
fairly distributed and therefore end affecting different groups unevenly 
(Frydman, 2011). 
This concept of wealth management can perhaps be better understood by relating 
it to the rules of chess: each type of wealth, the classes of assets, could be equated to the 
different kinds of pieces used in the game, each one of a different nature and with 
different characteristics and roles and rules governing its use, but all contributing to the 
game (some of these roles and rules are given by natural structures while others are given 
by material or social ones). Wealth management could also be equated to the chess game 
itself, whereby moving a piece in certain ways, each player aims at building 
configurations of pieces on the board (in turn, bound by the constraints their interaction 
create) that serve a specific purposed in the game, always in relation to another player’s 
configurations, be it defense, attack, or both, and that, ultimately, contribute to the end 
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result of the game: winning or losing. This last part of the analogy does not have to 
correspond with the reality of wealth management: the world can certainly be a zero-sum 
game, but this does not mean it has to be as such. It is precisely through concerted wealth 
management that such an outcome can be avoided. 
Both the level of value extraction and level of wellbeing are representative and 
realistic of the realities of the ecosystem in which human life takes place, only when they 
are sustainable; otherwise, they are illusory in the sense that their existence is only 
possible at the cost of other human beings’ present and future value and wellbeing (due to 
their degrading effect on a country’s wealth on which this wellbeing depends). 
Optimal value extraction (as a new conceptualization of economic growth) can no 
longer be understood by only considering wealth to be labour and capital, or even natural 
endowments and institutions. The way in which assets are currently lumped together 
creates considerable limitations for the understanding of their potential contribution to 
development, and, perhaps most importantly, to the understanding of how they can be 
sustainably used in the process of development. It also creates huge limitations for 
understanding how they can be influenced by policies through wealth management 
efforts. Instead, the current social, economic, and political order relies on many more 
specific types of wealth or specific modifiers that impact their potential to generate value, 
such as: 
 Natural endowments and their connection with global public goods. 
 Social, cultural, psychological, and spiritual capital (e.g., institutions, 
laws, rules, values, traditions), considered in this dissertation as social 
structures and social forces. 
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 Human capital (people and their capacity to create and manage wealth to 
extract value). 
 Infrastructure (e.g., public services, roads, ports, schools, hospitals) and 
produced physical capital (e.g., fixed and mobile produced assets used in 
extracting value). 
 Intangible-produced capital (e.g., intellectual assets, like corporate 
practices, branding, and others that generate value, not only through 
locally driven use, but also through royalties or through their future 
development into productive physical and intangible capital). 
 Local and global stock of public and private debt (representing the present 
value of the country’s wealth that has been borrowed from the future). 
 Local and global social, economic, and political relative standing (a result 
of the relative size of the wealth of a country and its power against that of 
other countries, giving it a relative bargaining position that impacts, either 
positively or negatively, the balance of its inter-country flows and the 
wealth value transfers they convey). 
In using these types of wealth (classes of assets) and their modifiers, to extract 
value, a country cannot do so by ignoring their nature and characteristics; even less so by 
not being strategic in their use. That is, a country can no longer afford to rely on the 
traditional ideas behind development planning, which do not actively allow it to engage 
in the management of its stock and flows of wealth, but only in the indirect allocation and 
extraction of value from them (through looking mostly at sectors, projects, and the 
capital-labour configurations). Renewable types of assets ought to be treated in different 
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ways than non-renewable ones. In extracting value from renewable assets, a country has 
to be aware of their natural limits, which, once crossed, causes them to lose their capacity 
to be renewed (these limits vary widely in scale and timeframe). Furthermore, different 
kinds of wealth have different formation, degradation, and depletion time-horizons, as 
well as different tipping-points on which the extraction of value depend—space-time 
limits that ultimately define a critical-path from which the process of development cannot 
escape. Different kinds of assets possess different levels of flexibility, mobility, and 
transformability; they can also interact with others to potentially create synergies and a 
sort of virtuous gravitation pull that can foster development, while their interaction with 
others can create conflict and degradation. Some types of assets lend themselves to the 
maximization of use in creating value; others, instead, can generate the most value when 
its use is optimal; others generate the most value when optimization and maximization 
are balanced in the best way possible; and, others’ value can be optimized and/or 
maximized only at specific points-in-time or under certain conditions (e.g., non-
renewable minerals could generate the most value when extracted and sold at times when 
their price is the highest). This understanding should not only underpin decisions about 
the strategic use of wealth to generate value that a country makes, but also its decisions 
about the optimal way in which surpluses (savings) can be used to ensure sustainability, 
and, hopefully, an increase of its wealth, so that the wellbeing of current and future 
generations can be ensured and improved, if needed. 
It is precisely through a comprehensive and encompassing wealth management 
strategy that a country can create the conditions for development in such a way that it can 
also create conditions for self-sustainable wellbeing (the self-reinforcing state)–evidently 
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within the limits that the local and global material and social structures imposes on them. 
Such a process could be conceived as the equivalent, at the government level, of 
Schumpeter’s “creative-destruction”: governments could play through cleverer policies 
and information, both the role of an indirect entrepreneur and/or venture capitalist 
encouraging innovative ways in which wealth could be configured that could lead 
towards development; as well as the role of continuously shaping and fine-tuning the 
possibility space created by local and global material and social structures on which such 
creative-destruction process takes place.  
The proposed concept of wealth management could provide governments with the 
understanding and tools to play a more productive role in development. In principle, if 
the private sector can play the role of an entrepreneur or venture capitalist, there should 
be no reason why governments could not play a similar role (through their shaping of the  
possibility space), particularly when their knowledge and command with regards to the 
stocks and flows of wealth and both the local and global material and social structures in 
which these operate (that is, the possibility to regulate and influence the management of 
wealth), provide them with much better information, knowledge, and agency than any 
single or collective private sector player could potentially have. The principle that 
collective action allows for the achievement of results, which no single individual can 
achieve, should also apply to the collective achievement of better management of their 
collective wealth, the coordination of which is entrusted on governments. In principle, if 
the mechanisms that have been designed so far to address the issues of coordination and 
control presented by the challenge of cooperation and collective action are considered to 
be defective or inadequate (like some would argue markets are), this does not mean that 
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alternative mechanisms that can be more effective and efficient cannot be found. That 
these may have partially failed so far does not mean new ones cannot succeed (Roth, 
2015). 
A New Aid Paradigm: Concerted Wealth Management 
Given their limited capabilities and freedom to attain self-reinforcing state, worse-
off countries could be helped by better-off ones by ensuring that the global material and 
social structures do not hinder these capabilities and freedoms, but actually enhances 
them. Better-off countries can ensure inter-country flows and the wealth-value transfers 
they convey, are not negatively affected by distortions that in virtue of their status of 
being better-off, they have imposed in the global structures either directly or indirectly 
through their local and global policy choices. This type of action could be called 
enabling.  
Better-off countries could also help those worse-off by helping them prevent and 
address the degradation, depletion, and destruction of their wealth through increased 
capacity to address emergencies and other events that may impact the integrity of their 
wealth, and through the management of risks in a more efficient and effective way. This 
type of action could be called safeguarding. 
Finally, better-off countries could help those worse-off improve the ways in 
which they manage their wealth. This type of action could be called enhancing. 
The reasons behind worse-off countries’ reduced or non-existent capabilities and 
freedom to achieve self-reinforcing state might be related to the types and the volumes of 
wealth they possess; to the ways in which they manage it; to the ways in which the global 
material and social structures influence the wealth-value transfers that result from inter-
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country flows; to the ways in which they manage the risks to the integrity of wealth; and 
to the way in which they manage events that impact the integrity of wealth.  
There is a two-way relationship between the first of these factors, the types and 
volumes of wealth they possess, and the rest of them. As mentioned before, countries that 
possess more wealth are usually able to better deal with the aspects involved in managing 
their wealth, particularly in managing emergencies and their consequences. Therefore, 
the amount of wealth a country possesses influences the way it manages it, and the way it 
manages also influences the amount of wealth it possesses.  
In this context, it is clear why the current taxonomy and architecture of aid is 
ineffective: it does not consider nor address essential aspects of the process of 
development that is supposed to serve. A broader concept of concerted wealth 
management that considers these dynamics between better-off and worse-off countries, 
and focuses, as a consequence, on enabling and enhancing the management of wealth, as 
well as safeguarding it, is necessary and should replace the exhausted and ineffective 
current paradigm of aid. The ultimate goal behind concerted wealth management is to 
achieve the convergence of better-off and worse-off countries’ capabilities and freedom 
to develop towards the achievement and maintenance of self-reinforcing state by the 
majority of countries. 
Contrary to the existing paradigm of aid, concerted wealth management, the 
proposed new paradigm, needs also to be based and organized on the basis of a more 
realistic understanding of the influence better-off countries can have on those worse-off. 
This will contribute to avoiding unrealistic expectations about what is possible.  
Better-off countries can always contribute to worse-off ones by enabling and 
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directly safeguarding their wealth, even when enhancing it might not be feasible. 
Ultimately, the process of development cannot be forced on to anyone. The 
concepts of capabilities and freedom that are at the core of the definition of development 
adopted in this research, are not only applicable in one, but in both directions. While the 
global community should never stop trying to contribute to the internal dynamics of a 
country, it also has to accept and respect the fact that each country should be sovereign. 
This is where the importance of the concept of defending the integrity of wealth by 
managing the risks and events that can degrade it, deplete it, or destroy it comes to play. 
Respecting a country’s sovereignty is as important as respecting the life of its citizens, or 
preventing the loss of wealth that, ultimately, determines how feasible the life and 
wellbeing of the citizens of that country are in the long-run. Therefore, even in the case of 
failed or conflict afflicted states where the possibilities of contributing in the longer-term 
aspects of development are very remote, better-off countries can still collaborate with 
them in maintaining the integrity of their wealth, including its people (safeguarding), and 
by ensuring that the global architecture does not impact them negatively, but that in fact 
enables them to increasingly achieve their wellbeing (enabling). 
Literature Underpinning the Proposed Conceptual Framework 
Over the following sub-sections, relevant literature supporting and further 
expanding on the basic conceptual framework proposed above will be summarized. At 
the end of each section, a table containing key messages from the literature is provided. 
These messages are incorporated in the formalization of the proposed conceptual 
framework developed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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The origins of wealth and wellbeing. 
Wealth can be simply defined as a stock of assets that produce a stream of value 
(C. Hall, 2012; Polanyi , 1957). The potential of wealth to produce value not only 
depends on the volume, quality, or characteristics of assets, but also on the composition 
of an asset portfolio or balance sheet. This is also the case of the wealth of nations 
(OECD, 2001; Spence, 2011; World Bank, 2011). The complementarity of assets within 
the portfolio is considered to impact the wealth of nations’ potential to generate value 
(Daly, 2004; Galor, 2011; Godfrey, 2014; Hartmann, 2014; Kümmel, 2011; North, 2005; 
OECD, 2001). However, this complementarity is contextual, and it changes with time 
(measured, for example, through changing input-output coefficients, or substitution and 
complementarity elasticities (Common, 2014)) (Athreya, 2013). 
While for mercantilists, the origin of wealth was a positive trade balance, for 
classical economists, it was instead the result of specialized labour, drawing from the use 
of land and tools. For the latter, the value created through production was the result of 
objectively adding the costs involved, represented by their use values (C. Hall, 2012).  
With the marginal revolution, introduced by neoclassical economists, value and 
wealth became relative (measured by exchange and not by use value), as well as a result 
of transforming production factors (natural resources, labour), not just their addition. 
Greater growth, value, and wealth were created when the marginal contribution of all 
additional units of factors used matched their marginal cost, maximizing the utility 
obtained from the portfolio of the factors of production. Furthermore, neoclassical 
economists assume that all factors of production could be substituted by others, obviating 
in this way the possibility of any limits to growth, or the possibility that economic growth 
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could impose any additional costs not already prized (Common, 2014; Daly, 2004; C. 
Hall, 2012; Helpman, 2004; Sengupta, 2013). In fact, growth was considered essential 
because the bigger the economic system, the better and more successful it was considered 
to be (Sengupta, 2013). 
As a consequence, most neoclassical economic growth models rely on the factors 
of production as the ingredients that, through the maximizing effects of the market and 
the pricing system, are ultimately responsible for growth (Sengupta, 2013). The price 
system, defined as the mechanism through which the overall context in which economic 
growth takes place is internalized into the production function (Galor, 2011). 
In time, economists realized that the accumulation of assets was not enough to 
guarantee growth and sustained wealth increases. Saving and investment was not enough, 
as originally believed by neoclassical economists and others, like Keynes (Meltzer, 
1988). Several iterations in the modelling of economic growth, added: (a) first, that “total 
factor productivity” was more important than the volume of the ingredients possessed; (b) 
later on, that technology and education, and overall human capital (as the source of 
technological progress) were the main causes behind ‘total factor productivity’ 
improvements; and (c) finally, that institutions and other public goods were also an 
important factor in explaining economic growth (H. A. Arndt, 1984; Helpman, 2004; 
North, 1990, 2005). These realizations extended the original list of ‘ingredients’ from 
land, labour, and machinery to the more elaborated concepts of human capital, 
intellectual capital, produced physical capital, natural endowments, and institutions 
(Aghion & Durlauf, 2005--these two volumes showcase the evolution of economic 
growth theory; Helpman, 2004; Spence, 2011; UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2012, 2014, 
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World Bank, 2006, 2011). 
In fact, environmental economists use the neoclassical framework but strive to 
quantify and internalize the value and prices of natural endowments as an important 
‘ingredient’ required for economic growth (Sengupta, 2013; UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 
2012, 2014).  
Both physics and ecological economics challenge these interpretations about 
where the wealth of nations lies, and how it is created and formed. Already in the early 
1920s, Frederick Soddy (1924), a Nobel Prize winner in chemistry who spent a good part 
of his career writing about economics and specifically about money and wealth, called 
attention to the conceptual perils of obviating that, ultimately, the source of all wealth 
was a continuous flow of energy and the still untapped knowledge about unfamiliar 
sources of energy, as well as unknown ways of improving the efficiency in its use 
(entrepreneurship and intellectual capital). Additionally, he also refuted the idea that 
capital could represent actual savings—in his view, it was, at the most, a form of 
embodied energy of which use had been delayed for a limited time. As a consequence, he 
suggested that wealth could be conceptualized as an ‘entitlement’ over flows of energy. 
His work was continued by other physicist and economists like Georgescu-Roegen 
(1971), Grubb (2013), Kummel (2011), Hall (2012), and Richmond (2013). Specifically, 
Kummel (2011), among others, produced empirical data to demonstrate that about 90 
percent of total factor productivity increases (which, in turn, explain about 70 percent of 
all economic growth) has been due to increases in net energy. Aligned with the physics 
economics school of thought, Kummel (2011, p. 243) argues that wealth only increases 
when the ratio of energy resources to number of people increases, and that some 99 
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percent of all species on Earth have become extinct because their ‘technology’ was not 
able to produce a net positive energy balance. 
While on the ecological economics front, scholars also acknowledge the 
importance of energy, their emphasis lies on energy’s role as a source of sustainability 
and resilience of the biosphere. They focus on the portfolio of assets and services that the 
biosphere provides (Biggs, 2015; Common, 2014; Costanza et al., 2015; Daly, 2004; 
Managi, 2015; Sengupta, 2013). Their understanding of wealth also relies on the idea that 
it is the result from the extraction of value from endowments and services provided by 
the biosphere. Given that human life is not possible without the biosphere, its resilience 
and sustainability are, in the final analysis, the real wealth of nations. Understanding, 
then, how to ensure that renewable resources are not overexploited, ecological-services 
are not pushed beyond their limits, non-renewable resources value is maximized through 
opportune and efficient transformation, and that the overall scale of human impact on the 
biosphere does not destabilize it in its fragility, is the key to realistic wealth creation and 
management (Biggs, 2015; Common, 2014; Daly, 2004; Managi, 2015; Sengupta, 2013). 
Scholars like Daly (Daly, 2004) approximate the achievement of this situation through 
the idea of a “steady-state economy” which contrast with the classical and neoclassical 
economics notion of steady-state (a state of equilibrium) embedded in theories of 
economic growth ((Helpman, 2004; Solow, 1956). Economic growth is costly, and there 
are actual physical limits, given by the biosphere and the impossibility to substitute 
natural capital with produced one (Sengupta, 2013). 
Both environmental and ecological economists have put considerable efforts into 
measuring the value of wealth in monetary terms. Evidently, their efforts have found 
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limiting factors given that several of the assets in question are public goods that are not 
traded in markets, nor is their value fully factored into the pricing of products and 
services that are traded. In fact, both groups of economists tend to identify sustainable 
development with stable or increasing aggregate value of all assets considered to be part 
of the wealth of nations (Common, 2014; Daly, 2004; Sengupta, 2013; UNU-IHDP and 
UNEP, 2012, 2014). 
In all the previous accounts of what wealth is and how it is accumulated, there is 
an underlying narrow discourse about ever increasing material wellbeing. Nevertheless, 
two relevant alternative debates have taken place, and have further intensified over the 
last few years. One relates to wealth allocation and the ways in which value extracted 
from this wealth (in the form of income) is distributed (Athreya, 2013; Daly, 2004; Galor, 
2011; C. Hall, 2012; Kümmel, 2011; Milanović, 2016; Piketty, 2014). The other relates 
to the additional dimensions of wellbeing that are not material and how they can be 
measured—including happiness, satisfaction, trust, sense of freedom, feelings of 
worthiness, and, more broadly, subjective wellness (Biggs, 2015; Daly, 2004; Managi, 
2015; Max-Neef & Smith, 2011; OECD, 2001; Oishi, 2012; UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 
2012, 2014, World Bank, 2006, 2011). This distinction between material and non-
material wellbeing is also consistent with several psychological studies like those of 
Maslow (2013) and Herzberg (1966) which suggested the existence of hierarchies 
separating between these two kinds of wellbeing and the differential impact they have in 
terms of motivation and self-actualization. In fact, the OECD (2001) goes as far as 
defining the portion of the gross domestic product that does not contribute to wellbeing as 
“regrettables.” Ultimately, both these debates question what value really is and means—
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and, hence, what wealth is, and how it relates to wellbeing. 
This debate about what wellbeing really means has also been at the center of 
Sen’s (2000) ideas about development as freedom. His influential view proposed that 
freedom was not only the primary end of development, but also the primary mean to 
development. Freedom is proposed by him as an expression of capabilities that allow 
human beings to avoid or escape the difficulties of poverty, as much as to pursue their 
own self-realization. This approach of a two-tier like understanding of human need as 
material and immaterial, resonates with the approaches of Maslow (2013), Herzberg 
(1966), and the other scholars mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
The impossibility to commensurate the concepts of use value, exchange value, 
and social value, tends to be resolved at the ideological level (Amin, 2013; Becker, 1977; 
Daly, 2004; C. Hall, 2012; Harvey, 2006; Hollander, 2008; Meikle, 1995; Soddy, 1935). 
In fact, Soddy (1933) argued in the 1920s and 1930s that the ideas of value and wealth 
were becoming meaningless, as the monetary system allowed for an excessive quantity of 
money whose own value rested on nothing more than ungranted trust rather than on any 
real variables or facts. Similarly, and pointing to the same issue, another Nobel Prize 
winner, this time in economics (Tobin, 1965) suggested that the illusion of value created 
by money can only hold as long as everyone does not try to convert it, simultaneously, 
into anything real. In his reasoning, Soddy applied the laws of thermodynamics, 
particularly looking at how, when considering entropy, it was impossible to think that the 
financial sector could possibly expand beyond the real sector, and without any limit. At 
the core of his argument was the idea that, if those who are not producing any real 
products are still yielded earnings, this could only happen at the expense of those who 
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were actually producing (see also Kümmel, 2011; Soddy, 1924). In 2007, global financial 
assets were already 3.6 times that of global GDP. This financial capital requires a return 
and this means that the real sector needed to produce enough returns for both itself and 
the financial sector—growth cannot go on forever, as Soddy argued (Kümmel, 2011). 
Likewise, value and wealth are inherently related to the idea of public debt, 
which, in many cases, become a de facto intergenerational redistribution of wealth 
(Athreya, 2013; Goodspeed, 2012; Kümmel, 2011; Soddy, 1924; Stiglitz, 2010). For 
Soddy (1924), even physical capital was, in itself, debt; financial and capital assets are an 
entitlement to money in the future—their value lies in their ability to produce goods and 
services in the future or in producing rent by lending that capacity to others (Kümmel, 
2011). Acknowledging this intertemporal quality of debt, economists have developed 
what are called “overlapping generations” models (Athreya, 2013; P. A. Diamond, 1965), 
which allow for the understanding and analysis of how households that are taxed to repay 
public debt, might not be the same ones benefiting from the spending and investment 
funded through it. 
Going back to the non-material dimensions of wellbeing, psychological studies on 
the psychology of wellbeing have pointed out the difficulties of understanding, and even 
more, measuring the relationship between ways in which we traditionally determine value 
and ways in which people perceive value, particularly when the time dimension is added 
(Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004; Oishi, 2012). Such studies have 
demonstrated that human beings seem to have a sense of wellbeing that is split between 
short- and long-terms; short-term being less linked to material wealth, and long-term 
more dependent on it. These senses of wellbeing are also split between the quality of 
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professional and material achievement and the quality and quantity of personal 
relationships; the happiest people are those with the best relationships, yet they do not 
reach levels of professional success that others who seem to be less happy do. 
Nevertheless, ultimately, these studies also find that satisfaction with our own lives is 
highly dependent on how our own societies define what should make us feel satisfied; 
these factors usually include high quality social relationships, access and level of social 
support, and mutual trust. These seem to be even more important than material wealth 
(Oishi, 2012). Finally, these studies also show that there seems to be a lack of continuity 
between what makes individuals happy and satisfied with their lives and what seem to 
make nations happy as a whole (Oishi, 2012). 
While these debates have brought overall agreement that wellbeing is a 
multidimensional concept far more complex than just material value and wealth, the 
underlying importance that material aspects have on the non-material ones cannot be 
overstated. This has also led to a general agreement that higher degrees of inequality in 
the initial distribution of wealth and higher inequality in the distribution of income, both 
do prevent optimal economic growth and wealth formation (Biggs, 2015; Costanza et al., 
2015; Galor, 2011; Kümmel, 2011; Sengupta, 2013). Increasingly, wellbeing is measured 
through new approaches and indicators; for example, the Inclusive Wealth Index (IWI) 
(UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2012, 2014); World Bank’s Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) 
(Managi, 2015); the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) (Managi, 2015); and the 
Happy Planet Index (HPI) (Managi, 2015). Furthermore, other measuring tools, like 
Planetary Boundaries or the Ecological Footprint (Managi, 2015), focus on helping to 
understand and address challenges of intergenerational natural wealth equity. 
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The problem, however, is that no agreement has been reached on how to deal with 
inequality in the achievement of wellbeing. On one side, neoclassical economists, relying 
on their welfare theorems, argue that the only effective way in which inequality can be 
addressed without making everyone worse-off is by redistributing initial wealth 
endowments (Athreya, 2013), and that any other mechanisms are doomed to fail. 
Furthermore, most economists address the problem of intertemporal wellbeing by relying 
on the idea that, if markets get the net-present value of wealth right, inter-generational 
equity can be achieved. What is needed then, they argue, is to improve markets (UNU-
IHDP and UNEP, 2012, 2014). Environmental economist argue that, unless most 
components of wealth and wellbeing are measured and internalized into the economic 
system and its markets (through prices), inequality in both the intra- and inter-temporal 
dimensions will remain unchecked (Biggs, 2015; C. Hall, 2012; Managi, 2015; Sengupta, 
2013; UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2012, 2014, World Bank, 2006, 2011). Ecological 
economists, in turn, advocate incorporating the limits of the biosphere and its ecological 
system on which human life depends on into the global economic system, as the only real 
way to ensure intertemporal wellbeing (Common, 2014; Daly, 2004; Sengupta, 2013). 
 
Table 3.1. Wealth and wellbeing key messages 
 Wellbeing results from material and non-material value, as perceived and 
experienced by human beings. Wealth and its proceedings are only wealth in as 
much as they contribute to wellbeing. 
 While wellbeing can be understood at both individual and social levels, societal 
wellbeing cannot be optimized if inequality is not minimal. Likewise, short-
term wellbeing is not necessarily consistent with long-term wellbeing. Even 
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when countries may express different preferences with regards to wellbeing, the 
survival of the human race and the biosphere, which makes its life possible, is 
not dependent on human choice but on its physical realities. 
 In the final analysis, all value comes from the energy that keeps Earth’s 
biosphere functional, and that allow human beings to exist and use their 
knowledge and capabilities to extract value from wealth and to structure social, 
economic, and political arrangements (the material and social structures) in 
increasingly better ways and forms. 
 Wealth is composed of natural capital (in the form of endowments and services 
provided by nature), intangible capital (human-produced knowledge that 
increases the productivity of value generating activities); tangible capital (both 
mobile—machinery, tools—and fixed—buildings, roads, public services); 
social capital (organizations, laws, traditions, value, culture—all allowing 
human beings to achieve more as a collective, than what they can achieve 
individually); and human capital (human beings’ biological, intellectual, and 
psychological capacity that allows them to procure for their own and the 
collective wellbeing). Most of these classes of assets derive their value from 
human capital’s capabilities to discover and realize the relative value embedded 
in them; in turn, human capital derives these capabilities from the opportunities 
that natural capital allows them to have by being alive in the first place. With 
no energy, there would be no biosphere; with no biosphere, there would not be 
human beings and others forms of life; and without human beings, any sort of a 
live or inert entities would be just lonely objects floating around in the universe, 
in a planet called Earth, with no purpose beside their mere existence. 
 The wealth of a country, however, is not only dependent on these individual 
classes of assets, but most importantly, on the overall portfolio and the way in 
which these relate to each other. The total value that can be extracted from the 
portfolio is bigger than the summation of the value that can be extracted from 
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them individually. Assets can sometimes and in certain conditions substitute 
and complement each other at different degrees, and they also exert feedback 
loops on each other (although not completely, nor all of them). 
 The material aspects of wellbeing are better known as they have physical points 
of reference; individual and social psychological aspects of wellbeing are 
harder to understand and measure, but, nevertheless, they are the ones on which 
“real value” lies. 
 Money and debt tend to create confusion both in the perception and analysis of 
what value and wealth are. They also have real implications in the ways in 
which society functions. They both play a role in bridging past and present, and 
through this role they also have real implications in equality and sustainability. 
As a consequence, while monetizing wealth can help commensurate 
incommensurable classes of assets and internalize more elements that play a 
role in the achievement of wellbeing, doing so also introduces distortions in 
perception and confusion that can have real negative consequences, particularly 




Even when human ingenuity is the driver of any kind of progress, progress is 
bounded because human life and all its outcomes are themselves ultimately bounded by 
the natural structures that their bodies, environment, the biosphere, and the universe 
impose on them (through organic and inorganic processes) (Kümmel, 2011; Wolpert, 
2016). Natural structures also bind both the material and social structures (Grubb, 2013). 
Human ingenuity does not shift the limits imposed by these structures but actually works 
its way towards them: what humanity may regard as limits at one point in time might not 
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necessarily represent actual limits, but instead limitations in human knowledge. While 
preindustrial societies were bound by organic and inorganic constraints only, industrial 
and post-industrial societies, which have used technology and energy inputs to extend 
organic capabilities, are now bound also by technological constraints. While these bounds 
can be pushed further out through human capital’s creative and innovative capabilities, 
there are ultimate physical limits that cannot be transgressed (Emmott, 2013; Georgescu-
Roegen, 1971; Kümmel, 2011; Wolpert, 2016) 
At the most basic level, the laws of physics are the outer bound to which human 
life is subjected; specifically, the laws of conservation and transformation of energy 
given by the first and second laws of thermodynamics. This means that perpetual 
exponential growth is impossible since nothing can happen without energy conversion 
and its resulting entropy (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; Kümmel, 2011; Soddy, 1924; 
Wolpert, 2016). The biosphere is a semi-closed system (one where limited exchanges 
with its environment takes place—it allows for energy inputs from the Sun) and, as a 
consequence, the internal services it provides carry limited capacity. As a consequence, 
increased growth reaches a point were pollution has to be abated through increases in 
energetic inputs. A point is invariably reached where the costs of abating pollution are 
higher than the value created through the activities that produce it, rendering them 
unfeasible in the long-term (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; Grubb, 2013; Kümmel, 2011; 
Wolpert, 2016). 
The biosphere, then, imposes limits to human activity given by its carrying 
capacity, and the timelines by which the services it provides are bound within it (Emmott, 
2013; Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; Grubb, 2013; Kümmel, 2011; Soddy, 1924). For 
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example, it has been estimated that once carbon dioxide emissions are brought back to 
acceptable levels (those within the carrying capacity of the biosphere—planetary 
boundaries) (Managi, 2015), it will take the biosphere about 300 years to deal with the 
excess stock of carbon emissions accumulated. In general, the atmosphere, oceans, and 
cryosphere display high levels of inertia, considering the timelines in which they operate 
to be of 50 to 100 years (Grubb, 2013). Furthermore, in the same way that the distribution 
of natural capital and human characteristics is unequal, the distribution of several of the 
effects that human activity has in the biosphere is unequal too. At a macro level, for 
example, while developing countries are historically responsible for less than a third of 
the cumulative of carbon dioxide emissions over the last 50 years, they are expected to 
endure about 75 percent of the damages caused by this accumulation (Grubb, 2013; 
Managi, 2015; Spence, 2011). Similarly, at the micro level, pollution that occurs in a 
specific place does not stay there but may, in fact, actually accumulate in spaces whose 
inhabitants played no part in the polluting activities nor attained any benefits from such 
activities (J. Diamond, 2006). 
At a different level, other natural structures further bound the limits of human 
creative and innovative efforts (Wolpert, 2016). The biological limits imposed by the 
human body are further bound by events that surround its development from their 
conception, as well as other events that may have short, medium, and long-term 
consequences in their capabilities. Keating (1999) and Bloom (2013) provide compelling 
arguments and evidence about the important effects that specific windows of opportunity 
and the events that take place during these windows have in the shaping of health, 
cognitive, and behavioural gradients. In particular, the first two years of life have proven 
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to be key in binding the potential of human beings. Moreover, biological and 
psychological characteristics of the gendered biology of living beings also influences 
economic and social behaviours, as well as play a role in terms of skills possessed 
(Eswaran, 2014). 
Natural structures, then, bound the creation, formation, and use of wealth, and 
therefore bound, as a consequence, the extraction of value from it and the attainment of 
wellbeing. Furthermore, natural structures allow for random unforeseen natural events to 
take place that can have considerable impact on wealth and on the capacity of human 
capital to extract value from it. Natural events and disasters that cannot be controlled, 
need to be planned for by managing risks, by increasing preparedness, and by building 
resilience, all within the realm of material and social structures (Benson & Clay, 2004; 
Commission on Global Governance, 1995; Committee on Assessing the Costs of Natural 
Disasters, 1999; Richardson, 2014). 
 
Table 3.2. Natural structures key messages 
 Natural structures bound all classes of assets. They also bound material and 
social structures. The human understanding of the bounds imposed by these 
natural structures is, in turn, bound by knowledge and technology. While 
increased knowledge and technology may change our understanding of these 
bounds and our possibilities within them (allowing us to move closer to the 
limits), it does not change them. 
 Perpetual exponential growth is theoretically impossible given the laws of 
thermodynamics. Bound by the laws of physics, the biosphere provides services 
that are limited in capacity and that, in turn, limits possible growth. Therefore, 
there is always a theoretical point where the costs of growth exceed its benefits. 
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 The operating timelines by which certain natural structures in which our way 
of life is deeply ingrained, usually extend between 50 to 100 years (although 
there are many others that operate in timelines of thousands and millions of 
years). Nevertheless, specific anthropogenic changes might have impacts that 
extend beyond those timelines and therefore pose intergenerational 
consequences, particularly in terms of equity in wellbeing. 
 Natural structures do not ensure equally distributed impacts. This poses a 
challenge in terms of the distribution of wealth and the wellbeing that draws 
from it. 
 Natural structures provide specific windows of opportunity for the formation 
and improvement of different classes of assets. Events that take place in the 
course of these windows, define function gradients that bound the potential of 
these assets to create and extract value and, therefore, to contribute in the 
attainment of wellbeing. 
 Natural structures cannot be controlled in every circumstance. They allow for 
random and unexpected events that can have sizeable impacts on wealth and its 
potential to create and extract value. These events can only be planned for and 
managed so as to reduce their impact. They are not equally distributed across 
the world and therefore do not affect all countries or individuals in the same 
way. 
 
Natural capital: natural endowments and natural public goods. 
Human existence is bound to the ecosystem in which it takes place. Therefore, the 
ecosystem and all its constituents are the most important natural endowment humanity 
relies on for its subsistence. In turn, this ecosystem cannot itself exist without the 
constant influx of energy received from the Sun (Common, 2014; Daly, 2004; 
Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; Grubb, 2013; Kümmel, 2011). 
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Contemporary views of what constitutes natural capital have considerably 
expanded from those of the past. Besides land, mineral, and organic resources as inputs 
of economic activity, the idea that the ecosystem provides ecological services, as well as 
recreational ones, has become part of a commonly shared view about the potential of 
natural capital to generate value (Helm, 2014). Broadly speaking, natural capital can be 
classified into: (a) renewable sources which are mostly organic (e.g., fisheries, 
vegetation, soil, wild and domestic life-forms); (b) non-renewable sources which are 
mostly inorganic (e.g., minerals, organic energy sources); and (c) ecosystem services 
(e.g., provisioning, regulating, supporting, including cultural and wellbeing services). The 
first two of these correspond to stocks from which flows can be extracted in order to 
consume, or to further accumulate into human made capital; the last one corresponds to 
the services (these have a limited capacity) without which life cannot be sustained and 
supported (Common, 2014; Daly, 2004; Managi, 2015; Sengupta, 2013). 
The challenge faced with regards to natural capital is that the ecosystem, and, 
therefore, human life, are fragile. Their existence depends on a number of very complex 
relationships that exist in a precarious balance with each other and that do not relate to 
each other in linear ways (J. Diamond, 2006; Grubb, 2013; Kümmel, 2011; Sengupta, 
2013). Different components of the ecosystem possess different dynamics and time-paths 
(e.g., they go through different sorts of oscillations and cycles, some through equilibrium 
and disequilibrium). Some undergo a process of succession (e.g., the species composition 
of an area evolves from less to more complex—for example, the transformation of 
grasslands into shrubs and into pine forests and then into hardwood forests, all over a 
period of 100 years or so)—some show remarkable resilience towards external shocks 
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without their own dynamic changing that much in spite of them; others display threshold 
effects (e.g., non-proportional impacts—small changes create exponential impacts); 
others are sensitive to bio-magnification (e.g., when a combination of factors build on 
each other to magnify an original effect); others are prone to synergy (e.g., by combining 
effects into something bigger than themselves); and some others are entropic (e.g., 
disorder and waste increases) (Common, 2014). All of these characteristics point to non-
convex substitution, complementary, and price elasticities among different kinds of 
natural capital, and, perhaps, among natural and produced capital (Common, 2014; Daly, 
2004; Grubb, 2013; Sengupta, 2013). 
As previously discussed, the timescales at which these relationships exist and hold 
are very different, ranging from decades and centuries for atmospheric and hydrological 
processes (for example, to process out greenhouse emissions of methane, it takes the 
atmosphere about 10 years, while to do the same with carbon dioxide, it takes it about 
100 years), to millions of years in the case of geological process. These become a 
challenge when human beings make use of natural capital in ways in which their 
demands over time exceed those that the ecosystem services’ capacity, as well as the 
natural limits of the renewable and non-renewable resources, allow for (Common, 2014; 
Sengupta, 2013). In fact, as Sengupta (2013) explains, by some estimates the current 
ecological footprint of human beings already exceeds the bio-capacity of our ecosystem. 
There are many ways, then, in which societies can undermine their environment. 
Diamond (2006) proposes at least 12 categories: (a) deforestation and habitat destruction; 
(b) soil degradation; (c) water mismanagement; (d) overhunting; (e) overfishing; (f) 
introduction of non-native species; (g) human population growth; (h) overall increase in 
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per-capita impact of human beings on the environment; (i) human-caused climate change; 
(j) build-up of toxic chemicals in the ecosystem; (k) energy shortages; and (l) full 
utilization of photosynthetic capacity. In turn, Biggs (2015) offers a number of principles 
to reduce society’s impact on the environment: (a) maintaining diversity and redundancy; 
(b) managing connectivity among its components; (c) managing slow variables and the 
feedback they provide into the system; (d) managing the environment as a complex 
system; (e) encouraging learning and experimentation that leads into more effective and 
efficient use; (f) using a form of poly-centric governance; and (g) monitoring and 
responding opportunely to emerging asymmetries.  
Grubb (2013), among others (for example Daly, 2004), showcase how 
“defensive” or “protection” expenditures aimed at reducing or avoiding societies’ 
burdens in the ecosystem, as well as at minimizing the risks of the ecosystem impacting 
human life, tend to have relatively high payoffs. For example, the assessment of the 
Clean Air Act in the US concluded that the costs incurred in protecting the environment 
between 1970 to 1990 produced benefits worth more than 40 times those costs (Grubb, 
2013, p. 9). Among environmental policy instruments that have been proposed and used 
are: (a) market-based regulations; (b) command and control instruments (e.g., emission 
licenses, minimum technological requirements, location restrictions); (c) taxation; (d) 
tradable permits; and (e) environmental performance bonds (Common, 2014; Daly, 
2004). 
From the understanding of these realities, concepts like “maximum sustainable 
yield,” “critical dispensation point,”, and “bio-capacity” have emerged as theoretical 
constructs that can enhance our capacity to understand the limits of our environment 
182 
(Daly, 2004; Sengupta, 2013). Kummel (2011), for example, suggests that social 
structures should limit material progress based on the limits of organic and inorganic 
processes.  
This complex fragility requires delicate management and awareness about the 
implications that individual and collective decisions have in the resilience of the 
ecosystem and organic life in it (Bairoch, 1975; J. Diamond, 2006; Spence, 2011). While 
different approaches have been proposed to facilitate this management process, they all 
build on the idea that measurement is essential, and that, currently, we lack measuring 
instruments and standards to make sensible decisions about our environment, as well as 
to understand our impact on it (Helm, 2014; Managi, 2015; Sengupta, 2013; UNU-IHDP 
and UNEP, 2012, 2014, World Bank, 2006, 2011).  
At the macro level, changes to national economic accounts have been proposed 
and are increasingly integrated into national income accounting statistics standards. At 
the micro level, methods to measure the content of natural capital in products traded and 
consumed have also been proposed. Among these many attempts are: (a) the concepts of 
Net Domestic Product (NDP) (which includes appreciation and depreciation of natural 
and human capital, and, more specifically, state of depletion of non-renewable resources, 
under- or over-use of renewable resources, and overall state of the ecosystem); (b) Social 
Value (the net present value of all current and future flows from natural capital that 
contribute to income and wellbeing); (c) Standard National Accounts (SNA) and the 
System of Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting (SEEA) (allows for the 
integration of environmental accounting into national accounts both in terms of physical 
volume, as well as monetary value); (d) Millennium Ecosystem Assessments (MES) 
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(aims to measure provisioning, regulating, and cultural services from the environment); 
(d) Living Planet Index (measures biodiversity as a proxy of the health of the ecosystem); 
(e) Ecological Footprint (provides estimates of the human demand on natural resources); 
(f) Embodied Environmental Impact Indicators (EEI) (provides evaluation indicators of 
the equity in the allocation of natural resources as measured by what is embedded in 
consumption); and (g) the Inclusive Wealth Index (IWI) (provides a monetary 
quantification of the wealth of nations that serve as a benchmark in time and across 
countries of the evolution of their stocks of wealth) (Common, 2014; Helm, 2014; 
Managi, 2015; Sengupta, 2013; UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2012, 2014). 
An area where better measuring instruments and standards is critical is that of the 
process of development. Because of the fact that increased levels of wellbeing per capita 
require an increased per-capita footprint in the ecosystem (under the current natural, 
material, and social structures), it is of particular importance to understand, not only the 
ways in which countries use their natural capital, but also the ways in which this capital is 
exchanged due to international trade. This understanding goes well beyond what the 
traditional national income accounting systems allow (Daly, 2004; Managi, 2015; 
Sengupta, 2013).  
Some of the measurement approaches described above contribute in tackling these 
limitations and needs. For example, an approach that is particularly useful in helping in 
accounting for wealth transfers resulting from inter-country flows is the Embodied 
Environmental Impact Indicators (EEI) (which require the internalization of all natural 
resources and services used in production). There are two approaches towards 
constructing these indicators (Daly, 2004; Managi, 2015; Sengupta, 2013): (a) bottom-up, 
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consisting in tracing the environmental impact of each step involved in the production of 
goods and services (examples of these are the GHG from the World Resources Institute; 
and the ISO-14064 from the International Standards Organizations, among others); and 
(b) top-bottom, which relies on macro input-output analysis to determine the overall 
transfer of natural capital by sector (these does not allow for the understanding of the 
environmental impact of specific products or companies—some examples include the 
Single-Region Input-Output Model (SRIO), and the Multi-Region Input-Output Model 
(MRIO)).  
According to Managi (2015), EEI indicators can be instrumental in the 
achievement of global sustainable development because they not only help quantify 
interdependence among countries in terms of natural capital, but also because they help 
raise awareness of how consumption impacts the use of local and foreign resources. 
In his book The economics of green growth: new indicators for sustainable 
societies, Managi (2015) presents a case study where water use embodied in the world 
trade of products is quantified for countries with a population over 20 million. It 
differentiates between water used for consumption and for production. The study shows 
how, for example, countries like Japan do not possess enough water to cover their own 
consumption; they virtually import water through the products they consume thanks to 
international trade; and if they were to maintain their consumption levels in a world with 
no international trade, they would need the equivalent of about 1000 percent of the water 
their current sources provide them with. This example begs the question of whether the 
current pricing system considers, and therefore assigns a price to this real transfer of 
natural capital in the form of water, from one country to another. It also begs the question 
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of whether the price assigned, when one exists, truly reflects the current and potential 
value of the water transferred. Similarly, it begs the question of whether such exports and 
imports of embedded natural capital are creating unsustainable use-patterns that lead to 
its unequal degradation or depletion in ways we do not know, measure, nor understand. 
Following a similar approach but focusing on India only, Sengupta (2013) uses an input-
output table to record transfers of natural capital among economic sectors, showcasing 
the possibility and usefulness of such analysis, even if yet rudimentary. 
Such transfers of natural capital are key to the wealth of nations, not only when 
seen through the lens of classical comparative advantage economic theory, but even 
under the less of “new” trade theory (Helpman & Krugman, 1985), which, in spite of 
opening room for additional factors like increasing returns to scale and network effects, 
nevertheless confirms the important role that national factor endowments continue to 
have in determining trade patterns and potential winners and losers. A lot depends, then, 
on the accuracy of market prices, preventing that current trade does not have negative 
intertemporal consequences on the wellbeing of trader nations. 
 
Table 3.3. Natural capital key messages 
 The ecosystem is the most important natural endowment humanity has. The 
ecosystem itself is fully dependent on the energy influx from the sun. 
 Natural capital can be classified into: (a) non-renewables or inorganics (stock), 
(b) renewables or organics (stock and flow), and (c) ecosystem services (flow). 
 The ecosystem is a complex web of interrelationships that are not linear but 
complex. Each component of the ecosystem behaves too in a complex way and 
is characterized by different dynamics and time-paths ranging from decades, to 
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hundreds or millions of years. 
 Natural and man-made capital relate to each other through non-convex 
substitution, complementary, and price elasticities. 
 Transgressing the limits allowed by natural capital undermines the ecosystem. 
These limits could be understood as maximum sustainable yields, critical 
dispensation points, or bio-capacity, among others. 
 Maintaining the diversity, redundancy, and connectivity of natural capital 
contribute to reducing society's impact on it. It also pays off to use 
environmental policy instruments to protect the environment. 
 Natural capital should be managed as a complex system through forms of 
polycentric governance. This means too, managing any emerging symmetries, 
as well as the slower variables and the feedback they provide. In order to do 
this, learning and experimentation needs to be allowed. 
 Managing natural capital is as complex as the dynamics of the natural capital 
themselves. Comprehensive measurement and monitoring are required for 
better management: stocks and flows need to be measured both in real and 
monetary terms; absolute and relative limits need to be constantly monitored 
and validated. 
 Transfers of natural capital between countries and local economic actors take 
place (besides obvious direct capital exchanges) through amounts embedded in 
products and services that are nationally and internationally traded. Empirical 
evidence shows how some countries are consuming and using natural capital 
beyond their own possibilities, while others are depleting and destroying their 
natural capital to fulfill the consumption of other countries without necessarily 
obtaining an equivalent, or at least similar, amount of wealth in exchange. 
These exchanges have a direct impact on countries’ potential to achieve and 
maintain self-reinforcing state, as they do involve a literal exchange of wealth. 
These exchanges of wealth are not always properly priced despite of their 
potential intertemporal effects on wellbeing. 
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Material structures. 
Material structures (e.g., energy transmission, transportation, and other public 
services infrastructure, as well as technological choices) facilitate the process of 
development and the attainment of wellbeing. However, they also impose real and 
opportunity costs, as well as important constraints to change (North, 2005; Stiglitz & Lin, 
2013; Thrift, Tickell, Woolgar, & Rupp, 2014). These types of structures, and the 
systems that support them cannot be changed overnight (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; 
Grubb, 2013; C. Hall, 2012). As a result, the degree of flexibility that the material 
consequences of social choices embed in material structures, facilitate or constrain social, 
economic, and political change (Aoki et al., 2012; C. Hall, 2012; Kümmel, 2011; Thrift et 
al., 2014). In fact, Grubb (2013) suggests that, due to the constraints currently imposed 
by material structures, humanity consumes about ten times more energy than is 
physically necessary to provide for the services demanded. 
Geoffrey West et al. (L. M. A. Bettencourt, Lobo, Strumsky, & West, 2010; L. M. 
a Bettencourt, Lobo, Helbing, Kühnert, & West, 2007; Kühnert, Helbing, & West, 2006; 
Luis Bettencourt & Geoffrey West, 2010) show display the relationship between 
population size and the size of their infrastructure and supply network show a scaling 
relationship, hence demonstrating the relevance and pervasiveness that the material 
implications of human choice and action, and the resulting material structures have. 
Material structures, then, provide real and tangible incentives to reinvest in their 
maintenance and enlargement, rather than in disrupting and replacing them. As a 
consequence, the deeper they are seeded into a mutually-reinforcing circle with the social 
structures, the more pervasive they become in influencing all sorts of social, economic, 
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and political decisions and their physical and financial lifespans (Grubb, 2013; Kümmel, 
2011). Ultimately, technology, infrastructure, and institutions all have material 
consequences in creating path-dependence for any process of change, and, while 
incentives and policies may push in alternative directions driven by innovation, they will 
be constraint by these material structures and the incentives they create and entrench 
(Grubb, 2013; Kümmel, 2011; Thrift et al., 2014). 
 
Table 3.4. Material structures key messages 
 Material structures (e.g., public services infrastructure, materialized 
technological choices) both facilitate and constraint social, economic, and 
political change. They create certainty but they also create incentives against 
innovation given the size and timespan of the investments required. They are 
extremely intrusive in that they touch almost every aspect of human life. 
 Material structures cannot be changed overnight. More flexible material 
structures, then, seem to be more conducive to change than inflexible ones. 
 
Social structures: social, cultural, psychological, and spiritual capital. 
Human beings, in all their individual capacity and ingenuity, cannot individually 
achieve as much as they can through cooperation with other individuals (e.g., peace, 
health, trade, justice, equity, environmental sustainability). However, for cooperation to 
take place, interpersonal organization, formal or informal, is required (Arrow, 1974; 
Benkler, 2006; Cronk, 2013; Godfrey, 2014; Hartmann, 2014; North, 1990, 2005). 
Likewise, cooperation is required for interpersonal organization to occur in the first place. 
Cooperation presents coordination and control problems that need to be addressed 
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(Godfrey, 2014; Pomerantz, 2004; Surowiecki, 2004). Therefore, it is perhaps in the 
capacity of societies to deal with these social dilemmas presented by cooperation, that the 
value of social capital lies (OECD, 2001; Oishi, 2012). 
Cooperation cannot be forced nor reduced to only one form or mechanism 
(Hartmann, 2014). Originally, it relies on trust, which usually can be established mainly 
at the personal level among small or medium sized groups. As the groups get bigger, 
more formal rules are required, as well as the formal and informal organizations to 
enforce them. Both these rules and the organizations they are embedded into can 
potentially create and maintain impersonal trust (Bowles, 2016). Nevertheless, in order 
for organizations to be functional, individuals need to sustain a relationship of trust with 
the organizations themselves, which is somewhat dependent on other individuals doing 
the same. It remains, nonetheless, a collective action issue, subjected to free-rider issues, 
and the coordination and control challenges discussed above, among many others 
(Arrow, 1974; OECD, 2001; Reynaud, 2002). 
Along with trust, concepts of respect, concern, and consideration for others; 
discipline; altruism; and other social and cultural values, all contribute to strengthening 
the role organizations have in a society, as well as their effectiveness. What has been 
termed social, cultural, psychological, or spiritual capital, is what makes cooperation 
possible (Morillo, 2014; O’Sullivan, 2012; OECD, 2001; Oishi, 2012; Rima, 2013). In 
the final analysis, the social structures that result and underpin human cooperation are the 
evidence of the commonalities that exist among the people that creates them—even if it is 
at some basic level (Arrow, 1974; Hartmann, 2014; O’Sullivan, 2012; OECD, 2001; 
Pomerantz, 2004; Rima, 2013; Surowiecki, 2004). As discussed in Chapter 2, these are 
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the same commonalities in forms of life, the language-game of daily life, which 
Wittgenstein argues about in his philosophical analysis. 
These capacities to understand, relate, and collaborate with each other, and 
perhaps more importantly, trust each other (the social and emotional intelligence of 
people) are the fuel that makes social, economic, and political change possible (Hamilton, 
Helliwell, & Woolcock, 2016; OECD, 2001; Oishi, 2012). In the end, seeking trust is 
equivalent to seeking reduced uncertainty (Aspers, 2011; Meltzer, 1988). 
Success of rules and organizations is not guaranteed only by their creation; they 
have to be validated through societal internalization. This internalization process, through 
its inner workings towards validation and routine setting, gives rules and organizations a 
strength in creating solid social structures that they do not possess by their mere 
theoretical existence (Godfrey, 2014; Reynaud, 2002; Surowiecki, 2004). The social 
structures created have many layers: from the family unit; to community; enterprises; 
local, regional and national governments; and the global order (Hartmann, 2014; North, 
1990, 2005).  
By their nature, rules are neither exact nor specific. Rather than providing precise 
and complete instructions for every single possible individual and collective action 
challenge, impossible in principle, they create a space and incentives within such a space 
that signal to both individuals and collectives—and allow them to signal each other— 
about socially-acceptable and desirable actions and courses of action, as well as about the 
cognitive instruments and approaches that enable individuals and collectives to share a 
vision and understanding of the world.  
Human understanding relies on experience, both contemporary and historical, and 
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this experience is not all laid out clearly in the open; a very relevant part also lies hidden 
within language, culture, cosmologies, traditions, and even within our genes (North, 
2005). Rules, which are theoretical, do not mean much until they are converted into 
routines that are practical (Arrow, 1974; Chang, 2003; Jean Cohen, 2012; Godfrey, 2014; 
Hartmann, 2014; North, 1990, 2005; Pomerantz, 2004; Reynaud, 2002; Roth, 2015; 
Surowiecki, 2004). “Rules do not have any meaning in themselves; rather the meaning of 
rules lies in their use.” It is the resulting routines that give rules and organizations a sense 
of identity, as well as stabilize them as part of a social structure (Reynaud, 2002, p. 121).  
Ultimately, space created by social structures allows for success and failure to 
take place (Athreya, 2013; Pinto, 2014). The more options and freedom available in this 
space, the higher the probability that net positive outcomes will result (Athreya, 2013; 
Benkler, 2006; Hartmann, 2014; Wolpert, 2016). As Nobel Prize laureate in Economics, 
Tinbergen (1962), argues, a conducive economic order requires both broader spatial and 
temporal horizons. Cohen (2012) calls this space, following Leijonhufvud’s corridor 
hypothesis, a “corridor of confidence,” a space in time through which social, economic, 
and political forces flow. Creating such a space or corridor is difficult, not only because it 
is a lengthy, complex and fragile enterprise, but also because undoing any progress made 
is a fairly easy and short-term affair (OECD, 2001). 
It is precisely in this micro-feature of human interaction, the need to internalize 
coordination through routine setting, where part of the complex characteristics of society 
come from. Facing the same set of rules, two groups of people will engage in the process 
described above to, in the end, create different sets of routines. What these sets will be is 
extremely hard to predict; what the emergent properties of these sets of routines will be 
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for the overall collective, even harder (Hartmann, 2014; Miller & Page, 2007; Page, 
2011; Reynaud, 2002). Furthering this level of complexity, there are now a number of 
pervasive media channels through which social, economic, and political change is 
influenced, particularly the newest ones (e.g., social networks, internet) (OECD, 2001).  
Hartmann (2014), among others, argues that it is this process of validation, 
stabilization, and identity creation, what makes growth possible, and not the traditional 
“ingredient-based” factors that are usually showcased by economic growth models (e.g., 
knowledge, innovation, physical capital, labour). It is, in fact, through this stochastic 
process that mechanisms of social coordination and exchange to deal with uncertainty 
and build trust are created (e.g. markets, networks, and hierarchies). These are all 
solutions to the coordination and control problems that human cooperation present. Some 
of these challenges are better addressed by some instruments and actors, and some by 
others—there is no rule that says private enterprise is universally better than public 
action, or that price-driven markets are always superior than any other mechanism to 
allocate scarce resources or possibilities. Specific institutional arrangements are required 
for dealing with specific problems. In fact, several scholars argue that governmental 
action tends to be more effective at dealing with the internalization of social costs and 
with other intangible categories like trust, empathy, and other social feelings (Alpert, 
2014; Arrow, 1974; Aspers, 2011; North, 2005; Roth, 2015). In particular, research by 
Nobel Prize winner in economics, Roth (2015), showcases the relevance that matching 
markets (those where traditional pricing do not play a role) have in solving some of these 
coordination and control issues. Furthermore, all of this relates, too, to the ideas of the 
political system being a black-box, as developed by Easton (1971). 
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This is yet another example illustrating the point made in the previous chapter 
following Wittgenstein’s ideas about the uses of language and how they “muddy” the 
waters of our analysis and discourse. In particular, the debate between libertarians and 
socialists about the possibility of social, economic, and political planning, is a case in 
point. Libertarians are completely opposed to any sort of planning, while socialist are 
convinced of its need and importance for the success of society (Ebenstein, 2015). When 
approached from a non-ideological view, it could be argued instead, that experience has 
demonstrated that certain solutions devised through that stochastic process of 
internalization and routine making, including planning itself, have proven remarkably 
successful in achieving effective and efficient results—albeit not always (e.g., matching 
markets (Roth, 2015) and wisdom of crowds (Surowiecki, 2004)). As discussed in 
Chapter 2, some sort of planning is practiced in most human societies regardless of their 
ideological preferences, some with more success than others. We might still be “limping” 
our way (Roth, 2015) towards better planning, but this does not mean that it cannot be 
done. Perhaps the key is determining what can and cannot be planned, rather than 
planning comprehensively. As Meltzer (1988) argues, planning might be beneficial only 
if it is attempted for those things that individuals and business cannot do on their own, 
not for those they can. 
An important question remains, however, with regards to whether the space 
created by social structures is, can, or should be the same for all individuals and 
collectives within it (Chang, 2003; Hartmann, 2014; Keating, 1999). For example, by 
establishing the breaking of certain rules as crimes, human beings create social structures 
in which those who break them enjoy a narrower space or corridor with less freedom. 
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However, there are subtler, or even plainly explicit ways in which these same limitations 
in space and freedom are imposed informally (e.g., ethnic and cultural discrimination), or 
even formally (e.g., reinforcing entitlements that perpetuate differences between 
individuals and collectives). It seems, that absolute equity might be difficult to achieve, 
and rare in practice. In fact, evidence suggests that human networks that starts from 
inequality tends to replicate inequality (Chang, 2003; Hartmann, 2014; Keating, 1999). 
What a society decides to do about these limitations of human interaction is yet another 
layer that adds complexity to social structures. This is one of those shortcomings that 
require proactive addressing (Hartmann, 2014). Effective and efficient social structures 
embed mechanisms to continuously adjust against the frequently unintended 
consequences, as well as intended ones, that result from the coordination and control 
challenges that human cooperation present. Once again, it is in the sophistication of these 
capacities that the value of social structures lies. 
How does this process of internalization and routine-setting work? Some suggest 
that this process cannot all be made explicit or accurately codified; that there exist levels 
at which individuals and collectives communicate for which our current capacity to 
articulate them escapes us. In fact, the contribution and relevance of this process may lie 
precisely on its abstract nature and adaptability (Arnswald, 2009; Arrow, 1974; Dopfer, 
2006--see several examples in this edited volume; Godfrey, 2014; Hayek, 2007; 
Reynaud, 2002; Tyler, 2011). As Kertscher (2009), drawing on Wittgenstein, puts it, 
The kind of consensus on these practices that exist in such a system is not the 
result of a rational consensus building, but is rather created by a common way of 
life. Only this common aspect facilitates the identification of valid norms; and it 
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can be described as a complex process of participation in socially diverse 
practices, language-games and discourses that provide the context for what may 
be called in this sense the basis of a line of argument. (p. 100) 
Nevertheless, it is usually acknowledged that the more intelligible and manageable 
information is codified and openly shared among as many individuals and collectives as 
possible, the better cooperation can be, and the bigger the benefits of collective action can 
be. Social structures that improve the way and extent to which information flows and the 
way it is managed tend to be more effective in achieving the ends to which they were 
formed to contribute to (Arrow, 1974; Athreya, 2013; Hartmann, 2014; Reynaud, 2002; 
Roth, 2015). 
A branch of economics—mechanism design—precisely takes aim at what occurs 
within this space created by social structures, as well as the creation of mechanisms to 
influence what happens in it. For example, mechanisms are proposed to not only reward 
participants to display their true behaviour (share true and complete information with 
others), but also to try and make certain collective choices into a dominant social strategy 
that can lead to a specific equilibrium outcome—a social choice function (Athreya, 
2013).  
While the state-of-the-art of our knowledge offers a few pointers of how that 
process within the space created by rules and routines takes place (e.g., preferential 
attachments, small-world phenomena, scale-free attributes), these are only broad 
generalizations. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no policy or incentive can 
outsmart social preferences spontaneously expressed by a collective. In this context, Nash 
equilibria (situations in game-theory in which participants, who are already considering 
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the strategies of others, cannot improve their outcome by changing their own strategies 
(Athreya, 2013)), allow for an alternative intermediate solution through which, rather 
than aiming at introducing incentives that lead to one specific action, a range of possible 
outcomes are considered and incentivize in ways in which the probability of some of 
these outcomes are higher than others (this is also supported by Titmuss (1971)). 
Specifically, the infinite-dimensional spreadsheet of Arrow-Debreu present a space where 
all possibilities could be assigned a probability (Warsh, 2006). And, while this approach 
has its critics (e.g. Romer, 1993) due to its assumption that all the possible past, existing, 
and future consumption goods can be represented, it could be repurposed, not to represent 
goods, but to represent more general states or other possibilities. 
Debate on how much of what happens within space created by rules and routines 
can be shaped through policy is far from conclusive (Athreya, 2013), in particular about 
the balance of positive and negative effects resulting from attempts to do so (Bowles, 
2016). (See also Cartwright’s (1999, 2010) ideas about our “dappled world”). Even 
Adam Smith (2002) said, 
In the great chess board of human society, every single piece has a principle of 
motion of its own altogether different from that which the legislature might 
choose to impress upon it. (p. 275) 
Still, in the spirit of neoclassical economics and its underlying mechanistic logic (rather 
than an alternative thermodynamic one), the search for the “holy grail” to find specific 
causes to specific human actions, both individually and collectively, continues 
(Richmond, 2013). What these reveal, though, is that many of these attempts are trying to 
change the outcomes of human action without really addressing their causes (Georgescu-
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Roegen, 1971; Meltzer, 1988). For example, as Eswaran (2014) suggests, while millions 
of dollars are invested to try to directly reduce child mortality by providing health 
services, several empirical studies have shown that, albeit and indirect route, investing in 
women’s education might be much more effective. Meadows and Wright (2008) point 
out to the common mistake made in economic theory and modelling to forget that as a 
complex system, flows do not respond only to direct intervention, but also to system 
changes that have to do more with stocks. 
Rules and routine are shaped by environmental and social conditions, as much as 
they affect them in return. In fact, in a world of continuous change, rules and routines 
need to continuously adjust if they are to remain relevant (Aoki et al., 2012; Benkler, 
2006; Galor, 2011; Grubb, 2013; Nelson, 1982; North, 2005; Reynaud, 2002). This not 
only applies at the country level. International structures are also an extremely important 
part of this process and influence it greatly, as well (Aoki et al., 2012; North, 2005).  
Likewise, rules and routines not only facilitate orderly social cooperation, they 
too impose costs on individuals and collectives (Stiglitz & Lin, 2013). Overall, social 
structures embed in them social choices about plurality, effectiveness, efficiency, and 
equity, even when these choices do not seem so evident (Athreya, 2013; Chang, 2003; 
OECD, 2001). Furthermore, and also in regards to the important role of global social 
structures, part of the challenge currently facing humanity lies in the fact that many 
coordination and control issues have a global dimension, while no global authority or 
mechanism to guide towards their solution nor deal with them exists in full or has the 
required relative standing to make a difference. Furthermore, both local and global social 
structures lack the organizations and the social, economic, and political mechanisms to 
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deal with and ensure intertemporal equity (Alpert, 2014; Chang, 2003; Grubb, 2013; 
North, 2005). (See also the edited volume by Bruszt and McDermott (2014) which focus 
precisely on dynamics and outcomes of the efforts towards international integration of 
regulations.)  
While the UN partially supplements some of these global needs, many exceed its 
capacity, and, perhaps more importantly, its possibility to act and to enact change (Alpert, 
2014; Commission on Global Governance, 1995). Overall, there is widespread technical 
agreement with regards to how current global social structures create a mismatch between 
private and social returns; how the rise of extremely large private organizations (e.g., 
banks, transnational corporations) have created trans-border complexities and large 
power imbalances; how the current arrangements create incentives for short-sighted 
behaviours; and how, overall, global social structures are far from a level playfield for all 
countries (Elson, 2011, 2013; Finnemore, 2013a; Independent Commission on 
International Development Issues, 1980; Nayyar, 2002; Spence, 2011; Stiglitz, 2010). 
(See Milanovic’s (2016) analysis on how the difficulties faced by countries in a 
globalized world in order to control and tax capital have exacerbated inequality.) The 
problem seems to be, then, one of collective will and action, rather than an intellectual 
and theoretical one. 
If cooperation can help individuals collectively achieve much more than what 
they would individually, the logical consequence is that the more effective and efficient 
social structure are, the more effective and efficient individual and collective efforts will 
be (Arrow, 1974; Aspers, 2011; Benkler, 2006; Roth, 2015; Sorokin, 2010). More 
specifically, the kind of rules, organizations, and routines, and the overall characteristics 
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of the social structures that have been found to positively influence the process of 
development, are, among others, those that: 
 Ensure mutual accountability at all levels of the social organization, as 
well as transparency about the impact of social and political decisions on 
the costs assumed by human collectives (Albala-Bertrand, 2013; Athreya, 
2013; Benkler, 2006). For example, consumer pricing of energy usually 
represents more of the political choices and preferences, than the actual 
accounting of the real costs involved in their production; nevertheless, this 
is usually hidden from broader social discussion. In fact, about US$500 
billion dollars are annually spent by governments in directly and indirectly 
subsidizing consumer prices—this is about four times the yearly flows of 
aid (Grubb, 2013).  
 Facilitate the availability, reliability, flow, and distribution of information, 
as well as the connectedness of individuals and collectives in varied and 
complex ways (to create strong, cohesive, and broadly connected 
networks) (Benkler, 2006). 
 Give participants similar positions in the networks created, allowing them 
to also have similar scopes of freedom to act (in network terminology, 
usually power is linked to those who have more central roles in the 
network) (Albala-Bertrand, 2013; Athreya, 2013; Benkler, 2006; Fligstein, 
2001; Hartmann, 2014; Marschak, 1972; Roth, 2015).  
 Rely on scale-free (i.e., characterized by possessing “hubs”), rather than 
random networks (the former seem to be better at resisting random failure, 
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and at remaining resilient in front of it; they also seem to facilitate faster 
diffusion of information) (Hartmann, 2014). Social network analysis can 
provide the tools to understand and design such networks (Hartmann, 
2014). 
 Allow for cohesive, social connections based on shared values and 
homogeneity, as much as they also allow for plurality and heterogeneity, 
as well as tolerance, solidarity, and willingness to compromise (Chang, 
2003; Commission on Global Governance, 1995; Galor, 2011; OECD, 
2001; Oishi, 2012; Sorokin, 2010). While several studies indicate that 
human beings are usually biased in favour of some groups rather than 
others, this does not mean they are not capable and willing to be aware of 
such bias and to address its consequences. In the same fashion that these 
biases can be and have been historically used to elicit disgust among 
groups to further antagonize with or marginalize particular groups, 
awareness of this possibility can be used to eradicate or at least minimize 
such reactions or attitudes (Bloom, 2013). 
 Allow for clear and equitable ownership rules, rights, and responsibilities 
(for example, with regards to intellectual property rights) (Athreya, 2013; 
Galor, 2011). Successful social structures are based on the understanding 
that the mere definition of what these rules, rights, and responsibilities are 
and entitle, are not absolute nor atemporal truths, but the result of a social 
process and the reflection of temporal social preferences that take place 
and represent a society in a given point in time (Benkler, 2006; Chang, 
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2003; Stiglitz, 2010; Ugur, 2013). In fact, in a knowledge-based economy, 
intellectual property rights are becoming increasingly important, while our 
social structures underlying them are becoming increasingly out-dated 
(Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 2004). 
 Provide the space and incentives for the design of markets and other 
mechanisms for the allocation of scarce resources, due to a clear 
realization that no single mechanism or arrangement have universal or 
atemporal validity (Athreya, 2013; Galor, 2011; Marschak, 1972; Roth, 
2015) 
 Foster positive attitudes and actions toward innovation by taking into 
consideration the varied understandings and attitudes that different social, 
religious, and cultural groups may have towards development (Galor, 
2011; Landes, 1998, 2010). For example, Landes (1998, 2010) showcases 
how even when China had access to gun powder many years before the 
Europeans did, its traditional use remained the same for many years in 
spite of evident alternative possibilities. Likewise, Chandler (1997) 
showcases the effect that social structures had in making transnational 
corporations and very large enterprises possible, and how these 
organizations, in turn, changed global attitudes and actions with regards to 
production costs, the availability of human capital, the relevance of 
international trade, and the global state of innovation and technological 
advance. 
 Provide financial and credit arrangements, and the intertemporal space 
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they create to borrow from the expectations of future benefits (Athreya, 
2013; Champ, Freeman, & Haslag, 2011; Fligstein, 2001; Galor, 2011; 
Goodspeed, 2012; Pinto, 2014). While doing so, avoid, as well, 
organizational choices that may disproportionately reflect the preferences 
of interest groups, or of those with the most power, rather than the 
preferences that better the social, economic, and political outcomes of 
those financial and credit arrangements (Calomiris & Haber, 2014). 
Turner (2016), for example, points out to how the percentage of banking 
reserves required is a choice that, while have huge implications in the 
functioning of the financial system and its impact on development, is not 
only driven by technical knowledge but by power and how it transpires 
through social, economic and political dynamics. Credit is not as 
important for growth as it seems to be. In fact, excessive credit growth 
might be behind the booms and busts of the economic cycles. What is 
more important is its intertemporal allocation (Arnon, 2011; Minsky, 
1978; Turner, 2016) 
 Is based on sound monetary arrangements. These arrangements are 
extremely important and have both short- and long-term consequences due 
to the ways in which they frame and constrain social, economic and 
political choices and actions (Desan, 2014; Fligstein, 2001; Harcourt, 
2011; Reich, 2015; Stiglitz, 2010; Stiglitz & United Nations General 
Assembly, 2010). The complex role money plays in society is a function 
of the different purposes it has: measure of value, medium of exchange, 
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store of value (Amin, 2013; Harvey, 2006; Meikle, 1995; Soddy, 1924). 
Stiglitz (Stiglitz, 2010; Stiglitz & United Nations General Assembly, 
2010) and Alpert (2014), among others, argue extensively about the need 
to reform the global monetary system with the aim of ensuring a more 
levelled playfield. They both argue this reform is necessary as well to 
avoid future financial crises by ensuring that an increase in the money 
supply tracks and does not exceed real and potential economic growth 
(these reforms include replacing the US$ as the de facto reserve currency) 
(Desan, 2014; Richmond, 2013; Soddy, 1924). Money is, in itself, a 
mechanism for intertemporal coordination (Champ et al., 2011; 
Goodspeed, 2012) and a way to manage economic cycles and aim for 
steady economic growth (Friedman, 1984; Meltzer, 1988; Jan Tinbergen, 
1962). As Keynes argued, when the neutrality of money is not taken as a 
fact, money can also be considered as a source of booms and busts 
(Davidson, 2015). The way in which society considers money and its role 
(Desan, 2014), has very important implications in the ways in which 
wealth is created and transferred. While most economists (not Keynes 
himself) argue that money does not have any impact on real variables in 
the long run (Davidson, 2015), they often ignore the short-term 
implications it may have in creating inequalities (e.g., because different 
groups react at different speeds, have differential access to information, 
and face different constraints that allow for short-term realized gains for 
only a few). The fact that society has yet not addressed these implications, 
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is a reflection of the constraints of current social structures (Amin, 2013; 
Arnon, 2011; Meltzer, 1988; Soddy, 1924; Stiglitz, 2010; Stiglitz & 
United Nations General Assembly, 2010; Turner, 2016). 
 Provide insurance arrangements that allow for the social spreading of 
individual and collective macro level risks (e.g., disasters and other shocks 
and externalities), the possibility to afford the uncertainties of the 
innovation process, and any other events or situations that can only be 
planned for but not controlled (Athreya, 2013; Godfrey, 2014). 
Unchecked, these risks and the costs they can represent have a direct 
negative impact in the wealth of nations and their ability to achieve 
wellbeing (Commission on Global Governance, 1995). 
 Establish structures and mechanism to deal with the consequences of the 
process of social, economic, and political change. This process usually 
creates winners and losers. Therefore, such structures and mechanisms can 
allow those who lose to swiftly reintegrate into the winning group 
(Spence, 2011). These might include, for example, training and 
transitioning support in the form of unemployment insurance (OECD, 
2001). Throughout these transitions periods, it is usually those who are 
more vulnerable (e.g., young children, and future generations who have no 
voice in the present) who are the most affected, and who cannot act to 
mitigate these effects. Many of these vulnerable populations also face 
important critical points in their development and consolidation that tend 
to set specific gradients in terms of wealth, behaviour, and cognitive skills 
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that define, to a great extent, the breath of possibilities and choices they 
will have for the rest of their lives. If not addressed during those particular 
critical points in time, the effects on these populations are usually far-
reaching and may last, at least, for the extent of the generation being 
affected, with the potential for spillovers into the following generations 
(Keating, 1999). All of these considerations are also applicable at the 
global level. Countries have spillover effects on each other, as well as on 
the global order and vice versa. The scale of these spillovers is not equal, 
nor proportional, among all involved (Chang, 2003; Jean Cohen, 2012; 
North, 2005). 
 Monitor and maintain the flexibility of the social structures to change and 
respond to change. This capability lies in how well diverse interests are 
represented by the groups which can exert influence in the process of 
social, economic, and political change; a process that, in itself, should 
allow for a balanced consideration and participation of all interests, 
particularly those of the minorities (polarization and exclusion need 
addressing). Overall the social structures should reassure its members 
about the functionality and legitimacy of the decision making process 
(Chang, 2003; Manyin, 2005; OECD, 2001; Pinto, 2014). This flexibility 
also includes the ability to recognize and address the contradictions that 
tend to be embedded into social structures given the slow, iterative, and 
stochastic process through which they are formed. For example, Hills 
(2015) showcases how there are deeply entrenched and contradictory 
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views embedded in the United Kingdom’s tax code with regards to wealth 
and its distribution. These contradictions exist due to the differing views 
liberals and conservatives have, and due to their efforts to perpetuate these 
views by embedding them into organizations that far outlive them. Landes 
(2010), reinforces this idea by describing how around the time of the 
British industrial revolution, the institutions at the time favoured 
redistributive activities, and as a consequence of these preferences, 
entrepreneurial activity tended to move towards alternative activities. 
 Provide specific structures and mechanisms, and the space to devise new 
ones, to deal with collective issues related to the public good. Biggs 
(2015) suggests, following the work of Elinor Ostrom (2010), that such 
structures and mechanisms should: (a) define in clear terms the ecological 
and the social boundaries; (b) adapt to the local conditions the rules that 
dictate how common resources are appropriated and used; (c) ensure that 
all those who appropriate and use common resources have a saying in 
decisions made about these resources, and, are accountable as well for 
their use; (d) graduate sanctions imposed on abusing appropriation or use 
of common resources, and mechanisms to deal with such conflicts are easy 
to access and inexpensive to use; (e) posses public legitimacy and are 
layered to reflect the size and complexity of the resources managed. With 
regards to policy principles to deal with these issues, Daly (2004) suggests 
that they should: (a) deal with one, and only one, goal; (b) aim at 
exercising macro-control while providing micro-freedom (to allow for 
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variability); (c) allow for a margin of error and for adaptability; (d) 
consider the initial conditions and their potential impact; and (e) provide a 
solution to the challenge that is at the same level of the challenge itself (in 
terms of those who face the challenge and the characteristics of the 
challenge itself). 
 Create and maintain productive and trade structures and policies that 
enable the transmission of knowledge and technology, as well as allow for 
the establishment of mutually beneficial relationships, and more equitable 
private and social returns (Galor, 2011) 
In spite of the overall agreement that might exist about the broader categories of 
desirable features above, once it comes to the specifics, economists like Georgescu-
Roegen (1971) suggest that there are no universal and timeless formulas that can be 
applied successfully in most societies, and, therefore, the most effective and efficient 
social structures will be those that are finely tuned to the different realities of their 
respective social collectives. Ugur (2013), makes the same argument by pointing to the 
example of how the definition of what constitute intellectual property is not only 
dependent on the prevailing social structures (and the preferences they reflect), but also, 
in turn, shapes the ways in which innovation is defined, measured, regulated, and 
encouraged or discouraged.  
Likewise, social structures are responsible for all the gender issues that are 
increasingly being denounced and addressed. These are embedded through history, 
culture, religion, politics, economic development, and traditionally unequal power 
distributions among genders (Eswaran, 2014). Many of these choices and preferences are 
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responsible for embedding differentiated and detrimental gradients for women that are 
now further embedded and entrenched in both material and social structures (Keating, 
1999). Perhaps the most evident example of the impact of social structures on gender 
differences is the choice to not compensate domestic labour—nor even to recognize them 
as accruing social benefits, or to protect and compensate women for bearing pregnancies 
(Eswaran, 2014). Furthermore, and besides the gender bias embedded in function 
gradients, and in material and social structures that tend to be almost hidden from social 
awareness, the fact that social structures do not recognize the possibility of differential 
gender social, economic, and political behaviours that need to be supported and 
incentivized rather than uniformed using a gender biased framework, is perhaps even 
more limiting (Eswaran, 2014). 
The truth is that while broad normative statements like the ones listed above—for 
example, that a sound social structure has to provide protection for intellectual property; 
or that genders have differential behaviours—seem neutral and sound, their 
meaningfulness, nevertheless, only matters once they are materialized in concrete 
practical aspects that are neither neutral nor close to perfection, and that, ultimately have 
real and tangible material and non material consequences. This, again, aligns with 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical views discussed in Chapter 2 and related to the inseparable 
connection between the conceptual and the practical; that is, authentic knowledge. 
 
Table 3.5. Social structures key messages 
 Cooperation allows human beings to achieve what they cannot individually. 
 Cooperation is based on trust. When the numbers of individuals cooperating 
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become large enough, formal structures need to be put in place to make up for 
the impossibility to establish direct personal relations of trust with everyone. 
The bond created through these structures, which also allows for these 
structures to be created in the first place, is usually termed social, 
psychological, or spiritual capital. 
 Cooperation presents problems of coordination and control that can be solved 
through different arrangements and practices. Since society is a complex 
system, none of these solutions have universal application. Furthermore, these 
solutions cannot be enforced. They need to be internalized and adapted through 
a process of social interaction that sets new routines replacing old ones. These 
processes of interpretation and internalization not only take place within the 
space created by natural, social, and material structures (a "corridor of 
confidence"), but, in turn, it also modifies it. 
 The value of social structures is dependent on how they facilitate the solution of 
cooperation problems towards achieving wellbeing. 
 Social structures do not necessarily provide a level playing field for all their 
members. The distribution of power they embed and create, influences their 
functioning and the implications of what takes place in the space they create. 
Society's preferences about how to address these inequalities are usually 
embedded in the social structures themselves, and this tends, in turn, to explain 
why their response and change tends to be slow. 
 While the social sciences have sought to understand and devise mechanisms to 
influence that process of interpretation and internalization that takes place in 
the space of a "corridor of confidence,” success has proven limited. Economists 
in particular face the limiting finding made by their own discipline that it is not 
possible to achieve such an objective; instead they have opted for alternative 
probabilistic tools that allow for different scenarios and different probabilities 
of them happening. 
 Global social structures not only tend to replicate the shortcomings and 
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limitations local ones have; they also add their own. The incompleteness of 
global institutions impacts the way in which global structures are currently 
setup; this leaves voids in terms of responsibilities and action. This is partly 
why, in spite of considerable agreement about the shortcomings of such 
structures, progress is not only slow at times, but inexistent at others. 
 Social structures that allow for more transparent and comprehensive exchanges 
of information to take place, as well as for this information to be codified, tend 
to facilitate the processes of interpretation and internalization described above. 
 Effective and efficient social structures (this is, to allow for effectively and 
efficiently achieve the wellbeing of the majority) tend to: (a) ensure 
accountability; (b) improve connectivity; (c) facilitate cohesiveness while 
promoting pluralism and diversity; (d) establish clear rules that are understood 
and enforced; (e) allow for multiple and diverse mechanisms for allocating 
resources, roles, and responsibilities, including those to deal with the 
difficulties presented by the public goods and bads; (f) promote innovation and 
flexibility while reducing uncertainty through insurance schemes; (g) wisely 
allow for the use of credit and money as mechanisms for intertemporal 
coordination, as well as for the proactive management of change cycles or 
structural transformation; (h) provide the mechanisms to deal with the costs 
imposed by change in both individuals and collectives, and through these 
mechanisms further diminishes the uncertainties that disincentive change; (i) 
minimize the embedding of contradictions in its structure; (j) create and 
maintain productive and trade structures, and implement policies that, allow for 
mutually beneficial relationships, equitable social and private returns, and 
efficient sharing of knowledge and technology; and (k) allow for continuous 




Natural and social forces. 
At the broadest level, natural forces are not only pervasive but indomitable by 
human beings. They can be understood and planned for, to a certain extent, but they 
cannot be fully predicted nor managed. The risks imposed by them can be mitigated but 
not eliminated. Therefore, the impact of natural disasters are usually severe, both in the 
short- and long-runs (Al-Rodhan, 2009; Albala-Bertrand, 2013; Benson & Clay, 2004; 
Richardson, 2014). In fact, Managi (2015) estimated that in 2012, damages of natural 
disasters were in the order of US$250 billion—more than twice the total amount of aid 
during the same year (OECD, 2012). These natural disasters can be classified into hydro-
meteorological (floods, hurricanes, temperature, and the like) and geophysical 
(earthquakes, volcanoes) (Benson & Clay, 2004).  
Regardless of their potential negative effects, these are the natural forces that, 
driven by energy, put the world in motion and allow human beings to live, innovate, and 
progress (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; Kümmel, 2011). 
That human beings have now themselves become a source of alteration of their 
own physical environment, only worsen the potential impact natural forces will have in 
the future, even perhaps in exponential ways (Biggs, 2015). Furthermore, their usual rates 
of economic growth, combined with the limited resources and capacity available in 
developing countries, put them in a rather disadvantageous position to opportunely 
prevent even more relevant changes to the environment than the ones already made 
(Biggs, 2015). Additionally, given that natural endowments are not equally distributed, 
nor are the consequences of natural forces, the initial conditions of countries determine to 
a great extent many of the risks they would have to face and address (e.g., earthquake 
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prone, low elevation, high erosion, gene pool, temperatures and other climate conditions). 
These conditions have been shown to have considerable impact in social, economic, and 
political progress. They can both drag or boost the forces behind social, economic, and 
political change (Galor, 2011; Hills, 2015; Managi, 2015; Pontifical Council for Justice 
and Peace, 2004). 
The experience of more developed countries shows that a more comprehensive 
understanding and effort to address the risks posed by nature’s forces, while not 
eliminating its effects, can greatly reduce them, including the minimization of the human 
deaths they cause (Managi, 2015). The ability of less developed countries to prevent, deal 
with, and resist sustained impacts from nature, is considerably lesser than that of more 
developed ones, just because of their limited resources and knowledge (they might also 
face worse natural risks due to geography, weather, and other characteristics—e.g., the 
Maldives). 
The risks created by natural forces are not independent of the social and material 
structures. They are likewise related to the prevailing economic and political conditions 
(Al-Rodhan, 2009; Albala-Bertrand, 2013; Benson & Clay, 2004). Furthermore, the 
frequency and continued impact of natural disasters have cumulative debilitating effects 
that not only extend beyond the specific material damages in the economic, financial, 
social, and political realms, but that also impact the resilience and speed of recovery of 
countries. Such potential effects, due to their importance, should be incorporated into 
macroeconomic forecasting and planning. There is enough evidence of the impact that 
natural disasters have in terms of economic growth to do so (Benson & Clay, 2004). 
Natural forces, independently and in conjunction with social forces, create 
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uncertainty for human beings. It is precisely this uncertainty that, in turn, provides for a 
considerable portion of the social forces dynamism. Uncertainty puts human beings’ mere 
existence in doubt, therefore, it serves as an incentive for them to continuously trying to 
reduce risks (Meltzer, 1988; North, 2005). In this process, it is their entrepreneurship and 
innovation that creates avenues to better control and management of their environment 
and the natural forces that underpin this environment (Helpman, 2004; Kümmel, 2011; 
Landes, 2010; Spence, 2011). 
And while this deep seated driver of change seems to be embedded as deep as in 
the genes of human beings, the ranges within which human beings can express these 
drivers is given by a number of gradients that constrains their individual health, 
cognitive, and behavioural capabilities, as well as by the gradients expressed by a society 
as a whole (Hartmann, 2014; Keating, 1999; Spence, 2011). Hence, human beings’ 
motivation and resolution for change is bound by both these natural and social gradients 
(Alpert, 2014; Benkler, 2006; C. Hall, 2012; Hartmann, 2014). 
Nevertheless, these function gradients can also be seen as enablers of change, 
particularly the social ones. What has been termed social, psychological, and spiritual 
capital can have enabling effects and transcend individual limitations by creating 
collective capabilities and motivations that can become great sources of change (Benkler, 
2006; Cronk, 2013; Hartmann, 2014; O’Sullivan, 2012; Oishi, 2012; Rima, 2013). In 
society, not only individual forces create change: “social dynamics and the forces behind 
them cannot be reduced to their individual members” (Oishi, 2012, p. 182). Social, 
economic, and political inequality for example, are increasingly acknowledged to 
negatively affect forces of change, although, in fact, they can also drive radical social 
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change when they strike the core of individuals and collectives who no longer are willing 
to support them. This negative influence is not limited to national or present time 
dimensions; it extends across national borders and generations (Biggs, 2015; Galor, 2011; 
Hartmann, 2014; Helpman, 2004; Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 2004; Spence, 
2011). 
Economists have developed “social choice functions” as means to understand the 
forces behind change, as well as their impacts. They have also developed the idea of 
“mechanism design” (as previously discussed) aiming to manage such forces and their 
potential impact in the form of change (Athreya, 2013; Bowles, 2016). Akerlof and 
Kranton (2010), discuss social identity as a source of such forces. Nevertheless, such 
manipulation of social forces, can also have unintended negative consequences that might 
exceed the intended positive ones (Bowles, 2016). 
 
Table 3.6. Natural, material, and social forces key messages 
 Natural forces can have positive and negative impacts. Negative impacts cannot 
be fully controlled but they can be better understood. Improved knowledge 
leads to better risk management and, in turn, this leads to mitigated 
consequences. 
 Human beings have now disrupted the ecosystem in ways in which have 
changed its risk profile. 
 The risk profiles of countries vary. Natural endowments and conditions are not 
equally distributed. Some countries bear bigger risks than others, and some 
countries face bigger obstacles in developing than others. Natural forces' impact 
is also dependent on the material and social structures and forces. 
 The capacity to prevent and mitigate the impact of natural forces is highly 
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dependent on the level of material and financial resources available. Due to 
their impact, countries need to include the potential effects of these forces in 
their macroeconomic forecasting and planning. 
 Survival and the reduction of uncertainty are deeply entrenched motivations 
that lead human beings’ efforts and behaviours. Innovation is often aimed at 
reducing uncertainty. However, human beings' capabilities are limited by 
gradients that are set early in their lives. As a group of individuals, societies 
also display gradients that limit the possibility of change, although they are not 
linearly related to those of the individuals that compose them. 
 Among the social forces that impact the possibility and the quality of 
development, social, economic, and political inequality is a very relevant one. 
 
The process of social, economic, and political change. 
Under the modernization paradigm of development, societies have been 
conceived to transform or developed through a progression from the primary, through 
secondary, and into the tertiary sector becoming the leading sector, as the pinnacle of a 
“developed” society. However, this vision is challenged by the idea that ultimately, the 
alleged “value” these sectors have is given by the social structures in place and by the 
preferences embedded in such structures at given points in time (D. Cohen, 2012). 
Furthermore, the idea that change was more dependent on how much was invested rather 
than how it was invested, was too, socially constructed by the misinterpretation of history 
(Hanushek, 2015). That is, an intrinsic relationship exists between the way a society is 
structured and the way in which change occurs, while, in turn, the way in which change 
occurs shapes and transforms the existing social structures. 
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The nature of this process is one in which trade-offs are made. How much 
biodiversity should be kept? Which sources of energy will be given preference? How 
much overall impact on the ecosystem would be allowed in exchange for what? How 
much efficiency at the expense of equity? How much for whom? How much technology 
and how many jobs? How much trade to allow for cheaper consumption but at what 
temporal costs of losing jobs and sectors? How much balance is achieved between the 
benefits of present generations and those of future ones? (Athreya, 2013; Biggs, 2015; 
Galor, 2011; Grubb, 2013; Hanushek, 2015; Helm, 2014; Helpman, 2004; Soddy, 1924) 
All the choices made produce real and opportunity costs, and they are not equally 
distributed. Asymmetries are pervasive, and they are not only a reflection of the process 
of change. Through the existing asymmetries embedded in the social and material 
structures, change further deepen or create new asymmetries. Furthermore, all these 
asymmetries have an impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the process of change 
itself. Among these asymmetries are those related to information, power, access, 
background, race, and gender (Athreya, 2013; Becker, 1977; Biggs, 2015; D. Cohen, 
2012; Eswaran, 2014; Freeman, 2008; Hartmann, 2014; Nelson, 1982). And, since 
change is so chaotic and unpredictable, it is hard to not do harm, or even reach the goals 
desired. There are many forces behind the process of change (e.g., natural, material, and 
social), and they are next to impossible to control without causing unintended 
consequences (Athreya, 2013; Biggs, 2015; D. Cohen, 2012; Freeman, 2008; Hartmann, 
2014). 
Change is constrained by material and social structures, but also guided by them; 
still, the very essence of change requires a new set of structures in place (Campbell, 
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2004; Lin, 2012a; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013; Surowiecki, 2004). Through their existence, 
current structures create certainty, yet, change only happens when uncertainty is 
embraced, so it can become more certain through such embracement. The choice of how 
much uncertainty to bear also determines how radical the changes could be and how 
constraining the existing structures will be (Grubb, 2013; Kümmel, 2011). Social 
structures implicitly embed relationships that showcase different preferences and 
sensibilities between its components—the elasticities. These elasticities serve as 
motivators or constraints for change, as well as its qualifiers (Freeman, 2008; Helpman, 
2004; Kümmel, 2011). Furthermore, the way in which natural, material, and social 
structures account for the costs that social, economic, and political change creates 
establish a precedent, as well as an expectation about how the risks created by uncertainty 
will translate into actual costs for those individuals and collectives who find themselves 
in the losing end of such process of change, influencing in turn their attitudes and 
motivations towards facing these risks (Lin, 2012a; Nelson, 1982). 
Therefore, individual and collective actors pursue change, on their own will or 
pushed by shifting circumstances. They do so, constrained by natural, material, and social 
structures, and informed by the preferences embedded in these structures with regards to 
change, innovation, and with regards to who will bear the uncertainty, risks, and costs 
that result from change. The intensity and speed of their efforts will vary with the 
intensity of the drivers for change, flexibility of the structures, and safeguards or rewards 
that such structures offer in exchange for the uncertainties of change (e.g., the ability to 
acquire and use capital; the ability to leverage their resources, those of others, and those 
available collectively; and the ability to maintain these arrangements and reduce the risks 
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of losing them) (Campbell, 2004; Godfrey, 2014; Meltzer, 1988; Nelson, 1982; North, 
2005; Surowiecki, 2004). A lot of the room available for change to happen is created by 
the psychology of individuals and collectives, and how it influences their perception, 
their attitude towards uncertainties and risks, and the kinds of forecasting tools they use 
to understand the risks and increase predictability (Aspers, 2011; Frydman, 2011; North, 
2005). Furthermore, the room for change is also created by governments through the 
provision of information that creates certainty about the direction of change and the 
measures to managing and reducing fluctuations and policy changes (Meltzer, 1988). 
Ultimately, communication, diversity, freedom, independence, decentralization, timing 
coordination, and the ability to read the signs embedded in social dynamics, are all 
factors that increase the probability of change heading towards greener pastures 
(Surowiecki, 2004). 
Change cannot happen if not framed within the current worldviews and 
perceptions that can provide for some certainty in front of the uncertainty and related 
risks that the prospects of change create. This frame, in turn, influences the speed and 
intensity of the change, and even perhaps if it will happen or not (e.g., will the change be 
evolutionary or revolutionary). Change requires social, economic, and political resources, 
and unless a minimal level of certainty is provided, the limited resources available are 
unlikely to be assigned to changes that lack support (Arrow, 1974; Campbell, 2004; 
Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 2004).  
Ultimately, though, and while it cannot happen without individual change, 
collective change is not caused only when individual change itself happens but when the 
collectives discover and embed new routines that, in turn, create a new stable structure 
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that influence individual change (Godfrey, 2014; Nelson, 1982; North, 2005; Reynaud, 
2002). A new structure is a symptom of adopted and stable change; it is not itself the 
main driver of change (contrary to what the technocratic approach to aid promulgates).  
This social process, more than changes in the volume of any of the ingredients of 
economic growth—labour, capital, natural endowments, knowledge—is at the core of the 
process of development (Hartmann, 2014). Changing structures in the process of being 
adopted usually redefine, among others, what terms like freedom, justice, and 
productivity mean (Benkler, 2006). They also create diverging environments for 
individuals and collectives to operate, creating a different set of matches and mismatches 
between them than the ones that used to exist. As a consequence, individuals and 
collectives that thrive better than others in the changed environment (e.g., comparative 
advantage in international trade) will tend to win from the change, while others will tend 
to lose (Godfrey, 2014; Hartmann, 2014; Lin, 2012a; Nelson, 1982). More importantly, 
change that does not create a match at all usually fails to take over and slows or prevents 
more relevant change. Unless change is translated in ways in which it fits individuals and 
collectives, it will not hold (Campbell, 2004; Freeman, 2008; Perez, 2002). Hanushek 
(2015); for example, showcases the importance of investments in education, creating a set 
of skills that matches the needs of the context, and how if this match does not take place, 
no matter how much money is spent, the results would not be optimal. In the end, the 
process of change can be equated to a game which set of rules is given by the natural, 
material, and social structures (Godfrey, 2014). 
Contrary to what neoclassic economists have modelled for years, social, 
economic, and political change is not mechanical. As a complex system ruled by the laws 
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of thermodynamics, change is a one-way street (Frydman, 2011; Georgescu-Roegen, 
1971; Giugale, 2014; North, 2005). Given the uniqueness of complex change and the 
unpredictable impact of structures and forces in the kind of change created, managing 
change means continued monitoring and adjusting (Hanushek, 2015; Hartmann, 2014; 
North, 2005). Furthermore, change is not uniform nor encompassing. Different social, 
economic, and political processes move at different rhythms; different groups have 
different interests and different power that all affect the bargaining processes and the 
outcomes of the change (Campbell, 2004; Dopfer, 2006--see several chapters in this 
edited volume; Friedman, 1984; Frydman, 2011; North, 2005).  
Changing structures take time. Development takes time because it involves 
morphing values, culture, perceptions, and other complex and intangible factors that are 
deeply ingrained in individuals and collectives. They may usually require a generation to 
change into other frameworks that are as stable and pervasive as the existing ones 
(Godfrey, 2014; North, 2005). Roth (2015) uses the analogy of societies “limping” their 
way through the process of improving our solutions to deal with collective objectives. 
Friedman (1984), for example, argues that social structures can create situations 
where those who benefit from them the most might, in-time, become themselves 
minorities. Given that at that point in time the benefits they accrue spread as a social cost, 
very thinly among the majority, these majority have little individual incentives to unite 
and push to modify the status quo. In this way, social structures can allow the creation of 
private wealth at a public cost. Group dynamics usually create incentives for policy 
makers to listen and cater more to organized minorities, than unorganized majorities (see 
also, Cukierman, Hercowitz, & Leiderman, 1992; Friedman, 1984). 
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This slowness in the process of change is commonly termed path-dependence. 
However, as discussed earlier, rather than being a cause of slow change, it might just be 
an effect of the unavoidable need for collectives to negotiate with rules and social 
structures to then translate and internalize them into stable social arrangements. Path-
dependence might be an effect, rather than the cause of the slowness of the process of 
social, economic, and political change. 
Besides what is described in the previous paragraphs, not much more is known 
about the process of how change occurs (Campbell, 2004; Manyin, 2005). Some existing 
research with regards to the mechanisms of change describe and account correlations that 
provide a plausible explanation, rather than causal relationships, and, therefore, hint at 
how to manage change without really explain it (Campbell, 2004). 
It is clear that when and how change starts happening is important. As a starting 
point, human being’s health, cognitive, and behavioural gradients are defined mostly 
during the first two years of life. Further changes to these gradients can happen at other 
points in life, but not to the same extent. Subsequent generations’ gradients are also 
influenced by those of the previous generation (Keating, 1999). Given the central role 
and multiplier effect human beings have in any process of social, economic, and political 
change, there is of course, a cascade effect (Keating, 1999). This is important because the 
capabilities of a collective are essential in driving change (Hartmann, 2014). 
Change tends to be driven by human beings’ innovations and their disruptive 
effects. Economic cycles have been a very important concern of economists throughout 
history. In studying them, some have found patterns or cycles that stretch for 25 or 60 
years (Devezas & Corredine, 2001). Some other scholars have negated the existence of 
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cycles (Barnett, 1998; Devezas, 2006; Devezas & Corredine, 2001). For example, Milton 
Friedman only acknowledged the existence of short and minimal adjustments in the 
economy (Ebenstein, 2015). Keynes and Wicksell (Arnon, 2011; Goodspeed, 2012), 
Schumpeter (Schumpeter, 1934), Tinbergen (1981), and Minsky (1978, 1986) all 
supported their existence. More recently, Milanovic (2016) has even argued, using 
empirical evidence, that over the past 500 years there have been “Kuznets waves or 
cycles” showcasing alternating increases and decreases in inequality. Much of this debate 
revolves around the timing and length of the cycles and the causalities behind them and 
resulting from them (Devezas, 2006; Devezas & Corredine, 2001; Perez, 1983, 2002). 
Likewise, in sociology, Sorokin’s (2010) four volume Social and Cultural 
Dynamics described, using a highly quantitative approach, how civilization underwent 
phase movements from sensate to ideational periods, and the transitions in between. 
Similarly, Schumpeter (1934) argued these dynamics of social and political change bring 
with them creation and destruction. 
Russian economist, Kondratiev, began this idea of regular cycles driven by 
disruptive innovations, as a hypothesis of the existence of economic long-waves. His 
hypothesis was extended to political long-cycles that follow the economic ones with 
some lag between them, due to the relationship that exists between economic and 
political power. Such combination is ideal in creating synergies between economics and 
political economy analyses (Barnett, 1998; Clark, Freeman, & Soete, 1981; Freeman, 
2008; Modelski & Thompson, 1996; Perez, 2002).  
In the same vein of work, J.W. and N.B. Forrester (J. W. Forrester, 1982; N. B. 
Forrester, 1973) created complex models of the world economy with consideration for 
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positive and negative loops and their impact in driving economic cycles. Through their 
research, they determined that the transition from growth to equilibrium is usually 
characterized by increasing restrictions that economic actors face, as the trade-offs that 
start developing against change during stages of technological bounded growth are 
greater and greater, and the new technologies and the corresponding and resulting 
material and social structures settle in. 
Being driven by technological progress, all these ideas of cycles relate to the 
innovation process and the stages through which an inventions diffuse through the social 
and material structures (Hartmann, 2014). Due to their nature, these innovations impact 
not only the technological base of a society, but also its social core. They push society 
through disruption, growth, synergies, maturity, and crises in a creative-destructive 
process of reallocating resources, as coined by Schumpeter (Freeman, 2008; Hartmann, 
2014; Schumpeter, 1934). They can create inequality (see Milanovic’s (2016) analysis of 
the effects on inequality due to the technological shift that occurred in the 1980s). They 
are even potential causes of conflict and war (Devezas, 2006). 
In fact, considerable research and findings prove that there are different 
behaviours characteristic to the different stages of these cycles or long-waves (Barnett, 
1998; Devezas, 2006; Modelski & Thompson, 1996; Modis, 2007, 2013a, 2013b, Perez, 
1983, 2002; J Tinbergen, 1981). Specifically, the challenging times towards the end of 
the long-waves tend to stimulate entrepreneurship and innovation; as a consequence, 
during the formative years of a long-wave, the main drivers of human action tend to 
become related to the “what.” Alternatively, as growth settles in and new innovations 
replace old ones, the biggest driver of change becomes the “how”, this is, how to improve 
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at doing the innovations that have already taken hold (Devezas, 2006). Different stages 
throughout the process of change require different arrangements, incentives, and policies 
(Fligstein, 2001; North, 2005). 
It is precisely these aspects noted above which are less contestable in the 
economic cycles literature, this is, that social, economic, and political agents behave 
differently depending on their perception of the stage through which an economic cycle is 
going, and that such differential behaviour leads to different outcomes at different stages. 
 
Table 3.7. Process of social, economic, and political change key messages 
 Social, economic, and political change is stochastic. It is not preordained by a 
series of progressive steps. 
 How much is invested is not as important in generating change, as is how it is 
invested. 
 Change requires making choices that have both intertemporal effects, as well as 
opportunity costs. These effects and costs tend not to be equally distributed. 
Asymmetries in access to information, power, background, ethnicity, gender, 
and other dimensions tend to play a role as well in the distribution of such 
effects and costs. These asymmetries tend to be embedded in and perpetuated 
through material and social structures. 
 Social, economic, and political change can only happen when some level of 
uncertainty is embraced. Material and social structures embed in them, 
explicitly or implicitly, elasticities between their different components that 
serve both as incentives and constraints towards change. Specifically, the way 
in which reigning material and social structures reward the winners and protects 
the losers create precedents that, in turn, further incentivize or constraint 
change. 
 Psychological factors play an important role in enabling or preventing change, 
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not only by validating visions of the future through current frameworks, but 
also by the ways in which they help processing and situating the uncertainties 
that come with it. 
 Individual change is required for collective change to happen. However, 
collective change is not stable until change is finally embedded into stable 
routines that establish a modified social structure. Such changes in the social 
structure usually tend to redefine central concepts like justice, freedom, and 
productivity and, therefore, they take time (even a generation or two). In this 
sense, the concept of path-dependence might be misunderstood as something 
other than the time it takes to interpret change and embed it into stable routines. 
Path-dependence may not be the cause of slow social, economic, and political 
change, but simply a symptom of the nature and characteristics of the critical-
path through which this change has to go. 
 Changes in social structures impact the ways in which individuals and 
collectives match or mismatch with the change taking place (this is, in part, 
what creates winners and losers). Changes that do not lead to considerable 
matching, tend not to hold. 
 Change is complex, not linear. The speed and intensity at which it happens is 
not uniform, with different components moving at different paces. Managing 
change requires, then, continuous monitoring and adjusting. It also requires 
understanding the individual dynamics of its components, as well as the 
dynamics between them. 
 Change tends to be cumulative because it is dependent on the functional 
gradients of generations that build onto each other’s gradients. These gradients 
are highly sensitive to specific timelines that tend to be missed (mostly due to 
social, economic, and political reasons), particularly in the instances in which 
they were also missed during previous generations. 
 Change tends to occur in cycles that are usually driven by disrupting events—
many times, innovation. These cycles mean transitioning from disruption, to 
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Table 3.7. Process of social, economic, and political change key messages 
growth, to equilibrium, and then towards decline, usually leading towards 
innovation and disruption, and towards yet another cycle. Different components 
of the social structures tend to behave in different ways depending on the stage 
they are and the stage of the cycle in which they are (due to the divergent 
incentives and environment that each ones of the stages of these cycles create). 
Likewise, the role of natural, material, and social structures themselves tend to 
differ depending on the stage of the cycle; and, in return, different stages tend 
to impact these structures in different ways. 
 A new structure is a symptom of adopted and stable change; it is not itself the 
main driver of change. 
 
Human capital. 
There is undisputed agreement about the role that the level and diversity of human 
capital has in enabling and creating wealth. From the simpler conception of labour of the 
classic economist, to Marx, to the neoclassical, and to the evolutionary economists, 
wealth ultimately comes from human beings’ manual and creative work (H. A. Arndt, 
1984; Galor, 2011; Hanushek, 2015; Helpman, 2004; Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1987, 1990). 
Manual labour can be substituted by some combination of capital and energy, while 
creative labour is responsible for output elasticity, this is, for productivity (Kümmel, 
2011). 
The latest Inclusive Wealth Report (UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2014) estimates that 
human capital contributes in average to 54 percent of the gains in inclusive wealth 
(compared to contributions of 33 percent from produced capital and 13 percent from 
natural capital). This was the case for 100 out of 140 countries for which the estimation 
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was produced. 
However, and while human capital has some sort of precedence over most of the 
other kinds of classes of assets (excluding natural capital, without which human life 
cannot exist), it is not in isolation from the classes of assets that it drives the creation of 
wealth. The ultimate potential to create value contained in human capital is not only 
given by its quantity and qualities, but by the way these relate to quantities and qualities 
of these other classes of assets. It is in this mutual relationship that its true capacity to 
generate value, as well as that of all the other assets, lies (or to destroy it, for example, 
through an excessive environmental footprint): they affect each other’s value, as well as 
create mutual dependencies and rigidities that feedback into the formation and evolution 
of each other. In fact, if human capital is the biggest contributor in creating wealth and in 
extracting value that leads to wellbeing; wellbeing, in turn, is what influences the 
qualities and characteristics human capital has—which are in turn, those that allows for 
its prominent role (Arrow, 1974; Galor, 2011; Godfrey, 2014; Hanushek, 2015; Helpman, 
2004; North, 2005; OECD, 2001).  
More specifically, for example, Helpman (2004) describes the relationship that 
exists between skilled and non-skilled labour and capital by referring to elasticities of 
substitution: between skilled labour and capital there is supposed to be a low elasticity of 
substitution (our technological progress has still to match human intellectual and social 
capacities), while between non-skilled labour and capital, this elasticity of substitution is 
higher. This complementarity or substitutability have important implications in the 
determination of wages, and, therefore, in the distribution of income and social, 
economic, and political inequalities.  
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In another example, Hanushek (2015) explains how the closeness or remoteness 
to and from a given technological frontier influences the way in which human capital is 
used: closeness to the frontier pushes it towards innovation, while remoteness pushes it 
towards imitation. In fact, he also demonstrates how higher rates of growth usually come 
from a strong group at the top of the skill distribution that can make a sizable contribution 
in terms of value added, as well as from a broad-base in the same skill distribution that 
can contribute to the competitive dynamism of nations. The problematic this presents is 
that such skill distribution is a source of inequality at the individual level that, in turn, 
tends to be perpetuated inter-generationally (see also OECD, 2001). 
The qualities of human capital are given by the knowledge, skills, and 
competences embedded in people, as well as by the attributes it possesses (OECD, 2001). 
These attributes relate to education, health, psychology, social capabilities, and even to 
beliefs, value systems, and spirituality (Arrow, 1974; Bloom, 2013; Cronk, 2013; 
Ermisch, 2012; Hanushek, 2015; Hartmann, 2014; Keating, 1999; O’Sullivan, 2012; 
Oishi, 2012; Rima, 2013; UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2014). This is why, more recently, 
scholars have started differentiating health capital, spiritual capital, and psychological 
capital, as related but independent from human capital (O’Sullivan, 2012; Oishi, 2012; 
Rima, 2013; UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2014). 
As with any other sort of asset or type of capital, investments in human capital 
can be made so it grows in volume and quality (Cronk, 2013; Hanushek, 2015; Managi, 
2015; OECD, 2001). The latest Inclusive Wealth Report (UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2014) 
estimates that, for countries with high rates of population growth, investments in human 
capital have higher pay-offs than investments in any other class of assets.  
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The most standard type of investment in human capital is education. However, it 
takes time for this investment to have an impact; many times, generations (Godfrey, 
2014; Hanushek, 2015; OECD, 2001). As with any investment, not all types have the 
same effect. The effect that an investment like education can have on human capital is not 
only given by inputs, but most importantly by how its results improve the match between 
the demand and supply for the knowledge, skills, and competences it created. 
Furthermore, the obsolescence of skills at different timelines should be matched by 
enhanced ones—a difficult task to succeed at given the diverging timeframes between 
changes in the demand for skills and changes in the prevalence of those skills (Hanushek, 
2015). Human capital that is not being used or is being under-used (unemployment and 
sub-employment) is not only not ripping all the benefits it could, but it is also being 
eroded, with the pass of time, in term of its qualities (Alpert, 2014). 
Another important type of investment in human capital is that on health (Keating, 
1999; OECD, 2001; UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2014). Investments in human capital are 
bound by a critical-path, usually the most important stage of this path being that 
corresponding to the first two years of life of an individual (Ermisch, 2012; Hanushek, 
2015; Keating, 1999). It is during this short period, that the behavioural, cognitive, and 
health gradients are determined, for the most part. There might be other points in time 
later that might be conducive to affect these gradients (school entry, and transitions to 
adolescence and adulthood), but not by a similar degree (Keating, 1999). These gradients 
determine, in turn, the socioeconomic gradients faced by individuals (gradients resulting 
from lower investments in human capital makes it harder for people to achieve wellbeing 
in the present time, as well as in the future—as theses gradients tend to reinforce each 
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other over time) (Keating, 1999). 
 
Table 3.8. Human capital key messages 
 Human capital has precedence over all other forms of wealth, except natural 
capital. Its contribution to overall wellbeing exceeds that of other types of 
capital or assets. 
 The creative and innovative power embedded in human capital is one of the 
most relevant determinants of output elasticities (total factor productivity), as 
well as of the distribution of value, and the wellbeing this value helps attain. 
 Human capital’s role in extracting and creating value is contextual: the 
knowledge, skills, competences, and attributes it possesses are capable to create 
and extract more or less value depending on how well they match their context. 
The management of obsolescence of human capital is necessary in order to 
maintain and improve its capacity to create and extract value. 
 The attributes of human capital relate to education, health, psychology, social 
capabilities, beliefs, value systems, and spirituality. Investments in these 
categories can modify the knowledge, skills, and competencies embedded in 
it—its qualities. These investments tend to produce higher returns than those 
made in any other types of capital or assets. Overall, investments that contribute 
enhancing how both the supply and the demand for human capital match, are 
the most effective. 
 The innovation and creativity from human capital that gets embedded in other 
classes of assets, introduce rigidities in material and social structures. 
 There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between human capital and 
wellbeing: the former allows for the attainment of wellbeing, while the latter 
contributes to increasing the value extraction potential of human capital. 
 Idle human capital represents considerable opportunity costs in terms of the 
creation and extraction of value and, therefore, in the attainment of wellbeing. 
Idleness also tends to erode human capital’s potential. 
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Table 3.8. Human capital key messages 
 The formation and improvement of human capital is highly dependent on a 
narrow timeline that creates a critical-path. The first two years of life are the 
most important in determining the health, behavioural, and cognitive gradients 
that, in turn, determine the socioeconomic gradient. Below potential gradients 
represent suboptimal investment, suboptimal human capital potential, and 
increased difficulties in creating and extracting value, as well as in attaining 
wellbeing. 
 
Fixed produced physical capital: infrastructure. 
Infrastructure or more broadly speaking fixed produced physical capital, because 
of its size and the resources and timelines involved in their design, formation, operation, 
and depreciation, are in the last analysis, change constraining over the mid- and long-
term. The embedded rigidities they impose create highly dependent material structures 
that often transcend into the immaterial social structures, constraining flexibility and 
innovation. They also exert pressure on natural structures as their existence establish 
entitlements over natural resources (Lin, 2012b; Managi, 2015; OECD, 2001; Jan 
Tinbergen, 1966; UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2012, 2014). 
Up to a point, these rigidities, nevertheless, play a role in reducing uncertainty as 
well as costs. In turn, reduced uncertainty and costs help societies get closer to achieving 
an aggregated investment level that could be considered to be a social optimum (the 




Table 3.9. Fixed produced physical capital key messages 
 Short- and mid-term wellbeing is partially achieved from the material structure 
that fixed produced physical capital creates. However, long-term wellbeing 
might be negatively impacted by the rigidities imposed by these material 
structures, which also impact natural and social structures, and forces. 
 Up to a point, rigidities help reduce uncertainty and costs; increased certainty 
and reduced costs allow for higher and more effective investments in capital. 
 
Mobile produced physical capital: tools and machinery. 
The wellbeing that mobile produced physical capital helps generated is dependent 
on its complementarity with existing material and social structures, as well as with 
existing human capital. As it is the case with other tangible and intangible capital, it 
enhances human capabilities. It is a piece of the puzzle, but is neither the only nor the 
most important one. For example, mobile produced physical capital is designed for 
specific inputs, these being energy, information, or materials, among others. Therefore, 
they embed the constraints that result from the structures they are themselves embedded 
into. Overall, there are feedback loops running to and from mobile produced physical 
capital into the material and social structures. The slow timeline by which material and 
social structures change, bounds the timeline by which mobile produced physical capital 
can change. In turn, mobile produced physical capital embeds constrains into material 
and social structures; therefore, the demand for it reinforces the constraints already 
embedded in the material structure (Godfrey, 2014; Independent Commission on 
International Development Issues, 1980; Kümmel, 2011; Jan Tinbergen, 1966). 
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Table 3.10. Mobile produced physical capital key messages 
 Mobile produced physical capital enhances human capabilities through its 
complementarities with human, social, intangible and natural capital. They are 
embedded into natural, material, and social structures that determine their 
theoretical capacity and efficiency to create value and wellbeing. 
 There exist feedback loops between the stocks of mobile produced physical 
capital and fixed produce physical capital that influence the overall levels of 
investment in an economy, as well as the evolution of the natural, material, and 
social structures into which they are all embedded—which in turn, influence the 
evolution of both types of produced physical capital. 
 
Intangible produced capital: knowledge and technology. 
As previously discussed, economists have given innovation and technological 
progress a central role in their modelling of economic growth (Aghion, Howitt, & 
Bursztyn, 2009; H. A. Arndt, 1984; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Hartmann, 2014; 
Helpman, 2004; Romer, 1990). Alternative economic models like the one developed by 
Galor (2011) are also consistent in pointing out that both the stock and rate of creation 
and diffusion of knowledge are key determinants of growth. Knowledge is responsible 
for new and improved modes of production that increase the productivity of the factors 
used.  
Not all intangible-produced capital complements the existing stock, though; some 
new knowledge is disruptive in that it can make previous paradigms and standards 
obsolete. Even in those cases, obsolescence of knowledge and technology might be 
temporary, given that their usefulness is dependent on the context (Independent 
Commission on International Development Issues, 1980). The analysis of the cycles of 
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innovation and the impact that disrupting knowledge has had in shaping the long-term 
performance of economies and their countries, was studied by Kondratiev, as previously 
discussed (Barnett, 1998; Modelski & Thompson, 1996; Perez, 1983; J Tinbergen, 1981). 
Knowledge and technology can be as disruptive, as they can be soothing and even inertial 
(Freeman, 2008; Ugur, 2013). 
The creation and diffusion of knowledge has, therefore, become an increasingly 
relevant policy objective. On one hand, investments in education have become a global 
goal through the Millennium Development Goals and the more recent Sustainable 
Development Goals (United Nations, 2016; United Nations General Assembly, 2015). On 
the other hand, progress in innovation and its diffusion have been increasingly promoted 
through systematic efforts implemented through the label of National Systems of 
Innovation (NIS) (Freeman, 2008; Romer, 1990; Ugur, 2013). As broader goals and 
mechanisms to ensure that an economy performs in a way that allows attainment of 
widespread wellbeing, these two main streams make sense. However, as it is usually the 
case, translating such macro goals into specific micro actions has proven difficult. For 
example, in terms of investments in education, traditionally, the focus has been on 
increasing enrolment, attendance, and attainment. Still, as Hanushek (2015) thoroughly 
demonstrates, the results of this particular effort has been disappointing in terms of 
stimulating increasing rates of economic growth. Hanushek demonstrates that it is, 
instead, the cognitive skills acquired through the education system, the ones which can 
actually make a difference by increasing adaptability and efficiency in developing ideas 
and approaches, which, in turn, contribute to economic growth. 
With regards to innovation and diffusion, NIS have centered around the 
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promotion of interactions as a facilitator of co-evolutionary dynamism (Freeman, 2008). 
Networked economies, where barriers to information are reduced and result in faster 
sharing, are central to the diffusion of knowledge (Benkler, 2006; Freeman, 2008). 
Specifically, NIS aim at generating new knowledge, technological progress, more 
effective and efficient functioning of the economic system (increasing total factor 
productivity), improved social and economic structures that enable and facilitate 
innovation, a more supportive cultural environment that values knowledge and 
innovation, improved products and services (more effective and efficient in fulfilling 
individual and societal needs), and, of course, an improved labour force in terms of the 
quantity and quality of their inputs (Freeman, 2008; Ugur, 2013). 
In the current social, economic, and political environment, knowledge is 
considered to have increasing returns given that the costs of diffusion are usually 
considerably lesser than those of creation (D. Cohen, 2012). While it is true that diffusion 
costs are relatively small, the increasing returns aspect is only possible because of the 
societal choices made with regards to intellectual property (Warsh, 2006). It is precisely 
the resulting social order of these choices what can give knowledge the status of private 
capital and not of public good; this is, at least for the period under which copyrights are 
provided to those who created it. It is too this social order, what determines what 
knowledge is and is not, and hence, what can be the subject of such copyrights. This in 
turns determine the flow of knowledge in a society and how easily it can or not permeate 
everyday life. Economists like Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) argue that the convergence 
of developing and developed countries is conditional, precisely due to societal choices 
related to intellectual property: low incentives to innovate and high incentives to copy 
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prevent both groups to converge. 
 
Table 3.11. Intangible produced capital key messages 
 The creation of knowledge can be enhanced by reducing barriers to access and 
improving connectivity among agents (both individuals and organizations). 
 While knowledge and technology can enable economic growth, they can also 
introduce rigidities through the accumulation of capital, which cannot be easily 
repurposed (material structures). 
 Technological change disrupts the material and social structures by creating 
winners and losers. 
 Not all kinds of knowledge are conducive to economic growth. The importance 
that knowledge has for growth is contextual. 
 The value knowledge has as capital, is dependent on the societal choices that 
determine the legal property rights of its creators.  
 
Modelling economic growth, development, and aid. 
Models represent theories (particularly for economists, for whom there is now 
little distinction between one and the other). They are explicit representations of ideas 
about causation and explanation, a sort of systematic storyline that help human beings 
make sense of the world they inhabit, as well as trace pathways towards its 
transformation (P. R. Krugman, 1998; M. S. Morgan, 2012; Morillo, 2014; Rodrik, 
2015). The latter being the most practical reason to model: to better understand which are 
the human actions that can influence the attainment of specific results (change in specific 
variables), structural change, or foundational change (Jan Tinbergen, 1966). In a way, 
theories capture specific aspects of the world, and, as a consequence, models do too. As 
such, models only cover limited aspects of reality, as well as the most common traits of 
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that reality (rather than the uniqueness of single occurrences) (Morillo, 2014). They also 
bound those common traits through explicit rules that reduce the uncertainties about 
causality or explanatory process (M. S. Morgan, 2012). 
The relatively limited complexity of models vis-à-vis the reality they represent, 
makes them into tools through which complexities can be untangled (Rodrik, 2015). Most 
models lie in between general laws and individual every-day situations: they lie at a 
mezzo level in between the general and the particular. They help answer sets of questions 
through the manipulation of its variables and rules. Answers to these questions then 
contribute, building increasingly accurate narratives that help making sense of the world 
(M. S. Morgan, 2012). Indeed, by making explicit assumptions about which are the 
important variables and which are the rules by which these variables are connected to one 
another, models empower many, not only their creators, to further refine them. Part of 
their usefulness lies in reducing the role that implicit assumptions might have in the 
understanding of reality (Athreya, 2013; M. S. Morgan, 2012; Morillo, 2014). 
Reducing an aspect of reality into a reduced set of variables and rules require as 
much imagination and creativity as it does intuition (M. S. Morgan, 2012). Many times, 
this process is constrained by the modelling tools and/or the nature and quality of the 
information available. This requires a number of trade-offs to be made by the modeller 
who has to balance their complexity, adaptability, practicality, and flexibility, while 
attaining an acceptable level of explanatory and predictive power (Athreya, 2013; P. R. 
Krugman, 1998; M. S. Morgan, 2012; Vroey & Hoover, 2004). 
Specifically, Athreya (2013), Bourguignon (2004), and Vroey and Hoover (2004), 
suggest a set of specific criteria that they believe improve the quality of models dealing 
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with economic realities. According to them, these models should: 
 Integrate demographic trends. 
 Consider the patterns and trends of income and wealth distribution (including 
actor capabilities) and integrate the enablers and disablers that actors face in the 
using of such income and wealth. 
 Consider the kind of arrangements that rule interactions among actors. 
 Consider the objective implicit in the dynamics of the interactions between the 
actors (purpose of the interaction). It should also consider the winnings and losses 
incurred by these actors in such interactions, and any possible trends in them. 
 Consider non-linear dynamic relationships. 
 Considers potential unexpected or unintended consequences of the actors’ actions 
and their interactions. 
 Consider the role of psychological variables, like expectations, and approximates 
the behavioural motivations and triggers of actors. 
 Consider sector interrelationships and their individual and collective performance. 
 Account for macro impacts of micro effects and the micro impacts of macro 
effects. 
 Be open in nature, integrating an economy within the global economic context, 
particularly trade and international financial transfers and payments. 
 Analyze both real and financial variables and flows. 
 Consider the different timelines involved and the specific change taking place. 
 Address coordination issues through varied timelines. 
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 Approximate the limitations faced by actors in terms of information and 
rationality. 
 Focus on the overall functioning of a system, rather than isolated relationships 
inside of it. 
Ecological and physical economists add a few more suggestions that tend to be 
ignored by mainstream neoclassical economists. Specifically, they point to the fact that 
an economy is not a mechanical system where motion goes back and forth. Instead, an 
economy is a thermodynamic system characterized by irreversible processes (entropy). 
As a thermodynamic system, an economy is also a complex system, and, as such, it is 
characterized by self-organization (endogenous creation of structures that are 
considerably resilient to shocks) and emergence (the system possesses features that 
cannot be deduced from the features of its constituents) (Daly, 2004; Sengupta, 2013; 
Slanina, 2014). Understanding complex systems not only requires understanding the 
relationship between the flows within the system, but, most importantly, the relationships 
between stocks and flows ((N. B. Forrester, 1973; Meadows & Wright, 2008; Miller & 
Page, 2007). Furthermore, both thermodynamic and complex systems are characterized 
by the role of random factors and their indeterministic impact on the system. As a 
consequence, models representing them should be iterative, stochastic, and probabilistic, 
for sure. For example, Szpiro (2011) explains how the famous Black-Scholes model 
successfully integrated the physics concept of Brownian motion to conceive a random-
walk dynamic that could predict financial market performance. (See also Slanina, 2014, 
who discusses two different kinds of models to deal with randomness: bare models—in 
which neither the source nor the dynamic of random behaviors is modelled; and involved 
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models—in which a mechanism that mimicks the perceived randomness is integrated into 
the model.) 
In fact, the latter ideas about how to model change can be clearly linked to the 
Wittgenstein’s ideas of rules and causal change that were discussed in Chapter 2. Slanina 
(2014) suggests that modelling human behaviour should consider the possibility that 
humans store in their memories a number of images that link situations and actions with 
outcomes. The way these images are stored and classified in the memory is neither 
systematic nor comprehensive. (It is random, instead.) These collections of images help 
to establish mental patterns that are used to make decisions by matching these images and 
patterns with the situation in which the decision is being made. Those images that 
showcase the most beneficial decisions made in the past in similar situations, are those 
highlighted through this process, and are those which tend to influence the ultimate 
decision. These images and patterns are continuously changing through assessment and 
reassessment of old and new images. This is, in essence, the core of Wittgenstein’s 
argument about the iterative process of interpreting rules and adjusting behaviour. 
Finally, Sengupta (2013), concerned with the need to integrate both the economic 
and ecological realities into a model, refers to the possibility to do this by: (a) adjusting 
economic models to integrate ecological constraints or parameters; (b) modelling the 
ecological sub-system and relating it to the economic sub-system via inputs and outputs 
exchanged between them (using, for example, an input-output model); and (c) unifying 
ecological and economic factors via a common denominator that is used to valuate them 
both. 
In spite of all its benefits, the modelling of the complex social, economic, and 
241 
political realities of life, has proven to be of limited utility when not used responsibly. 
For example, Szpiro (2011) accounts in detail the rise and fall of the Black-Scholes 
model which after much hype and a Nobel prize, resulted in the bankruptcy of the firm 
that it gave birth to. Likewise, the financial crisis of 2008 was unforeseen due to extreme 
reliance on models which underlying assumptions made such crisis almost unthinkable 
(Athreya, 2013; Turner, 2016). Models offer only a partial view, and as such they need to 
be complemented by political economy analyses that integrate and take seriously social 
and political variables regardless of how difficult it is to integrate them in the models. 
 
Table 3.12. Modelling economic growth, development, and aid key messages 
 Models should balance complexity and simplicity. They have to be practical, 
flexible, and adaptable; and they have to showcase an acceptable level of 
explanatory and predictive power. 
 Social, economic, and political systems, as well as the ecological system in 
which they are embedded, are complex thermodynamic systems. They have 
self-organizing and emergent properties, and showcase random behaviours that 
can only be modelled stochastically and statistically (regardless of whether the 
specific dynamics behind such random behaviours are or not specified). 
 Assumptions embedded in models should be made explicit. 
 Models should consider demographic, income, and wealth patterns and trends, 
as well as its enablers and disablers. 
 The arrangements and rules that govern the interactions and dynamics between 
actors, as well as the inequalities in intended and unintended outcomes they 
produce (winners and losers), should be integrated into models. 
 Models should consider the role of psychological variables like expectations 
and approximate the behavioural motivations and triggers of actors, including 
the limitations faced by them in terms of available information and rationality. 
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Table 3.12. Modelling economic growth, development, and aid key messages 
 Models should account for the macro impacts of micro effects and the micro 
impacts of macro effects. Similarly, they should consider the relationships 
between economies; a whole economy and its sectors; and individuals and 
collectives. 
 Coordination issues, both present and future, should be addressed by models. 
 Models should consider both real and financial variables and flows. 
 Models should reflect on the overall functioning of a system, rather than 




Chapter 4  
A Formal Interpretation of Concerted Wealth Management 
 
Chapter Summary 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, while the monetary and pricing systems play a 
crucial role in a society and have many potential benefits, they also create severe 
limitations. Among them is, for example, the difficulty in accurately accounting for 
public goods. 
Drawing on a Wittgensteinian epistemological and ontological approach, and 
using a strictly physical, not monetary approach, this chapter aims at redefining the limits 
of that about which aid can and should act upon, and that about which it can realistically 
do little and, therefore, should remain passive. This is the basis of the proposed 
alternative paradigm of concerted wealth management, which is suggested as a 
replacement to old-paradigm aid. The distinction between what should and should not be 
the subject of the proposed new paradigm is not necessarily an ontological, but a practical 
one: that which merits, and can benefit the most from our attention and efforts (in the 
form of aid) in order to promote development towards self-reinforcing state, and that 
which lends itself to confusion and muddiness with little practical effects in promoting 
such process of development, and therefore not to be meddled with through aid 
interventions. The new words and meanings introduced in Chapter 3 underpin the formal 
interpretation of the alternative conceptual framework developed in this chapter. 
A conceptual framework is proposed, then, in which covariant absolute and 
relative limits—natural and socio-material ones—define a possibility space through 
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which natural and social forces flow, and in which human beings can flourish and 
increasingly act in development inducing ways. This process of development is bound 
both by the natural and socio-material limits described above, and by the space-time 
characteristics of the classes of assets that compose the wealth of nations, in particular, 
the critical-paths by which their formation, transformation, and degradation are bound, 
and which translate into embedded function gradients characterizing each class of assets’ 
potential for value generation, within given periods of time.  
Wellbeing is possible through the extraction of value from wealth (in the self-
reinforcing state, total value extracted and total wellbeing are conceived as an identity). 
Value is obtained from extracting physical units of wealth, using these physical units to 
convert them into output (reflecting both, the impact of the dynamics within the 
possibility space and the impact of the available stocks of all classes of assets), as well as 
from placing such resulting output into a local and global context which assigns it an 
effective value in terms of physical units of wealth (usually realized through the 
comparison of the wealth obtained in exchange for the output in relation to the wealth 
embedded in such output). Whether the payoff obtained by a country for undergoing such 
a process of value extraction leaves it with more or less accumulated wealth and therefore 
modifies its potential for intertemporally satisfying the wellbeing of its citizens, depends 
on the level of matching and synchronization that exists at any given point in time, 
between the countries’ local natural and socio-material limits and the global ones 
(assuming an open economy). This level of matching and synchronization is influenced 
by how the stages in the lifecycle of the classes of assets overlap with the stages of long 
social, economic, and political cycles (in the case of this dissertation, represented by 
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Kondratiev long-waves—and, from this point forward, called long-term cycles). While 
this level of matching and synchronization influences the monetary denomination of the 
value extracted, this monetary denomination does not necessarily represent—in fact, 
seldom do—the real physical exchange of wealth taking place (mostly because as 
explained above, the pricing and monetary systems struggle in integrating a number of 
relevant variables, including of course, public goods). 
The extraction of value from wealth, and therefore the attainment of wellbeing, 
represent a trade-off between intertemporal choices (too much present extraction limits 
future extraction). This is why the setting of a clear and stable possibility space (through 
the setting of natural and socio-material limits) is essential in order to ensure 
intertemporal wellbeing. Such clear and stable space facilitates the making of those 
critical intertemporal choices. 
As a result, this chapter argues, the areas in which concerted wealth management, 
as an alternative paradigm to old-paradigm’s aid, should focus are: the delimitation of a 
clear and stable possibility space; the stretching of the classes of assets’ individual and 
portfolio bound limits towards their natural relative and absolute ones (as appropriate); 
the pushing of the classes of assets’ function gradients towards their maximum 
sustainable potential; the minimization of the social, economic, and political costs that 
structural transformation and natural forces impose differently onto different classes of 
assets; the improved matching and synchronization of local and global natural and socio-
material limits; and, the promotion of improved dynamics within the possibility space. In 
focusing on these aspects, development praxis should remain grounded on the limitations 
imposed by critical-paths, including the internal logic and dynamics of the natural, social, 
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economic, and political processes that take place within the possibility space (i.e., natural 
and social forces). The focus should then be in managing the conditions of such 
possibility space, and improving the disposition of those within that space, rather than 
manipulating their actions. 
Country Assets in Four Dimensions 
Wealth is the collection of classes of assets from which a country can extract the 
value that helps it attain wellbeing and ultimately, through the process of development, 
the self-reinforcing state (see Table 3.1). As discussed in Chapter 3, currently, we could 
classify these classes of assets into the following: (a) natural; (b) human; (c) fixed 
produced; (d) mobile produced; and, (e) intangible produced. The potential of these 
assets to produce value, and therefore wellbeing, is modified by: (a) the stock of local and 
global public and private debt as a liability that reduces the intertemporal capacity of the 
country to create and maintain wealth, as well as to extract value and wellbeing from it; 
(b) the local and global natural, social, economic, and political structures and forces, 
and (c) the local and global social, economic, and political relative standing of the 
country in relation to other countries, as an intangible that allows it to influence the 
underlying global socio-material structures, and through it, among others, the local and 
global monetary denomination of assets (pricing) and its proceedings (this impacts the 
ways in which, at specific points in time, the country can attain wellbeing). 
When comparing the proposed list of classes of assets and their modifiers above 
with the traditional understanding of factors of production, is clear that there is a 
correspondence between them. First, what was traditionally considered “capital,” has 
been split into (c) and (d), this is, fixed produced, and mobile produced, respectively. 
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Second, labour and knowledge are represented through (b) and (e), this is, human and 
intangible produced capital. Finally, what traditionally was represented by land, is now 
comprehensively capturing all of natural endowments as (a). With regards to the 
modifiers, public and private debt has usually been absent from traditional models of 
economic growth, as well as the social and political factors, such as the proposed relative 
standing, and the natural and social structures and forces. Both of the latter substitute for 
the more recent and common in the literature concepts of “social capital” or 
“institutions”, giving them instead, a far broader reach and meaning beyond that of 
simple ingredients, and more akin to them being the soul of the development process. The 
proposed conceptual framework, then, is much richer than the old paradigm and takes 
political economy analysis seriously by integrating social and political variables within 
the model. 
Classes of assets and the ecosystem. 
At the most basic level, the potential to generate value that each class of assets has 
is bound by natural limits (see tables 3.2 and 3.3). This also applies to intangible assets 
(see Table 3.11), as their codification has to be stored in a physical place and transmitted 
through physical means, even if it is in the human mind. Intangible assets are as well 
produced by human beings, which are themselves, bound by natural limits due to their 
biological bodies. 
Natural limits are imposed by natural structures (see Table 3.2). Natural structures 
impose limits that relate to, among others, physical properties (organic and inorganic 
properties), spatial characteristics (e.g., location, dispersion, accessibility, mobility), use 
potential (e.g., rival, non-rival, excludable, non-excludable), relative potential (e.g., 
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complementarity, substitutability), and time-related characteristics (e.g., formation, 
transformation, degradation, depletion, destruction, renewable, non-renewable). 
Natural limits can be absolute or relative. For example, the laws of physics state 
that matter cannot be created or destroyed in a closed system. Earth can be considered to 
be a closed system when it comes, for example, to minerals, given that meteorites, as the 
only means by which new matter enters Earth in our present time, are not that common 
and relevant in volume. Furthermore, space mining is in the realm of possibility but is 
still a few decades away. Nevertheless, theoretically, minerals cannot be exhausted, 
although this statement applies in geological time, which could be millions of years. 
Whether human beings can achieve the technological progress to collect and recycle all 
minerals back into a more orderly state (after their use have resulted in entropy), is 
debatable. Likewise, whether enough volumes of each mineral can be extracted and 
processed to supply the needs and wants of every single human being in a world with a 
growing population is also debatable. Therefore, one could say that in the timeframe by 
which human beings operate and have the capacity to operate in the foreseeable future, 
there are particular types of natural assets that will be bound by absolute natural limits—
represented by Ω𝐴𝑖 and 0𝐴𝑖, respectively, the upper and lower absolute natural limits of 
the class of assets, 𝐴𝑖). Once used up, no more will be available. This is the case of non-
renewable assets. 
Relative natural limits refer to, for example, those boundaries imposed by the 
functioning of the ecosystem: how much pollution can be processed; or how much of the 
population of a certain species can be used for human consumption without its feasibility 
and sustainability being compromised. 
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Figure 4.1, below, illustrates the points made in the preceding paragraphs. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Class of assets’ absolute and relative natural limits 
 
Given that ecosystems are not absolute themselves, and are contextually time-
bound, relative natural limits are not only determined by the nature of the classes of 
assets themselves, but also by how space and time impact them: the feasible and 
sustainable levels at which certain assets can be exploited will change continually, based 
on variations in all other parts of the ecosystem. This is a stochastic process (in contrast 
to a deterministic one).  
Figure 4.2 shows that, while the ecosystem is permanently bound by absolute 
natural limits, its relative natural limits vary in time (as showcased by the double headed 
arrows separating the absolute from the natural relative limits). Consistent with the 
Class of Asset’s Individual Limits
Upper absolute natural limit
Lower absolute natural limit
Upper relative natural limit
Lower relative natural limit
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absolute natural limits of the ecosystem, each class of assets’ absolute natural limits are 
permanently bound by the absolute limits of the ecosystem, as well. In turn, the class of 
assets’ relative natural limits (𝜔𝐴𝑖 and 𝜛𝐴𝐼) move along with the ecosystem’s relative 
natural limits, although not necessarily in a proportional way (changes in the ecosystem 
may not affect all its constituents equally, at least not in the short term—ecosystems can 
always reach new and different equilibriums, hence, their description as stochastic). 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Ecosystem and class of asset’s limits 
 
Note that since all classes of assets are considered to be part of the “ecosystem,” 
ecosystem is used here in a broader sense than usually used in the biology or 
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A collection of classes of assets in the ecosystem. 
As discussed above, as part of an ecosystem, the potential of a class of assets to 
generate value is bound by absolute limits first, and then by relative natural limits that are 
dependent on the relative natural limits of the ecosystem. These relative natural limits are 
time specific, and they shift based on the internal workings of the ecosystem, which 
depends on complex relationships between its components. 
These relations are dynamic and mutually dependent. They can be understood as 
the cross-covariance of the stochastic processes that characterize the ecosystem and the 
classes of assets. For example, to survive, humans require air, a specific temperature 
range, water, food—further, plants need water; animals need plants; among many others. 
Balances between living organism populations are very sensitive, and altering these 
balances can have huge consequences for other components of the ecosystem. This 
relationship also holds the other way around, with macro-level changes having relevant 
consequences at the micro-level. 
In practical terms, this means that, even though a class of assets may be bound by 
class specific relative natural limits, there is, as well, an ecosystem-driven relative natural 
limit for each class of assets, which represents relationships between the classes of assets 
themselves, in the context of their dealings with the ecosystem, and vice versa. For 
example, if the state of technological progress had allowed human beings to produce 
carbon dioxide without having caused much deforestation, the capacity of the ecosystem 
to abate carbon dioxide would have been greater than it has, and, perhaps, as a 
consequence global warming might not be as critical a problem. This means that the 
upper relative natural limit (𝜔𝐴𝑖) of the ecological service to abate carbon dioxide could 
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have been higher than what it is today. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Classes of assets' natural limits: individual and ecosystem bound 
 
The ultimate implication of this is that taken as a collection of assets, the upper 
and lower relative natural limits of each class of assets need to be further revised to 
reflect the relationships between them in the context of the ecosystem (see Figure 4.3 
above). To take into account the shift in the relative natural limits of each class of assets 
due to its relationship with the other classes of assets, 𝜔𝐴𝑖 and 𝜛𝐴𝐼 can, respectively, 
become 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝 and 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑝. The increasingly darker shades of blue of the different areas 
represented in Figure 4.3 relate, respectively, to the absolute natural limits (Ω𝐴𝑖 and 0𝐴𝑖), 








of each class of asset, 𝐴𝑖, in the ecosystem, ℰ. It is important to note that, while for 
illustration purposes, the limits are shown for example, to progressively narrow from Ω𝐴𝑖, 
to 𝜔𝐴𝑖, to 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝, this might not necessarily be the case. When assets are combined in a 
portfolio, they may actually increase their ecosystem bound relative natural limits due to 
their enabling or supporting effect. 
Adding the local and global social, economic, and political realities. 
At a given point in time, each one of these classes of assets is additionally bound 
by the limits imposed by material and social structures (see tables 3.4 and 3.5, 
respectively). These structures incorporate into them, among others, the influence that the 
three modifiers discussed at the beginning of this chapter exert in the potential any class 
of assets has to produce value, and therefore wellbeing (the stock of local and global 
public and private debt, the local and global social, economic and political structures and 
forces, and the local and global social, economic, and political relative standing of the 
country) (see tables 3.4 to 3.11). 
The social structure not only provides the rules and routines (social limits) 
through which a human collective can use classes of assets to create value; it also bounds 
the relative natural limits of these assets. Social limits (represented by 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝𝑠 and 𝜛𝐴𝐼𝑝𝑠) 
embedded in the social structure carry, intertemporally, the choices made by society 
throughout history, not only by choices made presently. 
For example, an ecologically conscientious society might decide that certain 
species of animals shall not be killed. The potential of these animals for generating value 
and attaining wellbeing is still given by the natural limits, and these limits are in no way 
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modified by the social ones; yet, it is social limits which make this potential negligible as 
the society has decided that no net wellbeing should be achieved through their killing 
(that is, the social cost of killing them exceeds the social benefit). Similarly, the same 
society might decide to conduct mineral explorations only on areas in which the richness 
of the ecological presence is below a certain threshold. In this case too, social limits do 
not modify in any way the natural limits, but it bounds them further, in this instance, to 
social preferences. On the contrary, another society might display a disregard for any 
intergenerational equity and decide to allow for the transgression of relative natural 
limits, leading to the depletion or destruction of one or many classes of assets. In this case 
as well, the social limits would not modify the natural ones; however, given that the 
social allowance is greater than that allowed by nature, a considerable cost will be borne 
by society, particularly, future generations. 
While social structures can exist at many different levels, for practical purposes, a 
simplification will be made so that only local and global ones will be discussed (the 
analysis and the model formalized, however, are applicable to other levels of aggregation 
or units of analysis). Given that the social structures of countries are embedded in a 
global structure, the social limits by which the country operates, factor-in, explicitly or 
implicitly, those global limits by which the country is bound. For example, being a 
signatory of an international treaty to eliminate the use of ozone-depleting substances, 
limits a country’s capacity to extract value from certain kind of natural assets, meaning 
that its local and social structure is bounded by the global one. 
Another important implication that global structures have on the local structures is 
that, by virtue of the international trade that takes place between countries, there is a de 
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facto transfer of wealth, as wealth can not only be traded directly but it is, as well, 
embedded in the products and services exchanged. In practical terms, this means that the 
ecosystem bound relative natural limits of the classes of assets of a country, 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝 and 
𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑝, can be shifted up or down through international trade, not necessarily because a 
country’s own quantities of each asset or their natural limits are actually being changed, 
but because the net trade balance (imports minus exports) will either mean that the 
country is, for all practical purposes, benefiting from the value extracted from more 
wealth than it actually used from its own stock, or that it is letting other countries benefit 
from the value extracted from its own wealth. Given the limitations of our current pricing 
and monetary systems in assigning monetary value to several classes of assets, as well of 
national income accounts limitations, it is likely that these exchanges are not being 
compensated fairly among the parties in terms of physical units of wealth (see Table 3-1 
and preceding text). 
If the net proceedings of international trade are positive and consumed in the 
present, they will not necessarily have an intertemporal effect on wellbeing; however, if 
these net proceedings are invested, they will increase the volume of the country’s assets, 
increasing, intertemporally, the capacity of the country to generate value. If, on the 
contrary, the net proceedings of international trade are negative, the country’s capacity to 
generate value intertemporally will diminish given the draining of assets that occur 
through their embedding in exports or direct exporting (see Chapter 3, Table 3-3, for an 
example). A country with a trade surplus in terms of physical units of wealth could be 
said to be building up its wealth, to be enjoying value beyond the one they could obtain 
from the wealth they currently possess, or a combination of both. A country with a trade 
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deficit in the same physical terms could be said to be currently experiencing a loss of 
wealth, which means it ends up possessing a reduced intertemporal capacity to generate 
value and attain wellbeing. 
The ability of a country to have a trade surplus is not only dependent on 
endogenous factors that determine its comparative advantage. It is also reliant on the 
social, economic, and political relative standing against other countries, and on how such 
standing positions these countries in their relative capability of influencing the global 
socials structures. Power, as well as monetary arrangements, have considerable influence 
in determining comparative advantages, and ultimately trade surpluses or deficits in terms 
of physical units of wealth. This is similar, although at a more macro level, to the 
description and theorization that gave Krugman (1987a) its Nobel Prize in economics. He 
argued that no longer productivity (as argued by Ricardo), or endowments (as argued by 
Heckscher and Ohlin) were alone in determining countries comparative advantages, but 
that economies of scale and network effects could sometimes supersede those factors in 
importance. The argument made in this paragraph, extends Krugman’s argument by 
including not only comparative benefits derived from closeness and complementarity 
among private actors, but also the private and public benefits that matching and 
synchronicity between the local and global socio-material structures can create. 
With regards to the material limits (represented by 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝𝑚 and 𝜛𝐴𝐼𝑝𝑚) imposed by 
material structures, these, as the social ones, are also relative. As the social ones, they are 
also ultimately bound by the natural limits. However, material limits either lie relatively 
up or down social limits, depending on circumstances. For example, material limits 
imposed by infrastructure choices made by society over the years, as well as by the 
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technological state of the art, might not make it economically feasible, or even possible, 
to transport certain kinds of assets from one place to another. Theoretically, it might be 
physically possible, for example, to harness more energy or apply it in other ways than 
the ones in which we do today; we could, too, invent new means of transportation 
(transporting such assets might not be bound in the same ways by natural limits as, they 
are by existing means of transportation and the infrastructure that supports them).  
Doing any of these might not be frowned upon by society either, and, therefore, 
not bound, as well, by any social limits. Still, the material limits of our present time might 
not allow society to do such a thing in order to extract value (e.g., think, for example, 
there is no widespread infrastructure to charge electric cars in public spaces and how this 
material limit, limits in turn social choices—in this particular case, the appeal to acquire 
an electric car). In this case, natural limits will act as the highest upper bound, social 
limits as a middle upper bound, and material limits as the lower upper bound by which 
extraction of value from such assets will be bound overall (at least in a particular 
timeframe). A hundred years into the future, for example, material limits might have 
shifted upwards and allow for transportation of such assets. However, at that particular 
point in time in the future, social limits might have shifted downwards and might then 
frown upon their transportation, for example, as something undesirable. In this case, 
natural limits will still act as the highest upper bound, material limits as a middle upper 
bound, and social limits as the new lower upper bound by which extraction of value from 
such assets will be bound overall, at that particular point in time. In this last case, social 
limits might be breached given that material limits allow it (although again, at a social 




Figure 4.4. Natural versus social and material limits 
 
Figure 4.4 above shows, side by side, the addition of social and material limits to 
the previously discussed ones in Figure 4.3. On the left, (a), the change in the natural 
relative limits by a trade surplus or deficit is showcased by the green area juxtaposed over 
the representation of those limits already illustrated in Figure 4.3 (being these new limits 
(represented by 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝𝜏 and 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑝𝜏). As discussed above, depending on whether trade 
produces a deficit or surplus in physical units of wealth, the effective limits of wealth 
possessed by a country will differ (these effective limits could theoretically exceed 
natural limits, given that wealth is being added or subtracted to the one already possessed 
by the country). On the right side of Figure 4.4, (b), and still bound by the absolute 
natural limits, both the social and material limits resulting, respectively, from the social 




















by the other and vice versa, so the particular situation depicted is for illustration purposes 
only. 
This means that the relation between relative natural limits gets further qualified 
by these additional two limits, reflecting the possibility that social and material limits 
may not only allow for the transgression of ecologically bound relative natural limits, but 
may also allow for the transgression of specific classes of assets’ ones. 
Ultimately, Figure 4.4 illustrates the resulting upper and lower bounds, which 
limit a collection of classes of assets’ potential to create and produce value, and, hence, to 
contribute to the attainment of wellbeing. These limits create a possibility space for a 
social, economic, and political process of change—development (see Chapter 2 for a 
discussion of this idea of setting limits from Wittgenstein’s epistemological and 
ontological approach). Given that the formalization of the proposed conceptual 
framework represents the ecosystem as a complex system in which stochastic processes 
takes place, the space contained within the proposed bounds can be formally termed as 
the possibility space. 
This possibility space for each class of assets (in Figure 4.5 below, is given by 
what could be called effective relative limits, 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑒 and 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑒), is the result of the 
interaction of their individual natural relative limits (𝜔𝐴𝑖 and 𝜛𝐴𝐼), the ecosystem bound 
natural relative limits (𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝 and 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑝), the international trade relative limits (𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝𝜏 and 
𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑝𝜏), the social bound relative limits (𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝𝑠 and 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑝𝑠), and the material bound relative 




Figure 4.5. Effective relative limits (and the possibility space within them) 
 
In summary, the proposed conceptual framework’s possibility space is bound by 
natural absolute and relative limits, which factor-in the effects of trade into those given 
by natural structures (𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝𝑁 and 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑝𝑁), and socio-material relative limits (𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝Ψ and 
𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑝Ψ), which factor in both the effects of material and social structures. 
Ecosystem’s relative limits through time. 
The formation, transformation, degradation, depletion, and destruction of a class 
of assets occurs in time. The timeline for any of these stages may last decades, hundreds, 
thousands, or millions of years. Some of these classes of assets go through only one 
cycle, while others can go through several. 
As discussed above, this time-bound process is shaped by absolute and relative 






average, global life expectancy is approximately 71.5 years (UNDP, 2015). However, the 
same evidence indicates that, due to a combination of factors, life expectancy is much 
lower in many countries. While genetic material plays a role in determining life 
expectancy, evidence also shows that access to preventive and corrective health care, 
opportune vaccinations, nutrition, and other factors play a prominent role. That countries 
with higher GDP per capita have, in general, higher average life expectancy, showcases 
the importance that material and intangible wealth can have. This means that in the 
present time, an average life expectancy of 71.5 years could be considered a relative, 
natural limit. This would be a relative and not an absolute limit because, in practice, there 
are a considerable number of cases all around the world, of people who live up to 80, 90, 
or even beyond 100 years. Theoretically, then, any of these upper figures, or an average 
of them, could be considered as an approximate absolute natural limit. 
Life expectancy is only one of the dimensions of human life. Other dimensions 
include physical work capacity (which would be expected to grow during childhood and 
adolescence, peak at midlife, and start decreasing in later years), reproductive capacity 
and intellectual capacity (might start and peak later than physical capacity, but can 
certainly last longer and even perhaps never stop growing), among many others. 
Therefore, each class of assets is bound by a timeline: a single one, or a cyclical 
one characterized by a succession of single timelines that repeat every so often (cohorts). 
For practical purposes given the geological timelines involved, it will be assumed that all 
inorganic classes of assets belong to the first category, that is, they only go through one 
cycle (this will also be assumed to include the fixed and mobile produced classes of 
assets); while organic classes of assets, as well as those created and formed by them, 
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belong to the second. Figure 4.6 showcases this difference (note that in the case of 
renewable/organic classes of assets, those represented in (b), the shape of the curve is 
used for illustration purposes as it is a simplification of the many different shapes that the 




Figure 4.6. Volume extraction possibility frontiers from non-renewable and renewable 
classes of assets 
 
Furthermore, a trade-off exists between the extraction of volume from a class of 
assets and its intertemporal potential for generating value. As discussed, absolute natural 
limits point to levels of volume extraction at which an asset will be fully depleted or 
destroyed; relative natural limits, in turn, point to levels of value extraction that, if 
surpassed (particularly in the case of renewable/organic classes of assets), endanger the 
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intertemporal value-generating potential (or what could be termed “health” of the class of 




Figure 4.7. Possibility frontiers for non-renewable and renewable classes of assets 
 
The outer frontier in Figure 4.7 represent the absolute natural limits. Extraction of 
volume at maximum level, Ω𝐴𝑖, would realize at once all the potential value embedded in 
the class of assets, 𝐴𝑖, while at the minimum level 0, no value will be extracted at all, 
although at 0 extraction, the potential of the class of assets to generate value will remain 
untouched. Both the frontiers created by natural and socio-material limits (𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝𝑁 and 
𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑝𝑁; and 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝Ψ and 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑝Ψ, respectively) are drawn close to each other to showcase the 
fact that their position, relative to the other is not necessarily predetermined, and, at 
times, and/or for some classes of assets, natural limits might be higher than socio-
material ones, or vice versa. Likewise, the representation of the effective relative limits 
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(𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑒 and 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑒) is also illustrative, as being the joint result of both the natural and the 
socio-material limits, could either be above or below them (given all relative limits are 
considered to be stochastic). The line at 45 degrees represents the midpoint in the 
possibility space created by each one of the possibility frontiers. 
Consistent with Figure 4.6, the choice of representing the possibility frontiers of 
renewable (organic) classes of assets with a convex curve is made to simplify the 
analysis. In reality, different classes of assets will have different types of curves 
representing the trade-off between value extraction and the maintenance of its potential to 
generate value (see Table 3-3). For example, renewable organic resources do not usually 
display decreasing marginal returns but graded ones with either one or several inflexion 
points or thresholds that may have a more than proportional effect on the asset’s potential 
to generate value (Common, 2014; Daly, 2004; Sengupta, 2013). Identifying a more 
accurate possibility space requires, then, a more complex dynamic analysis that considers 
the variety of possibility frontiers of each one of the assets in the ecosystem (Sengupta, 
2013). 
By making the assumption that there is a simple inverse relationship between the 
quantity used of a class of assets and the health of this class of assets (as determined by 
the quantity of a class of assets that remains after the extraction of a portion of from the 
total available), for the purposes of the proposed conceptual framework, this relationship 
could be represented mathematically as follows, 
 𝐴𝑖( 𝑖) =  (1 −  𝑖)
𝛼𝐴𝑖        [4.1] 
Where,  𝐴𝑖( 𝑖) represents the health function of a class of assets, 𝐴𝑖, which is 
determined by,  𝑖 ,the quantity extracted from the class of assets, 𝐴𝑖, and on the health 
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elasticity, 𝛼𝐴𝑖, which represents the impact on the class of assets’ value generating 
potential, of extracting a quantity  𝑖 out of the stock of the class of assets, 𝐴𝑖. 
Normalizing  𝑖 to factor-in the maximum potential extraction of units from the 
class of assets, 𝐴𝑖 given effective relative limits, 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑒 and 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑒, Equation 4.1 becomes, 





      [4.2] 
Health elasticity, 𝛼𝑖, is constrained by, 
𝛼𝐴𝑖 > 0      𝑛𝑑     W𝐴𝑖 ≥ 𝜔𝐴𝑖  𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑒 ≥  𝑖 ≥ 𝜛𝐴𝑖  ?̅?𝐴𝑖𝑒 ≥ 0 
Note that the stock of the class of assets is represented in Equation 4.2 by the 
denominator, (𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑒 −𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑒), which showcase the maximum potential quantity extraction 
considering both natural and socio-material limits (that is, the effective relative limits). 
Perhaps it is important to clarify, then, that given the constrains above, effectively, this 
denominator could be in certain cases equal to (Ω𝐴𝑖 − 0). However, choosing the former 
denominator will ensure integrating in the understanding of value extraction from wealth, 
not only natural limits but socio-material limits as well. Ultimately, the function gradients 
of the classes of assets are more fully reflected through their effective relative limits and 
the health elasticities than merely through their natural limits). 
If, 𝛼𝐴𝑖 = 1, the relationship between extraction and health is proportional; if, 1 >
𝛼𝐴𝑖 > 0, there are increasing opportunity health costs for the class of assets, 𝐴𝑖, per each 
unit extracted,  𝑖; and if, 𝛼𝐴𝑖 > 1, there are decreasing opportunity health costs for the 
class of assets, 𝐴𝑖, per each unit extracted,  𝑖. 
After establishing the trade-off between the health of a class of assets and the 
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quantity extracted from it, an output function, 𝜌𝐴𝑖( 𝑖), could be defined as follows, 
𝜌𝐴𝑖( 𝑖) = [( 𝑖)
𝛼𝐴𝑖]𝛽𝐴𝑖        [4.3] 
And, normalizing  𝑖 again, 







      [4.4] 
Where,  𝑖, represents the quantity of the class of assets, 𝐴𝑖, used to produce 
output, and, 𝛽𝐴𝑖, represents the output elasticity, which is constrained by, 
𝛽𝐴𝑖 > 0      𝑛𝑑     W𝐴𝑖 ≥ 𝜔𝐴𝑖  𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑒 ≥  𝑖 ≥ 𝜛𝐴𝑖  ?̅?𝐴𝑖𝑒 ≥ 0 
If, 𝛽𝐴𝑖 = 1, the relationship between quantity and output is proportional; if, 1 >
𝛽𝐴𝑖 > 0, there are decreasing returns to scale per each unit used,  𝑖; and if, 𝛽𝐴𝑖 > 1, there 
are increasing returns to scale per each unit extracted,  𝑖. 
Additionally, it is important to note that both health elasticities and output 
elasticities, 𝛼𝐴𝑖 and 𝛽𝐴𝑖, respectively, are class of assets’ specific, as well as time specific 
(this will be further developed later in the chapter). 
So far, in this chapter, the possibility of extracting value from assets has been 
analyzed as it occurs at a specific point in time, under some constraints. Figure 4.5 
illustrated how the possibility space for extracting value given by effective relative limits 
would look like at a given point in time. Figure 4.8, instead, showcases how at each point 
in time 𝑡, over time intervals, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3, 𝑡4, a different configuration of limits could be in 
place, reflecting both the effects of extracting value, over time, from the various classes 
of assets (which have an impact on the stock of these assets and therefore on its limits), as 
well as the effects of the complex inner workings of the ecosystem, which, as a stochastic 
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system accommodate dynamically to changes experienced by its components, as well as 
exert influence, as a system with emerging properties, into its components. 
 
 
Figure 4.8. Ecosystem’s effective relative limits over time 
 
After each time interval, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3, 𝑡4, the effective relative limits of the 
ecosystem change. The light red band on the outer side across the time intervals in Figure 
4.8, exemplifies the evolution in time of these limits in the case of the leftmost class of 
assets in the array; the band can broaden or narrow given its dynamic relationship with 
the other classes of assets and the ecosystem which contains them. All, as a result of the 
process of social, economic, and political change. 
As in the case of the red possibility space contained within effective relative 










four-dimensional representation of this possibility space, now additionally bound by the 
passing of time and how it impacts the ecosystem through human and nature intervention. 
This provides a more comprehensive image of the possibility space in which social, 
economic, and political change takes place. It is important to note that there is a 
stochastic process by which the proposed effective relative limits shape social, economic, 
political change; a change which, in turn, tends to modify such limits and the possibility 
space they create. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that, while on the two-dimensional possibility 
space in Figure 4.5, a mix of actions and policies might be put in place, its results in 
shaping this possibility space will mostly be seen at a later time—a lag exist between 
policies, actions, and the effective shaping of the possibility space through the results of 
such policies and actions. It is expected that a proportion of such change (see Figure 4.9 
below) will be planned (through the policies and actions mentioned above); another 
portion will be random due to the impossibility, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, in 
predetermining the exact way in which policies and actions will be interpreted and 
adopted into routines (as it is expected from a complex system); while the remaining 
portion of the change will be due to the path-dependence imposed by the socio-material 
limits that result from social and material structures (see Tables 3-4 and 3-5 and the text 
preceding them). There is also the potential that increasing public and private debt over 
time that is not matched by taxes or the proceeds of additional produced capital, could 
narrow down the possibility space by absorbing wealth through the demand for interests 
and the constraints imposed on credit that could limit the prospects to form or maintain 
wealth. This potential effect could be intensified if the investments financed through such 
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public and private debt fail to produce sufficient returns, or if, public and private debt 
financed present consumption rather than wealth creation. 
 
Figure 4.9. Path-dependence, and planned and random change in the possibility space of 
a class of assets 
 
Over the previous sections, the shaping of the two-dimensional possibility space 
depicted in Figure 4.5 was discussed as being the result of the interaction of a number of 
natural and socio-material limits in the context of an ecosystem. The shaping of the 
possibility space is, in itself, bound, at a first level, by this two-dimensional possibility 
space and, in practical terms, the collection of all the possibility spaces across time, 
which in turn, represent the four-dimensional possibility space. 
Figure 4.10 helps showcase the effect of effective relative limits on the formation 
of some classes of assets. On the left side of Figure 4.10, (a), the absolute and relative 
natural limits of the class of assets are shown—Ω𝐴𝑖   𝑛𝑑 0, and, ω𝐴𝑖   𝑛𝑑 𝜛𝐴𝑖, 













effective relative limits represented by ω𝐴𝑖𝑒   𝑛𝑑 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑒, on the right side of the figure (b). 
This means that while potentially the class of assets could have ripped-off benefits 
represented by the entire grey area on (a) (as per the natural absolute limits only), or by 
the entire dark yellow area on (a) (as per the natural relative limits only), the effective 
relative limits showcased on (b), had the effect of considerably reducing the grey and 
dark yellow areas, and therefore the potential value that could be extracted from the class 
of assets (for comparison purposes the original maximum area, as given by absolute 
natural limits, is shown in light off-blue on (b)). 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Impact of effective relative limits on the value generating potential of a class 
of assets 
 
If Figure 4.10 was representing, for example, human capital, (b) would paint a 
picture of a generation of human beings, who due to limitations in terms of nourishment 
















Formation of assets bound by
absolute and relative natural limits
( 𝐴𝑖   𝑛𝑑 0 and ω𝐴𝑖   𝑛𝑑 𝜛𝐴𝑖)
(b)
Formation of assets bound by
effective relative limits
(ω𝐴𝑖𝑒   𝑛𝑑 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑒)
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produce, through the course of their lifetime a fraction of the value they could potentially 
have (showcased by the grey red-stripped area between ω𝐴𝑖𝑒  and 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑒). Furthermore, the 
figure shows how their lives were made shorter than it could have—only having reached 
time interval 𝑡3, rather than 𝑡4. 
Likewise, the socio-material limits incorporated into the effective ones, can 
dramatically constrain or expand the effective value generating potential of a class of 
assets. For example, gender impacting social norms can easily reduce by up to half the 
value generating potential of a human generation: a country in which female employment 
or ownership of property or business is forbidden or discouraged, both passively or 
actively; or, a country in which education reinforces socially biased gender roles. 
As explained in the previous sub-sections of this chapter, since the ecosystem is a 
complex system, the under-performance of human capital due to the constraints imposed 
by the effective relative limits, would also have consequences for the overall performance 
of the system. Within the formalization of the conceptual framework proposed in this 
chapter, such under-performance will further narrow down the possibility space: under-
performing classes of assets can act as bottlenecks and create a critical-path that further 
bounds the possibilities of social, economic, and political change. 
This analysis could also be applied, for example, towards understanding the 
impact of natural and social forces. A natural or man-made disaster or a human disease 
could have similar effects on the function gradients of one or more classes of assets. For 
example, continuing with the illustration of human capital formation, it could be 
conceived that a highly contagious disease that affect children and ends killing or 
seriously and negatively impacting their functions gradients, could have a similar effect 
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than that shown on the right side (b) of Figure 4.10. Furthermore, one could think of a 
natural disaster in which the absolute natural limit, Ω𝑖, of a renewable resource, is 
seriously impacted, displacing the horizontal line representing such limit downwards. 
War and violent conflict, as well, can have serious consequences in the function gradients 
of several classes of assets and therefore create real and opportunity costs that will need 
to be dealt with by future generations. 
An Attempt to Overcome the Incommensurability of Assets in an Ecosystem. 
A difficulty in managing a diverse collection of classes of assets in an ecosystem, 
lies on their incommensurability. As discussed in Chapter 3, assets differ in terms of their 
space and time characteristics, given that they also differ on their nature.  
For example, timelines for the productive life of different assets vary widely. 
Infrastructure lasts for decades, perhaps even centuries; computers, on the other end of 
the spectrum, perhaps last up to five years. Similarly, the output functions of different 
types of assets can be very different. Usually, the efficiency of a bridge remains very 
similar throughout its productive life (i.e., the same number of cars can cross over it 
during the same unit of time given a constant flow of cars); on the contrary, the efficiency 
of a computer can be drastically reduced by the contextual requirements of new software. 
In the case of the bridge, an increased flow of cars may require the building of an 
alternative bridge to divert part of the flow, but nevertheless, the bridge will still be able 
to handle the same flow of cars for which it was designed. In practical terms, this means 
that the additional alternative bridge could be designed to handle the extra flow rather 
than the overall flow. In the case of the computer, if the new software has to be used, 
there might be no other alternative than to substitute the old computer for a new one. 
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While the old computer might still be able to contribute to other tasks, it is likely that 
these other tasks would produce less value-added, impacting the lifetime productivity of 
the computer. Money, pricing, and markets are for the most part, the means through 
which tangible and intangible things (including classes of assets, of course) in our world 
today are commensurate. However, as it has been already argued in this dissertation, the 
benefits these means provide come as well with considerable restrains that create 
troublesome biases. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, while there is some evidence about the existence of 
economic cycles that are tied to those that are social and political, still a considerable 
debate continues about their nature (for assessments of these debates see, for example, 
Barnett, 1998; Devezas, 2005, 2006; Devezas & Corredine, 2001). Nevertheless, two 
important reasons suffice to use economic cycles in the forthcoming attempt to 
commensurate the diverse classes of assets that form the wealth of nations. First, the 
Wittgensteinian epistemological and ontological approach adopted in this dissertation 
imposes the need to having a point of reference against which assessments can be made: 
the contextual (Horwich, 2012; Klagge, 2011; Tyler, 2011). Second, the 
incommensurability problems described at the beginning of this section require the use of 
a constant that can serve as a point of reference to allow for all the classes of assets in the 
ecosystem be commensurate. In particular, Kondratiev understanding of these cycles has 
been chosen due to its more interdisciplinary nature and the nature of the literature about 
them which tend to integrate political and social variables into the economic analysis 
(Devezas, 2006; Modelski, 1998; Modelski & Thompson, 1996). This choice will also 
allow for following the methodological approach proposed in Chapter 1 of combining 
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both elements of economics and its modelling approach, as well as the more traditional 
political economic analysis. Furthermore, the identity between value and wellbeing 
proposed in Chapter 3, will also contribute to substantiating the forthcoming attempt to 
commensurate classes of assets. 
Kondratiev, a Russian economist, and Schumpeter (through Kondratiev), suggest 
that there are overarching economic cycles called long-waves. These waves are driven by 
innovations—particularly disruptive ones (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of the social, 
economic, and political cycles literature and some of the debates around them). A 
disruptive innovation will push economic power from those who benefit the most from 
the previous wave, towards the disruptors creating a new wave. During a rising ebb, 
economic forces will push change throughout the fabric of the society: skills not 
previously in high-demand will start to increase in importance, raising demand, and 
incentivizing individuals to seek training and expertise in these skills; disruptors’ activity 
will start to showcase deficiencies or holes in the regulatory frameworks and institutional 
basis that will slowly come to be addressed by governments. Investments will tend to 
become increasingly allocated towards the disruptive sectors as their potential for 
financial return will be higher compared to traditional ones. Some sectors will become 
less dynamic than others, creating shifts in jobs and generating a social impact (the cost 
of structural transformation) that will also translate into political consequences. 
As disruption takes hold and starts taking over the economy in terms of its relative 
importance, previous trends accentuate further, cementing winning and losing situations 
for different social, economic, and political sectors. Once settled as the driver of the 
economy, and once a social, economic, and political change and equilibrium seems to 
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have been reached and take hold through an internalization process, pressure for 
remaining competitive and continuous growth, changes the focus of the new disruptive 
sectors from innovation towards consolidation and survival. Incentives of these sectors 
change towards maintaining the status quo they created. Smaller firms and new entrants 
have less chance to compete in the established sectors and have, instead, incentives to 
disrupt the current order (this is consistent with “new trade theory”—see Helpman & 
Krugman, 1985; and Krugman, 1987—and even with Minsky’s analysis of the financial 
sector—see Minsky, 1978, 1986). As the pressure from these new disruptors start to build 
up, the previous leaders find it hard to transform, usually entering into a declining ebb 
which will open up space for innovation and more considerable social, economic, and 
political change towards accommodating the needs and demands of the newly disruptive 
sectors. 
Relating this dynamic to the analysis of the previous sections on the natural and 
socio-material limits, it could be theorized that the possibility space depicted in Figure 
4.5, will tend, in time, to narrow further for some cohorts of the classes of assets, while 
broadening for others, as the economic powers of the disruptive sectors gain political 
influence and start pressuring for embedding of rules and routines into social structures 
that are favourable to them (this process of narrowing or broadening of the possibility 
space was illustrated in figures 4.8 and 4.9). This includes for example the push to 
recognise or reinforce intellectual property rights or leave certain loopholes open to allow 
for creeping monopolization. (This idea is also consistent with Minsky (1978), and with 
Acemoglu, Egorov, & Sonin, (2011).) The tightening of social structures towards social 
and material choices consistent with the disruptive sectors, and their effect on the 
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effective relative limits of the ecosystem, is showcased in Figure 4.11 (while Kondratiev 
long-waves are usually considered to be s-shaped, they will be represented in this 
dissertation, for simplicity, by regular sin curves). 
In the Figure, effective relative limits, ω𝐴𝑖𝑒  and 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑒, in 𝑡1, narrow down, 
respectively, towards, ω𝐴𝑖𝑒 (𝑡2)   𝑛𝑑 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑒 (𝑡2) , further reducing the potential value that a 
class of assets can generate, which is represented by the smaller red-dotted area between 
the new bounds. 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Narrowing of the possibility space during the rising and consolidation 
phases of a long-term cycle (e.g. a Kondratiev long-wave) 
 
It is important to note that such narrowing does not necessarily translate into a 
contraction in the monetary denomination of the economic activity, but rather into further 
concentration of the economic activity around certain activities that better match certain 
socio-material structures. It might, as well be, then, that while the area in the graph is 













rewards provided by those material and social structures for the use of those particular 
assets with specific characteristics are increasingly higher (the opposite, a broader area 
but reduced monetary rewards, is also possible). Still, the clear impact such narrowing of 
the possibility space has is that of creating inertia or path dependence in the ecosystem, 
partially consolidating winning and losing positions among social, economic, and 
political sectors and actors (this was also illustrated in Figure 4.9). Furthermore, as 
discussed above, the narrowing of effective relative limits, affects in different ways the 
cohorts within each class of assets based on how they match the stage of the cycle. That 
is, the situation depicted in Figure 4.11 could be different even for different cohorts of the 
same class of assets given that the structural transformation of an economy would have 
differential effects. 
On the contrary, as the ebb starts its decent and the previously disruptive sectors 
start scrambling for market share and efficiency so they can maintain their competitive 
positions, new disruptors will start building pressure towards opening up the possibility 
space. Disruptors will start tapping into dormant potential to produce value outside the 
effective relative limits of the ecosystem. As they gain economic ground, they will tend 
to gain social and political ground, and then the push to widen the possibility space will 
begin again, as shown in Figure 4.12. 
As showcased in Figure 4.11, the new effective relative limits are represented in 




Figure 4.12. Broadening of the possibility space during the downside phase of a long-
term cycle (e.g., a Kondratiev long-wave) 
 
In comparing Figures 4.11 and 4.12, a highly significant observation emerges. 
That the effective relative limits can be narrowed or broadened down does not mean that 
the different classes of assets can respond all swiftly to such changes. In the original 
example discussed around Figure 4.10 (b), the smaller grey area bounded by effective 
relative limits (ω𝐴𝑖𝑒  and 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑒) represented the medium- and long-term effects narrow 
limits could have in reducing the absolute intertemporal natural potential of a cohort of a 
class of assets to generate value. Inappropriate nutrition or lack of education, for 
example, shaped the grey area into a small fraction of what it could have been. The 
generation represented by it has been physically bound to a lower intertemporal value 
generating potential compared to its theoretical possibilities. This means that, at least for 
this same cohort or generation, the broadening of the effective relative limits will have 
little effect in reshaping its respective value curve (as shown in Figure 4.12, the limit 













represented in Figure 4.11 (capped by ω𝐴𝑖𝑒 (𝑡 )), reflecting that, in spite of the new 
effective relative limits increasing the theoretical value extraction potential of the class of 
assets, this theoretical potential exceeds the real potential currently possessed (i.e., 
embedded) by this class of assets and, therefore, reflecting as well the fact that the recent 
limit shift has not immediate consequences in its value generating potential. New 
generations will be able to benefit, as showcased by the green curve added to the right, 
(b), in Figure 4.12 to represent them. Through the widening of the effective relative 
limits, upcoming generations are allowed to develop closer to their absolute potential (the 
green and light-off-blue areas are almost the same size), and, therefore, they can be 
expected to contribute much more to creating value, and therefore, helping attain 
wellbeing. 
At this point, Figure 4.8 can be revisited to show how the original idea of the 
evolution of the effective relative limits over time showcased in it, relates to the ideas 
illustrated throughout Figures 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12. Figure 4.13 below now shows: (a) 
how the possibility spaces given, respectively, by the effective relative limits at 𝑡2 and 𝑡3 
(represented by two-dimensional planes), are connected to each other through an 
intertemporal possibility space (partially represented by the red rectangular area against 
the grey backdrop), as well as, (b) how these possibility spaces at 𝑡2 and 𝑡3, exist at 
specific points in time in the lifecycle of a class of assets, represented by the value 
generating potential curves in the grey backdrop (the possibility space at 𝑡2 is at the rising 




Figure 4.13. Four-dimensional representation of the possibility space on the backdrop of 
a class of assets' lifecycle 
 
Rather than serving to directly commensurate different classes of assets, the 
Kondratiev long-waves provide a space-time continuum and a common reference point to 
situate all the collections of assets in an ecosystem, in the same two-dimensional space. 
This approach is highly consistent with the Wittgensteinian epistemological and 
ontological framework adopted in this research, which is, precisely, highly contextual and 
calls for clear points of reference against which ideas and assessments can be validated 
(Klagge, 2011; Tyler, 2011). 
For example, using two axes, Figure 4.14 combines both three Kondratiev long-
waves and its four stages (termed: creation, growth, maintenance, destruction: 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3, 
𝑡4, respectively) on the horizontal axis; and several human generations on the vertical 












Kondratiev cycle. For simplification purposes, each Kondratiev long-wave is estimated to 
last for about 60 years (4 stages of 15 years each); each human generation is assumed to 
be at their peak for about 30 years, with generational shifts every 15 years. (Note that the 
human generation curves do not represent its full life cycle, but only their productivity 
peak.) What this juxtaposition allows, in this case, is to unearth the composition, or 
“fabric”, of the human capital at any given stage on the Kondratiev long-wave (or for that 
matter, other classes of assets, as this analysis could be extended to all of them). 
 
 
Figure 4.14. Long-term cycles (e.g., Kondratiev long-waves) and human generations in a 
two-dimensional space 
 
In the literature, there is evidence (see Chapter 3) that given the different set of 
incentives reigning during each one of the stages of the long-waves, human beings also 
tend to behave differently due to these incentives. This reality translates to the social, 
economic, and political realms. Human beings’ response is also attuned to the stage of 













their own life-cycle in which they are at any of those particular stages of the Kondratiev 
long-waves. Figure 4.15 helps to illustrate this point. 
 
 
Figure 4.15. The composition of human capital in a stage of a long-term cycle (e.g., a 
Kondratiev long-wave) 
 
 Intertwined at the t2 interval, the figure shows four human generations at different 
stages of their own life cycles. In the vertical middle (the darker blue area with the white 
dots, identified by the number 4), there is the crest of a generation which is already at its 
peak. It is likely that these generations’ set of skills is not entirely aligned with the sets of 
skills required by the rising ebb of the second Kondratiev long-wave, 𝑡2 (the growth 
stage). This is a generation where skills were probably molded by the needs favoured 
during the previous long-wave. 
On the contrary, the generations represented by the area in white crossed with 
narrow thin blue diagonal lines (identified by the number 1), or even the ones represented 




















by the white area with the small blue dots (identified by the number 2), are on their own 
rising stage, starting to acquiring and consolidating skills, and integrating into productive 
activities. It is likely that members of these generations will follow the incentives in place 
to develop skill sets valued during the current stage of the Kondratiev long-wave. The 
generations represented by the area identified by the number 3, are somewhat in between 
the two sets of generations discussed above and could go either way, depending on 
policies and actions taken. 
The risk profiles of older and newer generations are different as a consequence. 
The making of social, economic, and political winners and losers starts taking shape. Job 
demand will begin to shift favouring some and creating headaches for others.  
At this point, the importance that managing the possibility space has, as a proxy 
for managing the process of development, can be further highlighted. Development is a 
process of shifts and transitions. The speed at which each class of assets can adjust to the 
changes varies. Their malleability or elasticity is dependent on three factors: (a) function 
gradients embedded in the shaping of the class of assets, creating a sort of in-class 
(cohort specific) effective natural relative limit (as illustrated in Figures 4.10, 4.11, and 
4.12); (b) how the shape of the value generating potential function of the class of assets 
fits into the possibility space defined by the ecosystem’s effective relative limits (out-
class limits); and (c) match or mismatch between the stage in which the class of assets is 
in its own life cycle, and the stages of the Kondratiev long-wave (lifecycle stage match or 




Figure 4.16. Elasticity of a class of assets against social, economic, and political change 
 
The function gradient embedded in the shaping of the class of asset through the 
impact of the ecosystem’s effective relative limits (point (a) discussed in the previous 
paragraph—the effect of in-class limits) is depicted by the increased area of the value 
generating potential curves, representing, in this example, four consecutive human 
generations (in yellow, blue, green, and brown). The increasingly higher ecosystem’s 
upper effective relative limit, ω𝐴𝑖𝑒 , as well as the broader possibility space created by its 
distance from the ecosystem’s lower effective relative limit, 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑒, allows for the human 
generations to form increasingly closer towards their absolute natural limit, ΩA𝑖. (this is 
showcased by the increasingly bigger area of the curves representing each human 
generation, as well as by the rising embedded function gradient that touches the highest 
points of each one of these generations). 
Likewise, Figure 4.16 showcases how an increasing proportion of each 
generation's potential for generating value fits within the possibility space—the 
















effect of out-class limits). Three elements combine to increase the potential of human 
generations for generating value: (a) broader ecosystem’s effective relative limits (ω𝐴𝑖𝑒  
and 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑒) that broaden the possibility space; (b) ecosystem’s effective relative limits 
(ω𝐴𝑖𝑒 and 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑒) that track closer to the absolute natural limits—ΩA𝑖 and 0 (without 
exceeding the relative ones—ω𝐴𝑖 and ϖ𝐴𝑖—when they differ); and (c) human 
generations’ intertemporal value generating functions (𝑉(𝐴𝑖)) closer to their potential 
absolute natural limits—Ω𝐴𝑖 and 0 (without exceeding the relative ones—ω𝐴𝑖  and ϖ𝐴𝑖—
when they differ). 
Finally, Figure 4.16 also shows how each generation can exist at different stages 
of the Kondratiev long-waves, while they themselves are simultaneously at various stages 
of their own lifecycles (point (c) listed three paragraphs above—the effect of lifecycle 
stage match or mismatch). For example, the second and third human generations out of 
the four in the figure (blue and green) take place (their entire lifecycles) respectively in 
the downward ebb of the first Kondratiev long-wave (“destruction” or 𝑡4) and on the 
upward ebb of the second Kondratiev long-wave (“creation” or 𝑡1). Both these stages of 
the long-waves are characterized by deep change and transformation, with the old 
traditional sectors increasingly being challenged and replaced by the new disruptive ones. 
In contrast, the last human generation of the four (indicated in brown) takes place, 
for the most part, both in the “growth” and “maintenance” stages of the second long-
wave (𝑡1 and 𝑡2, respectively): its own increasing half takes place on the former, while its 
decreasing half occurs on the latter. These two stages of the long-waves are characterized 
by more stability than the other two. The disrupters have already started to take and 
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consolidate their dominant position, and the ecosystem’s effective relative limits start 
narrowing down, in turn, narrowing down the possibility space of cohorts of classes of 
assets that don’t quite match the disrupters’ preferences (supporting their own interests 
and blocking or interfering those of others), and giving clearer signals and incentives to 
make it easier for the growing generation to “ride” the wave to their biggest advantage. In 
the case of this last human generation, both its location within the stages of the long-
wave, as well as the considerable proportion of the generations’ intertemporal value 
generating potential curve area that is located within the ecosystem’s possibility space, 
presents, theoretically, better opportunities for social mobility, inclusiveness, and overall 
improvements in the social, economic, and political standing of this generation. Given the 
stochastic and mutually influencing nature of the relationships of the classes of assets 
within the ecosystem, a generation such as this seems to be poised to further push the 
ecosystem’s relative limits, as well as the relative natural limits of one or more of the 
classes of assets in the ecosystem, towards further stabilization of the status quo. 
Optimality of matching and synchronicity between a class of asset’s own lifecycle 
and that of the stages of the Kondratiev long-wave is represented in more detail in Figure 
4.17. Part (a) of the figure includes the same depiction of the possibility frontiers for a 
class of assets illustrated in Figure 4.7, (b), but inversely juxtaposes the Kondratiev long-
wave on the 45-degree line. The outer Kondratiev long-wave (represented by a darker 
shade of blue) touching the outmost edge of the farthest possibility frontier (given by  𝐴𝑖) 
with the wave’s highest point, showcases how absolute matching and synchronicity 
allows for the highest potential contribution of the class of assets within the course of the 
long-wave. This point of intersection,  ℎ, is represented in more detailed on the right side 
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of the figure at (b). As is shown, matching and synchronicity allows for the formation of 
the class of assets to be fully informed by the rising ebb of the long-wave (“creation” and 
“growth” stages, 𝑡1 and 𝑡2, respectively). Given that an assumption was made that a 
Kondratiev long-wave lasts for 60 years, while a human generation lasts 30, section (b) of 
Figure 4.17 shows a complete overlap between the generation’s productive lifecycle and 
stages “growth” and “maintenance” of the wave (𝑡2 and 𝑡3, respectively). (Note that, 
while not shown in the Figure, this human generation was born during the “creation” 
stage of the long-wave.) 
 
 
Figure 4.17. Effects of the degrees of matching and synchronicity between the stages of a 
long-term cycle (e.g., a Kondratiev long-wave) and those of the lifecycle of a class of 
assets 
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of Figure 4.17), which highest points are intersecting with the frontier of possibilities 
given by 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑒, showcase the mutual influence that the ecosystem’s effective relative 
limits and the long-waves have on each other, given the different levels of matching and 
synchronicity between them. Ultimately, less matching and synchronicity reduces the 
potential contribution of the classes of assets in producing value, and, hence, the 
downward shift of the possibility frontier from the one defined by,  𝐴𝑖, to the one defined 
by, 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑒. In this sense, the Kondratiev long-wave is yet another factor that through the 
natural and socio-material limits (𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝𝑁 and v𝐴𝑖𝑝𝑁, and 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝𝛹 and v𝐴𝑖𝑝𝛹, respectively), 
influence the determination of the effective relative limits (𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑒 and 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑒). 
First, at any given time, as it was previously discussed was the case for each 
country’s natural relative limits (𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝𝑁 and v𝐴𝑖𝑝𝑁), the global community is effectively 
limited by the interaction of all the countries’ limits (global limits). Natural relative limits 
could then be split into two components: a global one and a local one. These could be, 
respectively, represented by, 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝𝛮𝐺 and v𝐴𝑖𝑝𝛮𝐺, and, 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑝𝛮𝐿 and v𝐴𝑖𝑝𝛮𝐿. Given that the 
monetary denomination obtained at any given point for the use of physical units of a class 
of assets is given by how the entire money supply is allocated among the choices 
available, and given that in the highly unequal world of today, a majority of this money 
supply is in the hands of a few countries and within them, a few individuals, it is their 
preferences that influence the most the relative value that can be obtained through the use 
or exchange of wealth. These preferences are not only expressed in the present time 
through the completion of specific transactions, but also embedded throughout time into 
material and social structures and the resulting material and social limits in those 
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dominant countries that tend to permeate those of the other countries, given that adhering 
to the said structures tends to become an “entry” or “participation” requirement. As a 
consequence, it could be theorized that the bigger the distance between the global and 
local natural relative limits, the less value generating potential a class of assets has. (See, 
for example, Bruszt and McDermott (2014) where several authors discuss the dynamics 
between national and global standards and regulations.) Furthermore, the McKinsey 
Institute (2014) showcases how this degrees of matching and synchronization between a 
country and the global marketplace/order is related to incremental economic growth 
benefits (specifically, 40% higher to those countries that are more connected). Note that 
given that the monetary denomination is dependent on the timing in which it takes place, 
matching and synchronicity and their resulting effects in monetary denominations are 
particular to specific points in time; as a consequence, from this point on, all variables 
used in the formalization of the proposed conceptual framework will be time specific and 
identified by the subscript, 𝑡𝑛. 
Global and local natural relative limits’ degree of matching and synchronicity, 
𝑁𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  (the bigger the distance, the less matching and synchronizations exists between 








       [4.5] 
Second, and as in the case of natural relative limits, the same logic and analysis 





, respectively, the distance 
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between them, as a proxy for their degree of matching and synchronicity, 𝛹𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  (the 









       [4.6] 
Both, 𝑁𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  and 𝛹𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , impact 𝑣𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛( 𝑖𝑡𝑛) in the following manner: if they are 
both equal to 1, 𝑣𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛( 𝑖𝑡𝑛), the value generating potential of the class of assets, 𝐴𝑖,  
would generate (in physical units of wealth,  𝑖𝑡𝑛)  an equivalent amount of wealth to that 
extracted from the class of assets, 𝐴𝑖; if they are bigger than 1, 𝑣𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛( 𝑖𝑡𝑛) would 
generate wealth in excess of that extracted from the class of assets, 𝐴𝑖; and, if they are 
bigger than 0 and less than 1, 𝑣𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛( 𝑖𝑡𝑛) would generate lesser wealth than that extracted 
from the class of assets, 𝐴𝑖 
This relationship between 𝑁𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  and 𝛹𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , and 𝑣𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛( 𝑖𝑡𝑛) could be 
represented by, 
𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 = 𝑓(𝑁𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  𝛹𝑆𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛)       [4.7] 
Where, 𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , represents the value elasticity as being a function of the degree of 
matching and synchronicity between local and global natural and socio-material limits. 
As a consequence, using Equation 4.4 and Equation 4.7 as points of departure, the 
value generating potential, 𝑣𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , at a point in time, 𝑡𝑛, of a class of assets, 𝐴𝑖, when using 
a quantity,  𝑖𝑡𝑛, of physical units of wealth of the said class of assets, can be now 
represented by, 
291 



















     [4.9] 
0 < 𝛼𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛      𝑛𝑑     W𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 ≥ 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑛 ≥  𝑖𝑡𝑛 ≥ ?̅?𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  ?̅?𝐴𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑛 ≥ 0 
Equation 4.9 showcases three different trade-offs that extracting value from a 
class of assets present. These are also illustrated on Figure 4.18. The first trade-off (on 
the upper-right section of the figure’s quadrant, (a)) is between volume extracted from the 
class of assets and the effect of this extraction on the overall health of the class of assets; 
this health elasticity is represented by, 𝛼𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 . The second trade-off (on the lower-right 
section of the quadrant, (b)) is between volume extracted and the output that could 
potentially generate value; this output elasticity is represented by, 𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 . Finally, the third 
trade-off (on the lower-left section of the quadrant, (c)) is between the output generated 
and the value received for such output; this value or income elasticity is represented by, 
𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 . Both 𝛼𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  and 𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , embed in them the state of technology related to the 
extraction of value from a class of assets, as well as to the production of output from a 
given quantity extracted from a class of assets. The variable 𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , as discussed in the 
previous paragraphs, reflects that, ultimately, in an interconnected world, the monetary 
denomination of any output obtained will be given by the matching and synchronicity or 
lack thereof, between such output and the output that is favored at local or global scales 
(as reflected by the decisions of those who possess the bulk of money). This monetary 
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denomination impacts the balance of the exchange in terms of physical units of wealth, 
and therefore ends up impacting the stocks of wealth of a country and its ability to fulfill 
the wellbeing of its citizens. 
(It is important to reiterate that from this point on, to reflect the importance that 
contextual time plays in determining the wealth of nations, all variables are not only class 
of assets specific (as identified by the subscript 𝑖), but also time specific (as identified by 
the subscript, 𝑡𝑛).) 
 
 
Figure 4.18. Trade-offs in the generation of value from a class of assets 
 
Ultimately, what Figure 4.18 showcases, is support for one of the central 














the possibility and ability of extracting value from wealth, which, in turn, is dependent on 
how healthy this wealth is (represented through the fourth elasticity that emerges from 
the figure as shown on the upper left quadrant, (d), and that summarizes the effect of the 
other three elasticities in generating value). The figure shows the nature of this 
relationship at an specific point in time, and hints at the potential intergenerational 
implications that draining wealth’s health can have in reducing its potential to generate 
value. The nature of these relationships, through time, between wealth’s health and its 
ability to generate value (in physical units of wealth) are then given by the bounded 
elasticities identified by 𝛼𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , 𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , and 𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  (bounded since they have an aggregated 
impact that build on each other’s). 
The health and output functions (given by  𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛( 𝑖𝑡𝑛) and 𝜌𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛( 𝑖𝑡𝑛)) impact the 
classes of assets’ effective relative limits. These effective relative limits, in turn, drive 
changes in the health and output functions through the scarcity they impose (incentivizing 
improvements in productivity, 𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , as well in the ability to extract physical quantities of 
the classes of assets,  𝑖𝑡𝑛, imposing an increasingly smaller effect on the classes of 
assets’ health—through an improved health elasticity, 𝛼𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 ). Through these impacts, as 
well as through changes in relative natural limits, the possibility frontiers shift upwards or 
downwards. Lastly, it is the value elasticity represented by 𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  (matching and 
synchronicity), that ultimately determines the value in physical units of wealth (and, as a 
consequence, the intertemporal implications of present extraction of value from wealth). 
This value is ultimately validated or invalidated by its ability to satisfy wellbeing (once 
again, given the central premise made in this dissertation that, intertemporally, value 
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equals wellbeing). Since they affect each other (as shown in Figure 4.18), these three 
elasticities could be considered bounded elasticities. 
Being key for defining a path of development towards self-reinforcing state, these 
elasticities are essential variables that can inform and contribute to wealth management 
efforts. It is clear at a first level of analysis, that favorable elasticities are not only a sign 
of good wealth management but also a contributor in fulfilling wellbeing and attaining 
self-reinforcing state. However, being these elasticities defined at the class of assets level, 
further consideration makes it evident that good management requires more than simply 
optimizing these elasticities for each class of assets on its own (or the cohorts within 
them). In fact, the optimal configuration of elasticities across the classes of assets, 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , 
in the ecosystem, 𝑡𝑛, is farther more impactful than narrowly focusing on the individual 
classes of assets. Moreover, the optimal configuration of these elasticities across time, is 




Figure 4.19. Optimization of bounded elasticities 
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overall value (and as a consequence the wellbeing that a country can obtain from its 
wealth) raises questions, both about the scale of the costs a country has to assume to 
match and synchronize its socio-material relative limits to global ones, and about the 
economies of scale limitations that small countries face in terms of natural relative limits 
(and as a consequence, in terms of their capability to match and synchronize their natural 
relative limits with global ones). After all, as described by Spence (2011) there are a 
considerable number of very small countries in the world: about 146 with populations 
below 2 million (68 of those with populations below 1 million). These limitations have 
important consequences for the possibility of convergence between better-off and worse-
off countries towards the self-reinforcing state, and therefore, need addressing. 
While matching and synchronicity has been defined above in terms of natural and 
socio-material limits, ultimately, as it was previously argued, both these limits are also 
dependent on the overall lifecycle stage-synchronicity between that of a class of assets 
and that of the Kondratiev long-wave: the growth and maintenance stages of the 
Kondratiev long-waves are usually related to narrower socio-material limits for some, 
while the creation and destruction stages are usually related to broader socio-material 
limits for others (this is in relation to current and previous leading sectors). Comparing 
the Kondratiev stages, which will be denoted by 𝐾t  𝐾t2  𝐾t3  𝐾t4, with the stages of the 
lifecycle of a class of assets (in this particular case, a renewable/organic one), which will 
be denoted by 𝐴𝑖𝑡  𝐴𝑖𝑡2  𝐴𝑖𝑡3  𝐴𝑖𝑡4, perfect matching and synchronicity could be defined 
by the diagonal in the matrix 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  𝐾𝑡𝑛 below (highlighted in yellow—this was also 
graphically showcased in Figure 4.17), 
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𝐴𝑖𝑡  𝐾𝑡 𝐴𝑖𝑡  𝐾𝑡2 𝐴𝑖𝑡  𝐾𝑡3 𝐴𝑖𝑡  𝐾𝑡4
𝐴𝑖𝑡2  𝐾𝑡 𝐴𝑖𝑡2  𝐾𝑡2 𝐴𝑖𝑡2  𝐾𝑡3 𝐴𝑖𝑡2  𝐾𝑡4
𝐴𝑖𝑡3  𝐾𝑡 𝐴𝑖𝑡3  𝐾𝑡2 𝐴𝑖𝑡3  𝐾𝑡3 𝐴𝑖𝑡3  𝐾𝑡4




As per the discussion above with regards to the relationship between the 
Kondratiev long-waves’ stages and the broadening and narrowing of the effective relative 
limits of the possibility spaces, it would be expected that perfect matching and 
synchronicity as defined by the diagonal of the matrix, 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  𝐾𝑡𝑛, would also be linked 
with a value elasticity, 𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , of 1, or very close to 1. 
The analysis made in this section, while focusing on limited number of classes of 
assets, is perfectly applicable, with some minor modifications, to all of the other classes 
of assets in the ecosystem. Evidently, given their different timelines and different 
characteristics; the shapes of the areas representing their value extraction functions; the 
locations and shapes of their possibility curves; the intersections of the areas representing 
their value extraction functions and the Kondratiev long-waves (the “fabric” mentioned 
above and showcase in Figure 4.15); and the potential degrees of matching and 
synchronicity they can have with the long-waves; each class of assets will showcase 
different realities and possibilities. Furthermore, this could be applied at different levels 
of analysis to understand the degrees of matching and synchronicity between individuals 
and their communities, regions and countries, and countries and the global context, 
among other levels of aggregation. This gives considerable flexibility to the proposed 
conceptual framework. 
The multi-dimensional critical-path of development. 
Up to this point, the analysis has concentrated on understanding the nature of the 
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limits that bound the possibility space, as well as the implications these limits have on 
individual classes of assets. However, already in discussing figures 4.4 and 4.5 above, the 
interrelationship between different classes of assets was signaled as extremely important. 
This interrelationship means that even when one class of assets’ individual absolute and 
relative limits might be at their optimal maximum (or for that matter, those of most 
classes of assets), if the limits of another class of assets on which its (or several classes of 
assets’) potential to generate value is dependent are constrained and as a consequence 
constrain too the said class of assets, such optimal maximum limits become irrelevant for 
value extracting purposes. In the end, the constraining limits of one class of assets can 
theoretically be responsible for defining the shape of the possibility space due to their 
pre-eminence over the others. This pre-eminence, while in absolute terms defined by 
natural structures, in relative terms is contextual (as discussed in the previous subsection, 
based on the degree of their matching and synchronicity with the long-term cycles), and, 
as a consequence, it can shift in time. In the final analysis, the possibility space will 
always have an absolute shape that will be given by the natural structures. Nonetheless, 
its relative shape will be stochastic and the result of the interrelationship between and 
among all classes of assets and the ecosystem across time. 
Putting this in the context of the classes of assets discussed in this and previous 
chapters (natural, human, fixed produced, mobile produced, and intangible produced), it 
is clear that besides natural assets and human capital, all other classes of assets being 
“produced” depend precisely on natural and human capital. In turn, as was also discussed 
previously in this chapter, human capital is dependent on natural capital and the 
ecosystem as a whole. 
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The one-dimensional critical-path is, then, that of each class of assets 
individually. Each asset has absolute and relative gradient functions which are 
determined by their own nature but realized through their interaction within the 
ecosystem. This defines fairly precise critical-paths for the optimization of their 
individual value extraction potential. As was discussed through the example of human 
capital, the first two years of human life are critical in determining health, cognitive, and 
behavioural function gradients. While there are a couple more points in time in human 
beings’ development paths during which such gradients can be influenced, room for 
doing so is limited. The critical-path for human capital is then defined by these first two 
years of life, and those other moments. There will be little use in trying to change 
function gradients out of those windows of opportunity, at least with the knowledge and 
technological progress we have achieved so far. 
Consideration of the one-dimensional critical-path leads to a two-dimensional 
one. Continuing with the example of human capital, its survival and development are 
dependent on physical and emotional nurturing, both of which are external to a human 
life. Food, air, care and company of others are all exogenous to a human being, yet 
essential for its survival. This means that knowing that the first two years of life set a 
critical-path for human development is necessary but not sufficient. Having access to 
food, or to growing food, and having the knowledge to do so, knowing what to eat and 
how, all become, as a consequence, part of the critical-path of human development. This 
is what could be considered as the two-dimensional critical-path: a critical-path that 
results from the indissoluble relationship between a class of assets and others that make 
possible its existence, and that jointly determine its value or capacity to contribute to the 
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fulfillment of wellbeing. It is their mutual dependence what eventually determines the 
increasingly more accurate realistic two-dimensional critical-path. 
However, it should be clear at this point that this is still not sufficient. The classes 
of assets on which another class or several depend, are themselves dependent on other 
classes of assets, and, therefore, further adjustment is needed to conceive the now two-
dimensional critical-path as a three-dimensional one in which there are a multitude of 
relationships at different degrees that perhaps more indirectly, but influential 
nevertheless, impact the value generating potential of all classes of assets. 
Finally, as was illustrated through Figures 4.8 and 4.9, when a three-dimensional 
possibility space is then projected in time to create a four-dimensional one, a four-
dimensional critical-path emerges as well. While the independent creation, formation, 
maintenance, depreciation, depletion, and destruction of a class of assets can have its own 
logic in the space-time continuum, additionally, as part of an ecosystem in which it 
interacts with other classes of assets, the evolution throughout time of the whole system 
will further define the critical-paths of all the classes of assets, individually and 
collectively. 
It is perhaps important to note the parallel between the analysis of the preceding 
paragraphs with regards to the critical-path of development, and the analysis made in 
previous sections of this chapter with regards to the setting of the limits of the possibility 
space. The logic behind both analyses is very similar, with layers of analysis adding 
complexity over each other, further constraining limits and paths more and more, making 
them dependent on an increasing number of stochastic variables. And just like in the end, 
the relative limits discussed make the possibility space stochastic, they also make the 
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critical-paths stochastic. Ultimately, these limits and critical-paths represent together the 
two ultimate limits by which all material objects are bound: space and time. 
This line of thought can be extremely useful in understanding what could be an 
efficient path towards the attainment of self-reinforcing state. For example, investing in 
the education of children who were underfed and carry in themselves the constrained 
function gradients resulting from this sad reality, will be less beneficial than investing in 
their correct nourishment earlier in their life (the point is not to invest in the former but to 
invest more opportunely so the constrained function gradients are avoided). Investing in 
the information technology platforms that could enable the production of intangible 
capital, while, at the same time, the investment in human capital is lacking, is also 
inefficient. And while these examples have been used before in, for instance, 
development planning efforts or new growth theory (Romer, 1990), the insight that has 
not been fully considered and integrated in the analysis is, precisely, the conditionality 
that delineates the limits and critical-paths that define the possibility space.  
Moreover, the prioritization of human life and ecosystems over everything else 
has not been a reality of the modern era. In framing the problem addressed by aid, at the 
beginning of Chapter 2, it was clear that the majority of statistics underpinning the 
Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals are concerned 
with the number of people dying or having limited physical and emotional development 
opportunities, rather than on the function gradients that are behind of many of the effects 
showcased by such statistics. Furthermore, the deplorable state to which the human race 
has brought the ecosystem is an even clearer sign of how far human action has been from 
considering the relative prominence of human lives and the ecosystem above everything 
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else. It is clear that the integration of a realistic, four-dimensional critical-path into the 
investment decisions made by national and international authorities is not yet a reality. 
In the next chapter, the implications of this deficiency will be explored, not only 
in terms of what it means for development inducing aid efforts, but most importantly, in 
terms of what it means for the conception and delivery of the new paradigm of concerted 
wealth management. 
Is the Possibility Space a Black Box? 
So far, the proposed conceptual framework has progressively suggested the 
connection that exists between natural, social, and material limits, both at the level of an 
individual classes of assets and at the level of a collection of classes of assets (portfolio). 
It also has explored the role that international trade and the global natural, material, and 
social structures exert on these limits, and how the local and global social, economic, and 
political relative standing of a country, as well as its stock of local and global public and 
private debt, further influenced these roles. 
A central premise of the proposed conceptual framework is that the possibility 
space created by both natural and socio-material limits (the effective relative limits) is 
where the real process of social, economic, and political change takes place: that is, 
where the process of development towards the self-reinforcing state takes place. It has 
been argued in this and previous chapters that what happens through the motions of 
natural and social forces in this possibility space can hardly be manipulated nor 
outsmarted, at least not beyond more immediate ways; that what happens in this space 
goes through a critical-path in terms of process and time that cannot be short-circuited if 
effective change is to be internalized and take hold. Furthermore, it has been argued that 
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the very specific outcome of this internalization process is unique and emergent, and 
cannot be fully predicted or arrived at forcefully through manipulation. The possibility 
space is like a river-bed or canal through which natural and social forces can flow and 
combine. This conception is consistent with Keynes’ idea of providing clear signals to 
economic actors as a way to improve economic functioning and prevent booms and busts 
(Davidson, 2015). The flow and combination of natural and social forces is, by definition, 
an entropic process; the clear demarcation of a stable possibility space can, as a 
consequence, help minimize such entropy. 
The particular implications of the premise discussed above could be summarized 
in the following resulting preferences. First, it makes sense to focus on setting clear 
limits—the conditions (consistent with the Wittgensteinian approach adopted). These 
limits are essential for our survival and we know enough about the space-time realities of 
our world to be able to do this in a meaningful and impactful way. This is one of those 
things about which we can say something and act in far more positive ways than many 
other things about which the current paradigm encourages development economists and 
aid actors to “ramble,” although instead, we should probably remain silent, instead. 
Second, as a result of defining clear limits, a possibility space and corresponding 
critical-paths emerge. As discussed previously in this chapter, there are also meaningful 
things we can say and do about these critical-paths (and some of these have been stated in 
previous pages already). The characteristics that help improve the dynamic within such 
spaces, the management of bounded elasticities that both define and showcase the 
implications of natural and socio-material limits, and the priorities spelled by critical-
paths that point to avenues to facilitate the optimization of value extraction, and therefore 
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of wellbeing fulfilment, are all meaningful and more certain ways to influence the 
process of development towards the attainment of self-reinforcing state than many of 
those pursued through the current paradigm (see Pinto (2014) who makes a similar 
argument). 
Third, attempts to manipulating and meddling with the dynamics (i.e., the actions 
that derive from dispositions and conditions) that take place within a possibility space is a 
risky game, but perhaps more importantly, less effective and efficient as an avenue 
towards true development and the attainment of the self-reinforcing state (i.e., fully 
internalized) than the two preferred avenues to influence development discussed above. 
As such, this third alternative, it is argued in this dissertation, should only be pursued if 
the other two have been exhausted and only, as well, used for very specific and short-
term bound attempts to influence development, although, preferably, should be treated as 
one of those aspects about which a Wittgensteinian approach recommends us to remain 
silent and passive. 
In summary, it has been argued, so far, that given the difficulties, and perhaps 
even the impossibilities of manipulating this process of change, conceivably, the most 
important role of the organizations created to address the coordination and control 
challenges presented by human cooperation, is to focus on defining and managing the 
characteristics of the possibility space. This task applies both to local and global 
organizations, particularly given the way in which the world is currently connected. 
The focus should then be in managing the conditions and improving the 
dispositions, rather than manipulating actions. 
Defining and managing the characteristics of the possibility space means, as it has 
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been argued throughout this chapter:  
1. Determining or at least approximating the absolute and relative natural limits 
of the assets, classes of assets, portfolio, and the ecosystem in which all of 
them are embedded (this is, for the most part, a fairly technical and scientific 
task). 
2. Assessing the current material structures (i.e., the stock of technological 
choices embedded in existing produced classes of assets, as well as embedded 
in the intangible produced capital, both imposing practical constraints in 
innovation and change through increased costs and reduced incentives due to 
economies of scale). 
3. Assessing the current social structures and how they relate to both the natural 
and material limits, in order to adjust them so these structures and the limits 
they impose are all better aligned, and perhaps, even more importantly, to 
ensure that no natural limits are exceeded, jeopardizing the potential of the 
country’s wealth to generate value and sustain, intertemporally, the levels of 
wellbeing that the country needs and wants. 
4. Reshaping the socio-material limits to focus on shaping the possibility space, 
rather than directly trying to manipulate what happens inside of it through the 
handling of natural and social forces. (Managing what happens inside of it 
does not mean directly influencing micro actions but monitoring them and 
adjusting the limits of the space as an indirect way to influence these micro 
actions. That is, the focus should be in managing the conditions and 
improving the dispositions, not on directly manipulating the actions without 
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really changing the dispositions at the core.) 
5. In shaping the possibility space countries also need to understand the critical-
paths by which their wealth’s temporal dimensions are constrained, so the 
function gradients that will be embedded in it will increasingly get closer to 
the optimal natural limits, while the socio-material limits also get closer to 
optimally reflecting the preferences of their societies. 
6. Improving the characteristics of the possibility space by enhancing and 
broadening connectivity at all levels; by increasing levels of trust at all levels; 
by balancing cohesiveness and commonality with diversity and plurality; by 
allowing for diverse and innovative forms of addressing cooperation and 
control issues which are structured in ways in which mutual benefits result 
that are equitable and that balance private and public returns; by ensuring 
equality of opportunity and standing that allows shared and widely spread 
comparable capabilities; by increasing the volume, veracity, accuracy, and 
transparency of information at all levels; by increasing accountability; by 
ensuring that limits that bound the possibility space are clearly understood by 
the majority and that they do not impose asymmetries favouring those who 
have greater social and material endowments nor embed contradictions that 
provide mixed and confusing signals; by enabling innovation through making 
widely available risk minimizing and return maximizing instruments; by 
managing the use of money and credit to provide intertemporal flexibility but 
avoiding excessive growth beyond natural limits; and by enabling and 
encouraging mutual solidarity (see Table 3.5). This also includes managing 
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the path-dependence, the public and private debt, and random intertemporal 
changes (see Figure 4.9) to provide a comprehensive and stable policy led 
possibility space; it also includes, as discussed above, avoiding the embedding 
of contradicting layers into the socio-material structures (i.e., regulations that 
remain in place, even when new regulations with opposing objectives are 
being enacted). 
7. Reaching and maintain the self-reinforcing state. 
While the previous seven points are extremely important, they depend, in the final 
analysis, on the human beings that operate within such possibility space. It is, in the end, 
their intellectual and emotional capabilities, health, aims of life, approaches, and attitudes 
towards difficulty and opportunity—everything that defines a human being—what matter 
the most within that possibility space. The relationship explored in Chapter 3 between 
wellbeing and human capital is of great significance at this point. Wellbeing can only be 
attained for the majority when what happens within the possibility space allows for it, 
and yet, given that what happens within such a space is conditionally dependent on 
human beings, there seems to be a circular relationship between the two; even knowledge 
generation is limited by the physics of our world (Wolpert, 2016). Hence, in 
complementing point 6 above, the most important way in which the possibility space’s 
characteristics can be improved is by improving those of the human beings which operate 
within these spaces (i.e., their function gradients and their dispositions). 
Given all of the above, this alternative focus on defining and managing the 
characteristics of a possibility space rather than what happens within such a space, has 
far-reaching consequences in terms of the traditional understanding of public policy. An 
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important part of current policy-making efforts aims at directly steering what is 
happening in such a space or at influencing it (Bowles, 2016). This approach leads, 
sometimes, to layering social structures on top of each other rather than truly 
transforming them in response to existing and changing realities. The proposed 
conceptual framework pushes the function of policy-making towards a different 
underlying mind-set: how do socio-material structures need to be adjusted to respond to 
internal pressures emanating from the possibility space, from expectations about the 
evolution and shape of the possibility space, and from both the current and expected state 
of the global context—all of these are to be considered, while carefully and zealously 
protecting the natural limits imposed by the ecosystem. 
The possibility space is, then, not a black box. That what happens in that space 
cannot be controlled almost mechanically should not be a surprise. Human beings are not 
disposed of their own will. They are not fully predictable, and, while trends and 
commonalities clearly exist in all facets of social life, these trends are mostly descriptive 
rather than normative cause-effect explanations (see Chapter 2). Not being able to have 
the possibility to directly manipulate what happens in such a space does not automatically 
makes the space into a black box. In fact Kishik (2008), argues in relation to 
Wittgenstein’s idea of “form of life” already discussed in Chapter 2, that a human life 
cannot be separated from the space of possibilities between infancy and death: 
…life is neither a space of necessities nor a space of impossibilities but only a 
space of possibilities. These possibilities become apparent only between the 
extreme cases of tautologies and contradictions…The logical space may be a 
space of possibilities, but “reality is as it were an island amidst possibilities” 
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(WVC, 261). Wittgenstein helps you not to drown in the sea of possibilities by 
directing you to the land of what is really the case in the world. (p..17) 
Wittgenstein’s epistemological and ontological approach, which is the basis on which the 
arguments developed in this dissertation are built, suggests the impossibility of devising a 
theory about causal relationships inside such possibility spaces. This idea of a possibility 
space is even consistent with the economics approach developed by Arrow-Debreu, 
through which our space-time reality is represented by infinite-dimensional spreadsheets 
considering every single intertemporal possibility and their probabilities (Warsh, 2006). 
There is considerable literature explaining how social processes work; how 
individuals and groups interpret rules and internalize them into routines; how values and 
cultures are transmitted throughout generations; how power is protected by those who 
have it and contested by those who do not. And while a considerable part of this literature 
is descriptive and fails to provide cause-effect explanations that can always be replicated, 
that is perhaps the closest we can possibly get towards such kinds of causal explanations. 
In fact, recalling what was discussed in Chapter 2, Wittgenstein argues that there is no 
causal relationship between rules and actions. The point is perhaps to move away from 
the aspiration and approach towards controlling and manipulating human dispositions and 
actions to attain very specific outcomes: an approach criticized already in the 18th century 
by Adam Smith (2002). Instead, an approach towards understanding the processes in 
terms of their critical-paths and characteristics may add much more to policy-making 
than what the traditional approach has been able to accomplish (see Table 3-5 and 
preceding text). For example, if study after study were to show with a certain degree of 
accuracy the average time it takes in a particular society to internalize a specific kind of 
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law or practice, rather than focusing solely on controlling and manipulating such a 
process, a better public policy approach could put emphasis instead on managing the 
transition period and ensuring that throughout the said average time, the costs of 
transformation, as well as those resulting from the uncertainty created by the process of 
change, are reduced for all those impacted. This requires a shift in the conception and the 
addressing of change, from the simple theorization of a seamless shift from point A to 
point B, to a complex emerging process from A to an unknown but approximate or 
desirable state. The idea is not to presume to know how people will act, but to adjust 
policies based on how they act. In this sense, policies need to also become “transition-
inclusive.” 
The process that takes place within the possibility space is, by nature, an entropic 
process. Entropy is the cost of passing time required for natural and social forces to settle 
into specific stable temporal states. Reducing entropy means reducing the time to move 
from one stable temporal state into another, and this can be better achieved by managing 
limits than by trying to manipulate the process inside the possibility space (Page, 2011). 
In a sense, improving the possibility space is like having a broader genetic pool from 
which the chances of advantageous recombination are higher (Page, 2011). 
Conceiving policy-making in the way proposed in the previous paragraphs 
requires a clear departure from the traditional ways in which it has been conceived and 
implemented. As the literature shows, there is considerable evidence of how the layering 
of laws continues embedding contradictions in the social structures, as well as furthering 
a complexity that benefits the most those who are already doing well, and those that have 
the economic and political power to make the most of these social and material 
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structures—considerably more than those who do not share such power. This 
reconceptualization of policy-making requires a new approach to frame policies, not as 
behaviour changing but as limit-setters, and to measure, as well, how they do that 
(including their specific impacts on natural and socio-material limits and their distributive 
outcomes). 
A Few Implications About Achieving Self-Reinforcing State 
The objective of the process of development is to achieve self-reinforcing state. 
Given that the process of development depends on the extraction of value from wealth, 
management of wealth is central in the attainment of self-reinforcing state. In a nutshell, 
managing wealth requires managing classes of assets, managing the composition of a 
portfolio of classes of assets through different timelines (including the cohorts of all 
classes of assets), and managing risks and events that could potentially shift any of the 
natural, material, or social limits, or directly deplete or destroy wealth. 
The formalization of the conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 3 and carried 
out in this chapter provides some guidelines towards managing wealth. These are further 
developed and summarized in the following sub-sections. 
 The active creation and management of a possibility space. 
 Every country is embedded in the same global ecosystem, although they 
simultaneously operate in regional and local sub-systems, among others. 
 There are absolute natural limits that the global community of countries 
has to respect. Doing otherwise may not only have unequal effects in the 
present time; in the long-term, all countries might experience similar 
effects. 
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 There are relative natural limits that can be global or local. The ecosystem 
provides a number of services that are global in nature. As a group, 
countries cannot exceed these relative natural limits without 
compromising the ecosystem and human life. There are other services 
provided by the sub-systems in the specific space in which a country 
exists, which limits have to be respected. The level of control a country 
can exercise in respecting natural relative limits depends on whether they 
are local or global, and on their relative global social, economic, political 
relative standing, which gives it more or less influence in the global 
community. 
 One of the most important tasks countries need to do in managing their 
wealth is to continuously, individually, and collectively through concerted 
wealth management, enhance their knowledge and understanding of the 
natural limits by which each asset is bound, as well about the 
characteristics of an asset given by its origins in terms of space and time 
dimensions. 
 Furthermore, different classes of assets, due to their individual nature, 
have both absolute and relative natural limits of their own that need to be 
respected if their integrity is not to be compromised. 
 The classes of assets that form part of the wealth of nations have among 
them synergetic effects. They can potentially enhance the value-generating 
potential of each other; however, they can also restrict it. Handling this 
interrelation between the classes of assets is an extremely important task a 
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country should pursue in managing its wealth. 
 Throughout their history and through a never-ending process of social, 
economic, and political change, countries establish a social structure that 
is continuously evolving. As a result of this process of change that is made 
possible through the established social structures, a material structure is 
also built-up, over time, which introduces constraints to the process of 
change itself. Social, economic, and political change relies and is 
constrained by socio-material structures, but socio-material structures, in 
turn, change due to such processes of change. This is the essence of the 
stochastic nature of social, economic, and political change. 
 International trade shifts the natural relative limits faced by a country in its 
process of development. Embedded in products and services traded are 
amounts of wealth exchanged between countries. Due to monetary 
denomination issues that impact exchange rates; the overall portion of a 
country’s public and private debt that is global; and short- and medium-
term global demand and supply pricing effects; a country’s net balance in 
physical units of wealth resulting from trade might be positive or negative; 
negative balances shift the natural relative limits of certain assets 
downward, while positive balances effectively add wealth and shift these 
limits upward. The social, economic, and political relative standing of a 
country impacts its level of influence on defining and modifying global 
structures that determines the equality in exchange of wealth that result 
from trading within such structures. 
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 Natural forces can have an impact in shifting the natural limits. Given that 
most of the natural forces cannot be controlled, creating a safe and 
conducive possibility space requires planning for and managing the 
potential impact of natural forces. These efforts can involve accumulating 
knowledge about prediction and prevention of consequences, improved 
preparedness that can reduce consequences, improve resilience, facilitate 
recovery, creating insurance arrangements, and many others. 
 Limits that effectively shape the possibility space can be grouped into 
natural and socio-material limits. It is within this space that human actions 
take place and all natural and social forces flow. Drawing on the 
ontological and epistemological considerations discussed in Chapter 2, 
realistically, there is not much more that can be done to influence (beyond 
the very short-run and very specific facets of reality) the deeply human 
and social process of interpreting the environment and its rules into 
routines that create a social order and a stable social dynamic. While some 
types of policies (e.g., cash transfers) might influence behaviour in the 
very short-term, no policy or incentive can short-circuit the natural process 
through which human beings interpret their environments and their fellow 
humans surrounding them, to negotiate with both a stable order, and 
operate conjunctively and functionally through rules and routines to 
establish and maintain such an order. Therefore, creating a clear, safe, 
broad, and distinct space for human beings to figure out their share of the 
process of social, economic, and political change, should be yet another 
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one of the most important tasks of governments. This includes among, 
many others, improving connectivity, information flows, transparency, 
accountability, clear rules, mechanisms for solving collective problems, 
and diversity and plurality. This maxim should not be equated or confused 
with that of libertarianism in which the possibility space is defined only by 
property rights and their enforcement (Ebenstein, 2015). As discussed 
throughout the chapter, the setting of the effective limits of a possibility 
space is the result of a complex, stochastic process combining natural and 
socio-material limits that reflect a considerable and broad array of natural 
and social considerations, beyond that of private property. 
 Within the possibility space managed by a government, both positive and 
negative trends tend to appear. It is quite difficult for any social institution 
to predict when and how these trends will surface. Therefore, another one 
of the most important tasks of governments in enabling a process of 
development that can lead to self-reinforcing state is to monitor events that 
occur within the possibility space, so the bounds that create such a space 
can be stochastically adjusted through policy. The purpose of such 
adjustments is to minimize negative trends, maximize positive ones, and, 
further, fine-tune the perception within such a space of the persistence of 
intertemporal certainty. In particular, social interaction within the space 
created might create inequalities between individuals and different social 
groups. Such inequalities point to the need for changing social and 
material structures, as well as to managing costs both individuals and 
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groups face within such a space, due to the structural transformation of the 
social, economic, and political orders. Addressing these potential and 
actual costs of transformation might involve preventive, mitigating, and 
corrective actions. These might include skill-building, creating channels 
for social mobility, providing specific incentives to selected groups, and 
other similar measures that modify the effective relative limits by which 
each class of assets and its cohorts are constrained. It is essential to keep 
in mind that the build up, and transformation timelines and critical-paths 
of different classes of assets can be very different among them, and 
therefore, in realistic terms, these differences can result in differential 
benefits and costs among all classes of assets that prevent a smooth 
transformation process (hence the need to proactively managing the effect 
of such transformation). 
 Ultimately, rather than trying to modify or manipulate human behaviour 
occurring within the possibility space (i.e., actions), a government should 
ensure that the possibility space allows for innovation and a reasonable 
level of chaos and complexity, while balancing the human and social need 
for certainty and solidarity, and ensuring the wellbeing of the majority, in 
particular of those who tend to lose because of their mismatch and lack of 
synchronicity with the current requirements within this probability space 
at specific points in time. This is perhaps one of the areas in which a clear 
differentiation with the libertarian approach of relying only on property 
rights to delimit the possibility space can be made (Ebenstein, 2015). The 
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conceptual framework proposed here relies on a much broader and more 
comprehensive definition of social structures; still, it draws a line 
precisely where the limits start blurring into efforts to manipulate human 
action. The emphasis of the proposed conceptual framework is in creating 
a space where human freedom, both individual and collective, is at the 
centre, although such freedom must exist within a viable and sustainable 
social order that is considerably more complex than property rights and 
the basic rights of the individual. 
 The projection of the possibility space through time 
 Ensuring that the existing possibility space respects the limits imposed by 
the ecosystem we live in and, simultaneously, enables the majority of its 
citizens to contribute to the extent of their potential, as well as achieving 
their needed and desired levels of wellbeing, is only an ephemeral 
objective, if not embedded in a long-term vision that ensures the 
attainment of self-reinforcing state. 
 The role of a government, after having facilitated the management of such 
a possibility space, should be to plan ways in which such a space will need 
to be adjusted to accommodate population growth and the need to 
maintain or increase levels of wellbeing given mostly fixed absolute 
natural limits.  
 Given that both population growth and the natural limits of our ecosystem 
tend to follow very slow patterns of change, they are not difficult to plan 
for. This facilitates the projection of other relevant variables into the 
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future. 
 Human beings, while intelligent enough to modify their environment, 
cannot yet control it. Bounded by their survival instincts, human beings, 
both individually and collectively, look for certainty and are better able to 
operate under it; particularly, they are better at taking the risks that lead to 
innovation under increased certainty. 
 Certainty can be artificially created through insurance schemes embedded 
in the social structures. While they do not prevent the unpredictable, they 
help individuals and collectives manage it and plan ahead for negative 
outcomes. Furthermore, increased certainty can be achieved by embedding 
in social and material structures preventive and relief tools and 
mechanisms. Likewise, these cannot fully prevent the unpredictable; yet, 
firstly, these provide an increased sense of safety, and, secondly, they 
allow mitigating and reducing the impact of such unpredictables. Finally, 
government has to reassure individuals and collectives about its 
willingness and capacity to address the unpredictable when not preventive 
or corrective measures are available, and that in such addressing, the 
integrity of the possibility space will be reinstated as soon as possible, and 
the costs to both individuals and collectives minimized and fairly 
distributed, with those getting the winning end of the bargain showcasing 
solidarity with those on the losing end. 
 Likewise, the costs of structural transformation that are inevitable in a 
stochastic process of social, economic, and political change need to be 
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planned and taken care for. Assurances that they will be so would also 
decrease uncertainty. 
 Hence, another one of the most important tasks of governments in 
enabling and facilitating a process of development towards the self-
reinforcing state, is to project the possibility space into the future, as an 
increasingly safer and broader one. The same way in which currently a 
government needs to ensure a clear, safe, broad and distinct present 
possibility space, it needs, as well, to create a similar future possibility 
space or corridor. 
 Besides creating a clear, safe, broad, and distinct possibility space for 
individual and collective action, when looked through the lens of time, 
another primary task of governments is to aim at ensuring that each class 
of asset forms as close as possible to its absolute natural potential, and 
that, as a consequence, allows for the potential extraction of the maximum 
and optimal level of value from them towards the satisfaction of the 
wellbeing of the majority of its citizens. However, it is important to note 
that, independently, each class of assets can do very little in maximizing a 
country’s potential to obtain value, even if its individual capacity is 
maximized. Ultimately, it is the configuration of the collection of assets in 
the ecosystem what optimizes the overall capability of a country to 
generate value. Each class of assets impacts the others, and all together 
enable or constraint each other in a stochastic process that although 
complex, can still be managed. 
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 Furthermore, contrary to the approaches followed by both environmental 
and ecological economists, the proposed conceptual framework relies not 
on the monetization of the stocks of wealth but on the clear definition and 
management of limits in terms of physical units of wealth. Ultimately, the 
value assigned to a country’s wealth by these groups of economists faces 
the same limitations that any prices face—in particularly, that they are 
relative to competing individual and social uses and preferences both, in 
the supply and demand side, as well as in a very particular point in time 
and timeframe. In this sense, prices are tautological and only reflect what 
the current state of the world and what its limited epistemological 
capabilities can fathom about the future, all scrambled through the 
complexity of socio-material structures. Sustainability is a long-term 
phenomenon and the pricing system has proven not to be most effective in 
allowing for intertemporal considerations that result into smarter long-
term decisions. The current state of the environment is just but one of the 
proofs that can easily help sustain this argument. 
 The struggle to commensurate the incommensurable 
 Managing a collection of classes of assets with very diverse natures, 
lifecycles, and characteristics is extremely difficult, particularly when 
there is a considerable disconnect between their lifecycles and those of the 
social, economic, and political processes. A human generation is on 
average 30 years long, and most democracies allow for political continuity 
for up 8 to 10 years. In the meantime, economic and innovation cycles 
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span through periods of 25 to 60 years; research and development 
activities also take place within periods of one or more decades; 
technological breakthroughs continue shaping the material and social 
world around them for many years even when new technological 
breakthroughs have replaced them; and, infrastructure choices constrain 
alternative paths for decades or even centuries. 
 Incentive systems embedded in the material and social structures usually 
lack intertemporal considerations and mechanisms to incentivize and 
reward decision-making and actions that facilitate intergenerational equity. 
 One of the most important tasks of a country is to embed into its material 
and social structures tools and mechanisms that introduce sufficient 
checks-and-balances as to make explicit the long-term consequences of 
short-term social, economic, and political decision-making. Ensuring that 
one of the suggested most important task of the government—projection 
of the possibility space into the future as an increasingly certain and 
broader one—is successfully carried over and deeply embedded into 
material and social structures, can facilitate the continuous and publicly 
transparent consideration of the long-term consequences of short-term 
actions (and it is argued in this dissertation that doing so by externalizing 
the consequences of government action and policy as measured by 
physical units of wealth can have a positive impact in achieving such 
government task). 
 Another primary task of governments is to enable and facilitate the 
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transformation of the classes of assets it possesses (by influencing health, 
output, and value elasticities), and for them to retain the ability to create 
what is currently, and what it is expected to be, valued by both the local 
and global communities. Government should also aim to maximize the 
matching and synchronicity (or address the lack thereof) between stages of 
the broader social, economic, and political cycles (identified in this 
dissertation as long-term cycles), and stages of the classes of assets it 
possesses, as yet another mechanism to increase their ability to create what 
is valued by most individuals and collectives, both at the local and global 
levels. 
 The real space where countries can help each other 
 As discussed above, the possibility to short-circuit the individual and 
collective human process that takes place within the confines of the 
possibility space is unrealistic. Achieving a stable social, economic, and 
political order and its social and material structures’ underpinnings, takes 
time, and while efforts could be made to shorten such a timeline, the 
experience with aid over the last more than 60 years, does not seem to 
validate that this course of action might represent a sound investment. 
 Alternatively, helping countries construct and maintain, stabilize, or 
broaden, or strengthen a possibility space for human action to take place at 
the pace dictated by its social reality, might be both more effective and 
efficient. 
 Without any doubt, providing mechanisms and safeguards to reduce 
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uncertainty and address unexpected events is one of the most important 
and effective areas in which concerted wealth management can have a 
meaningful and sizeable impact. 
 Finally, the real way in which the long development processes can be 
short-circuited is by addressing, as soon as possible, the constraints 
imposed in the formation of certain classes of assets through failures in 
investing in them at the critical points in which their function gradients are 
defined. Human capital is the most important class of assets that can be 
formed (natural capital can mostly be managed, not formed). For example, 
ensuring that the next two generations of children in Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries are perfectly nourished, emotionally protected and stimulated, 
and possess literacy, mathematical, technical, as well as social skills, 
could, perhaps, do much more for the sub-continent than the trillions of 
dollars that have already been spent in pursuing technocratic illusions, like 
those pushed forward by the current paradigm of aid. 
 
Table 4.1. Most important government tasks in managing the wealth of nations 
 First: continuously, both individually and through concerted wealth 
management, enhance knowledge and understanding of the natural limits by 
which each asset is bound, as well as about the characteristics of an asset given 
by its origins in terms of the space and time dimensions. 
 Second: increase the understanding of the complementarity and substitutability 
among classes of assets as to ensure that the configuration of the portfolio can 
reach its natural potential to generate value. 
 Third: continuously monitor events that occur within the possibility space, so 
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Table 4.1. Most important government tasks in managing the wealth of nations 
the bounds that create such a space can be stochastically adjusted. The purpose 
of such adjustments is to minimize negative trends, maximize positive ones, 
and further, fine-tune the perception within such a space of the persistence of 
intertemporal certainty. 
 Fourth: project the possibility space into the future as an increasingly safer and 
broader space. The same way in which, in the present, a government needs to 
ensure a clear, safe, broad, and distinct possibility space, it needs, as well, to 
create a similar possibility space or corridor projected in time. This includes, 
among many other things, improving connectivity, information flows, 
transparency, accountability, clear rules, mechanisms for solving collective 
problems, addressing of risks and transformation costs, and diversity and 
plurality. This means improving the conditions and the dispositions of social 
actors. 
 Fifth: ensure that each class of asset forms as close as possible to its absolute 
natural potential, and that, as a consequence, it allows for the potential 
extraction of optimal levels of value from these assets towards satisfaction of 
the wellbeing of the majority of citizens. 
 Six: enable and facilitate the transformation of classes of assets, as for them to 
retain their ability to create what is currently, and what it is expected to be, 
valued by both the local and global communities. Maximize the matching and 
synchronicity between the stages of the broader social, economic, and political 
cycles, and the stages of the classes of assets, as yet another mechanism to 
increase their ability to create what is valued by most individuals and 




Chapter 5  
Aid Revisited: A Tale of Two Paradigms 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents a detailed comparison between the existing paradigm of 
foreign aid (and the conception of the process of economic growth on which it is based), 
and the proposed conceptual framework developed in Chapter 4—concerted wealth 
management.  
To proceed with such comparison, the proposed conceptual framework is further 
developed to include the effects of public and private debt. Additionally, the concepts of 
optimal value extraction, Ξ (as an alternative formulation of economic growth), and 
optimal value allocation, Ρ (as a conceptualization of the equality among citizen’s 
wellbeing), are formalized. Resulting from these formalizations, the concept of self-
reinforcing state, Ζ, is also formalized as one in which the two concepts of optimality 
defined above are simultaneously achieved. This results in the possibility to summarize 
the proposed conceptual framework, in its entirety, by the simple formulation, Ζ ∵ Ξ ≊
1 ≊ Ρ (that is, self reinforcing state, Ζ, is attained because, ∵, value extraction is almost 
optimal, Ξ ≊ 1, and because the value extracted is almost optimally allocated, 1 ≊ Ρ). As 
a new measurement of success, this formulation could substitute, or at least complement, 
the old paradigm’s measurement of GDP growth as a sign of prolific social, economic, 
and political change. 
Through a series of specific comparisons looking at how each paradigm (i.e., old 
and new) responds to some of the most important challenges faced in promoting 
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development, particularly from the aid enterprise point of view, a number of clear and 
important distinctions between these paradigms emerge. In this comparison, the words 
and meanings of both the old and new paradigms are used respectively, as to highlight 
their differences. 
While for the old paradigm, growth and, therefore, the possibility of development 
derive from the limitless maximization of the present value of output, the new paradigm 
focuses on the optimization and maximization of the intertemporal value generating 
potential of each class of assets, and the portfolio of classes of assets, over their entire 
lifetime. Such potential is not defined in monetary terms (as, it has been argued, 
monetary denominations tend to be highly contextual and only reliable for limited periods 
of time) but in physical terms. 
Furthermore, while both the old and new paradigms focus on addressing 
development constraints, the old is mostly driven and focused by current ones at the 
broader macroeconomic aggregate level (e.g., savings, investments, and balance of 
payment gaps and their short-term drivers, poverty, death, disease, etc.). Instead, the new 
paradigm looks at constraints from a pre-eminently intertemporal perspective, to then 
proactively design and manage a possibility space, guided by a clear understanding of the 
limitations that critical-paths impose. This difference between the paradigms mean that 
the old paradigm might be more prone to address the effects of aid-recipients not having 
achieved self-reinforcing state, rather than addressing the causes behind these countries’ 
difficulty in achieving such state. 
The old paradigm aims at helping aid recipients achieve self-sustaining growth as 
soon as possible (so aid can stop), without much practical concern for limits to growth, 
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the distribution of incomes (lacking the tools to deal with it), and the critical-paths that 
might constrain long-term growth and sustainability (particularly because there are 
mostly politically driven/determined issues about which the aid enterprise usually recuse 
itself). If such concerns are expressed by the old-paradigm aid, they tend to be more 
rhetorical and aimed at reducing reputational risks, particularly, because the theoretical 
constructs behind aid praxis do not always offer the technical tools to integrate them and 
devise comprehensive solutions that deal with them. The new paradigm, instead, starts by 
defining a possibility space given by natural absolute and relative limits within which, 
environmental sustainability is possible, as well as socio-material limits that reflect the 
physical impact of societal choices both in the ecosystem, and specifically, on human 
wellbeing. It also considers the critical-paths to which each class of assets is bounded, 
and the implications these have in terms of where and when aid can be more or less 
effective. It also makes the distribution of incomes into an essential requirement for 
attaining self-reinforcing state, the attainment of which (along with the convergence of 
most countries into such a state) is the most important objective of the proposed 
formulation of concerted wealth management. 
Finally, among other additional differences, while under the old paradigm all 
classes of assets are mostly lumped into labour and capital (and increasingly knowledge, 
under new growth theory), are considered to be fully substitutable and complementary, 
and their contributions to growth are all lumped into the concept of total factor 
productivity, under the new paradigm, instead, more classes of assets are considered 
(each unique and therefore subjected to different critical-paths and function gradients, 
among others) and they are non-substitutable, only contextually complementary (with 
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their relevance and relative role determined by the state of affairs), and their contribution 
to growth and development uniquely determined by the context. This difference means 
that aid interventions (investments in general) designed following the old paradigm, and 
not considering the subtleties introduced by the proposed conceptual framework, might 
not only be suboptimal but perhaps even wasteful. 
After these comparisons, the chapter ends by proposing an approach that could 
facilitate the adoption and therefore, the impact of the proposed conceptual framework. 
The proposed approach lends from the success the old paradigm enjoyed due to its 
infiltration into the core of the aid enterprise as a Trojan horse (discussed in Chapter 2). 
The new Trojan horse this chapter proposes, is the pushing for a new and complementary 
“language” built not on monetary denominations, but on physical ones: new national 
income accounts, and new accounting, trading, and labeling standards and practices, 
requiring both, the spelling in physical units of the wealth content in goods and services; 
and the spelling of the impact of policies and regulations in terms of these same physical 
units (these as a mean to more clearly define the natural and socio-material limits that 
bound the possibility space in which the process of development takes place). This new 
language can enable avoiding the distortions monetary denominations introduce. For 
example, if the ingredients of a Big Mac, or the water required to produce a kilo of meat 
are the same in two international locations, from an intertemporal perspective their 
equivalent monetary denominations should be similar (although they tend not to be) 
because, ultimately, the cost for the human race in terms of the impact these have in the 
ecosystem are also similar (and, in the long term, this reality is considerably more 
important than any other given our mere existence depends on it). After all, differences in 
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endowments are only an apparent comparative advantage as, in the ultimate analysis, the 
human race and the ecosystem on which it depends on, are only one and the same. If the 
monetary denominations of goods or services do not fully represent the embedded wealth 
in them, such distortions result in hidden net transfers of wealth that, unchecked, prevent 
the convergence between better-off and worse-off countries, as they tend to drain the 
wealth from some countries into others. They also hide and mask pernicious 
intertemporal effects on the ecosystem (understood in the broader sense in which it is 
used throughout this dissertation), which ultimately translate in pernicious effects in 
global wellbeing. This new proposed Trojan horse—a new language for the proposed 
new paradigm of concerted wealth management—can also help make public policy more 
transparent by making explicit its physical implications and the distributional 
consequences they have in terms of wellbeing. 
Setting the Stage 
Over the previous four chapters, it was argued that the difficulties that plagued the 
aid enterprise since its inception are not mainly due to effectiveness and efficiency issues 
related to its volume, allocation, and delivery, but due to its problematic conception. 
Specifically, in Chapter 2, evidence was presented about how an entrenched, narrow 
conception of economic growth around a very reduced number of ingredients, but not 
around the processes behind it, led to a similarly narrow set of practical tools (i.e., 
development planning and national income accounting), that permeated the aid enterprise 
to its core. Due to the silent assimilation of these ideas, as if they had infiltrated aid as a 
Trojan horse, not much debate about aid-effectiveness has focused on the implications 
they had, and continue having, on it. 
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Through Chapters 3 and 4, an alternative conceptual framework was developed 
and formalized, purposely conceived to address the shortcomings of economic growth 
theory, development planning, and national-income accounting; especially those that 
seem to negatively have impacted the aid enterprise. It was also developed to shift the 
received understanding, and, hence, the debate, about aid. (Chapter 6 will discuss the 
extent to which the proposed conceptual framework addressed these two challenges.) 
In the following sections, the formalization of the conceptual framework derived 
in Chapter 4, will be used to reimagine economic growth, to, in turn, reimagine aid. 
The Old and the New Paradigms 
The received understanding of economic growth, planning, and aid. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, one group of classical economists considered growth 
to be the result of certain factors being present and abundant, more than the result of a 
particular process (e.g., Adam Smith, Alfred Marshall). The other group, while focused 
on the process rather than on the factors or ingredients, held a very narrow view, which 
was centered on profits and surplus value as the drivers of this process (e.g., David 
Ricardo, Karl Marx). 
The neoclassical synthesis, while still focused on the factors or ingredients, 
greatly reduced them in number. Its aim was to understand the relationship between 
them, and too many made this task excessively complicated. Likewise, regard for the 
process was dropped as part of the explanation of growth, and, like the classics, an 
implicit assumption was made that an increased abundance of ingredients will result in 
growth, particularly when free markets are functioning. Even when this assumption 
turned out to be unfounded, neoclassical economists turned their focus to the idea that the 
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marginal productivity of the ingredients was behind economic growth, in particular the 
idea that increases in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) were responsible for economic 
growth. Due to the central role the pricing system has in neoclassical economics and the 
assumptions behind many of its models, the neoclassical synthesis moved the attention 
away from the process of development, and even farther away from the socio-political 
debate, as it left to the pricing system and the markets to resolve the process of 
development. 
In its most simple mathematical form, the neoclassical economic growth model 
(AK model of economic growth), as it has evolved from the Harrod-Domar model, can be 
represented by (Helpman, 2004; Kregel, 1972), 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝛼𝐿1−𝛼         [5.1] 
This means that the total output (𝑌) in an economy is given by how capital (𝐾) 
and labour (𝐿) complement and substitute each other (given by the coefficient, 𝛼) in 
producing such output (𝑌), and how the knowledge and innovation that drives factor 
productivity (𝐴) enhances both their potential to create output. Growth can then occur 
either by an increase in the total capital (𝐾) and labour (𝐿) available, and by changes in 
knowledge and innovation (𝐴) that can both change, in turn, the way in which these two 
factors complement and substitute each other (given by 𝛼), as well as the way in which 
such combinations create increased output (𝑌). Given its simple form, other types of 
factors, like human capital, can be incorporated in the model in a similar fashion (H. A. 
Arndt, 1984; Helpman, 2004). 
While a bit more complex than the Harrod-Domar model of economic growth, 
which did not integrate factor productivity, the AK model above still relies on the 
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assumptions that abundant (and not finite) resources are always available (this is, there 
are no limits to growth), and that the factors or ingredients are fully substitutable 
(Helpman, 2004). In fact, as Thirlwall (2011) demonstrates, it just takes to make the 
assumption that, 𝛼 =
1
2






, where s is the savings 
ratio, and c the capital-output ratio), and the AK neoclassical model  (as described in 
previous paragraphs) to derive the exact same results and become equivalent to each 
other. 
Furthermore, while the idea of factor productivity has been embedded into the 
models of economic growth, not much is known about how to influence it, besides of 
course, the general notion that knowledge, innovation, and institutions are partially 
responsible for it, and, therefore, that investment in education and skills, as well as in 
improving the institutional setting are necessary. The importance of this gap in the 
understanding of factor-productivity became even more apparent when econometric 
studies indicated, for example, that at least half of the differences between countries’ 
economic growth performance could be explained by it (Helpman, 2004); or that, in the 
US alone, about 80 percent of the long-term increase in per capita income was due to it  
(H. A. Arndt, 1984; Helpman, 2004; P. R. Krugman, 1996; Salvadori, 2003a). 
In practical terms, and particularly for development planning, this limited 
knowledge about factor-productivity at the macro level meant that, it was implicitly 
assumed that if at the micro-level investment projects passing the investment threshold 
had positive rates of return, they will ultimately provoke economy-wide factor 
productivity improvements (Chenery, 1955, 1961, Jan Tinbergen, 1964, 1967). 
Nevertheless, besides the economic efficiency that would be implied in the rate of return 
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of these projects, planning for the institutional and incentive structures that could lead to 
innovation and technological progress was too complex to become part of development 
planning (H. A. Arndt, 1984; Helpman, 2004; Spence, 2011). In fact, most methods of 
development planning rely on the use of coefficients that are taken as given, and that are 
mostly fixed due to their computation being based on historical figures (Chenery, 1955, 
1961; Jan Tinbergen, 1967). 
Development planning is then mostly focused on maximizing national income (or, 
at least, increasing it by a certain amount with the least possible investment offering the 
highest rates of return) through the allocation of investment resources into particular 
projects (determined through the ranking of the projects’ internal rates of return, be it 
economic, social, or a combination of both), based on the simple idea embedded in the 
models of economic growth, that increases in capital increase output (Chenery, 1955, 
1961; Helpman, 2004; Jan Tinbergen, 1967). As a consequence, through development 
planning, an effort would be made to, through these investment decisions: (a) reduce 
disequilibrium between supply and demand, due to constraints in particular factors (these 
create bottlenecks); (b) reduce disequilibrium reflected by the balance of payments (these 
also create bottlenecks through shortages in foreign exchange to pay for capital and 
imported production inputs); (c) manage the structural transformation of the economy 
and its potential implications on future growth (to build on comparative advantages) 
(Chenery, 1961). 
While development planning can help allocate the resources available in a way in 
which the best possible use of them is made (as measured by marginal rates of 
contribution and overall rates of return), reality is that, in practice, and particularly for 
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less developed countries, there is a gap between what can be done and what might need 
to be done in order to deal with the three objectives enumerated above. For example, the 
disequilibrium between supply and demand due to constraints in particular factors ((a) 
above), could be significant enough that the investments required to correct them might 
exceed by far the available in-country resources. If because of this limitation, certain 
investments cannot take place, some existing bottlenecks will remain, limiting the 
capacity of the whole economy. 
This is the point where aid is presented as an alternative to fill such gap between 
investment needs and possibilities. The cut-off for investments (based once again on their 
ranking in terms of rates of return) can change if more resources are available to 
undertake more of the required projects. Aid, it is suggested, can help address what is 
known as the “investment limited growth” challenge (Chenery & Carter, 1973; Chenery 
& Strout, 1966a, 1966b). From this perspective, if a target rate of economic growth 
requires a certain amount of investment but the resources available do not allow for such 
investments, then the target cannot be met. If the gap between the required investment 
and the possible one is filled by aid, then, the rate of economic growth can be achieved. 
Likewise, aid could also complement the efforts of development planning to, as 
suggested in point (b) above, reduce disequilibrium in the balance of payments by 
providing for the gaps in foreign exchange. If the challenge of “investment limited 
growth” was addressed both through local and foreign resources (aid), as a consequence, 
quick and relatively important rates of economic growth, sufficient to mobilize an 
economy towards self-sustaining growth, might exert pressure on the balance of 
payments due to imports of capital or production inputs that are not produced locally. 
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Inflows of aid can fill, as well, potential temporary gaps between exports and imports. If 
aid or other resources to deal with these gaps are not available, trade becomes, as a 
consequence, a limiting factor to growth. This situation is known as “trade limited 
growth” (Chenery & Strout, 1966a). 
In simple mathematical terms, using the most basic economic output identity, 𝑌 =
𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝑋 −𝑀, and if savings are considered, the following identity results: 𝐼 − 𝑆 =
𝑀 − 𝑋, showing the interrelation between saving, investment, and trade gaps (𝑌, is 
income; 𝐶, consumption; 𝐼, investment; 𝑋, exports; 𝑀, imports; and, 𝑆, savings). 
These ideas, which were at the core of Chenery & Strout’s (1966a) dual-gap 
model, have, as discussed in Chapter 2, shaped the way in which aid was conceived, 
delivered, and evaluated. Not only was aid seen as necessary as to fill both the investment 
and foreign exchange gaps, but was also seen as a mechanism to drastically reduce the 
time required for developing countries to achieve the rates of economic growth that, in 
time, will allow them to provide for the needs of a growing population and to save and 
invest increasingly more so they would not need aid soon enough. 
Concerted Wealth Management. 
What are the implicit understandings of economic growth, planning, and aid put 
forward by the conceptual framework proposed and formalized throughout Chapters 3 
and 4?  
In a nutshell, optimal value extraction (as a substitute conceptualization of 
economic growth) results from the process of social, economic, and political change that 
takes place within the possibility space; that is, the process of development. Through this 
process, societies extract value from wealth; that is, from the classes of assets that 
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compose wealth. Through this extraction of value from wealth, societies can attain the 
wellbeing they need and want. As a logical consequence, intertemporally, in the self-
reliant state value and wellbeing are an identity. 
As a consequence, according to the proposed conceptual framework, optimal 
value extraction is a function, in the short term, of how effective and efficient, within the 
possibility space, is this extraction of value from wealth. In the long term, it is a function 
of how the process of social, economic, and political change stochastically “negotiates” 
with the limits imposed by the possibility space and critical-paths, so as to enlarge them 
by moving the effective relative limits, 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑒 and v𝐴𝑖𝑒, closer to the absolute ones, Ω𝐴𝑖 and 
0; this, through innovation and technology, and through more effective and efficient 
social, economic, and political rules and routines (reducing entropy through improved 
social dynamics taking place within the possibility space—see Table 3.5 and its 
preceding paragraphs).  
In the mid-term, optimal value extraction results from a combination of pushing 
the upper effective relative limits, 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑒, closer to its natural ones, Ω𝐴𝑖, plus broadening 
the space between the upper and lower effective relative limits, ‖𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑒 −𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑒‖, 
particularly for those classes of assets that might impose constraints on the others, and, as 
a consequence, on the portfolio as a whole. These avenues leading towards the 
achievement of optimal value extraction, which draw from Table 4.1, and Figure 4.19, 
are illustrated in Figure 5.1, below (the thick yellow line at the core of the possibility 




Figure 5.1. Avenues towards optimal value extraction 
 
An optimal-value-extraction-inducing process of social, economic, and political 
change is one that, within the confines of the possibility space and critical-paths, 
continuously brings about innovation and technology that help find and implement more 
effective and efficient ways to combine and recombine wealth with the purpose of 
extracting enough value from it, allowing to fully satisfy the wellbeing needed and 
wanted by the majority. Such optimal-value-extraction-inducing process is, as well, one 
that turns itself into continuously improving the rules and routines that guide it, so as to 
make it possible to perform at a level that allows society to achieve and maintain self-
reinforcing state.  
This proposed approach, which establishes a time-bound distinction between the 





Moving the yellow line (represents 
current value extraction) closer to 
each of the classes of assets’ upper 
effective relative limit 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑒
Moving the classes of assets’ local 
effective relative limits, 𝜔𝑖 and 
𝜛𝑖 , closer to their absolute natural 
limits, Ω𝐴𝑖 and 0.
Broadening narrow spaces between 
the classes of assets’ effective 
relative limits, 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑒 and 𝜛𝐴𝑖𝑒 , that 
might be constraining the portfolio 
of classes of assets’ overall potential 
to generate value
Preventing, minimizing, and 
compensating for the effect of 
disasters that could greatly reduce 
natural limits
Moving the classes of assets’ local 
effective relative limits closer to the 
global effective relative limits
Optimizing the possibility spaces of the classes of assets’ cohorts, 
considering their lifecycles against those of the long-term cycles
Optimizing the characteristics of the 
possibility space so that natural and 
socio-material forces can yield the 
highest value out of wealth (through 
innovation) while reducing entropy 
and tracing critical paths towards the 
minimum physical possible
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help reframe the argument that Mankiw and Romer advanced in comparing the different 
notions of “knowledge” held by the neoclassical and the new growth models (Warsh, 
2006). What Romer (Mankiw, 1995; Romer, 1990) calls knowledge under new growth 
theory, is more in line with the kind of dynamic improvements that according to the 
propose conceptual framework are experienced within the possibility space, and that are 
often hard to predict and understand, but, once they are, they get formalized and become 
intangible produced capital. What Mankiw (1995) suggests, instead, under neoclassical 
growth theory is that what happens within these possibility spaces is shared by all human 
beings, perhaps reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s “forms of life”, and therefore, common and 
widely available to all, hence somewhat exogenous to the growth process (that is, it is not 
necessarily converted into private property). The proposed conceptual framework 
integrates both the neoclassical and new growth theories into one by separating the space 
and the process from which the intangible capital is produced, from that of the existing 
intangible produced capital itself, uniting in this way both theories’ distinctions of 
knowledge. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, this possibility space in which change takes place is 
given at the highest level by natural limits, and then, pushed mostly inwards, by 
constraints imposed by portfolio considerations, trade, material structures, and overall 
local and global social structures. Given that the effective relative limits of this possibility 
space embed in them the limits of value extraction given by the ecosystem, the process of 
development informed and contained by it, can theoretically, and potentially, be more 
effective in fostering effectiveness and efficiency in the use of wealth, as scarcities are 
clearly articulated and known by everyone in such spaces. This transparency can lead to 
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efforts to discover additional sources, alternative sources, or ways to improve efficiency 
in extraction and productivity in their use (represented by the optimization of health—𝛼, 
output— 𝛽, and value— 𝜃—elasticities, among other variables—see Figure 4.19). 
Building on the formalization of the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 
4, mathematically, the value generating capacity of a society at time 𝑡𝑛, could be 










     [4.9] 
∑ 𝑣𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛( 𝑖𝑡𝑛)
𝑛
𝑖 = 𝑉𝜀𝑡𝑛         [5.2] 
0 < 𝛼𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛      𝑛𝑑     W𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 ≥ 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑛 ≥  𝑖𝑡𝑛 ≥ ?̅?𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  ?̅?𝐴𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑛 ≥ 0 
 Where, 𝑉𝜀𝑡𝑛 represents the total value extracted from all the classes of 
assets 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛, in the ecosystem, ℰ, at time, 𝑡𝑛, at quantities,  𝑖𝑡𝑛, in which a set of time 
specific natural and socio-material relative limits, called effective relative limits, 𝜔𝐴𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑛  
and v𝐴𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑛
, bound human activity, and are in turn bounded by absolute natural limits, 
W𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛
, and, 0. (It is important to note that the summation of the value extracted from each 
class of assets is made possible, regardless of their substantial incommensurability, due to 
one of the central assumptions at the core of the proposed conceptual framework: that in 
the self-reinforcing state, value and wellbeing are an identity.) This means that given 
wellbeing can be defined in physical units of wealth, a comparison can be made between 
the value obtained from wealth (measured in physical units of wealth) and wellbeing, 
showcasing in this way the net-wealth effect of the value extraction process. Therefore, 
what the summation shows is the overall wellbeing that was extracted from wealth. 
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Please also note that the summation represented by Equation 5.2 is made possible given 
that Equation 4.9 has been normalized. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, 𝛼𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , 𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , and 𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  in Equation 5.2 above are, 
respectively: the health elasticity, which represents the impact in terms of the health of 
the class of assets, of extracting,  𝑖𝑡𝑛 out of the stock of the class of assets, 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  (is 
constrained by, 𝛼𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 > 0); the output elasticity, which represents the productivity with 
which a unit of the class of assets, 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , can be converted into output (is constrained by 
𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 > 0); and value elasticity, which represents the trade-off between the output 
extracted and the value received for such output in physical units of wealth (is 
constrained by 𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 > 0). 
As discussed in Chapter 4, if health elasticity, 𝛼𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 = 1, the relationship between 
extraction and health is proportional; if, 1 > 𝛼𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 > 0, there are increasing opportunity 
health costs for the class of assets, 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , per each unit extracted,  𝑖𝑡𝑛; and if, 𝛼𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 > 1, 
there are decreasing opportunity health costs for the class of assets, 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛, per each unit 
extracted,  𝑖𝑡𝑛. 
If, 𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 = 1, the relationship between quantity and output is proportional; if, 1 >
𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 > 0, there are decreasing returns to scale per each unit used,  𝑖𝑡𝑛; and if, 𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 > 1, 
there are increasing returns to scale per each unit extracted,  𝑖𝑡𝑛. 
And if, 𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 = 1, the relationship between output and value would mean that an 
equivalent amount of wealth to that extracted from the class of assets, 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛, is obtained in 
exchange; if 𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 > 1, the output produced per each unit extracted,  𝑖𝑡𝑛, would generate 
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wealth in excess of that extracted from the class of assets, 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛; and, if 1 > 𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 ≥ 0, the 
output produced per each unit extracted,  𝑖𝑡𝑛, would generate lesser wealth than that 
extracted from the class of assets, 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛. 
The health and output functions (determined by 𝛼𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  and 𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 ) impact the 
classes of assets’ effective relative limits and these effective relative limits, in turn, drive 
changes in the health and output functions through the scarcity they impose (incentivizing 
improvements in productivity, 𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , as well in the ability to extract physical units of 
wealth,  𝑖𝑡𝑛, imposing an increasingly smaller effect on the classes of assets’ health given 
by the health elasticity, 𝛼𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛). Through these impacts, among others, as well as through 
changes in relative natural limits, is that the possibility frontiers shift upwards or 
downwards. Lastly, it is the value elasticity represented by 𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛  (matching and 
synchronicity), what ultimately determines, at any given point in time, the value in 
physical units of wealth of the output produced, and, as a consequence, the implications 
that the value extraction that led to such output may have in terms of a country’s 
intertemporal capacity to generate value from wealth (given that such value extraction 
and trade could engross or drain a country’s stock of wealth). 
In the old paradigm (Equation 5.1), 𝐴 or TFP, in lieu of the proposed coefficients, 
𝛼𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , 𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , 𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , of the new paradigm was presented as exogenous. Yet, as Warsh 
(2006) explains it citing Robert Solow, 
[Solow’s] “manna from heaven” shorthand for technological change had been 
widely misunderstood. “Exogenous does not mean either ‘unchanging’ or 
‘mysterious’ and certainly not ‘unchanging and mysterious.’ It is a temporary 
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designation, meaning that we try to workout in detail how the rest of the model 
adjusts to the exogenous elements, but not the other way around.”. (p. 374-375) 
In a way then, the old and new paradigms agree in that both, 𝐴, in the former, and, 𝛼𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , 
𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , 𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 , in the latter, are not fully explained but actually explanatory. 
However, while the old paradigm leaves it still as an externality, the new paradigm, 
building on Wittgenstein’s epistemological and ontological approach, sets clear limits 
with regards of what can and what cannot be theorized. It is precisely in setting clear 
limits, that the new paradigm offers a more specific understanding of development that 
allows focusing on those things that matter the most as subjects of policy, while letting 
the rest follow a course that, regardless how much policy makers want to control and 
manipulate, relies on its internal logic and timeframe rather than exogenous meddling or 
manipulation. For example, in the old paradigm elasticities are given by prices and the 
changes in the quantities supplied or demanded that shape these prices; on the contrary, 
mindful of the limitations and distortions of the pricing system and monetary 
denominations, the new paradigm relies on real variables and physical properties 
(reflected through socio-material structures, limits, and forces) to determine its proposed 
elasticities. Furthermore, under the old paradigm, development planning relies on 
coefficients of variation that summarize in them, in a highly simplified way, a 
considerable number of variables (although theoretically, these variables are only labour, 
capital, savings, investments, and output). The new paradigm instead, given that the 
bounded elasticities are defined by class of assets, allows for development planning based 
on a contextual optimization of the portfolio of classes of assets that take into 
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consideration health, output, and value elasticities within classes of assets, across classes 
of assets, and across time for both these categories—including as well the different 
cohorts take make up each class of assets (see Figure 4.19). 
As also discussed in Chapter 4, that matching and synchronicity of local and 
global natural and socio-material limits, plays an important part in determining the 
overall value generated from wealth (and as a consequence the wellbeing that a country 
can obtain from its wealth) raises questions, both about the scale of the costs a country 
has to assume to match and synchronize local socio-material relative limits to global 
ones, as well as about the economies of scale limitations that small countries face in 
terms of natural relative limits (and as a consequence on their capability to match and 
synchronize their local natural relative limits with global ones). These limitations have 
important consequences for the possibility of convergence between better-off and worse-
off countries, particularly for smaller and less endowed countries. Therefore, an aid 
enterprise that neglects dealing with this important aspect of the development process is 
considerably constrained in contributing to the achievement of such convergence. 
Equation 5.2 above represents only the value generating capacity of a country at 
time 𝑡𝑛. While a summation of the function 𝑉𝜀𝑡𝑛 , that is, ∑ 𝑉𝜀𝑡𝑛
𝑡𝑛
𝑡 
, could, notionally, 
represent the intertemporal value generating potential of a country’s wealth, it is argued 
in this dissertation that such a representation would be illusory. As it has been previously 
argued, given the distortions in the pricing system and the dependence of monetary 
denominations on contextual aspects at specific points in time, relying on intertemporal 
monetary based calculations only can be misleading. Monetary denominations are, it is 
argued in this dissertation, matching and synchronic-stage dependent and therefore only 
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realistically valid for periods of 15 to 20 years in the sense that they would hardly capture 
complete information, as it is often assumed in neoclassical economics. This is 
particularly the case, given the impact class of assets’ lifecycles and long-term cycles 
have in creating specific and unique contexts for pricing. As a consequence, a stable point 
of reference, a physical one as suggested in the previous chapter, is necessary as a 
reliable constant to make sense of a changing world. In the long-run, what indicates to a 
great extent the value generating potential of a class of assets is not the old paradigm’s 
summation of the expected monetary proceedings from it, but the closeness of its 
function gradient(s) to that which is given by absolute natural limits. In the case of this 
dissertation, these reference points or constants are provided by the relation between the 
lifecycles of the classes of assets and long-term cycles, as well as by the intertemporal 
identity between value and wellbeing. 
Within these periods of time corresponding to stages of the long-term cycles 
(represented in this dissertation by Kondratiev long-waves), the value extracted from the 
classes of assets is negatively impacted through the portion of it that needs to be spent in 
paying the interest over the stock of public and private debt, and through the reduced 
flexibility in having less potential to access credit. As discussed in relation to Figure 4.9 
in Chapter 4, intertemporally, interests on public and private debt, particularly if growing 
vis-à-vis the size of the collection of assets and if interest rates are rising, can have a 
creeping effect in diminishing the proportion of value that can be extracted by a country 
in order to fulfill the wellbeing of its citizens.  
Drawing from Equation 5.2, the impact of the stock of public and private debt in 
the value generating potential of a country could be represented as follows. First, in order 
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to commensurate interest payments (which are denominated in monetary terms) with 
value extracted, a conversion needs to be made, 
ℳ(𝑉𝜀𝑡𝑛) = 𝑌𝑡𝑛        [5.3] 
Where, ℳ, is the function that translates into a monetary denomination, 𝑉𝜀𝑡𝑛 , 
which, as per Equation 5.2, represents the total value extracted from all the classes of 
assets 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛, in the ecosystem, ℰ, at time, 𝑡𝑛, using quantities,  𝑖𝑡𝑛. This monetary 
denomination, 𝑌𝑡𝑛, can be equated to the traditional, 𝑌, through which the annual output 
of an economy is represented by most economic models (which is also equivalent to 
GDP). 




            [5.4] 
Where, Π𝑡𝑛, represents the total citizenship, at time, 𝑡𝑛. 




         [5.5] 
Where, 𝑅𝑡𝑛 , is the total interest paid on the public and private debt during time, 
𝑡𝑛. As in Equation 5.4, Π𝑡𝑛, represents the total citizenship. 
Now, the proportion of how much the per capita interest paid on public and 
private debt, 𝑟𝑡𝑛, at time, 𝑡𝑛, represents out of the output per capita, 𝑦𝑡𝑛, for time, 𝑡𝑛, or, 




         [5.6] 
Using Equations 5.4 and 5.6, net output per capita, ?̂?𝑡𝑛 (that is, net of interests), at 
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time, 𝑡𝑛, can be calculated as follows, 
?̂?𝑡𝑛 = (1 − 𝜆𝑡𝑛)𝑦𝑡𝑛        [5.7] 
Which, in turn, can be translated into total net output, 
?̂?𝑡𝑛 = ?̂?𝑡𝑛 ∗ Π𝑡𝑛         [5.8] 
And finally, by using the inverse of the, ℳ function (Equation 5.3), ?̂?𝑡𝑛, can be 
translated back into non-monetary value extracted, although this time, net value 
extracted, 𝑉𝜀𝑡𝑛, that is, net of interest, 
ℳ−1(?̂?𝑡𝑛) = ?̂?𝜀𝑡𝑛        [5.9] 
Now, Equation 5.9 is the equivalent of Equation 5.2 minus the value extracted 
reduction due to the interest paid on the stock of public and private debt. 
Consistent with the definitions in which the proposed conceptual framework is 
built (see Chapter 3), self-reinforcing state is partially attained when optimal value is 
extracted from the collection of classes of assets. Optimal value refers to that which 
allows for the fulfilling of the wellbeing (both needed and wanted) of the majority of 
citizens intertemporally. (It is important to remember at this point that, as per the 
definition of the self-reinforcing state in Chapter 3, a central tenet of this dissertation is 
that value and wellbeing are an identity.)  
In practical terms this means that the value extracted has to be enough to: (a) pay 
for the interests on the public and private debt; (b) to make-up for the depreciation and 
physical units extracted from the classes of assets, as well as to further build these or 
additional classes of assets if currently not enough value generation potential is available 
to fulfill the wellbeing of the majority, or if the population is growing and additional 
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value generating capacity is expected to be needed; and, (c) to pay for the wellbeing of 
the majority of citizens.  










)]      [5.10] 
Where, for time, 𝑡𝑛, ?̂?𝜀𝑡𝑛 , represents the net total value extracted from all the 
classes of assets 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛, in the ecosystem, ℰ, at quantities,  𝑖𝑡𝑛; Φ𝑡𝑛, is the total wellbeing 
needed and wanted by the majority of citizens (see Chapter 3); Δ𝑡𝑛, is the total 
depreciation of all the classes of assets in the ecosystem, ℰ (this is, the reduction in their 
capacity to generate value due to use, decay, disasters, shocks, or similar reasons—the 
summation of each class of assets’ depreciation, 𝛿𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 ); Γ𝑡𝑛, is the additional citizens that 
will be added to the citizenship from time, 𝑡𝑛, to time, 𝑡𝑛+1; and, Π𝑡𝑛 , represents the total 
citizenship at time, 𝑡𝑛. The first component of the equation (the left side) expresses how 
much of the wellbeing needed and wanted, Φ𝑡𝑛, is the value extracted at time, 𝑡𝑛, ?̂?𝜀𝑡𝑛, 
able to fulfill. The second component of the equation (the right side), spells how much of 
the value extracted at time, 𝑡𝑛, ?̂?𝜀𝑡𝑛, is required to ensure intertemporally, the capacity of 
the country’s wealth to fulfill the wellbeing needed and wanted by its citizens. In 
summary, Equation 5.10 represents how far the net total value extracted, at time 𝑡𝑛, goes 
in fulfilling the needs and wants of the country, without affecting its intertemporal 
capacity to do the same. If 𝜉𝑡𝑛 < 1, less value might need to be extracted (i.e., more than 
required is being extracted); if 𝜉𝑡𝑛 > 1, more value extracted might be needed (less than 
required is being extracted); and if 𝜉𝑡𝑛 = 1, the value being extracted is in equilibrium 
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with the country’s intertemporal needs (i.e., optimal value extraction). 
Optimal value extraction is only one of the characteristics of self-reinforcing state. 
How well does the value extracted allow for the fulfilment of the wellbeing needed and 
wanted by and for the majority of citizens, is the other. This latter characteristic, 
however, is more complex given that, even if optimal value is being extracted, the 
entitlements each citizen gets might be highly unequal. This means that equality in 
entitlements over value extracted depend both on, first, whether there are enough 
entitlements to cover for the wellbeing needs and wants of every citizen, and, second, on 
the way in which the total value extracted is allocated to every citizen. Furthermore, these 
wellbeing entitlements would probably be linked to the distribution of the ownership over 
the classes of assets themselves. 
Following Sen (1976, 1997), and further developments by Shorrocks (Jenkins, 
Kapteyn, & Van Praag, 2010; A. Shorrocks, 1994; 1995), the optimality in the allocation 
of the value extracted, 𝜚𝑡𝑛, will be developed using the concept of deprivation profiles. 
Figure 5.2 shows that the concept of deprivation profiles is modelled after the 
Gini coefficient and the Lorentz curve (Sen, 1997; A. Shorrocks, 1994). One of the 
difference between them, however, is that while for the Gini coefficient the 45-degree 
line represents the equal distribution of all income among all individuals, in the case of 
the deprivation profiles, the 45-degree line represent that of the normative fixed poverty 
line of choice (in the case of the proposed conceptual framework, maximum allocation of 
value extracted is represented by the 45-degree line). The other difference that derives 
from the one above, is that rather than a full Lorenz curve below the 45 degree line, the 
deprivation profiles produce a poverty gap profile that starts growing, less and less, until 
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it reaches a point where no additional individual’s income (in the case of the proposed 
conceptual framework, the individual’s allocated value extracted), is below the normative 




Figure 5.2. Deprivation profile 
 
Building on the previous paragraphs, and consistent with the idea of the self-
reinforcing state developed in Chapter 3, achieving and maintaining such a state requires 
the fulfillment of the levels of wellbeing needed and wanted by and for the majority of 
citizens. It is possible then to define four different profiles (not all would be levels of 
deprivation, but nevertheless, levels that could be analyzed through Sen’s and Sharrocks’ 
framework mentioned above). For each one of these four profiles, a line of maximum 













them, and before the next one, will represent: (a) citizens that fulfill their wellbeing 
needs, identified by φ1𝑡𝑛; (b) citizens that fulfill their wellbeing needs and wants, φ2𝑡𝑛; 
(c) citizens that exceed their wellbeing needs and wants, φ3𝑡𝑛; and (d) all citizens, φ4𝑡𝑛  
(therefore, equal to ?̂?𝜀𝑡𝑛. As per Figure 5.2, linked to each one of these maximum 
allocations of value extracted, there is one corresponding population share, all adding up 
to the entire population or citizenship, Π𝑡𝑛; these are, respectively, π1𝑡𝑛, π2𝑡𝑛 , π3𝑡𝑛, and 
π4𝑡𝑛 , such that, 
( 4𝑡𝑛 − π3𝑡𝑛) + (π3𝑡𝑛 − π2𝑡𝑛) + (π2𝑡𝑛 − π1𝑡𝑛) + π1𝑡𝑛 = 1 
Given that the maximum allocations of value extracted, φ1𝑡𝑛, φ2𝑡𝑛 , φ3𝑡𝑛 , and, 
φ4𝑡𝑛 , progressively include the allocations below them, isolating the population share for 
which the allocation of value extracted allows them to fulfill both, and solely, their 
wellbeing needs and wants, requires a simple mathematical operation, 
𝜚𝑡𝑛 = ( 3𝑡𝑛 −  2𝑡𝑛)        [5.11] 
Equation 5.11 presents, then, the proportion of the citizenship for which their 
wellbeing needs and wants are being fulfilled, not more, not less. The higher the 
proportion, the more optimal the allocation of the value extracted is. 𝜚𝑡𝑛, is then a proxy 
for the optimality of the allocation of the value extracted in period, 𝑡𝑛. 
Hence, in its most basic definition at period 𝑡𝑛, the self-reinforcing state, 𝑡𝑛, is 
considered to exist if Equation 5.10, 𝜉𝑡𝑛, is 1 or almost equal to 1, and, if simultaneously, 
Equation 5.11, 𝜚𝑡𝑛, is also 1 or almost equal to 1. At time 𝑡𝑛, the self-reinforcing state, 
ζ𝑡𝑛, could be represented as, 
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ζ𝑡𝑛 ∵ 𝜉𝑡𝑛 ≊ 1 ≊ 𝜚𝑡𝑛        [5.12] 
That is, at time 𝑡𝑛, self-reliant state has been attained because, ∵, optimal value 
extraction, 𝜉𝑡𝑛, and optimal value allocation, ζ𝑡𝑛, are almost equal, ≊, to 1, and therefore, 
both have been almost attained. (Note that given the dynamism of the process of social, 
economic, and political change, the attainment of all variables above is considered to be 
only imperfectly possible.) 
Under the proposed conceptual framework, however, such a time specific (𝑡𝑛) 
self-reinforcing state can only be conceived as a partial definition given that what may be 
the case in a particular period, 𝑡𝑛, might not necessarily mean an intertemporal self-
reinforcing state is maintained (characteristic which in the final analysis is at the core of 
what self-reinforcing means). Therefore, it would make more sense to define such a state 
only intertemporally, with the understanding that it represents the continuous attainment 
of self-reinforcing state over the time periods, 𝑡𝑛. 
Such a definition of an intertemporal self-reinforcing state can encapsulate the 
entire alternative conceptual framework developed in both this chapter and Chapters 3 
and 4, as simply as, 
Ζ ∵ Ξ ≊ 1 ≊ Ρ        [5.13] 
This is, self-reinforcing state, Ζ, can be attained because optimal value extraction, 
Ξ, and optimal value allocation, Ρ, are achieved simultaneously. This could be used as an 
alternative to the traditional GDP growth measure of success on which most of the 
economic, social, and political analysis, action, and rhetoric of the present relies. In fact, 
one of the virtues of using Equation 5.13 as a complement or substitute of GDP is that the 
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proposed analysis of the self-reinforcing state can be done at multiple levels of 
aggregation, from the local level, all the way up to the global level. 
Nevertheless, the above is considered to be a basic definition of  Ζ, given that no 
consideration is made about savings and investments, as well as other important aspects 
that play a role in shaping inequality. 
For example, an 𝜉𝑡𝑛 < 1, reflects that, at time 𝑡𝑛, excessive value extraction is 
taking place. While the most immediate policy suggestion would demand reducing the 
extraction of value, such policy might or might not be granted, depending on how the 
excessive value extracted is used. If it is consumed within period 𝑡𝑛, and this 
consumption is not undertaken by those whose wellbeing is not met, it will indeed be 
advisable to reduce it or procure its redistribution, particularly if there is still inequality 
that needs to be addressed. However, if it is being invested, and if due to effects that 
matching and synchronicity (as reflected by value elasticity, 𝜃𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑛 ) may be having in 
value, pricing, or other factor advantages lead to advantageous trading terms, it might be 
appropriate to keep exceeding the theoretical optimal value extraction. If the investment 
allows for an improved distribution of the ownership of the classes of assets, it might also 
be advisable to keep exceeding optimal value extraction, at least temporarily. 
Likewise, when it comes to inequality, the proposed definition of optimality of the 
allocation of the value extracted, 𝜚𝑡𝑛, is also a basic one. A more comprehensive 
definition would consider the role excessive value extracted could have in terms of 
addressing inequality. It would also consider linking this consideration to the one 
discussed in the previous paragraph, that is, whether the excessive value extracted is 
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being consumed or invested, as well as who is consuming and what it is invested in. 
Notionally, and drawing from Figure 5.2, the poverty gap line, φ2𝑡𝑛  (representing the 
minimum value level required to fulfill both the wellbeing needed and wanted), could be 
compared to the poverty gap resulting from subtracting, φ3𝑡𝑛 , from, φ4𝑡𝑛 . This 
comparison would result in the quantification of the excess of value extracted enjoyed by 
the population share, ( 4𝑡𝑛 −  3𝑡𝑛), that is, beyond the level of wellbeing needed and 
wanted, and, therefore, in the possibility to determine how much of the poverty gap for 
the population share, π2𝑡𝑛  (which represent the population share not being able to fulfill 
their wellbeing needs and/or their wellbeing wants), could be filled by this excess value 
generated consumed by some. Such comparison could also help understanding whether 
after using such excess value to fulfill the unmet wellbeing of that population share, π2𝑡𝑛 , 
there is a remnant, and whether this remnant is being used for consumption or 
investment, or whether there is still a gap, confirming the need for additional value 
extraction. All important considerations in determining whether value extraction should 
be reduced or increased and what kind of actions could be more effective in attaining 
optimal value allocation. 
Furthermore, not only the allocation of value extracted is important, but the 
distribution of the stocks of classes of assets themselves from which this value is 
extracted, a distribution that surely impacts the way in which the former distribution takes 
place.  
Finally, the same approach used before in separating global and local socio-
material limits, can be applied in the analysis of the concepts of optimality and self-
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reinforcing state. Even when a country can theoretically be in self-reinforcing state, a real 
and sustainable state will require consideration for all countries, particularly given that all 
absolute and relative natural limits are bound by the one ecosystem that is shared by all 
countries. 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 below, summarize some of the preliminary policy choices that 
result from the limited analysis proposed in the previous paragraphs. 
 
Figure 5.3. Macro-policy considerations resulting from the level of attainment of self-
reinforcing state 
 
As discussed before, the political implications of the analysis of the temporal 
attainment of the self-reinforcing state are highly contextual. Nevertheless, Figure 5.3 
showcases the notional standard responses that different combinations of achievement of 
optimal value extraction, Ξ, and optimal allocation of value extracted, Ρ, might direct 
towards. Given that, 0 ≤ Ρ ≤ 1, the table only show two possibilities, Ρ < 1, and, Ρ ≊ 1. 
In the case of, Ξ, given that it can be both above or below 1, three possibilities are shown, 
Ξ < 1, Ξ ≊ 1, and 1 < Ξ. Inside the table, the symbols, ↑ ↓ =, represent respectively 
that, Ξ and Ρ, most likely should be increased, decreased, or maintained from current 
levels. This is perhaps clearer if attention is paid to the cell on the right of the middle row 
↓ ↑ ↓ =
= ↑ = =




< 1 ≊ 1
(Ξ Ρ) (Ξ Ρ)
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where the symbols are =,=. As per the definition of self-reinforcing state if both optimal 
value extraction and optimal allocation of value extracted are close to 1, ≊ 1, then self-
reinforcing state has been achieved and now the focus could be put in maintaining it 
(hence the =,=). In the other situations portrait in the table in Figure 5.3, adjustments are 
required in either one or both of these variables (Ξ, and, Ρ).  
As suggested earlier, this analysis could be applied to different levels of 
aggregation. This means that in following the approach to policy design suggested by 
Figure 5.3, different political actions could be designed at different levels of aggregation, 
aiming at micro-macro consistency towards achieving self-reinforcing state for the 
majority of citizens within the majority of countries. 
Figure 5.4 below, offers a more complete but more complex framework to 
conduct a similar policy analysis. As discussed a few paragraphs before, ultimately, 
decisions about what policy options are optimal for the context will not only be impacted 
by whether the value extracted is optimal or whether the allocation of the value extracted 
is optimal. Considerations with regards to whether the surplus and deficits on one or the 
other variable should be addressed, and how, or when, should also consider whether they 
are being spent on consumption (C), or are instead being invested (I) by the different 
population shares of each one of the poverty gap levels, π1𝑡𝑛, π2𝑡𝑛, π3𝑡𝑛 , and π4𝑡𝑛 , and 
whether their consumption or investment are rebalancing the allocation of assets or the 




Figure 5.4. Macro-policy framework considering consumption and investment choices 
 
These are all extremely important considerations for policy making, but will 
require significant effort and length to develop further. This is out of the reach of this 
dissertation (hence, contrary to Figure 5.3, Figure 5.4 does not include the symbols, ↑ ↓
 =, in any of the situations depicted by the cells or boxes contained in the array). 
Nevertheless, for practical purposes, having these considerations present allows for 
further discussion in the remainder of this chapter, as well as in Chapter 6. 
All of the previous considerations about the self-reinforcing state are essential 
because they point out to the fact that the allocation of wealth and entitlements over its 
proceedings, is not a “natural occurring” phenomenon, but in fact, is driven by natural 
and socio-material structures and the elasticities, both embedded and resulting from them, 
that impact the use and ownership of wealth by a society, and, as a consequence, the 
implications these have themselves in those structures and elasticities. 
Economic growth under the proposed conceptual framework is not conceived as a 
temporal event of maximization of output but as an intertemporal one of optimization of 
wealth extraction and allocation—optimal value extraction throughout time. Furthermore, 
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an increase in the value generating potential of the wealth of a country. Real economic 
growth is registered under the new paradigm, once the overall potential for generating 
value of the classes of assets in the ecosystems shifts upwards. This is proposed in this 
dissertation as true economic growth. The need for socially driven decision of how to 
spread that value over the years is then, under the new paradigm, out in the open. The 
way in which a society decides about this spreading or allocation, gets embedded in the 
possibility space through socio-material structures, and the limits they impose in shaping 
such space. 
This latter consequence of the proposed conceptual framework has huge 
implications in the way in which value is understood. A great deal of the economic 
development related decisions made in present time rely on the calculation of present 
values (this is the present discounted value of flows to be received in the future). Under 
the proposed conceptual framework, economic development decisions need to rely on the 
intertemporal potential of wealth to generate value throughout time as expressed by its 
physical reality (limits) and how close these limits track absolute or relative natural limits 
(as to insure intergenerational equity).  
Within this conception of economic growth, and considering that development 
was defined in Chapter 3 as the process of social, economic, and political changes 
towards the achievement of self-reinforcing state, then, under the proposed conceptual 
framework, development planning should be mostly focused on enhancing a society’s 
capacity to extract wealth from the classes of assets it possesses as to allow it to achieve 
and maintain self-reinforcing state. In a sense, the purpose of development planning 
could be, under this view, related to the pursuing of the objectives summarized in Table 
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4.1, Figure 4.19, Figure 5.1, and figures 5.3 and 5.4. 
As a consequence of the conceptions of economic growth and development 
planning resulting from the proposed conceptual framework, the role that the transfer of 
foreign resources in the form of aid could have are: (a) helping improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency with which recipient countries extract value from wealth; (b) helping 
recipient countries address as early as possible any constraints that the effective relative 
limits of one or more classes of assets might be imposing, on the rest, and, therefore, on 
the whole portfolio; (c) helping recipient countries broaden the possibility space, as well 
as improve its characteristics; (d) helping recipient countries protect the integrity of their 
wealth; and (e) ensuring that the wealth exchanged through inter-country flows does not 
produce a disproportionate negative effect on the stock of wealth, and therefore, on its 
value generating potential. 
How do the old and new paradigms compare in their approaches? 
The old paradigm’s main theoretical premises about aid are that it can increase the 
speed at which developing countries achieve self-sustaining growth, because, it not only 
translates directly into economic growth when filling investment needs that, unfulfilled, 
limit this growth, but because it also fills the foreign exchange gaps that an economy 
moving towards industrialization may face, and that, unattended, might also constrain the 
speed of growth. While in principle valid, these affirmations are too broad to mean much 
at all; in praxis, aid is not implemented at this macro level. Establishing the causal link 
from the micro actions of aid’s praxis to this broad measures of success (i.e., incremental 
and more immediate growth) is problematic, to say the least. 
The new paradigm, instead, starts from the premise that there is a critical-path 
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towards the attainment of self-reinforcing state that cannot be short-circuited. Aid might 
help recipients get closer to the timelines imposed by such a critical-path, but it cannot 
speed up the process beyond that. This critical-path is set by natural, material, and social 
structures, and, as a consequence there are also limited windows of opportunity to 
influence the severity of the constraints this critical-path will impose in approaching the 
attainment of self-reinforcing state. Within those windows of opportunity, aid 
contributions that can fill resource gaps faced by their recipients (gaps that can prevent 
them from increasing their value generating potential), can have a more significant 
impact than those aid contributions that do not. In instances where the critical-path allows 
for a relative rapid shift in the value generating potential of one or several classes of 
assets or the entire portfolio, and which addressing is constrained by lack of resources, 
aid might again have a more significant impact, if it were to fill such a gap. Note that 
both these situations are also faced by better-off countries (those who already are closer 
to attain self-reinforcing state). However, in their case, these not only tend to be relatively 
minor in proportion to their overall wealth, but they are as well dealt with through 
existing resources or through new resources coming from the issuance of public and 
private debt. From this perspective, then, aid could also have a more significant impact 
by filling resources gaps (through grants), if the recipient countries cannot incur in new 
debt, or if, even if they can, doing so may impose further intertemporal constraints that 
might reduce, offset, or exceed the benefits of borrowing. Finally, aid could also fill gaps 
a recipient may face in combating the deterioration, depletion, or destruction of some of 
its assets, as well as in helping recipients improve the ways in which they manage their 
wealth to extract value from it. Even at this general level, and although the distance 
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between today’s rhetoric of aid and the tenets of the proposed conceptual framework is 
shorter, the differences between both paradigms are still clear and substantial, particularly 
when considering the praxis of aid, not its rhetoric. 
Firstly, while under both of these paradigms, aid aims at addressing constraints, 
under the old paradigm the emphasis is mostly on current constraints at the broader, 
macroeconomic aggregate level (e.g., savings and investment gaps, balance of payments 
unbalances, poverty, death, health deficiencies, etc.) rather than on the underlying causes 
behind them. The new paradigm, instead, looks at constraints, first from an intertemporal 
perspective, to then act on the shaping of the possibility space, guided by a clear 
understanding of the critical-paths faced by each one of the classes of assets from which 
the aid-recipient extracts value. This means that the old paradigm might be more prone to 
address the effects of the aid-recipient not having achieved self-reinforcing state, than the 
causes behind the aid-recipients’ impossibility to achieve it. For example, without being 
driven by critical-path considerations, aid, as conceived under the old paradigm may miss 
important windows of opportunity and end up simply ameliorating, rather than preventing 
or correcting, the negative consequences that having missed such windows of opportunity 
might have imposed on current and future value generating potential. 
Secondly, under the old paradigm, one of the ultimate objectives of aid is to bring 
the recipient to self-sustaining growth sooner than it might have on its own. This 
objective, however, does not show consideration for the limits to growth imposed by the 
ecosystem, or considerations of a critical-path and the realistic timeline it imposes on the 
process of development, or consideration about the distribution of growth, nor 
considerations about the intertemporal sustainability of the level of growth pursued. The 
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new paradigm, instead, starts from a well-defined possibility space that ensures 
sustainability, and that clearly frames the spaces and timeframes in which aid can have a 
more substantial impact through the consideration of the critical-paths. Starting from the 
consideration of such a possibility space and critical-paths, the new paradigm ensures 
respect will be given to the limits to growth imposed by the ecosystem, as well as to the 
ultimate objective of attaining the wellbeing of the majority, which is at the center of 
attaining self-reinforcing state. Achieving such a state is, under the new paradigm, the 
single most important objective of wealth management. 
Thirdly, there is a subtler, although not less important difference, in the way aid’s 
role is conceived under the old and new paradigms. In the old paradigm, not only are the 
classes of assets considered severely simplified (mostly labour and capital), they are also 
treated both as if they could fully complement and substitute for each other, and as if the 
timelines they are bound by were similar. Furthermore, improvements in their 
contribution to growth are lumped in a single figure of total factor productivity that not 
only includes the individual contributions of each class of assets, but also masks any time 
considerations with regard to when those productivity changes were originated (a change 
in productivity might have resulted from a series of changes building onto each other 
over time, but only reflected years after). As a consequence, under the old paradigm, 
theoretically, aid that fills investment gaps directly impacts growth, almost in real-time, 
regardless of the timing, context, and the focus of such investments, besides what is 
fathom through their rates of return. 
Under the new paradigm, instead, each class of assets is different in nature and it 
is subjected to different natural limits. Each one is also bound in different ways by socio-
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material structures and limits. The nature of each class of assets impose different critical-
paths and their development is bound, at the same time, by specific function gradients 
that ultimately impact their value generating potential. Under the new paradigm, there are 
more disaggregated classes of assets (besides capital and labor) interacting with each 
other at different stages of their individual development, all enmeshed in a “fabric” of 
assets at different stages of their lifecycles (cohorts), which combine, complement, and 
constrain each other. This means that under the new paradigm, not all investments are 
created equal, and that the timing and context of the investments are extremely important, 
but not always captured and reflected by rates of return. Hence, aid-funded investments 
that do not consider these complexities are likely to be, compared to those undertaken 
with the new paradigm’s approach, considerably less effective in the best case, and 
perhaps even wasteful in the worst case.  
Finally, and perhaps in what is one of the most important differences under the 
new paradigm, the impact that investments funded through aid have, is not measured, as 
in the old paradigm, by their contribution to the not-time specific and broad factor of total 
productivity, or the total present value of wealth, but through the intertemporal projection 
of the value generating potential of a class of assets over its lifetime, as reflected by its 
function gradients. 
These differences, their consequences, and some additional ones are summarized 
in Table 5.1 below, 
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Table 5.1. Differences in economic growth, planning, and aid approaches between the 
old and new paradigms 
Old Paradigm New Paradigm 
Economic growth and other planning 
considerations are mostly supply-side 
based. 
Considerations about economic growth and 
development planning are framed within 
natural and socio-material limits, and 
incorporate the impact on both the supply-
and demand-sides. 
Comparative advantage is driven by 
productivity, endowments, and 
economies of scale. 
Comparative advantage are also driven by 
bounded elasticities of health, output, and 
value that depend on the matching and 
synchronization between local and global 
economies. 
Ultimate objective is for an aid-recipient 
to achieve self-sustaining growth (growth 
without the requirement of aid). The path 
towards structural change requires 
securing a certain level of economic 
growth that aid could enable (by filling 
current investment and balance of 
payment gaps that constrain growth), 
allowing for subsequent increased 
investments to drive structural change. 
Ultimate objective is for aid-recipient to 
achieve self-reinforcing state 
(intertemporal optimal value extraction and 
allocation). Structural transformation 
means affecting the classes of assets’ 
gradient functions (bringing them closer to 
their natural limits) that lead to true 
economic growth (e.g., bringing the classes 
of assets’ effective function gradients 
closer to their absolute natural limits), and 
to the improvement of the possibility space 
and what takes place within such space. 
Growth does not automatically lead to 
structural transformation, but is a symptom 
instead of such transformation. 
363 
Table 5.1. Differences in economic growth, planning, and aid approaches between the 
old and new paradigms 
Old Paradigm New Paradigm 
Effects of trade on potential 
intertemporal growth are ignored as the 
exchanges of wealth that take place 
through trade, are not fully reflected 
through monetary denominations. 
By focusing on the classes of assets and 
their limits, transactions and policies are 
judged by their impact in terms of physical 
units of wealth. Trade creates real wealth 
transfers between the parties that can add 
or deduct from their overall wealth, 
therefore, shifting the effective relative 
limits that define the possibility space, 
ultimately impacting a country’s wealth 
and its capacity to extract value from it. 
In spite of its pervasiveness, path-
dependence is considered exogenous and 
not modelled into economic growth and 
planning considerations. 
The concepts of critical-paths, as well as 
socio-material structures and limits, 
replace the idea of path dependence and 
provides a theory for understanding how 
they create social, economic, and political 
inertia. 
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Table 5.1. Differences in economic growth, planning, and aid approaches between the 
old and new paradigms 
Old Paradigm New Paradigm 
Aid macro success is measured in terms 
of induced economic growth and impact 
on poverty reduction. Inequality is 
discussed in rhetorical terms but not fully 
integrated in aid praxis due to the welfare 
theorems that are embedded in the 
neoclassical economics models on which 
many aid decisions are based, as well as 
due to the political nature of the potential 
solutions for inequality, which fall 
outside the scope and realm of aid 
interventions. 
Wealth management success is measured 
in terms of overall effects in the capacity 
of classes of assets to allow for value 
generation and the attainment of the 
wellbeing needed and wanted by the 
majority of citizens. 
Policy tend to impose limits to social 
forces, as well as to incentivize certain 
kinds of behaviors (i.e., dispositions). 
These tend to layer on top of each other, 
creating and furthering internal 
contradictions in the social, economic, 
and political order (i.e., conditions). 
Policy does not aim at manipulating 
natural and social forces (i.e., actions), but 
at constraining them through the 
establishment of a clear possibility space 
bounded by natural and socio-material 
limits (i.e., the conditions and the 
dispositions). The aim is at changing 
conditions and dispositions, not at 
manipulating dispositions. 
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Table 5.1. Differences in economic growth, planning, and aid approaches between the 
old and new paradigms 
Old Paradigm New Paradigm 
Mostly concerned with increasing rate of 
growth, here and now. Not fully 
concerned with long-term cycles’ impact 
on growth and development, and 
therefore unable to offer much in terms 
of policy recommendations on how to 
deal with them. 
Mostly concerned with increasing the 
intertemporal capacity to generate value of 
the different classes of assets over the 
entirety of their lifecycles. Classes of 
assets’ lifecycles are embedded into long-
term cycles (i.e., Kondratiev long-waves) 
that serve as a reference point. This 
treatment leads to considerable 
understanding of the dynamics of the 
process of development and its 
implications in terms of the cost of the 
transformation it produces (specific to each 
cohort within each class of assets). As a 
consequence, offers policy alternatives that 
are grounded on relevant timeframes and 
contexts. 
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Table 5.1. Differences in economic growth, planning, and aid approaches between the 
old and new paradigms 
Old Paradigm New Paradigm 
Does not consider limits to growth and, 
therefore, may lead towards 
unsustainable situations and structures. 
Without prices accounting for accurate 
and complete environmental and other 
intertemporal costs, investment gaps 
filled through aid (which are decided 
using, among others, the pricing system) 
might negatively affect the intertemporal 
capacity of a country to generate 
economic growth. 
Entire approach starts from the limits to 
growth as understood through current 
knowledge and technology. As knowledge 
and technology improvements allow for 
higher limits, the possibility space can be 
expanded to reflect increased potential for 
value generation. By setting a possibility 
space clearly defined by natural and socio-
material limits, the probability that 
investment decisions made within this 
space can have negative impacts on the 
ecosystem, are significantly reduced. 
Distribution and equality considerations 
come as an afterthought and are second 
to the maximization of efficiency (as per 
economics welfare theorems driven by 
Pareto efficiency considerations). 
Distribution and equality considerations of 
both wealth and the entitlements over 
value extracted from it, are an integral part 
of the idea of development, the concept of 
self-reinforcing state, and the resulting 
conception of concerted wealth 
management. 
Based on the idea of “ideal” and 
“naturally occurring” markets and their 
allocative implications. Social and 
political variables are usually considered 
exogenous and not part of the theoretical 
toolbox on which the praxis of aid relies. 
Markets, as well as intellectual property 
and other social constructs are ultimately 
demarcated by regulations and institutions 
that have an allocative impact. Socio-
material structures are made endogenous 
through socio-material limits defining, 
along natural ones, the possibility spaces. 
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Table 5.1. Differences in economic growth, planning, and aid approaches between the 
old and new paradigms 
Old Paradigm New Paradigm 
Several incommensurable classes of 
assets are lumped into capital and labour, 
while making assumptions that they are 
fully substitutable, and that their 
timelines or lifecycles, and physical and 
space characteristics are the same. 
Furthermore, any specific changes in 
factor productivity are lumped into one 
figure: total factor productivity. 
Is based on the detailed analysis of the 
nature of several distinct classes of assets 
with different lifecycles and critical-paths, 
different function gradients, and different 
absolute and relative limits. The suggested 
modelling for the portfolio is stochastic, 
with all classes of assets being influenced 
and influencing the others. The value 
generating potential of each class of assets 
is given by its specific function gradients 
and its specific bounded health, output, and 
value elasticities at specific points in time. 
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Table 5.1. Differences in economic growth, planning, and aid approaches between the 
old and new paradigms 
Old Paradigm New Paradigm 
Investment allocation decisions rely on a 
number of coefficients that are used to 
project factor substitution and inputs-
outputs between sectors. These are 
calculated using historical data. By 
relying on historical trends to make 
investment decisions, these decisions 
carry with them the path-dependence 
contained in the calculated coefficients 
themselves. Decisions made along this 
way reinforce path-dependence. 
The role of the planner is to define clear 
and stable possibility space. Her/his role 
also consists in expanding the area of such 
space and to improve the characteristics 
within that space allowing for more 
effective and efficient allocation of 
resources, and leading as a consequence to 
the attainment of intertemporal wellbeing 
for the majority. Investment decisions aim 
at pushing the function gradients of each 
class of assets towards their upper absolute 
or relative natural limits (as required by 
each class of assets); which unequivocally 
increases the class of assets intertemporal 
value generating potential. However, 
investment decisions are also made 
conscious of the limits imposed by critical-
paths which are also reflected through 
bounded health, output, and value 
elasticities. Under the new paradigm, the 
planner, in shaping the possibility space, 
monitors these elasticities and adjust 
policies to aim at their in-class, across-
classes, and across-time optimization. 
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Table 5.1. Differences in economic growth, planning, and aid approaches between the 
old and new paradigms 
Old Paradigm New Paradigm 
Allocations and distribution are usually 
perceived as naturally occurring and 
therefore subject to a posteriori 
adjustment only. 
Allocations and distributions are 
determined by socio-material structures 
and limits. The morphing of these 
structures and limits present an explicit 
trade-off between intertemporal efficiency 
and equity objectives. 
Mostly concerned with current 
constraints, linked to gaps in investment 
and balance of payments capacity. 
Intertemporal considerations are limited 
to those related to social and economic 
returns reflected in the present value 
calculated through the pricing system. 
Investment decisions made only on 
grounds of present value and with 
consideration for projects, sectors, and 
the allocation of capital and labor, may 
lead to depletion or destruction of assets 
due the limitations of the pricing system 
in incorporating public goods, very long-
term timeframes, and linking diverse and 
highly disconnected markets. The cost-
benefit analysis implicit in investment 
decision making mostly relies on the 
flows within the economy rather than on 
the stocks of wealth. 
Mostly concerned with intertemporal 
constraints, addressed by positively 
influencing function gradients during the 
appropriate windows of opportunity given 
by the critical-paths. Constraints are not 
considered to be the result of insufficient 
present investment but of deficient 
function gradients (due to insufficient 
opportune investments) that impact not 
only a point in time but the entire lifecycle 
of the classes of assets affected. 
Investments are meant to improve the 
overall intertemporal value generating 
potential of the classes of assets (in 
physical units of wealth, not monetary 
terms), rather than to maximize monetized 
economic growth through specific projects 
or sectors. 
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Table 5.1. Differences in economic growth, planning, and aid approaches between the 
old and new paradigms 
Old Paradigm New Paradigm 
At the theoretical level, aid that fills 
investment and foreign exchange gaps is 
not concerned with its impact on social, 
economic, or political equity. 
Furthermore, lack of consideration for 
the effects of matching and synchronicity 
between the life cycles of the classes of 
assets and the long-term cycles in the 
way aid is allocated, potentially 
misinforms the timing and characteristics 
of the most productive investments. The 
value of an investment is contextual, 
only as captured by the pricing system 
through which such investment decisions 
are made. 
Concerted wealth management aims at 
facilitating the attainment of self-
reinforcing state, in which the majority of a 
country’s citizens attain the levels of 
wellbeing they need and want. Equity is 
embedded in the purpose of concerted 
wealth management, as well as in the 
process of development (through the 
requirement for optimal value allocation 
embedded in the attainment of self-
reinforcing state). Furthermore, by 
focusing on improving the function 
gradients of all classes of assets, including 
human capital, equity is also embedded in 
allowing for the maximization of the value 
generating potential of every human being. 
Finally, by focusing on managing 
transition costs presented by limited 
matching and synchronicity between 
lifecycles of a class of asset, and long-term 
cycles (Kondratiev long-waves), as well as 
between local and global natural and socio 
material limits, equity is also embedded in 
the purpose of concerted wealth 
management and in the process of 
development. Policies are “transition-
inclusive.” 
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Table 5.1. Differences in economic growth, planning, and aid approaches between the 
old and new paradigms 
Old Paradigm New Paradigm 
Sensitivity about timing is given by 
overall objective of speeding the process 
of achieving self-sustaining growth (so 
aid flows are not needed anymore), and 
by the theoretical assumption that 
additional investments translate directly 
into growth (as long as they pass the rate 
of return threshold). Decisions about 
these investments are informed by 
symptomatic constraints rather than by 
the understanding of the underlying 
causes behind these symptoms. 
Timelines for the achievement of self-
sustaining growth are not realistic by 
virtue of the assumption that investments 
have a short-term and almost 
unequivocal impact on growth. 
Timelines are also unrealistic due to the 
lack of consideration of the critical-paths 
and the effects of path-dependence. 
Sensitivity about timing is at the core of 
any wealth management intervention. 
Wealth management aims at changing the 
overall, intertemporal value generating 
potential of all the classes of assets, as 
informed by the critical-paths; by the 
possibility space in which social, 
economic, and political change takes place; 
and by the degrees of matching and 
synchronicity between the lifecycles of the 
classes of assets and the long-term cycles 
as well as between the local and global 
natural and socio-material limits. 
Investment can impact growth, but it does 
not necessarily; adequate timing, adequate 
levels, and adequate contexts, can all 
determine its potential impact on growth. 
Timelines are derived from limits imposed 
by natural, material, and social structures 
and by the critical-paths they impose, and 
finally by the windows of opportunity 
opened by these two in the context of the 
long-term cycles. 
 
Illustrative examples of the differences between paradigms. 
Natural and socio-material limits: function gradients and the critical-path. As 
was argued over the previous chapters, all value, and, therefore, all wellbeing, is 
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extracted from wealth. The value generating potential of a class of assets is determined 
by its function gradients. These function gradients are, in turn, determined by the way in 
which, in the context of natural, and socio-material limits that bound them, each class of 
assets is created, formed, and developed, and how through such processes, specific 
characteristics are embedded in them that determine its lifetime or lifecycle potential to 
generate value in a given context. Once set, these function gradients reflect the total value 
that, using existing knowledge and technology, could possibly be extracted over the 
lifetime of the class of assets (which can be spelled out through the bounded elasticities 
of health, output, and value, as discussed in Chapter 4). 
However, as important as these individual function gradients are, the value 
generating potential of individual classes of assets also depend on their complementarity 
and substitutability with other classes of assets, and how these relationships enhance or 
diminish it, in a particular context (given by long-term cycles, in this dissertation, 
showcased by Kondratiev long-waves). This context is given by natural and socio-
material limits and by the events taking place inside of, and simultaneously re-shaping 
the limits of the possibility space these limits create.  
Using several of the figures already included in Chapter 4 to justify the points 
made in the paragraphs above, Figure 5.5 illustrates the way in which natural and socio-
material limits ultimately create a possibility space within the bounds of effective relative 
limits. Figure 5.6 (also from Chapter 4) illustrates the impact these limits have in 
determining the function gradients of the classes of assets, and, therefore, their 




Figure 5.5. Interrelation between natural, socio-material, and effective relative limits 
 
The practical implication of the new paradigm in terms of the relevance of capital 
accumulation, a central tenet of the old paradigm, cannot be clearer. The return on 
investments in capital accumulation is dependent on: (a) current function gradients of the 
class of assets in which investments are being made; (b) stage of development which the 
class of assets being invested in is going through; and (c) context in which the investment 
is taking place—the stage of the long-term cycle (i.e., Kondratiev long-wave), as well as 
the relations between local and global natural and socio-material limits, and between the 
different classes of assets. 
For example, contributing to the formation of human capital through investments 
in education and the infrastructure required to deliver it, will have differential returns for 
different generations of children. If an important portion of the children who are currently 
attending school suffer from malnutrition and stunted growth, education efforts are either 
less effective and efficient, or, alternatively, more expensive than it would be for children 


























return on the investment for the generation of children currently in school will be 
potentially less than that it might be for newborns, once they get to school. However, this 
will only be true if this new cohort or generation of children is better nourished. If they 
are not, it is probable, then, that the return on the investment will not be superior for this 
other group of children either.  
 
 
Figure 5.6. Effective relative limits, gradient functions, context, and value generating 
potential 
 
The new paradigm forces considering that investing in education might be better 
served initially, not by investing directly and in the first place in education, but in 
nurturing children. Figure 5.6 above, shows how it took four human generations for the 
last to finally reach its absolute natural limit and, therefore, to maximize its value 
generating potential (each human generation is represented by the yellow, blue, green, 
and brow curves). The embedded function gradients will depend on the choice and mix of 
investments. Too much investment in education without enough investment in nutrition 
















not enough investment in education means as well a lower gradient and slower 
transformation towards reaching the absolute natural limit. Furthermore, the context in 
which the investment takes place also impacts the function gradient: towards the 
destruction stage of the Kondratiev long-wave, it might not yet be clear what kind of 
skills and expertise will be in high demand, while on the creation stage, this is already 
clear. It might be more productive to invest in nourishing the newer generations, which 
will be at school age during the creation stage, so they can have higher-function 
gradients, and, therefore, higher returns on education that can give them the skills to take 
the new wave and ride it more successfully. Simultaneously, investment in education 
oriented towards the older generations of children during the destruction stage might have 
higher returns if focused on providing broader skills that might make them more 
adaptable to navigate the ebb out of the old wave, as well as the ebb into the new one. 
Finding such balance requires managing the entire portfolio of wealth, 
considering how each class of assets and its cohorts affect the other. There exist critical-
paths that need to be considered in order to maximize the return on an investment. These 
critical-paths, as well as the possibility space inside which all of these investment 
decisions are made and take place—while ultimately bound in absolute terms by natural 
limits—stochastically, move along a chain of socio-material limits and contexts. This 
means that investment decisions are highly particular and that, while their ultimate return 
is highly influenced by the considerations made in the previous paragraphs, the above is 
general guidance rather than a specific and broadly applicable technocratic solution. 
What the proposed conceptual framework showcases is, precisely, the diversity, 
uniqueness, and complexity of each decision and therefore showcases as well, the limits 
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of unrealistic technocratic approaches. 
By using this conceptual framework behind the new paradigm, it is easy to 
confirm why, under the old paradigm, aid effectiveness has been challenging. First, 
towards the beginning of the aid enterprise, without other economic growth model than 
that of Harrod-Domar, with no consolidated national income accounting system, or 
model of development planning, each investment project funded through aid relied too 
heavily on the pricing system (which was also likely to be hindered by distortions) and its 
limited capacity to pick up on the elements discussed above which, according to the new 
paradigm, are essential in maximizing the impact of an investment. That is, the pricing 
system needed to pick up on natural limits of all the assets used and impacted by the 
investment project; it had to pick up on both the effects of the existing material limits on 
the investment, as well as on the effects on this investment on the material limits 
themselves; it had to pickup on the social preferences and choices; and on the long-term 
cycle’s (i.e., Kondratiev long-waves) impact over the lifecycle of the investment and 
beyond. Only if it did, would the net present value of the project be representative of 
reality, and it would ensure that the investment have a minimum level of impact on 
economic growth (as one of the main goals of aid under the old paradigm). 
However, not even today can the pricing system pick up on the aspects discussed 
above. Lacking in a capacity to reflect these aspects, the investments resulting from its 
guidance are likely to focus in one class of assets and its individual performance and 
contribution, rather than in the context of the entire portfolio’s performance and 
contributions, as well as in intertemporal considerations. This was the first important 
deficiency that impacted the effectiveness of aid since its inception (and perhaps it still 
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does to some degree). Furthermore, with the limitations still imposed by the pricing 
system, factoring in socio-material limits into investment decisions might be even less 
possible.  
This leads to the old paradigm’s second most important deficiency: if the pricing 
system cannot pick up on information or signals about classes of assets, material, and 
social considerations, it cannot pick up either on the resulting critical-paths bounding the 
return of an investment. Investments made this way, then, will also have limited returns if 
the timing or the specific objectives of the investment are not attuned with the critical-
paths and the overall impact the context has on these paths. 
Later on, when national income accounting and development planning became 
part of the aid enterprise and helped guide aid allocations, some of these limitations were 
partially addressed. Overall ranking of investment projects and the evaluation leading to 
these rankings was, at this point, based on a more complete view of the economic system, 
with input-output coefficients linking different investments, and all investments 
connected to the overall economic system, contributing with a quantifiable expected 
growth. Additionally, by development planning efforts considering periods of five years, 
and, in some cases, longer, some of the intertemporal effects of investments funded 
through aid could be integrated into the decision-making. Regardless of these 
improvements, however, lack of direct consideration for the stocks of wealth, for its 
function gradients, for the lifecycles of the different classes of assets and their cohorts 
(which clearly exceed the five-year mark), for the context and the contextual stage in 
which the investments were taking place, would all ultimately continue limiting the 
effectiveness of the aid allocation process and, hence its effectiveness. Still, too much 
378 
reliance is put on the pricing and monetary systems, with little being done in proactively 
addressing the biases and limitations they impose. 
Figure 5.7 below illustrates some of the points made above. On the left side of the 
figure, (a), the dotted red line showcases a hypothetical investment directly 
using/influencing the three classes of assets represented by the last three vertical lines. 
Given the limitations of the economic growth model, development planning, national 
income accounting, and the pricing system, old-paradigm aid funded investments are 
likely to occur beyond the possibility space, or what amount to the same thing, beyond 
the effective relative limits. In Figure 5.7, (a), from right to left, a hypothetical aid-funded 
investment (represented by the thick dotted line in red and blue) might have respectively 
exceeded the first class of assets relative limits, might have been within those, in the case 
of the second, or might have been below them, in the case of the third. 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Potential effects of old paradigm aid on the value generating potential of a 

















Potential waste and constrains 
produced by aid funded investment
379 
The red-striped area represents wasted investment resources because the 
recipient’s natural, and socio-material limits allow it to rip benefits from the investment 
up to the upper relative natural limit, but not beyond it (where actually the investment is). 
The blue-striped area represents investment resources that, while they might not have 
been wasted, as they seem to have brought the lower effective relative limit closer to the 
lower absolute natural limit (broadening the in-between-relative-limits space), they might 
not have contributed to eliminate constraints that might have made possible to extract 
more value from the class of assets represented by the third left vertical line from the 
right. As showcased on the right side of the figure (b), while the value generating 
potential of the latter class of assets is represented by the grey curve, the portion of its 
area, covered with blue-stripes, represents the portion of the potential that was 
constrained by the portfolio limits represented on the left side, (a). For illustrative 
purposes, it could be argued that, if the aid funded investment on the third class of assets 
from the right had not had the impact of further lowering the lower effective relative 
limit, but instead its upper one (as represented by the dotted grey line and the greyed area 
expanding the possibility space and the upper effective relative limit), then the blue-
stripped portion of the value generating potential curve on the right side, (b), would have 
not existed and, therefore, not reduced the total return from the aid funded investment. 
While, evidently, this is a theoretical construction conveniently built to 
demonstrate potential limitations in the effectiveness of aid under the old paradigm, it is 
still a well-founded one, particularly given the limitations that the tools of old-paradigm 
aid introduced in its volume, allocation, and delivery considerations. Without specific 
regard or tools for natural limits, function gradients, context, stochastic relationships 
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between classes of assets, and other sophistications introduced through the new 
paradigm, it is very likely that situations like the one illustrated in Figure 5.7 occur under 
the old paradigm. The analysis provide important insights, through the light of the new 
paradigm, about why these limitations might have contributed in making aid ineffective. 
Technocratic and non-contextual generalizations’ impact on aid effectiveness. 
The frame of reference and tools underlying old-paradigm aid’s volume, allocation, and 
delivery decisions, resulted in the pursuit of replicable and scalable technocratic 
solutions, based on generalizations about the history of economic growth (and its 
underlying assumption of a linear-staged path from an economy dominated by agriculture 
to one dominated by services). 
As it was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, for example, the work of Hanushek 
(2015) has showcased how the traditional focus of aid-funded investments in education 
on increasing enrolment and permanence, and even literacy, was ineffective in promoting 
economic growth, and how, instead, an alternative approach towards building and 
measuring relevant skills had proven to be more effective. 
As it has been argued in this and previous chapters, constrained by specific ideas 
and tools, old paradigm aid has been largely non-contextual, and because of its 
underlying assumption of a linear path towards economic growth, fairly atemporal in the 
design or delivery of its interventions. The example from Hanushek above illustrate these 
unfortunate traits. 
Figure 5.8, below, showcases the potential effects of aid-funded investments that 
incorporate little regard for the implications that context and timing, when seen from the 
perspective of the new paradigm, might have in their effectiveness. Similar to Figure 
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4.16, it shows four human generations over the space of two Kondratiev long-waves. 
Between the red lines, shaded in red, is the area showcasing an almost secular trend from 
old-paradigm aid funded investments that along the lines of those discussed by Hanushek 
(2015), focused on the technocratic and atemporal conception that literacy, enrolment, 
and permanency were both necessary and sufficient in every context or stage. It is not 
that such investment may not still have a return; they could possibly solidify education 
institutions, maintain or improved the infrastructure required, attract more and better 
teachers, and have other impacts. However, by not following a more dynamic strategic 




Figure 5.8. Potential impact of contextual and temporal considerations in the 
effectiveness of aid 
 
These opportunity costs are illustrated by the pale-yellow area on top of the red. 
By being responsive to the different characteristics of the Kondratiev long-waves stages, 
not only could the same investment have had a more sizeable effect on the function 














human generations, but, by doing so, it might have also created an opportunity for a 
country to have taken a more prominent and relatively important global position within 
upcoming waves. Ultimately, this could have created a multiplier effect on the rate of 
return of the original investment. 
Intra- and inter-country trade flows and wealth transfers. In previous chapters, 
evidence was presented to establish the relevance of the volume of wealth that is 
exchanged through trade. It was also suggested that, in spite of this relevance, and that 
because of the limitations and shortcomings of the pricing and monetary systems, such 
exchanges of wealth may not be fully factored in the trading prices, and, therefore, for 
some countries, international trade may be conducive to their wealth, and hence their 
capacity to extract value from it, draining towards their trading partners. 
Under the proposed conceptual framework, the new paradigm of aid would focus 
on managing both the stocks and flows of wealth (in terms of physical units), rather than 
managing and maximizing the flows in monetary terms only. If the limits imposed by 
nature are quantifiable and measurable in physical terms (notwithstanding that pricing 
might provide another useful point of view), there seems to be no reason why they should 
be primarily monetized, particularly when prices have proven to be unreliable and 
volatile. Conceived in this way, and under the main premise of the new paradigm that all 
value and wellbeing comes from wealth, it is easy to see that embedded in each product 
or service are physical units of wealth that are exchanged through trade, hidden under the 
ignorance that the current choices about measurement, labeling, reporting, pricing, and 
monetization create. 
Figure 5.9 below illustrates these effects more clearly. On the left side (a) of the 
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figure, the possibility space is shown for several classes of assets. On the right edge, the 
green arrows show the effect that a trade surplus, not in monetary but in actual physical 
units of wealth, can have on the natural relative limits (𝜔𝑖𝑝𝑁 and 𝜛𝑖𝑝𝑁). A trade surplus 
increases the effective quantity of one or several classes of assets a country has at its 
disposal for value extraction and attaining wellbeing. Hence the enlarged area, now 
represented by the original light blue one, plus the two additional areas added at the top 
and bottom of it (with the white background and the light blue diagonal stripes). This 
enlarged area means that the original possibility frontier, this is, the one without the 
effects of international trade, is shifted upwards allowing for increased potential value 
extraction and increased “health” of the class of assets. This shift is showcased on the 
right side (b) of Figure 5.7, through the green arrow shifting forward and the overall 
effect of the shift being represented by the area with the white background and the light 
blue diagonal stripes. 
 
 
Figure 5.9. Effects of international trade on natural relative limits and classes of assets 
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Likewise, although with the opposite effect, the left edge of the possibility space 
depicted on the left side (a) of Figure 5.7, shows the effect of an international trade deficit 
in physical units of wealth shrinking the natural relative limits, and consequently, on the 
right side of the Figure (b), in shifting downward the possibility frontier (signaled by the 
downward green arrow) and illustrated by the area in light red. 
As discussed in Chapter 4 and shown in Figure 5.9 above, by integrating the 
impact of international trade on the derivation of the natural relative limits, the new 
paradigm make these effects endogenous and ensures that local and global policy can be 
negotiated and formalized within the possibility space, through the availability of 
information about physical units traded that, unlike prices, are not dependent on 
speculations about their intertemporal value. Wealth accounting based on physical units 
might paint a very different picture of international trade than that painted by prices, but, 
nevertheless, be much more objective, particularly in relation to intertemporal 
dimensions, and, therefore, much more conducive to create a more balanced world order 
and, for sure, a viable ecosystem. Ensuring precisely that this balanced order exists is, 
according to the new paradigm, one of the most important objectives of concerted wealth 
management (see Table 4.1). 
In contrast, the old paradigm has used aid to promote trade by not only aiming at 
increasing the exporting capacity of recipient countries, but also by pushing for 
improvements in efficiency and regulation related to trade. If successful, aid might 
contribute to its recipient’s increased participation in international trade, and for the 
relative importance of trade in their economies to increase, even, perhaps, helping to 
alleviate balance of payments pressures (as originally intended through the conception of 
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the dual-gap model). In this sense, it could be said that if these achievements were 
realized, aid could claim to have been effective against the measure of success it set for 
itself. Yet, evidence shows that not every country benefits in the same ways from trade , 
and that, in fact, due to deteriorating terms of trade, some countries do not see an 
improvement in their international position even if they continuously increase their 
volume of exports (Harrison, 2007). This is, precisely, one of those cases, like the ones 
discussed in Chapter 2, where the meaning of words “muddy” the waters. Would it be 
correct to say that aid has been effective because a country’s participation in international 
trade has increased, because trade is now relatively more important in the composition of 
the aid recipient’s economy, and because increased trade has alleviated balance of 
payment pressures? This would be correct, indeed, if success was to be measured without 
consideration of sustainability. However, as argued throughout this dissertation, doing so 
would only be an illusion. Present benefits that come from the hidden and creeping drain 
of the intertemporal potential of a country to extract value from its wealth, and through it, 
wellbeing, are unsustainable. 
If the old paradigm approach is judged from the perspective of the proposed 
conceptual framework underlying the new paradigm, it is possible to think that the 
inefficiencies in the pricing and monetary systems and the limitations that are still 
experienced in internalizing natural endowments and other classes of assets, as well as 
the distortions created by it not considering critical-paths, are all contributing to 
misrepresenting the real exchange of wealth occurring beneath these prices, and, 
therefore, that some countries might be transferring more wealth than that they received 
in exchange, reducing their overall wealth-levels and, ceteris paribus, their intertemporal 
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value generating potential. This is not a concern figuring in the approach of old-paradigm 
aid, and here again, may be another reason for its limited effectiveness.  
As explored in this and Chapter 4, the degree of matching and synchronicity 
between the global and local natural and socio-material limits, as well as between the 
stages on which the lifecycles of the classes of assets are in relation to the stages of long-
term cycles (i.e., Kondratiev long waves) have a direct impact on the value generating 
potential of a country. Similar physical unit extractions from wealth leading to similar 
output can lead to very different values obtained from such outputs, all due to this degree 
of matching and synchronicity. Hence, it becomes a strategic consideration to determine 
the best timing possible for extracting value from wealth. The old-paradigm approach 
misses these kinds of subtleties in the process of development and hence produces 
standardized approaches, like promoting exports or increasing a country’s share in world 
trade, that may lead to results than hinder, rather than promote, development. Perhaps 
more importantly, the old paradigm gives little consideration to the implications, and 
even impossibilities, that trying to conform with global socio-material limits present to 
small countries, which happen to be a considerable portion of all countries (Spence, 
2011). The cost of conforming to such structures may be too high both in absolute and 
per-capita terms, for it to be a real possibility to these countries. Conforming to global 
standards not only limits the possibility space but may also shift it towards realms in 
which these worse-off countries may have reduced potential to extract value from wealth. 
Yet, if they can’t conform, their possibility to obtain higher value from their wealth is 
constrained. Furthermore, when putting into perspective the breadth of these countries’ 
absolute natural limits vis-à-vis those of bigger and richer countries, the proposed 
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conceptual framework points to the practical implications these differentials may have on 
the ability of countries to converge towards a self-reinforcing state. Once again, these 
considerations are, under the old-paradigm, not given simultaneous consideration to the 
more traditional approaches of increasing savings and investments, and addressing 
balance of payments issues. 
Targeted multiple interventions on the same subject. Chapter 4 suggested that 
the proposed conceptual framework could offer an alternative to commensurate different 
classes of assets and different stages in the lifecycles of these classes of assets by 
transposing these lifecycles with those of the long-term cycles—specifically, the 
Kondratiev long-waves. 
Previously, the interaction between the lifecycles of one class of assets and the 
Kondratiev long-waves was explored. In this subsection, the subject of the analysis are 
the implications that a cohort of classes of assets within one of the stages of the long-
wave have in determining what an effective aid intervention could look like. 
Figure 5.10 below (which comes from Figure 4.15), illustrates the meaning of 
coexisting cohorts of a class of assets within a stage of the Kondratiev long-wave. For 
example, if the transposed value-generating potential curves on t2 represent human 
capital, the labour force at this point in time is composed by human beings at different 
stages of their lifecycles belonging to four different generations. These would include 
very young people starting to acquire skills to allow for integration into the labour force. 
It would also include seasoned professionals who have proven to adapt to the present 
requirements for skills and expertise. It would include, as well, older people, whose skills 
might no longer be aligned with those required by leading sectors. 
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Figure 5.10. Coexisting cohorts of a class of assets in a stage of a long-term cycle (e.g., a 
Kondratiev long-wave) 
 
Having such a detailed understanding of the overall composition of the labour 
force at a given stage of the long-wave provides considerable information for designing 
policies and aid programs that address differences in and between cohorts. (As discussed 
in Chapter 4, each of the Kondratiev long-wave’s stages not only has distinct 
characteristics, but it also provides different kinds of incentives and spaces that can 
influence the way individuals act.) 
Under the new paradigm, then, a concerted wealth management led intervention 
to address the opportunities and challenges related to human capital would probably 
include interventions to minimize costs faced by older generations, because their skills 
might no longer align with those in higher demand; it might, perhaps, even include efforts 
to offer programs to upgrade their skills, as well as also include interventions to change 
curricula for the youngest generations so their skills will be better aligned with those 




















required in the current stage of the Kondratiev long-wave. For example, Figure 5.11 
shows the effect that the lack of matching and synchronicity between a human generation 
and a Kondratiev long-wave could have in its value generating potential. Without the 
proper policies to address the mismatch, a considerable portion of the value generating 
potential of a class of assets would be missed, and therefore, the potential to attaining 
wellbeing reduced. 
The above analysis provides for a richer framework to understand both the causes 
and the implications of development constraints and development paths faced by 
different countries. The old-paradigm, again, misses these subtleties and tends to offer 




Figure 5.11. Effect of lack of matching and synchronicity between a stage of a class of 
assets' lifecycle and a stage of a long-term cycle (e.g., a Kondratiev long-wave) 
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cohabitate with each other at different stages of their own lifecycles. As well, this 
oversight has an impact on the potential effectiveness of old-paradigm’s aid, because it 
ignores the specific costs of not addressing the particular implications that the long-wave 
has on the classes of assets’ value generating potential. As Page (2011), points out, policy 
makers are increasingly using quantile regression techniques. The proposed conceptual 
framework, however, is superior than such an approach in that it not only dissects the 
cohorts as quantile regression techniques might, but also provides a point of reference (in 
the form of Kondratiev long-waves) against which the analysis and potential policy 
making can be better framed and informed. 
In terms of policy implications, the proposed conceptual framework provides a 
way to look at the different kinds of elasticities embedded in socio-material structures 
and limits that impact the socio, economic, and political structure of a country. It makes it 
possible to explicitly showcase the trade-offs between efficiency and equity that take 
place in shaping socio-material structures and limits.  
Disaster and humanitarian relief versus developmental aid. Conceptually, under 
the old paradigm, every dollar of aid that fills an investment or foreign exchange gap, 
translates directly into economic growth, at least in theory. On the contrary, according to 
the same theory, disaster and humanitarian relief does not translate directly into growth. 
It is not difficult to understand why, then, throughout the history of the aid enterprise, 
development aid has received the biggest share of funds. In 2014, humanitarian and 
disaster relief was close to US$25 billion (High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, 
2016), while development aid was about US$135 billion in 2013 (OECD, 2014). 
When viewed from the new paradigm perspective, preference for development aid 
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cannot be taken for granted. First, even when all the considerations that the proposed 
conceptual framework proposes are considered (e.g., possibility space, critical-path, 
contextual assessment based on long-term cycles are considered), investing in increasing 
the value generating capacity of one or more classes of assets involve a higher risk than 
preventing its deterioration, depletion, or destruction. While it might take years of 
investment to finally increase the intertemporal value generating potential of a class of 
assets, a disaster or any other sort of exogenous shock might take just a few minutes to 
drastically reduce it. The longer the formation period of a class of assets is, the more 
impact a disaster could have into its intertemporal value generating potential; the 
timelines of both are so different that what is destroyed in seconds may take decades or 
centuries (e.g., environmental impact) to rebuild. It is clearly most cost-effective 
investing in preventing and mitigating disasters and other shocks first, than on rebuilding 
afterwards. 
The new paradigm allows for an easier visualization of this trade-off, given that 
classes of assets are managed not only intra- but inter-temporally (something that in 
practice is not as clear cut under the old paradigm). What really matters is the 
intertemporal value generating capacity of the class of assets and how to improve it 
through interventions aimed at improving function gradients and long-term capacity near 
its natural limits. Nevertheless, the prevention of deterioration, depletion, or destruction 
of these classes of assets as to protect additional investments and overall value generating 
potential, occupies also an essential place in the new paradigm. 
Figure 5.12 below illustrates how a disaster or shock will shift downward the 
possibility frontier of a class of assets, towards the thick green curve (a), and how the 
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value generating potential of the class of assets, represented by the area in light grey, 
loses a considerable portion (the portion crossed in diagonal green lines) due to such 
disaster or other sort of shock (see side (b) of Figure 5.12). This is the case, given that 
disasters or shocks not only have a present impact, but that in destroying part of the 
existing wealth, they also destroy the value that over time could have been extracted 
through it. Furthermore, rebuilding their value generating capacity diverts resources that, 
pre-disaster, could have been adding towards classes of assets’ intertemporal value 
generating capacity. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Managi (2015) estimates that in 2012, the damages 
imposed by natural disasters were in the order of US$250 billion. Aid flows might, then, 
cover the most important and immediate consequences of such disasters, particularly in 
the humanitarian front, but, at only a fraction of the entire impact they had, it is hard to 
see how the old paradigm’s approach is really responding to such a tangible problematic. 
 
 
Figure 5.12. Impact of a disaster in a class of assets' possibility frontier and intertemporal 
value generating potential 
(a)
Impact of a disaster over the
possibility frontier
(b)
Impact of a disaster over the value

















Building a New Trojan Horse: A Possible and Realistic Way to Change Aid 
An important argument made in Chapter 2 was that economic growth, 
development planning, and national income accounting served as Trojan horses that 
shaped aid praxis. Aid, in turn, served itself as a Trojan horse through which specific 
ideas and tools linked to a specific vision of how economic growth takes place, were 
embedded in the framework used by both aid-giving and aid-receiving countries in 
managing the process of development. Ideas and tools that might have been highly 
contentious from the ideological point of view, took hold in virtually all countries which 
at some point were recipients of aid, even in those in which such contentiousness seemed 
unavoidable. That this happened, for the most part, throughout the Cold War period, 
further solidifies the argument that aid served indeed as a Trojan horse that spread such 
ideas and tools around the world. Even more so that it was the United States itself, which 
in fact made it a requirement for their aid recipients to implement such tools, right in the 
middle of the Cold War, particularly when planning was at the core of the Soviet Union’s 
economic model. 
Seen as a technical and operational requirement for receiving aid, these tools were 
widely accepted and implemented. But also as shapers of a language of their own, these 
ideas and tools also ended up shaping a considerable part of the practical aspects behind 
the process of social, economic, and political change (including policy-making), and 
undoubtedly, the praxis of aid.  
The case for the importance that words and meanings have in driving both our 
understandings and our actions was also supported in Chapter 2, using Wittgenstein’s 
epistemological and ontological approach. The fact that humanity is still struggling with 
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changing the ways in which it deals with the environmental costs of its actions has been 
influenced by how absent these consequences have been, and continue to be, from the 
main ways through which we “measure” our personal and societal performance and 
success. They are absent from the language that frames and drives our praxis. 
The debates, negotiations, and actions that take place as part of the process of 
social, economic, and political change, even when addressing environmental issues, lack 
the strength required to move beyond rhetoric and limited consequences, given how 
difficult it is under the current “language game” to translate words into specific, 
measurable, and accountable plans and actions, and perhaps more importantly, given how 
conflicting many times those consequences are with the “illusions” created through the 
current language. Even when by now, a considerable portion of human beings are aware 
of the environmental consequences societies have caused, the specifics of how these 
consequences are built-up from the micro level, and, therefore, of what is every person’s 
and organization’s share of the macro environmental consequences, are still 
unfathomable and incalculable, although they don’t have to be as shown by some 
examples presented in Chapter 3. As a result, and in spite of more and more people’s 
wishes to the contrary, the environmental consequences of human preferences and actions 
remain on a similar destructive path, with much more rhetoric than deeds taking place. 
Changing the way in which social, economic, and political change takes place 
requires a new language that revolves around measuring and reporting, from the micro to 
the macro level, on the creation, formation, use, maintenance, depreciation, and 
destruction of the assets and classes of assets on which countries’ wealth is built. Being 
the real limits by which human life is bound of a physical nature, there does not seem to 
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be a need to complicate or expose to the distortions of the monetary and pricing systems, 
variables for which there is enough understanding and tools to measure their physical 
dimensions. When it comes to natural endowments and ecosystem services, it is of little 
relevance whether the price of water or the overall cost of manufacturing is lower in one 
country than in another; what matters, intertemporally, is that a certain physical volume 
of water and other natural resources are being used, and that a certain physical volume of 
different types of pollutions (not only carbon dioxide) are produced and need to be dealt 
with. Prices might be lower in one location than another, but the intertemporal costs for 
the human race might be similar; lower prices might just be an illusion caused by the 
partial blindness resulting from our lack of physical measure, or from our less than 
optimal efforts to measure and drive our decisions through those measures. It may be true 
that there might be productivity and technological differences among countries which 
allow them to use more or less of the same physical units of wealth to produce the same 
product or service or even to pollute less; nevertheless, currently we assume, at the lack 
of physical evidence, that all of the resulting price differences can be fully explained by 
traditional comparative advantages, rather than by distortions and biases in the pricing 
system. 
The timeless debate about differences between use and exchange values that it is 
still unresolved, and which some have argued cannot be solved (Meikle, 1995, 1996, 
2000), was put aside from the mainstream economics debate after the marginal revolution 
settled for using the concept of utility as a commensurability artifice (Meikle, 1995). Yet, 
it is clear that the issue is far from resolved, as for example, the Big Mac Index points to 
clear differences between use and exchange values around the world (Clements & Lan, 
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2010; Ong, 1997). This divergence can be clearly expressed as follows: the cost for the 
ecosystem of producing a Big Mac is very similar regardless of the country in which its 
ingredients are manufactured, yet prices differ considerably among them (Clements & 
Lan, 2010; Ong, 1997). Furthermore, these prices most certainly do not capture the whole 
environmental costs they produce anyway. As Bowles (2016) explains the requirement 
for market prices to lead to Pareto-efficient outcomes is that contracts have to be 
“complete” (that is, they have to specify all the benefits and costs for the parties). 
Evidently, contracts aren’t complete as they seldom price all externalities that have to do 
with environment, social, and political variables: “…incomplete contracts are the rule not 
the exception…” (p. 31). 
Table 3-3 and the paragraphs preceding it, summarized an extremely relevant 
example showcasing the impacts of the lack of physical measurement in the use of 
natural resources and ecosystem services: Japan’s yearly consumption-levels requires in 
excess of 1,000 percent more water than all the in-country sources can provide. This 
water is embedded in products consumed, coming from other countries. It is very 
unlikely that prices of these products reflect the real water scarcity in Japan, and in the 
world as a whole, when the above information is not widely and opportunely available 
for the pricing system to integrate it in the price of such commodities, and when there 
exist practical stances with regards to environmental issues that are still ambivalent, 
contradictory, and certainly incomplete. Is not clear, then, that the price received by the 
producing countries for their products will reflect either the real cost of water in terms of 
its potential to generate intertemporal value. Countries are using their wealth to produce 
manufactures or services for export that provide foreign exchange that, in turn, helps 
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satisfy their wellbeing (mostly in the present); but are they being paid for the real 
intertemporal value their water has? Are they even aware of how much of their wealth 
they relinquished so they can at least reinvest an equivalent amount in other assets that 
will bring back the overall intertemporal value generating potential of its wealth to the 
amount it was before such hidden exports of water took place? Even if the pricing system 
might work in brokering apparent mutually beneficial exchanges between countries, 
given it has not been successful in integrating the cost of natural endowments and 
services, why would these exchange prices reflect the real intertemporal value of the 
water used, particularly when the real scarcities faced by countries and consumers are not 
openly calculated and known, as in the case of water resources in Japan? Without 
imports, Japan’s consumption would have to dramatically adjust downwards as water 
would become a bottleneck in satisfying current consumption levels. 
Another way to think about this, is through the use of a thought experiment. What 
is the difference between oil and water? They are both naturally occurring liquid 
substances that are scarce. However, their scarcity is substantially different. The cycle by 
which oil is formed is very different and goes through a timeline that is also very 
different from those of water. Given how essential water is in substantiating human life, 
what would happen if the space-time scarcity of water far exceeded that of oil? What 
would happen if only ten countries possessed 90 percent of the fresh water available in 
the world and if they were grouped together in an OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries) like organization/cartel to setup minimum prices? Would then the 
difference between water and oil be, for all practical purposes, as we understand it today? 
Evidently not. But this begs the question of whether our current understanding is 
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absolutely correct or if it is relative and simply the result of our current biases and 
blindness. The point is that if such powerful organization/cartel were to exist, it might 
push and succeed on embedding in our socio-material structures, elements that would 
enable those “owning” water to rip considerably more value from it than what they do 
now. Not only absolute or relative natural scarcity, but socio-material limits, impact 
pricing. After all, as was discussed earlier, intellectual property and ownership, for 
example, are not naturally occurring but a result of choices embedded in socio-material 
limits. 
The new language that is needed will require an expanded system of national 
income accounts along the lines of the United Nations System of Environmental-
Economic Accounting (SEEA) (Kreimer, 2000; Sengupta, 2013; United Nations, 2012); 
and accounting, trading, and labeling practices that require the reporting of the use and 
content of assets and classes of assets, as well as the intertemporal entitlements in the use 
of these classes of assets goods and services embed in them. All of this at the micro-, 
meso-, and macro-levels (e.g., consumers; intra- and inter-industry both at the local and 
global levels; and, country, regional, and global). That is, the content of the different 
classes of assets in each good and service, and their intertemporal entitlements on these 
classes of assets, needs to be accounted for and reported. 
This new language will also have to reshape the way in which public policy is 
conceived and implemented. To complement updated national income accounts and 
updated accounting, trading, and labelling practices, public policy would also have to 
explicitly provide quantitative physical guidance about the limits by which the use of 
assets and classes of assets will be bound, as well as a quantification of its impact in the 
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allocation of wealth and its proceedings. This is what Chapters 3 and 4 partially meant by 
social limits shaping the possibility space through societal agreement about preferences 
in using these assets and classes of assets in relation to their absolute and relative natural 
limits. 
Likewise, material limits will also have to become part of the new language, 
through the quantification of their implications in terms of the use of assets and classes of 
assets they embed and entail. Currently, for example, appliances and electronics specify 
their power consumption. Yet, there is little accounting, tracking, and reporting of how 
wide-spread certain technologies’ uses are and, therefore, of the hidden material limits by 
which societies seem to, slowly and almost unknowingly, bound their future through 
decisions made in the present. Each toilet produced embeds in itself an entitlement over 
the use of water resources; each car produced embeds an entitlement over the property of 
minerals, carbon fuels, and even environmental services that will be required, at some 
point in the future and over a time span, to process back the inputs required to build the 
car into their original or alternative states that makes them useful again. This means that 
every time a car or a toilet is built, we are further solidifying the material limits created 
by society; every time a highway is built, it solidifies the demand for cars; every time a 
car is built, it solidifies the demand for oil; or, in the case of electric cars, for batteries 
and electricity. Not only has the human race been failing to measure the use of the assets 
that makes it possible for it to survive and satisfy their desired wellbeing; it has, as well, 
failed to account for the accumulated impact these decisions have in its intertemporal 
freedom to choose and to innovate and survive. An optimal possibility space is one in 
which the costs of having multiple alternatives to solve a collective action problem, are 
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balanced with the costs of increasingly relying on only one. Yet, this important trade-off 
is not debated about or acted upon under the old paradigm. 
Changing our accounting, labeling, and reporting can change the debates and our 
policy approaches. It can change our macro-, meso-, and micro-decision-making 
processes. It can improve the way in which the pricing system works. It can change the 
perception that the allocation and distribution of stocks of wealth, as well as claims over 
the flows they generate, are naturally occurring, when in the end, they are the result of the 
socio-material limits that are clearly defined by every country and by the international 
community. New measurements can shift our debates and actions towards a conception 
of aid closer to the one proposed in this dissertation. While laborious and costly, such 
changes are not impossible. For example, for years now, many OECD, and increasingly 
non-OECD countries have adopted regulatory impact assessment regulations that require 
such assessments to be not only made an essential input in the regulating and legislative 
processes, but also an essential output of that process that needs to be embedded in the 
resulting laws and regulations (OECD, 2015). As a result, the public is informed about 
the expected costs they will face in terms of regulatory compliance, and is also given a 
point of reference to frame their rights and their expectations from regulatory institutions. 
Likewise, laws and regulations could embed in them the impact they have in the 
allocation of wealth and its proceedings, as well as their impact in ensuring our long-term 
survival through the management of wealth and its limits. 
While the final outcome of such change in measurement, labeling, and reporting 
cannot be fully predicted or manipulated, as it will definitively have emerging properties, 
it is more likely that humanity can agree on improving the way in which “ways of life” 
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are measured than on directly changing such highly entrenched and polarized “ways of 
life.” Efforts to change those “ways of life” have demonstrated through, for example, the 
debate about aid (in)effectiveness, not to foster enough and opportune change. Seeing our 
“ways of life” through a renewed lens and different vantage points can perhaps be more 
effective in helping change our ways and in better helping us understand how to so. 
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Chapter 6  
Concerted Wealth Management: One Wealth, One World 
 
Chapter Summary 
Over the previous chapters, three important arguments about the problematic 
behind aid were advanced. First, while the evidence of aid’s (in)effectiveness is 
inconclusive, the fact that the volume, allocation, and delivery challenges it continues 
facing today are awfully similar to those identified fairly soon after its inception more 
than 60 years ago is, in itself, a clear sign of deep-rooted problems, and of considerable 
opportunity costs incurred. Even if it may not be possible to affirm conclusively that aid 
is ineffective, it can be affirmed, without hesitation, that the debate about its effectiveness 
has been appallingly ineffective. Second, it has been substantiated that volume, 
allocation, and delivery challenges are not the true causes behind aid’s problematic 
effectiveness, but rather an effect of the true cause behind its likely ineffectiveness: a 
flawed and muddled conception based on the limited world in which its praxis was 
constrained by the faulty language that economic growth theory, development planning, 
and national income accounting imposed on it. Third, that since the received theory 
underpinning aid put undue emphasis on capital accumulation and growth maximization, 
and gave little practical regard to limits to growth, to the process of social and political 
change, or to the impact of the global context, aid praxis tended to replicate this approach 
and its limitations (which were also reinforced by the constraints imposed by the political 
and institutional architecture behind it), even if rhetorically it tried covering the actual 
tracks and narrowness of its praxis. 
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In analysing these aspects of the problematic behind aid effectiveness, a 
Wittgensteinian epistemological and ontological approach was followed. First, through 
the analysis of language games, a successful attempt to disentangle confusions embedded 
in the discussion of aid effectiveness, as well as to specify the impact that language limits 
imposed on the aid enterprise, provides considerable clues on potential avenues to 
dissolve these confusions and, hence, opens up a world of possibility to improve aid 
effectiveness. Second, through an evaluation of the soundness of the theoretical basis on 
which aid was conceived, it was possible to determine severe limitations in this basis, 
and, therefore, to offer alternatives to overcome them (among these alternatives are ones 
related to the consideration of: the existence of a critical-path determining social, 
economic, and political change; the impossibility of replicable and scalable 
technocratic/hydraulic solutions to the problems of development; the futility of adhering 
to the illusion that change towards a stable new social order can be achieved through 
manipulation that leads to a specific predetermined state; and the need to specify 
reference points against which reality can be made sense of). 
As a result of this Wittgensteinian analysis of the aid enterprise, as well as an 
analysis on the roles of ideas in producing social, economic, and political change, the 
proposed research questions of this dissertation were answered by, among others: (a) 
defining the limits by which human activity is bound; (b) defining the limits imposed by 
human beings through the material and social structures they create; (c) establishing a 
relationship of identity between value and wellbeing and specifying an ideal state—self-
reinforcing—in which this identity makes the most sense; (d) determining the critical-
paths by which the wealth of nations is bounded; and (e) establishing a possibility space 
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and its characteristics, recognizing that beyond the limits that encapsulate them and the 
rules that are given, how both these limits and rules shape these spaces and what happens 
inside of them, is driven by an inner logic and a critical-path about which little can be 
said and not much effective intertemporal manipulation can be performed. 
The resulting proposed conceptual framework—concerted wealth management, a 
new paradigm to replace aid—implies that: (a) the distinctions between developing and 
developed, or North and South countries, are irrelevant and misleading; it makes more 
sense to understand the development path as a continuum in which some countries are 
better-off than others but on which, regardless of these differences, the self-reinforcing 
state can only exist when the majority of countries are closer to such self-reinforcing 
state; (b) inter-country flows convey real transfers of wealth which modify a country’s 
natural limits and, therefore, have intertemporal effects in their capacity to fulfill the 
wellbeing of their citizens; (c) better-off countries can help those worse-off to safeguard, 
manage, and enhance their wealth, as well as enable their capacity to benefit from inter-
country flows; and (d) considerable risks are posed on the long-term survival of the 
human race and the ecosystem by the insistence of relying only on monetary 
denominations that give the illusion that absolute limits might be relative. 
Rather than just relying on increasing the ingredients and improving the markets 
(so ingredients can better mix), the new paradigm starts by establishing clear priorities 
and limits (e.g., the ecosystems comes first, then human beings, then the other classes of 
assets). The conditions that delineate the possibility space, first, then the formation of 
dispositions, and perhaps only then but highly discouraged, the meddling with actions. 
The new paradigm debunks the idea that the allocation and distribution of wealth, and 
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entitlements over the flows it generates, are naturally occurring, and, instead asserts that 
they are the result of natural, material, and social structures that impose limits to natural 
and social forces. The new paradigm gives a realistic consideration to critical-paths, and 
then provides a framework to build realistic timelines on which, in turn, change can 
actually take place. Furthermore, within these factual realities, the new paradigm offers a 
typology of actions that could lead to expanded limits and a broader and better 
functioning possibility space. It also offers a diagnostic of the difficulties a direct process 
of global coordination and agreement on the traditional problematic of aid entails (given 
known social, economic, and political constraints), but it also provides some light about 
the less-explored limitations of the aid market (e.g., supply driven, asymmetric power and 
information, among many others). Based on this diagnostic, the new paradigm offers an 
alternative, a sort of Trojan horse that, by focusing on embedding measures of physical 
units of wealth in every aspect of our daily lives, could potentially and indirectly 
circumvent and break the vicious circle in which old-paradigm aid has remained trapped. 
In practical terms, the new paradigm does not offer, as was originally thought possible, a 
“recipe”—since the possibility of one existing has been disproved—but, instead, an 
approach to “cooking.” 
The proposed framework fulfilled most of the requirements set forth in Chapters 1 
and 3 (e.g., explaining impact of inter-country flows on wealth; expanding the categories 
of wealth considered; considering not only flows but stocks as well; relying on processes 
of change other than those offered by the markets; avoiding linearity in its logic; and, 
integrating exogenous variables, among many others). Due to time and resource 
constraints, no empirical validation of the model proposed was possible, although a clear 
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research program for such validation is suggested, including a detailed list of stylized 
hypotheses to be tested. Nevertheless, it was carefully and meticulously researched and 
built on state-of-the-art knowledge which in itself has been empirically substantiated and 
submitted to falsification. 
Perhaps even more importantly, the model proposed in Chapter 4 and further 
developed in Chapter 5, achieved the methodological objective set forth in Chapter 1 of 
combining the advantages of both economic modelling and political economy 
approaches. Throughout the dissertation, serious consideration was given to the social 
and political aspects of development. They were, in fact, integrated into the formal model 
proposed through the concept of socio-material limits. The implications of taking 
political economy seriously resulted both in specific recommendations that go beyond 
simple traditional economic variables and mainstream economics approaches, as well as 
in a number of testable hypotheses that make the proposed conceptual framework 
empirically falsifiable. 
This dissertation has contributed to the literature by confirming that when looked 
at from a different point of reference, in this case, an alternative conception of economic 
growth and development, a conceptualization of aid that is not only different but much 
richer, emerges. Furthermore, this dissertation has also contributed to the literature by 
demonstrating that, when the current paradigm of aid is evaluated through a comparison 
to the proposed new paradigm, clearer reasons explaining its problematic effectiveness 
emerge. 
While these two are considerable contributions to the field of international 
development studies, perhaps an additional third and final one has the most relevance due 
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to its strictly practical nature. This last contribution consists of the idea of pushing for the 
implementation of an already viable and tested modified national income accounting 
system, as well as of accounting, trading, and labelling standards, both of them as part of 
a potential Trojan horse that could do more to change aid, the development enterprise, 
and humanity’s approach to environmental issues, than what sixty years of circular 
debate have been able to do so far. 
Revisiting the Research Question and the Thesis Statement 
This dissertation started from the premise that, at best, not only is the evidence 
about aid effectiveness inconclusive, but that the fact that over the last sixty years there 
has been little progress in terms of addressing aid’s recurrent and long standing 
shortcomings is, in itself, evidence that further tilts the balance of its effectiveness 
towards problematic territory. This, of course, does not mean that aid has achieved 
nothing (see Chapter 2), but it certainly means that if not entangled by a complex 
historical background, a mix of conflicting motives, and a weak and misleading 
theoretical basis, it is very possible it could have achieved considerably more. The 
opportunity costs of its problematic have been enormous, even if only because this same 
problematic has dragged on for so long. 
As suggested in the Preface, this dissertation does not present a case against aid as 
a concept or as an enterprise. In fact, it proposes untested avenues to make it better. It 
does, however, present a strong case against continued pretending that we know more 
than what we really do, or that 60 years is not more than enough to know by now that 
there is something inherently wrong with our approach to the task. 
Previous chapters offered evidence supporting the assessment of aid summarized 
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in the preceding paragraph. Furthermore, the evidence provided supported yet another 
important argument made throughout this dissertation: that the volume, allocation, and 
delivery issues plaguing aid delivery are more an effect than a cause of its 
ineffectiveness. The real cause, it has been argued and supported, is the problematic 
conception of aid that resulted from the ingredient-based and process-less understanding 
of economic growth and development received from the dominant neoclassical school of 
economics. As a Trojan horse, economic growth theory, development planning, and 
national income accounting infiltrated and permeated the most practical aspects of the aid 
enterprise and, by limiting its language, limited and shaped its world, too. 
Besides ignoring the global context and its asymmetric impact on less developed 
countries, the old paradigm’s understanding of the world engrained into the core of aid’s 
praxis, placed an undue emphasis on the accumulation of capital and the maximization of 
growth through productivity increases and their technological progress underpinnings, as 
well as the institutions supporting them. This emphasis relegated both limits to growth, 
and the process of social, economic, and political change behind such growth (except of 
course, as it relates to productivity increases), including the consideration of the critical-
paths leading to it, to the background. 
Furthermore, the vision of wealth underlying the neoclassical understanding of 
growth had no bearing on space and time realities, either at a level at which could be 
considered a valid simplification required by any sort of mathematical modelling, or, 
more importantly, at a level at which such simplification could not have resulted in 
engraining an unrealistic and irresponsible stance about our ecosystem and all the assets 
in it from which human survival and progress depends. Ultimately, this understanding of 
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wealth and its relationship to growth shaped in very subtle but pervasive and wide-
ranging ways, the conception of aid, its overall approach and praxis, and the tools behind 
them. 
By comparing this conception, approach, and praxis with those that would result 
instead if the neoclassical understanding of economic growth were to be replaced by the 
one suggested through the proposed conceptual framework put forward by this 
dissertation, Chapter 5 showcased the kind of limitations and implications the received 
understanding has had in constraining the effectiveness of aid. Many of these limitations 
and implications were precisely and directly linked to the severely inaccurate and 
misleading assumptions about the space and time characteristics of the wealth of nations 
that are embedded in the neoclassical model of economic growth. 
To respond to the specific research questions proposed in Chapter 1, considerable 
evidence supporting the proposed conceptual framework was presented in Chapters 2 and 
3.  
Of particular importance in developing the arguments put forth by this 
dissertation was the use of a Wittgensteinian epistemological and ontological approach. 
Among other things, this meant that emphasis was given to: (a) separating that which 
something could and should be “said” and done about, from that which not much could 
be “said” or done about, and, therefore, that which we must remain silent about (leading 
to the proposal of delimiting a possibility space through the setting of natural and socio-
material limits, as well as to make a clear distinction between physical denominations and 
monetary ones, among others); (b) shifting the “muddied” and unproductive analysis and 
addressing of the aid (in)effectiveness problematic by putting forth a rather different set 
410 
of “pictures” that could change the way in which this problematic is viewed 
(Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 57, Paragraph 144), this leading to the proposition of a new 
language, composed by new words and meanings, and also by a framework grounded on 
the physical realities of the wealth of nations; and (c) avoiding putting forth a causal 
theory of how to make development happen, and adopting, instead, a descriptive 
approach of the variables and dynamics about which something could be said and done. 
This last point, in particular, reflects a conclusion from this dissertation that differs from 
one of the original ideas set forth in Chapter 1: that a focus on the recipe, rather than on 
the ingredients, was necessary. It is clear now, however, that such an idea is inaccurate 
and misleading, and that it was still influenced by the received understanding of 
development. A recipe, while different in name, is, in the end, yet another way of 
expecting that a magic formula or Holy Grail, a technocratic, clinical, or hydraulic 
approach, can be found. If anything, this dissertation and, specifically, the paradigm 
proposed, shows that there cannot be a recipe for development, but only “cooking” 
towards it—that we can understand a great deal more about the ingredients behind it; 
their potential interactions, complementarities, and substitutions; their space and time 
nature and possibilities, but that, essentially, since all of these are highly contextual and 
complex, there can be no recipe and most definitively not a unique recipe. 
Development workers and institutions can contribute by supervising the “slow-
cooking” process, through long-term engagements, drawing from and making the most of 
the wealth that is available. If anything formulaic or recipe-like in nature resulted from 
this dissertation, it is the attention and discipline with which natural and socio-material 
limits, as well as critical-paths, need to be addressed. These are the real and relevant 
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variables and areas about which something could be said and done, and not the many 
others suggested by old-paradigm aid into which so much effort and resources have been 
poured, without seemingly ever leaving the unproductive vicious circle into which they 
seem to be locked. Rather than a recipe or a comprehensive theory of change, this 
dissertation offers tools to understand the fragments, areas, and spaces that offer the 
possibility to get things done by separating them from those in which the mud will trap us 
and get us stuck in endless unproductive debates like the ones of the last 60 years. 
Furthermore, the Wittgensteinian approach helps in situating aid effectiveness’s 
vicious circle within the idea of confusing language games; helps frame the problematic 
that the language created by the economic growth model, development planning, and 
national income accounting ensued by limiting the world of aid, therefore shaping it and 
constraining it; it also helps epistemologically and ontologically supporting the argument 
against a technocratic/hydraulic/clinical approaches common to aid that implicitly 
assume there is only one explanation for every problem of development and that 
implementing the unique solutions that allegedly derived from this explanation always 
results in the same outcome as if they were driven by immutable mechanical laws. A 
Wittgensteinian approach also helps support the idea that problems and solutions are 
engrained on each other through the people who face them and, hence, that aid’s 
approach to impose preconceived solutions is nonsensical, as the core of the solution has 
to come from the practice of those affected (not by the presumed knowledge being 
transferred, which Wittgenstein rejects as knowledge if devoid of practice—even 
acknowledging the benefits of knowledge sharing and transfer, such knowledge would 
have to go through an internalization process which will set a critical-path that cannot be 
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short-circuited and which is usually ignored by old-paradigm aid).  
Adopting a Wittgensteinian approach also helps to lay the ground for what the 
proposed conceptual framework calls the possibility space which, ultimately, is the space 
where change and development takes place as a practical process following its own 
internal logic, not the illusory vacuum in which “proven” mechanical solutions externally 
devised by the aid enterprise are assumed to always provoke the same result. 
Finally, the use of a Wittgensteinian approach in combination with the use of 
economic modelling and political economy analysis helps dissipate the “fog” (P. R. 
Krugman, 1998) that has, on several occasions throughout the history of development 
theory and practice, “muddied the waters” of the debate (to use a Wittgensteinian 
expression). For example, rather than engaging in the debate of whether government 
intervention or deregulation of markets are required, this dissertation and the proposed 
conceptual framework proposed, starts from the realization that markets and the 
allocation and distribution of wealth (and its proceeds) are not naturally occurring, in the 
sense that they do not exist in a pure and untouched state. Instead, they are always 
defined and determined by natural, material, and social structures and the limits they 
impose. It is, then, not only possible to address the issues that derive from markets’ 
allocative and distributive outcomes, but additionally, to more proactively focus on 
understanding the consequences that structures and limits will have in the outcomes of 
markets before they are created, as well as during their operation. 
Both the evidence in previous chapters and the proposed conceptual framework 
resulting from all of the above can now be used to explicitly respond to the research 
questions suggested in Chapter 1. 
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Managing and safeguarding the wealth of nations. 
The first research question in Chapter 1 asked about the theoretical grounds on 
which the management of the wealth of nations should be based. It also asked for the 
specific challenges faced by aid-receiving countries and the potential ways in which aid-
giving countries could cooperate with them in dealing with these challenges. 
As it has been continuously argued throughout this dissertation, one of the most 
important theoretical and empirical foundations on which the proposed conceptual 
framework is based, is the fact that the ecosystem that sustains life is finite in physical 
terms and, as such, is bound by space and time. This reality becomes more pressing when 
a contrast is made between geological and ecological times (e.g., hundreds, thousands, 
and millions of years), and a realistic timeline for the human race where finitude and 
fragility might constrain it to not survive itself for millions of years. This, it has been 
argued, means that in terms of hierarchy, the ecosystem is at the highest level of 
importance, because without it there cannot be life. At the middle is the human race: 
without it, all other organic and inorganic life would only have served their natural 
purpose as part of the cycle of nature, and, as a result, would be dependent only on the 
events that naturally shaped the universe, and not on the human race’s capacity to use and 
transform them. Human beings possess the ingenuity to find value in their surroundings 
by using them for their own benefit; they can’t, however, live without the ecosystem. 
By extension, this important basis for the understanding of the wealth of nations 
and its management, leads to a necessary consequence: there are absolute natural limits, 
and there are critical-paths by which human beings themselves, as well as their 
surroundings, are bound. Within those natural limits, more can be done and ingenuity can 
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certainly improve the way in which the space between those limits can be used. Yet, the 
absolute limits cannot be crossed both in terms of their space and time dimensions. This 
also means that everything is connected and that the value of one thing depends on that of 
another, and all of these values themselves depend on human beings, who, in turn, are 
dependent on the ecosystem. As a consequence, following the existing paradigm of 
economic growth and development which is based on a premise that these natural limits 
have not yet been reached, and that ingenuity will have already found a way to extend 
them once we get there, is an existential gamble. In fact, following it today, knowing 
what we know, amounts to a gamble with the pre-emptive knowledge we will lose. 
 In the final analysis, all these limits are shared equally by all human beings: 
distinctions of countries and geographies become irrelevant when dealing with such an 
absolute reality. To survive, humanity needs to concertedly manage its wealth. 
These previous two considerations (e.g., finiteness of the ecosystem and 
interdependence within the ecosystem) lead, in turn, to yet another: as humanity uses its 
ingenuity to its benefit, the material structures and the limits resulting from them embed 
themselves into the ecosystem, and simultaneously enable and constraint further both 
ingenuity and the space within which humanity can survive. These material structures 
allow for time and costs savings, productivity increases, connectivity, replicability, and 
expandability. However, the more these are embedded over time and become more 
important in scale (in relative terms), the less space there is for change and disrupting 
innovation. They create both path-dependence and a critical-path: that is, they create 
material limits. 
Another important stepping-stone on which the grounds for the proposed 
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conceptual framework rest is that of the social limits by which the process of managing 
the wealth of nations is bound. Human collectives are based on trust. The bigger and 
more complex they become, the more this trust rests on the organizations that support 
them. These institutions are the result of iterative and stochastic processes of establishing 
and settling rules and routines that operate as trust-creating mechanisms. This process is 
bound, as well, by a critical-path and, ultimately, by natural limits. This is a process that 
cannot be forced from the inside or imposed from the outside. Organizations and their 
rules and routines can be transplanted to different collectives, but they do not 
immediately and automatically change anything, and, if they do, the change will be 
emergent; this is, it will be different in different contexts. 
This leads to yet another relevant stepping-stone on which the proposed 
conceptual framework is based: that of the existence of a possibility space. This space is 
one delimited by the above-mentioned natural, material, and social limits. It is a space 
where human individuality, human interaction, innovation, change, and progress take 
place. It is a space through which natural and social forces flow and combine to shape the 
world we live in. This is also the space from where material and social limits are 
influenced (pushed and pulled) and where humanity can progress towards reaching closer 
to natural limits without, however, having the possibility to exceed them.  
The less friction and inertia that exists within this possibility space, the less 
entropy natural and social forces create. Yet friction and inertia can only be reduced from 
the inside, through the inner logic and workings prevailing in such space, as well as 
through the improvement of the “conditions” and “dispositions” of those agents operating 
within them. Attempts to manipulate such “actions” taking place within such possibility 
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space, it is argued in this dissertation, are intertemporally ineffective, and can even be 
detrimental in spite of apparent immediate benefits. 
Finally, the proposed conceptual framework is built on a simple but relevant 
identity: wellbeing equals value. What gives meaning to anything human beings do, is 
how it contributes to their wellbeing. Wellbeing has two facets: a basic one that relates to 
the space and time realities of human life (the most material ones), and that impose 
specific conditions for its development, survival, and optimal functioning—the needed 
level of wellbeing. A second facet is relative and determined by the perceptions, 
preferences, context, and aspirations of the country’s citizens themselves—this is the 
wanted level of wellbeing (which, while less tangible, can nevertheless be expressed in 
terms of material consequences, that is, in terms of physical units of wealth). 
The image of the world resulting from these theoretical grounds on which the 
proposed conceptual framework is based, is the reality faced by the entire human race, 
not just by one or a few countries. Nevertheless, given that navigating through such 
constraints is dependent on the relative level of wealth already possessed by a country, 
different countries find themselves in different positions with respect to those constraints. 
This is why it is argued in this dissertation that the distinction between developing 
and developed, or North and South, is irrelevant and misleading. Given that the 
achievement and conservation of the self-reinforcing state is the ultimate objective of the 
process of development, it makes more sense to understand countries based on the 
following distinction: better-off countries are those which are closer to attaining and 
sustaining the self-reinforcing state; worse-off countries are those which are further away 
from doing so. Development is a continuous, perhaps never-ending process. Proximity to 
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a self-reinforcing state could be seen as a matter of relative importance: unfulfilled 
wellbeing and lack of optimality in the extraction of value from wealth pervades every 
country and the entire world. What varies is how pervasive this is at each country’s level. 
Development is, then, a common, concerted process, rather than an independent one. The 
true self-reinforcing state is not that of one country, but that in which most countries 
share a similar standard and a similar outlook. 
The proposed idea of self-reinforcing state represents a condition in which, 
intertemporally, a country, and more broadly, the world, is capable of extracting enough 
value from wealth—conceived as optimal value extraction—so as to fulfill, for the 
majority of its citizens (conceived as optimal value allocation), the levels of wellbeing 
needed and wanted—nothing more, nothing less. A country closer to the self-reinforcing 
state is able to maintain the integrity of its wealth by continuously investing, innovating, 
replacing, upgrading, protecting, and using it in increasingly creative and efficient ways. 
In fact, better-off countries already generate enough value to not only care for themselves 
but also to potentially cooperate with other countries that are comparatively worse-off. 
In contrast, worse-off countries, those that are further away from achieving the 
self-reinforcing state, are not only characterized for not being able to provide the levels of 
wellbeing needed or wanted to the majority of their citizens, they are additionally trapped 
by very limiting function gradients that severely restrict the intertemporal value 
generating potential of several (if not all) the classes of assets composing their wealth; a 
situation that, in turn and in emergent ways, limits the value generating potential of their 
entire portfolio of classes of assets. Furthermore, their already constrained capacity 
leaves them extremely vulnerable to natural, social, economic, and political shocks. In 
418 
summary, worse-off countries tend to hold wealth which intertemporal value generating 
potential is considerably below its absolute natural potential, while, simultaneously, their 
capacity to extract value is also constrained by the limited value generating potential of 
this wealth. This is indeed, a vicious circle. 
It is precisely because they are in this vicious circle that worse-off countries 
require assistance from better-off ones. For example, given that produced capital 
formation depends on human capital, and that, in worse-off countries, human capital is 
usually constrained due to low function gradients resulting from malnutrition, reduced 
emotional and intellectual stimulus, and health issues, among others, the potential to 
increase produce capital is low. This further reduces the possibility of extending, through 
the use of produced capital, the value generating potential of human capital. Likewise, 
low-produced capital stocks can also limit a country’s structural value generating 
potential, further reducing chances to address malnutrition and other key factors, and, 
therefore, keeping its human-capital function gradients low. Breaking this vicious circle 
requires investments in nutrition, education, and health that cannot be completely 
afforded by worse-off countries, not even through issuing of public debt, as most better-
off countries are able to do. 
Better-off countries’ contributions can potentially break such vicious cycles (not 
in the old-paradigm’s sense of capital investment as increases in capital, but in the new-
paradigm’s proposed sense of improving capital’s function gradients). However, to do so, 
natural, material, and social limits, as well as relevant critical-paths all need to 
simultaneously guide the conception, development, and delivery of such contributions, if 
they are to maximize their potential impact. This is what is meant to be achieved through 
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the proposed idea of concerted wealth management. 
Another area in which better-off countries can potentially contribute to worse-off 
ones moving closer towards the self-reinforcing state, is that of dealing with natural, 
social, economic, and political shocks. For countries already not able to extract enough 
value to satisfy their citizens wellbeing, it is extremely difficult both planning to reduce 
risks of shocks, as well as mitigating the impacts of these shocks. Most of these shocks 
have immediate and severe consequences in the stocks of wealth possessed by a country, 
both in terms of their size and their function gradients. Given the creation and formation 
timelines of most classes of assets, recovering wealth lost through these shocks takes 
considerable and sustained investment over several years, many times over decades, that 
is usually several times that which would have taken in preventing or ameliorating such 
impacts. Yet, with their already limited capacity to generate value further reduced 
through a potential shock, the possibility for these countries to both reach and maintain 
previous levels of wellbeing, as well as engaging in the sustained investment required to 
recover its previous capacity, is extremely limited. 
Better-off countries’ contributions towards planning for shocks and reducing 
worse-off countries’ exposure to them, as well as to dealing with their inevitable 
consequences are, in summary, yet another way in which they can contribute to worse-off 
ones. 
Finally, better-off countries can contribute to worse-off ones by sharing wealth 
management knowledge and expertise. As stated earlier, the proposed conceptual 
framework posits the processes of economic growth and development as more of a 
continuum, rather than a discrete collection of separate states. Both better-off and worse-
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off countries are subjected to the same reality and logic, to similar limits and critical-
paths. Better-off countries still struggle with structural change, both internally and 
globally; they still deal with shocks; they still keep struggling with reaching and 
sustaining the self-reinforcing state; and this means they still have to ensure that the 
majority of their citizens achieve both needed and wanted levels of wellbeing.  
The difference, as argued above, is not only one of scale (i.e., the relative size of 
the challenge faced) but also of possessing the capacity and freedom to do so. Hence, 
both the lived experience and resulting acquired knowledge through such processes 
obtained by better-off countries can be of great help to worse-off countries, not because 
worse-off countries have to go through and replicate the same linear process better-off 
countries have, but because they are both perfecting their own processes to extract value 
from wealth. Likewise, the knowledge and technologies better-off countries have 
developed in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency with which they extract 
value from wealth can provide considerable help to worse-off countries. 
The impact of global social and material structures on the wealth of nations. 
As it is usually the case with any interaction between human collectives, a set of 
rules and routines and the organizations to support and uphold them, is required in order 
for this interaction to be effective and efficient. The sort of contributions that better-off 
countries provide to worse-off countries towards their faster transitioning towards the 
self-reinforcing state requires such rules, routines, and organizations as well. However, as 
argued above, when it comes to the space in which social, economic, and political change 
takes place, the setting of these rules, routines, and organizations cannot be forced or 
imposed. It has to rely, instead, on an iterative and stochastic process that, given its 
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emergent characteristics, cannot be forced, or its specific outputs manipulated or 
predicted in full (this is consistent with the Wittgensteinian epistemological and 
ontological approach adopted throughout this dissertation). 
Contrary to this, both existing global organizations and the rules and routines they 
follow remain, in spite of the continuous criticism and commitments to reform, driven by 
aid-giving countries. Voting powers at most, if not all, international financial institutions 
still give better-off countries a majority, and their management and key staff still tend to 
be dominated by the citizens of these countries, or at least by aid-recipient countries 
citizens who attended aid-giving countries’ best universities (i.e., staff selection remains 
biased towards mainstream and unified thinking around the same subjects). In fact, the 
heads of both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are still de facto 
selected, in what shows an unfortunate double standard and appalling anachronism, by 
the United States, the European Union, and Japan (in the case of the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency). 
The same criticism can be made about the global rules related to trade, intellectual 
property, migration, and others (see Chapters 1 to 3), which is precisely the subject of the 
second, and last, research question proposed in Chapter 1: the impact inter-country flows 
have in enabling or disabling worse-off countries in transitioning towards the self-
reinforcing state, and the role better-off countries can have in enabling or disabling this 
impact. 
Throughout this dissertation, convincing evidence is presented about the relatively 
superior importance inter-country flows have in terms of both the size of worse-off 
countries’ economies, as well as the size of aid flows. Indeed, aid flows pale in 
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comparison to the size of other inter-country flows, as well as in comparison to the size 
of the issues it aims to address, and, as a result, aid can no longer afford to sustain the 
tenet that it can have a catalyzing effect without at least proposing a proper theoretical 
framework as explanation. Chapters 2 and 5 provide evidence, respectively, that both 
aid’s size and role in most worse-off countries have diminished, and that the theoretical 
framework on which it is based—the dual-gap model—is built on a macro-level theory 
that, from the start, presupposes a positive effect of aid-flows on economic growth by 
virtue of increasing investment or making up for foreign exchange gaps. 
Furthermore, convincing evidence in regards to the role inter-country flows have 
on the wealth of nations through the wealth transfers they convey, and, consequently, in 
their capacity to achieve self-reinforcing state, is presented both in Chapters 2 through 5 
(i.e., the role trade has in shifting natural relative limits and therefore, on the value 
generating capacity of a country) 
Consequently, the proposed conceptual framework at the centre of this 
dissertation considers the direct effects of inter-country flows as modifiers of the relative 
natural limits on which material and social limits depend, and which, together, determine 
the possibility space in which a country manages its wealth. Additionally, limits imposed 
by global social structures are embedded together with the local, into the socio-material 
limits mentioned above. 
Given the problematic discussed at the beginning of this section with regard to the 
rules, routines, and organizations behind aid, as well as behind the ways in which, 
traditionally, the potentially negative effects of inter-country flows have been ignored, it 
is not surprising, then, that a new international mode of coordination seems to be 
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required, and that the rules, routines, and the organizations underlying it, would have to 
come as a result of a well-balanced interaction between better-off and worse-off 
countries, and not as an imposition. 
A structure in which one party is trying to achieve something on its own terms, 
often leads to other parties attempting to do the same—that is, trying to achieve 
something on their own terms. This leads to an interaction with two or more objectives 
rather than a common one, something more akin to a market transaction than to the kind 
of concerted wealth management that is now imperative for the survival of the human 
race. If, at the very least, the conditions for such a market for aid were aligned with those 
that have been demonstrated to make markets more efficient, perhaps the current results 
would be better. Unfortunately, they are not: currently, the “aid market” is characterized 
by asymmetric information and power, uncertainty in the supply and demand of 
resources, limited standards on implementation and disclosure, limited accounting and 
reporting, and unsystematic and unstandardized measurement and reporting of results, 
among many others (see Chapters 1 through 3). 
Over the preceding chapters, it was also suggested that modifying national income 
accounting standards, as well as accounting, trading, and labelling standards, could be of 
considerable help to worse-off countries and the world as a whole. Reconceiving 
international trade and other kinds of inter-country flows in terms of the physical units of 
wealth embedded in every product and service, lends a very different lens to the 
evaluation of what these flows really entail for better- and worse-off countries. If value 
equals wellbeing, and value is extracted from wealth, then the direct impact inter-country 
flows have on a country’s wealth impacts their capacity to extract value and attain 
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wellbeing, as well. 
As long as inter-country flows continue being measured only in terms of their 
monetary denomination rather than in terms of their wealth content as well, the 
problematic in capturing through the pricing system disjointed markets and exceedingly 
long timeframes will also trickle down to affect the degree and speed at which the 
convergence of countries towards self-reinforcing state can occur. A certain degree of 
proportionality in the transfers of wealth that inter-country flows entail is required for this 
convergence to take place. 
As this dissertation demonstrates through Chapters 4 and 5, the degree of 
matching and synchronicity between local and global natural and socio-material limits 
plays an important role in the determination of the opportunities and the rewards that are 
reaped by different countries through their international dealings. Given the nature of 
these limits and what it means in terms of their inertial evolution, it is argued that 
development planning techniques under the old paradigm will tend to be ineffective. 
Under the new paradigm, comparative advantage is the result of a much more complex 
mix of bounded health, output, and value elasticities that are fully dependent on the 
context. The degree to which local and global natural and socio-material limits relate to 
each other, both in terms of their relative breadth and of their relative size, plays an 
important role in enabling or disabling countries’ potential to converge towards self-
reinforcing state. Development planning is then, under the new paradigm a process of 
tracing an intertemporal local-global evolving fit. As a result, development planning is 
not fully possible without concerted wealth management. 
The previous paragraphs summarized the ways in which throughout this 
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dissertation the originally suggested research questions are addressed. Evidently, given 
the size of the undertaking required to reimagining a theory of economic growth and aid 
against which current theories could be evaluated, more research is required to further 
refine the proposed conceptual framework. Nevertheless, the progress made has provided 
plausible and internally consistent answers for these research questions. These answers 
have, as well, provided a reasonable argument to confirm the thesis that the cause of aid 
ineffectiveness does not rest as much on aspects relating to its volume, allocation, or 
delivery, but in the narrowness of its conception. 
The impacts that the current paradigm has had in terms of aid’s praxis focusing on 
the ingredients rather than on the process behind economic growth, as well as on the 
endogenous rather than on the exogenous constraints faced by worse-off countries, have 
both been well-documented and supported throughout the previous chapters. Chapter 5, 
in particular, provides a macro comparison of the old paradigm and the new one resulting 
from the proposed conceptual framework, as well as several specific examples of how 
both their approaches and the potential impact of the development inducing interventions 
they advocate, would differ under both paradigms. 
What this research helps conclude is precisely what the thesis proposed originally 
states: a new approach to understanding economic growth that revolves around the 
management of wealth, provides a more solid and comprehensive theoretical framework 
on which to reimagine aid. When the resulting conceptual framework is used to both 
evaluate the existing paradigm of aid, as well as to propose plausible and considerably 
more elaborated explanations and justifications about the role that development inducing 
interventions could play, it is fairly clear why the aid enterprise has struggled and 
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continues to struggle: the conceptualization on which it relies has severely limited its own 
effectiveness. Besides becoming a filler of investment and foreign-exchange gaps faced 
by worse-off countries, there was nothing else specific enough that the narrow and 
simplistic conceptualization of aid could suggest: growth meant adding more resources 
when locally unavailable. Such general guidance meant almost anything could be 
justified as aid. 
In contrast, the proposed conceptual framework suggests the need to prioritize the 
ecosystem and human capital over the other kinds of wealth; it provides sound arguments 
on the importance of the critical-path for both, holding realistic expectations about the 
timelines required to make progress, and using resources more effectively by both 
investing opportunely and by following sequences that could maximize the benefits of 
such investments. It also suggests a typology for how to expand the possibility spaces. It 
evidences the importance of not only focusing on current but intertemporal constraints 
too (i.e., function gradients). It bounds the pursuit of optimal value extraction, as a 
substitute of economic growth, within realistic limits, and through such framing, it further 
narrows and pins-down the potential roles aid could play in the form of concerted wealth 
management. These and other differences between the old and new paradigms, as well as 
some of the complexities the proposed conceptual framework contributed with, are 
summarized in Table 5.1. 
Likewise, as it is suggested in the thesis statement, the proposed conceptual 
framework confirms that the areas in which concerted wealth management (as a 
substitute for old-paradigm aid) should focused are: (a) improving the ways in which 
wealth is managed and value is extracted from it (enhancing); (b) helping protect the 
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integrity of wealth (safeguarding); and (c) ensuring that wealth exchanges resulting from 
inter-country flows does not consistently create disproportionate exchanges of wealth, 
particularly from worse-off to better-off countries (enabling). In addition to these 
originally proposed areas, throughout this dissertation, two additional areas for concerted 
wealth management to focus on were identified: (a) managing the critical-paths towards 
maximizing as soon as possible the function gradients of all the classes of assets 
composing the wealth of a country; and (b) managing the possibility space as to improve 
its internal characteristics, broadening its limits closer to the natural ones, as well as 
moving them as close as possible—matching and synchronizing them—to global ones 
(these two tasks are, of course, related to the three other functions described above: 
enhancing, safeguarding, and enabling). 
In summary, while additional research is required to further advance and connect 
the ideas proposed through the conceptual framework developed in the preceding 
chapters, already this new paradigm helped uncovered implications of the narrowness in 
the historical conception of aid. It seems, indeed, that taking aid’s problematic as issues 
of volume, allocation, and delivery is confusing the effects as causes. This dissertation 
provides support for the thesis suggested in Chapter 1, in that it is instead the narrow 
conception of aid, that creates volume, allocation, and delivery related problems. 
Assessing the Proposed Conceptual Framework Against the Set Requirements 
Chapters 1 and 3 propose a number of requirements the alternative conceptual 
framework would need to comply with in order for it to differ from the existing 
paradigm, and therefore, potentially offer a better explanation for its problematic 
(in)effectiveness. 
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Specifically, in Chapter 1, it is suggested that the proposed conceptual framework 
should provide the foundations for: (a) the basic structure of a more comprehensive 
theory of wealth management; (b) a conceptual framework for understanding the nature 
of the value transfers resulting from the different kinds of inter-country flows; (c) a basic 
understanding of concerted wealth management outlining a typology that corresponds to 
a new broader and alternative understanding of aid; (d) a better understanding of the 
relationship between the proposed typology for concerted wealth management and the 
existing taxonomy of aid, as well as the gaps between them; and (e) a better 
understanding of the implications all of these consideration have in terms of the 
architecture through which aid is currently being delivered, and in terms of the changes 
that might be required in this architecture in order to focus instead on the proposed 
broader concept of concerted wealth management. 
Chapter 3, in turn, suggests that the proposed conceptual framework would have 
to overcome the main shortcomings of the existing paradigm, so as to: (a) go beyond the 
broader economic factors categories used in the old paradigm; (b) consider both stocks 
and flows of wealth; (c) focus on the intertemporal optimization of wealth rather than the 
maximization of growth; (d) consider the need for planning and managing potential 
emergencies that could impact wealth; (e) move beyond the simplistic consideration of 
the ingredients to grow to a more thorough understanding of the process of change behind 
it; (f) move beyond the duality of markets and governments thinking to focus on the 
underlying issue of addressing the coordination and control problems of cooperation; (g) 
address the costs of transformation resulting from the process of development; (h) 
consider the levels of aggregation and disaggregation of social interaction—micro and 
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macro levels—as well as the implications these have in terms of the forces they possess 
and release; (i) not be devoid of considerations about the local, regional, national, and 
global structures in which the process of development takes place, particularly through 
the wealth-value transfers that result from inter-country flows; (j) integrate both the 
endogenous and exogenous factors that impact the capabilities and freedom of countries 
to develop; (k) not assume a catalytic effect; (l) focus on supporting countries to manage 
their wealth as a unique mandate implemented through one architecture with only one 
driving motive and consistent incentives; (m) provide a typology of specific activities and 
actions that can be taken to achieve its ultimate objective of enabling most countries to 
attain self-reinforcing state (e.g., convergence); and (n) not rely on an underlying 
assumption that the process of development is a linear enterprise that require countries’ 
development to be driven progressively by their primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors. 
This and previous chapters provide enough details about the proposed conceptual 
framework to make it clear that it has, indeed, adequately addressed and fulfilled these 
requirements. Evidently, while some are addressed in more comprehensive ways than 
others, nevertheless, all have been addressed.  
For example, the proposed conceptual framework moves beyond the simplistic 
duality-of-capital-and-labour in the neoclassical growth model, to include, instead, five 
different classes of assets (i.e., natural, human, fixed produced, mobile produced, and 
intangible produced), as well as three modifiers of their value generating capacity (i.e., 
stock of local and global public and private debt, socio-material structures and limits, and 
local and global social, economic, and political relative standing of countries). 
Furthermore, rather than focusing on the flows only, as the neoclassical growth model 
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does, the proposed conceptual framework gives prominence to stocks of wealth across 
time, and equates economic growth, not just to changes in the flows but also to 
intertemporal changes in the stock and its capacity to generate value. Moreover, it offers 
an alternative conception of economic growth via the concept of optimal value extraction. 
Another example of how the proposed conceptual framework addresses the 
original set of requirements in Chapter 3 is in the way it focuses on the definition of a 
possibility space in which the process of social, economic, and political change can take 
its natural course, rather than relying on the apparent but ineffective manipulation of the 
process of change that, as the neoclassical economic growth model proposes, is portrayed 
as to take place in a limitless natural, material, and social mechanical order. This provides 
a dramatically different point of reference for public policy, moving from direct 
incentives and disincentives linked to behaviours, towards a setting of clear limits that is 
in tune with the realities of the physical and temporal world inhabited by humanity. The 
points of reference for such limits also shift thanks to the proposed conceptual 
framework, from setting them in reference to a unique conception of “markets” or any 
other preconceived-as-optimal or “natural occurring” social structure (without any 
consideration for natural limits), to setting them in reference to natural limits first, and 
only then, to socio-material limits stochastically related to them.  
Rather than fostering the illusion that natural, material, and social critical-paths 
can be short-circuited, the proposed conceptual framework offers the alternative view that 
it is not the efforts to manipulate what happens inside the possibility space (e.g., actions) 
what works, but the stabilization of the possibility space through both limit-setting and 
the management of the transition costs of intertemporal transformation. Ultimately, 
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contrary to the dominant neoclassical conception of economic growth which gives 
prominence to the ingredients required for growth, the proposed conceptual framework 
gives prominence to the space in which growth can happen. Rather than relying on a 
unique recipe, the proposed conceptual framework sets up a possibility space in which 
multiple and unknown recipes can emerge; a space where cooking takes place. That these 
recipes emerge within limits that ensure sustainability, rather than in a limitless world, is 
indeed one of the major ways in which the set requirements in Chapter 3 are met through 
this dissertation’s contribution. 
Perhaps the two requirements addressed the least are those related to the levels of 
(dis)aggregation of social interaction and their implications in the process of 
development, and those related to extending the analysis to the local and regional levels. 
In Chapter 4, the argument is made that the proposed conceptual framework is flexible 
enough to be applied to analyses at every level—from micro, to meso, to macro—as well 
as for any kind of country, aggregate of countries, or other disaggregations within them. 
The problematic presented by quantifying the limits by which a possibility space is 
bound, as well as the impact flows have in further adjusting such limits (be it inter-local, 
inter-regional, or inter-country), is very different in scale although very similar in 
principle. The basics of managing wealth are likewise similar in principle and different in 
scale at different levels of analysis. Given these similarities, and the resource constraints 
faced in completing this research, further developing these nuances would not have added 
considerable value at this point.  
A final set of requirements is also discussed in Chapter 3. It includes addressing 
some of the most important current limitations that the market, or other cooperation 
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mechanisms, create for countries in the process of development: (a) the diversity of the 
time horizons, critical-paths, and other temporal and physical limits of wealth that no 
single market can coordinate; (b) the coordination of uncoordinated markets through the 
provisioning of consistent and systematic signals and information that can extend the 
effective time dimensions under which markets operate; (c) the process of shaping 
through policy the elasticities of different kinds of wealth, so their formation, 
complementarity, substitution, and transformation can be strategically and 
intertemporally managed so as to enable the attainment of self-reinforcing state (this 
implies managing both stocks and flows of wealth to achieve intertemporal optimization 
of their value generating capacity); (d) the management of the entropy created by 
uncoordinated markets, and by the structural transformation of the economy that 
ultimately degrades the relative stocks of wealth, and that generates shifts in the material 
and social structures that create winners and losers; (e) the coordination and management 
of the implications that the global social structure has on local and international markets; 
on countries’ flows and stocks of wealth; as well as on the flows and stocks of public and 
global goods; (f) the management of the process of distributing a country’s stocks and 
flows of wealth among its citizens, as well as of the value extracted from them (rather 
than the traditional focus on managing sectors, projects, and the allocation of labour and 
capital—the ingredients); and (g) the minimization of excessive upswings and 
downswings in the functioning of a society that create social costs that, in turn, are not 
necessarily fairly distributed. 
With regards to these, the proposed conceptual framework is also successful. The 
different time-horizons that characterize different classes of assets are coordinated 
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through the artifice of transposing them against the background of long-term cycles (in 
the case of this dissertation, the Kondratiev long-waves). This allows for the 
conceptualization of a cohort of classes of assets at different stages of their own 
development—the “fabric” of the wealth of a country at different stages of long-term 
cycles. Such understanding, it is argued, provides a very useful tool to comprehend the 
process of structural transformation that underpins the process of development, and to 
address, in a timely manner, the mitigation of the costs of such transformation, including 
the supporting of those who absorb the highest cost throughout it. 
Additionally, the proposed conceptual framework gave prominence to the 
importance of the possibility space and the need for it to provide a clear and stable 
intertemporal environment for the process of social, economic, and political change to be 
more effective and efficient (e.g., by avoiding excessive up and downswings of the 
economy) in leading the country towards the achievement of self-reinforcing state. This 
possibility space, and the corresponding critical-paths, provide the basis for the analysis 
between the complementarities, substitutability, and transformability of the different 
classes of assets. 
Finally, by introducing the impact of inter-country flows, and by giving 
prominence, not to their monetary denomination, but to the physical units of wealth 
embedded in products and services, as well as their intertemporal entitlements on wealth, 
the proposed conceptual framework also accomplishes integrating, the impact of global 
natural, material, and social structures and their limits, in distributing and allocating 
wealth and wellbeing among the population. 
In terms of the economic modelling key messages discussed in Chapter 3 (see 
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Table 3-12), the proposed conceptual framework succeeds in capturing the stochastic and 
thermodynamic nature of the process of social, economic, and political change behind 
development. It also succeeds in bridging intra- and inter-temporal dimensions through 
the artifice of using long-term cycles (e.g., the Kondratiev long-waves) as a reference 
point to transpose the value curves of the different classes of assets against the different 
stages of such cycles. Furthermore, it also bridges the micro- and macro-dimensions of 
the development process by focusing on defining macro-limits (the possibility space), to 
allow for micro-actions to take place within them (the process of social, economic, and 
political change). Furthermore, the proposed model in which the suggested concerted 
wealth management is conceived (developed in Chapter 4 and further refined in Chapter 
5), provides a frame of reference for understanding the transitional dynamics of change, 
and, therefore, for managing the process of development, where the currently 
predominant neoclassical model does not. Finally, the proposed model avoids relying 
only on monetary denominations and, instead, combines actual physical variables and 
equivalencies to determine the intertemporal value generating potential of the classes of 
assets, which compose a country’s wealth. The relative value of those quantities is 
influenced by the stages of the economic cycles, as given by the long-term cycles and, 
therefore, not constant at every point in time. The only constant, the model argues, is that 
given by the ecosystem physical realities. 
Finally, the proposed model clearly defines what self-reinforcing state means 
through the identification and definition of optimal value extraction and optimal value 
allocation. These give the process of development a clear success path and the means to 
measure progress towards attaining self-reinforcing state in a much more effective way 
435 
than that in which the old paradigmatic measure of GDP has or could. 
The Social, Economic, and Political Consequences of the New Paradigm 
Previous chapters suggest some implications of the proposed conceptual 
framework. For example, Chapter 4 discusses the shift in conceiving policy-making as a 
limit setting enterprise, rather than as an incentive or disincentive provisioning one. 
Likewise, Chapter 5 suggests measuring economic growth, not as the difference between 
output from one year to the next, but as the overall change in the intertemporal value 
generating potential of all classes of assets. Chapter 3 similarly introduces the idea that, 
rather than continuing focusing on economic growth, the idea of optimal value extraction 
is a far more appropriate way to align a society towards the attainment of self-reinforcing 
state (this concept is further developed in Chapters 4 and 5). Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 all 
touch on the implications that the proposed conceptual framework has in terms of making 
the managing of the costs that result from the structural transformation of a society, a 
central function of wealth management: a function that can have extremely relevant 
implications in enabling or constraining the attainment of self-reinforcing state. Finally, 
Chapter 5 offers a clear conceptualization of the optimal allocation of value extracted, 
and offers specific insights on potential policies that could also enable the achievement of 
self-reinforcing state. 
Summarizing in this section all of the consequences that, if implemented, the new 
paradigm would have, will require repeating a considerable portion of this dissertation. 
However, other practical implications exist that have not been addressed in previous 
chapters. These will be developed over the next sub-sections. 
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Setting the limits of the possibility space. 
In the first place, the process through which the determination and the setting of 
natural, material, and social limits that is at the core of the conceptual framework 
proposed, is not fully specified. 
In Chapter 3, a number of approaches to measure the limits imposed by the 
ecosystem are discussed. Given the already vast knowledge accumulated, it is perhaps in 
the area of natural limits where the challenge faced in adopting the proposed conceptual 
framework is most manageable. Conceivably, one of the main limitations that still exists 
in this respect is that, given the ways in which the carrying capacities and availabilities of 
natural resources are calculated, difficulties may arise in applying the proposed 
conceptual framework to different levels of aggregation. For example, it might be 
possible that the calculated limits for a specific class of assets are available at the micro 
but not at the macro level, and that, on the contrary, for another class of assets, they 
might be available at the macro but not at the micro level. As a consequence, setting 
meaningful limits at one common level would require the conversion of one or more 
calculated limits, so as to ensure that all the limits are consistently referring to the same 
levels of aggregation. This kind of conversion might not always be straightforward, and, 
therefore, it may introduce biases and a level of uncertainty that would require risk 
management techniques to account for them, as well as to account for the potential 
impact they may have on decision making. 
When it comes to material limits, though, the challenges are considerably bigger. 
While some aspects of these limits exist about which enough information is available (for 
example, the energy consumption required by all physical products, or the type of 
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connectors embedded in these products, or the water or energy inputs required to 
manufacture or produce certain goods, or the relationship between urban centers and the 
levels of public infrastructure), there are others which are infinitely more complex to 
assess, for which limited or no information is available. 
For example, the portfolio of public infrastructure is composed of a considerable 
large and diverse array of assets with different useful lives, different purposes, and 
different degrees of complementarity and substitutability among them. Even if the 
proposed conceptual framework required us to only narrow the material limits at the 
broader level of each class of assets, translating the complexity of this portfolio of public 
infrastructure and other material structures into a specific volume limit for each class 
might prove to be too complex. A potential solution could lie in estimating the 
intertemporal potential demand of classes of assets’ stocks by relying on a 
standardization of estimated demand over their lifetime, based on a reduced number of 
broader categories of infrastructure. 
In setting the material limits for intangible produced capital, the influence that the 
consideration of physical infrastructure has would be multi-dimensional: intangible 
produced capital requires physical media for storage, sharing, and usage. If, for example, 
there were two options for storage—physical and digital—it would be clear, then, that 
digital storage will require less physical space. Thinking about the material limits 
imposed by physical storage could require adding up all the available physical storage 
space as well as all of the existing codified knowledge, and determining whether space 
limitations impose any limit towards the accumulation of additional quantities of the 
intangible produced capital. Similarly, the kinds of physical storage and codification of 
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knowledge available might also introduce logistic limitations that might impose limits to 
the accessibility to these intangible produced assets.  
Given that more dimensions could be further added to the analysis, evidently, 
there is a great degree of complexity in translating all of these dimensions of real material 
limits into a specific material limit for a specific class of assets; particularly, if these 
limits are to be both representative and relevant, in terms of their role in effectively 
limiting the process of social, economic, and political change. Nevertheless, perhaps a 
targeted survey conducted for a representative sample of key individuals or enterprises 
that influence the creation of intangible produced capital might help reveal their 
perceptions about the present and future limitations they are facing, or might yet face in 
this regard. The point is that the setting of different limits will require different 
techniques in order to determine them. 
For social limits, the difficulties are also considerable. In this particular case, the 
challenge would be more of achieving coordinated change, than true complexity in the 
task. This means, specifically, that if, as suggested in Chapter 4, policy-making would 
become a limit-setting endeavour rather than an incentive/disincentive one, then each 
policy would clearly stipulate specific implications in terms of the limits imposed to all 
the classes of assets affected by the policy (quantifying them in terms of physical units of 
wealth). An analysis and adequate aggregation of all the limits imposed by all the 
existing laws over a class of assets will provide an accurate picture of the social limits by 
which a specific class of assets is bound. This could also apply to global social limits, if 
international agreements were required to state such limits. 
However, since this is not actually the case, consolidating the effects that policies, 
439 
organizations, and the rules and routines they embed will have in each class of assets, 
presents considerable difficulties. Proxies, like corruption or governance indices, might 
provide an overall framework for assessing such limits, but even these are usually 
calculated with an entire country as the unit of analysis. As a consequence, dissecting 
how these translate at the class of asset level, will again make the process difficult.  
As in the case of material limits, several methods might be needed in order to 
approximate social limits. None of them, however, are likely to produce the specificity 
that modifying national income accounting, labeling, and other related standards, as well 
as the approach to policy making, could have. Hence, the argument that changing them 
can become the required Trojan horse that could finally create change in the way we 
manage the development process and, therefore, aid or its substitute: concerted wealth 
management. After such changes are introduced and, as a result of them, the information 
of content and entitlements over classes of assets of every good and service, every law, 
every activity, and everything that draws from wealth would be available from the start 
and would create the possibility for aggregations to be made at any level, for limits to be 
set at any level, and for possibility spaces to be defined and monitored at every level. 
Measuring wealth. 
As a centerpiece of the proposed conceptual framework, it is argued that there is 
not that much benefit in measuring wealth using a monetary denomination. Doing so can 
not only present a number of technical difficulties likely to result in biased valuations; it 
can also, in turn, negatively affect the allocation of resources through those biased 
valuations. Furthermore, such monetization will also feed into the illusion that absolute 
limits imposed by nature, can be made relative through money, or that, because they are 
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“correctly” priced, such limits would be automatically protected. Chapter 5 alerts about 
the risks in believing that just because the monetary costs of manufacturing a product or 
providing a service in different countries diverge, they do not embed in them very similar 
amounts of wealth, and represent very similar costs to the ecosystem. Natural limits are 
bound by space and time and cannot be overcome; relativizing them through their 
representation in monetary terms creates the illusion that they can be, and this is a very 
risky avenue that has already brought humanity into an environmental crisis. 
Nevertheless, not all classes of assets are easy to quantify in terms of their 
physical aspects, specifically because their physical dimension does not necessarily 
capture their true capacity to generate value. This is the case, for example, of intangible 
produced capital (as its value generating capacity depends on ever changing social 
structures that give certain rights and obligations to their owners). In this particular case, 
however, approaching such a challenge from the epistemological and ontological basis of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical thought can be enlightening.  
Natural and tangible produced capitals are both defined by their physical 
characteristics. These characteristics, in turn, determined their lifecycles and useful lives. 
Social structures can build on these space-time realities to create bounds regulating their 
use; yet, it cannot really change them.  
On the contrary, in the case of intangible produced capital, it can only exist if its 
existence is embedded in the social structures. Furthermore, both its space-time 
characteristics need to be specified by such structures as well, as per se, this kind of 
capital does not possess meaningful characteristics on its own; its potential to generate 
value is intrinsically linked to social structures that are in themselves nor timeless nor 
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absolute but time-bound and contextually relative. 
This means, as a consequence, that the value-extracting potential of a class of 
assets such as intangible produced capital, is determined by the social structures. Without 
them, it would still be useful, but without the status of being private property and, 
therefore, scarce, its value in monetary denomination would be close to zero (e.g., open-
source software that is freely available over the Internet). On the contrary, stringent social 
structures that provide strong proprietorship rights, as well as an artificial long 
proprietorship life, can make intangible produced capital to become almost invaluable in 
monetary terms. Furthermore, ownership characteristics allowed by social structures have 
a direct implication in the distribution of wealth and wellbeing in a society. It is not 
markets nor only fortune what determines the value of intangible produced capital, but 
the social structures behind it. 
This is yet another reason why measuring wealth and using such measures as the 
yardstick to evaluate sustainability and equality, are essential. Without such measures, the 
impact of social structures gets hidden, lost in monthly and yearly flows of money, as 
well as in price figures. With the proposed measurement in physical units of embedded 
wealth and entitlements over wealth, it can be clearly put in evidence how social 
structures can create wealth and determine its allocation and the allocation of its 
proceedings. Intellectual property laws raise the price individuals would have to pay if 
such laws did not exist. Therefore, this kind of law effectively dictates the transfer of 
wealth from those who are not given such intellectual property to those who are. 
How Does the New Paradigm Relate to Other Development Paradigms? 
So far, and purposely left until the end, the discussion of highly contested and 
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ideologically charged concepts, as well as existing development paradigms, have been 
avoided. The use of Wittgenstein’s epistemological and ontological framework demanded 
it. As previously quoted, in Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 57, 
paragraph 144), he states, 
I wanted to put that picture before him, and his acceptance of the picture consists 
in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently: that is, to compare it 
with this rather than that set of pictures. I have changed his way of looking at 
things. 
Likewise, the quotation from Keynes included in the Preface of this dissertation 
showcases the importance that “struggling to escape from habitual modes of thought and 
expression” (Keynes, 1957, pp. v–vii) was expected from the attempts from the readers of 
this dissertation in assessing its content. 
Up to this point, it is probable that readers have consistently and systematically 
questioned many of the statements put forth throughout this dissertation. In doing so, they 
probably are tempted to use “that” set of pictures, the ones they have before them from 
their past readings and studies, rather than “this” set of pictures; that is, the ones put 
before them throughout this dissertation. The reason why Wittgenstein was so adamant 
about constantly reminding his audience about the reference points against which they 
were evaluating his remarks, was precisely because using different “pictures” distorts and 
confuse the essence of what is being communicated. He was not looking for 
understanding (which could mean many different things), but for changed “ways of 
looking”: this is, changed behaviours and practices. And this is precisely, as also 
discussed in the Preface, the suggested measure of success for this dissertation: stopping 
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what does not make sense continuing and putting us on our way to getting things done. 
Chapter 3 introduces a number of words and meanings on which the proposed 
conceptual framework is built. Such words and meaning were carefully chosen so as to 
help the reader adopt new pictures that ultimately would allow them to see anew. 
Nevertheless, it is quite impossible not to use a few terms which can bring back the 
reader’s inclination to revert to old pictures. Among such, development, wellbeing, 
sustainability, and self-determination, could be mentioned. In spite of this possibility, no 
explicit meaning for some is provided, precisely to avoid falling back into debates that 
would not only “incline” the readers towards, but might have ended up even reverting 
them back to their old frames of reference. Furthermore, where no precise meanings are 
provided, a silent point was being made, just as Wittgenstein states that the most 
important part of his philosophy could never be written (Flowers & Ground, 2016). The 
intention of remaining silent about those reflects, most of all, the epistemological and 
ontological conclusion that discussions surrounding them cannot lead to any real and 
practical conclusion—this purposeless exercise is far away from the objective behind 
writing this dissertation. They ultimately rely on axioms that cannot be reconciled. As 
already discussed in Chapter 2, 
Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one 
another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic. (Wittgenstein, 1969, 
paragraph 611, p. 81) 
A great deal of the senselessness of the debates about aid effectiveness and development 
paradigms, as well as the opportunity costs they imposed, comes precisely from the fact 
that they could hardly ever be settled. In the most Wittgensteinian fashion, it is much 
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more productive to dissolve their existence through the realization that if such debates 
were to be taken to their ultimate consequences, they will reach incompatible axiomatic 
stances which no side of the debate is willing to compromise, and about which 
unequivocal truthfulness or falsehood could not probably be established, anyway. 
The temptation in the social, economic, and political sciences is to be specific, 
and, confusingly, both precise and generic, as a mark of scientific achievement. However, 
trying to agree, for example, on a precise definition of wellbeing might be more 
detrimental than beneficial. Agreeing, perhaps, in the explicitness about each party’s 
definition, as well as about being mutually respectful about their differences, could be a 
more conducive approach to move past those things which can hardly be widely agreed 
on. 
With this in mind, the proposed conceptual framework and its mathematical 
formalization are flexible enough to allow different parties, relying on different axioms, 
leading to different words and meanings, as well as different standards, to still guide their 
development efforts in a concerted fashion with others. As has been argued throughout 
this dissertation, a need exists to stop trying to manipulate what happens within a 
possibility space (e.g., actions), and instead, to start trying to understand its inner logic to, 
in turn, improve its limits (e.g., conditions) and its characteristics (e.g., dispositions). 
More specifically, in regards to its position against other development paradigms, 
the proposed conceptual framework cannot be fully compared. After all, following 
Wittgenstein’s logic, something cannot be seen for what it is, if a different set of pictures 
is used in “seeing” it, rather than the set of pictures on which it was constructed. 
Nevertheless, a few things can be said. 
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The next few paragraphs draw from an assessment of the history of development 
theory, based on several renowned development economics textbooks (De Janvry & 
Saodoulet, 2016; Anthony P Thirlwall, 2011; Todaro & Smith, 2015); some others books 
which critically look at the development, progression, and complementarity or divergence 
of ideas in the field (Hunt, 2002; Meier & Stiglitz, 2001); and, on a recent paper by 
Collier (2015) in which he discusses the most recent developments and trends in the field. 
The purpose of this historic assessment is twofold: first, to find commonalities and 
differences between the methodological approaches of existing development paradigms, 
and that of the proposed conceptual framework emanating from this dissertation; and 
second, to account for apparent practical similarities and differences between these old 
paradigms and the new one proposed here. 
In a nutshell, the history of development ideas showcases: (a) a preference for 
macro level and partial explanations without much micro foundations, usually in the 
forms of monothematic fashions; (b) considerable reliance on strong assumptions, 
sometimes not fully disclosed but implicitly sustained; (c) proposed solutions that, while 
consistent with the theoretical frameworks or the diagnostics offered, are plausible but 
not uniquely necessary and, therefore, display some biased preferences of their 
exponents; (d) deeper understanding of the movement of the variables and the 
interrelation between their movement, rather than a deeper understanding of the 
functioning of the underlying system to which these variables belong (resulting in limited 
and partial mechanistic  explanations); (e) considerable focus on the description of an 
undesirable state (a point A), a desirable one (a point B), and the definition of a unique 
set of policies that aim at transforming the undesirable state into the desirable one (from 
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A to B) without specificity about the transitional dynamics and the costs these impose; (f) 
a mostly linear and historically determined conception of the development process; (g) as 
previously discussed, a many times implicit reliance on axiomatic beliefs, sometimes 
obviated enough that it may give a paradigm the appearance of divergence from others, 
although in the final analysis it may not be that different—many of the differences end up 
being about biased preferences; (h) an “us” and “them” duality of exclusive development 
states (e.g., developed, developing; North or South); and, (i) lack of usage of explicit and 
consistent space and time reference points that can ensure soundness in the analysis and 
help avoid confusion through the mixing of divergent and incommensurable reference 
points. 
A few examples illustrate the points made in the previous paragraph. With respect 
to the use of assumptions, it is clear that not only mainstream economists incorporate 
them into their models. Theorist from the left, such as Emanuel, Amin, and Cardoso, also 
incorporate them, although less explicitly. For example, Emanuel’s analysis of unequal 
exchange relies on three important assumptions: capital is mobile but labour is not, the 
rate of profits is assumed to be equal across countries, and products exported from the 
periphery cannot be exported from the centre (Hunt, 2002). These are as unrealistic as 
many of the assumptions made by mainstream economist, but without them, Emanuel’s 
whole theoretical justification of unequal exchange falls down. Similarly, Amin makes 
another highly contestable assumption: the centre is capable of autarky but the periphery 
is not. Finally, Cardoso’s historical analysis of dependency contains the implicit 
assumption that, in spite of continually morphing, dependency is a permanent state in the 
sense that it cannot be overcome without revolutionary change; dependency is conceived 
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then as a state from which no gradual exit is possible.  
Evidently, economics-based development paradigms also rely on assumptions. 
For example, the discussions about inequality are usually focused on a posteriori fixes. 
There is a hidden and implicit assumption behind this approach: that inequalities are 
naturally occurring and that not much can be done to preventing them, but only to correct 
them after they express themselves. In fact, there is an assumption that if corrective 
actions are taken, it is not only likely that inequalities will not be prevented but, 
furthermore, that due to such corrective actions everyone would end up being worse-off 
(as Pareto-efficiency would be prevented). 
All of these assumptions from the left and from the right showcase that, regardless 
how comprehensive, open, and explicit each theorist wants to be, there are still a number 
of assumptions lying so deeply underneath, that they become hard to trace. This lack of 
unity in the method and in the scientific standards followed, “muddy the waters” (to use 
once again a Wittgensteinian expression) and, within the confusion it ends up creating, it 
gives room to apparent, but unreal, problems that get discussed and debated over and 
over again, seldom arriving to practical conclusions. Given hidden but essential 
axiomatic assumptions, such debates could never lend such practical conclusions. A 
Wittgensteinian approach to “dissolve” these problems, focuses on unearthing 
assumptions like those discussed above, to then establish that ultimately, many of these 
disputes are axiomatic and cannot be settled in spite of all the apparent intellectualism 
surrounding the arguments of both sides. 
Another example that results from comparing different development paradigms 
helps illustrate the point made in Chapter 2 with regard to the possibility of the same 
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phenomena being explained by multiple and concurring explanations. It is precisely 
because of this potential coexistence that most explanations do not really offer an account 
of causality, but only a plausible account of reality. This means that, ultimately, many 
explanations provided by development paradigms can coexist, and if they can, then none 
can claim correctness while claiming erroneousness of the others. That is, they become a 
matter of belief and interpretation of how the world works, and therefore, of axiomatic 
preference. For example, within the structuralist and dependency schools, some basic 
tenets are shared: trade is problematic for developing countries and the possibility to 
develop; and, comparative advantage theory does not apply in the case of 
developing/dependent countries. These tenets are also shared, for the most part, by others 
on the left, including Marxist and neo-Marxists, even if they may not agree with the 
particular explanations and solutions proposed. They agree on the principles but differ on 
the specifics, and, therefore, on the solutions. Prebisch, for example, justifies the failure 
of comparative advantage due to differences in demand elasticities, while Emanuel does 
so on the grounds of divergence in exchange prices among countries. In turn, neo-
Marxists, rather than focusing on comparative advantage, explain the problematic of 
trade through the role social class plays in the distribution of surplus value and how a 
position in the periphery guarantees unequal exchange (mostly through monopolistic and 
monopsonistic trade) (Hunt, 2002). 
The collection of plausible explanations discussed in the previous paragraph 
showcase, again, more belief and interpretation than truly testable hypotheses (at least not 
in the way some of the “high-development theories” were conceptualized and developed). 
In fact, as Popper has criticized, when rebutted by empirical evidence, some scholars who 
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put forth such explanations tend to change their underlying theories and resulting 
explanations, making them non-falsifiable (Popper, 1965). Furthermore and as previously 
argued, by taking the commonality in these paradigms’ explanations to their last 
consequences, it is clear that in the ultimate analysis, they rely on the same axiomatic 
assertions. Therefore, behind the scientific appeal and intellectualism of their theories, 
what really matters and makes a difference in the diagnostic and solutions proposed, are 
those underlying unscientific and untestable premises. (See, for example, Sen’s (1960) 
analysis of balanced and unbalanced growth and how when looked at independently they 
both seem right, when looked at from each other’s point of view they both seem wrong, 
but, in reality, they both share a great deal of common ground and, therefore, the alleged 
differences unreal.) 
Some additional examples could illustrate this further. The idea of basic needs is, 
in principle, similar to that of Marx’s cost of reproducing the working class (Hunt, 2002). 
They differ as a matter of degree and point-of-reference used. Usually, the concept of 
basic needs is not only related to the most basic biological requirements for the survival 
of human beings (as would be the case from the Marxist perspective), but includes, as 
well, longer-term concerns related to education, health, and overall capabilities and 
freedom. This is a matter of diverging degrees, as well as diverging explanations, about 
the reasons and motivations behind the need to fulfill them. From a Marxist perspective, 
an exploitative motivation exists based on the self-interest of capitalists who, in order to 
obtain surplus, require labour (which, for Marx, is the only source of value). From this 
point of view, the degree to which basic needs are then logically derived is dependent on 
the minimum investment required to sustain labour. Furthermore, if the supply of labour 
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is abundant, such minimum investment may be even lower, as it is likely that the 
definition of basic needs will be temporally limited so as to allow short-term, rather than 
long-term survival and development of the labour force (new and healthy labour can 
always substitute for old and sick labour).  
On the contrary, from the basic needs paradigm perspective, the motivation for 
fulfilling such needs is grounded on a human-centric conception of progress which views 
human capabilities and freedom as an end in itself (Sen, 2000).  
Nevertheless, embedded within this latter paradigm is an implicit and systemic 
view that capitalism, perhaps with a more human face, is still at the core of the solution to 
fulfill these basic needs. As such, addressing and fulfilling basic needs is mostly seen as 
an afterthought. It is a corrective effort to tame capitalism’s wild instincts and modus 
operandi. 
In summary, both paradigms draw from the scientific and irrefutable fact that 
human nature requires physical nurture; yet, they depart as soon as their space and time 
points of reference come into play. Once again, these points of reference tend to be 
axiomatic, and, therefore, a matter of belief and preference. Behind the cloud of scientism 
and intellectualism, the debate can be ultimately reduced to aspects about which 
agreement cannot probably be reached. In practical terms, this means that there are 
considerable opportunity costs in pretending they can be. This is precisely the kind of 
pseudo-problems that Wittgenstein method is particularly helpful in “dissolving” 
(Horwich, 2012). 
A final example to illustrate some of the trends and common characteristics 
shown by development paradigms is that of lacking or inconsistent space and time points 
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of reference. When economists discuss, for example, increasing or decreasing returns to 
scale, implicit in their discussion is a consideration of space and time, otherwise the 
concepts of increasing and decreasing would be meaningless. Yet, in a complex 
economic system, returns not only exist in reference to the unit of analysis of the 
economist but in reference to how this unit of analysis fits within its macro-context, both 
from the dimensions of space and time. The specific dimensions used in any analysis of 
increasing or decreasing returns will change any resulting assessments; yet, often, 
considerations about these frames of reference are overlooked. Likewise, empirical 
validation of theories and models are influenced by the space and time dimensions of the 
data used. In a similar fashion, theories that rely on a linear conception of development 
tend to depend on space and time dimensions that although tautological in nature within 
the logic of the paradigms, are nevertheless used to support them.  
For example, many theories from the left and the right implicitly assume that 
industry will always generate more value added than agriculture, and, therefore, that 
development requires a transition from the latter to the former as the predominant sector 
of the economy. It would only take a thought experiment imagining a world in which a 
nuclear winter has decimated power sources on which some produced capital rely, to 
realize that in such a world, agriculture might be the key wealth generating sector, at least 
for some time. Ultimately, development is not about the sectors but about value added, 
productivity, and demand, among others; and these are all highly contextual. A vision of 
sectoral transformation as an avenue towards development creates confusion as to where 
the real path towards development lies. 
 A final example on how the choosing of space and time reference points have 
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considerable impact on the formulation of theories can be given by the confusion several 
Marxist paradigms make between real and money wages. For example, Emanuel’s 
analysis of unequal exchange is based on money rather than real wages; as a result, his 
analysis fails to account for the role of productivity and how simultaneous changes in 
both productivity and money wages may not affect real wages. His argument is only 
possible because he is using a reference point that allows him to back up his claim 
(Todaro & Smith, 2015). However, once the illusion is broken, his claims dissolve. 
Likewise, the dependency paradigm relies on a space-time reference point that situates 
countries in two distinct and impossible-to-join states using a notional rather than exact 
differentiation. Critics of this paradigm have suggested that, from a different point of 
reference, it is more plausible to affirm that all countries are dependent on others, and 
that the real problem is not really dependency as portrayed by the paradigm but 
something deeper about the way all countries relate (Hunt, 2002; Lall, 1975; Anthony P 
Thirlwall, 2011). If all countries are dependent on others, then the point would be to 
determine the degree and the qualities of such dependence, as well as how different 
degrees of dependence influence the levels of development achieved by different 
countries. It is clear then that, whatever reference points are used to conduct such an 
analysis, will also influence the results of the analysis. 
To summarize this part of the section, it is not hard to see why Krugman (1998) 
argues that not only were many of the development theories incorrect in their predictions, 
but also, that when their predictions turned out to be correct, the real explanations of the 
events that took place differed from that offered by the theory making the prediction. 
Being based on axiomatic beliefs and preferences, many of the theories of development 
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seem to try fitting reality within their preconceived notions of the world, rather than 
fitting their theories within a more objective (in the degree that is possible) conception of 
it. 
 So far, only an assessment of other development paradigms has been offered 
without any reference to the new paradigm proposed in this dissertation. The best way to 
bring them together is, perhaps, by offering a comparison of their potential similarities 
and differences. A number of points can be made in this respect. 
First, the new paradigm does not claim to offer a recipe but the tools to cook. As 
such, it does not provide predetermined states and transitions. The self-reinforcing state 
which is at the core of the paradigm is both precise and flexible; it focuses on those 
aspects about which something can be said and done, and then, creates a space for those 
about which it is senseless to be precise (e.g., wellbeing). Likewise, the possibility space, 
which is a central concept of the new paradigm, is delimited but not completely or 
precisely defined. Overall, the new paradigm offers an opportunity for unimagined 
solutions. This is very different from other existing development theories, which offer 
only linearity, predefined paths, and specific normative states (e.g., A and B). For 
example, some theories from the left can only imagine radical change through a 
revolution and a more-or-less predefined dynamic towards such a revolution taking place. 
This is why they tend to focus ad nauseam on the analysis of the problematic, rather than 
on the solutions (as only one seems possible). 
Second, the new paradigm is clearly nested among absolute and relative natural 
limits, which then nest it, in turn, within socio-material limits. Ecological and 
environmental concerns are considered as necessary but not sufficient. There are other 
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limits that, while ultimately capped by the physical limits of our world, need to be 
considered as limits in their own right. For example, the proposed conceptual framework 
relies on the idea of function gradients as the practical expressions of the individual 
potential limits of each class of assets and their specific cohorts. Human capital, as much 
as intangible produced capital, are all capped by their own specific and unique sets of 
limits. Most existing paradigms instead have either no consideration at all for limits, they 
include them through proxy mechanisms, like prices, or they include only some limits but 
not all. For example, among the classical political economists (De Janvry & Saodoulet, 
2016), Malthus was perhaps the only one who theorized under the presence of absolute 
limits. Smith, Ricardo, and Mill all saw in innovation, market expansion, and 
specialization, means for continuous growth. Implicitly, then, the limits were imposed by 
the variables defined within the paradigm, rather than by specific space and time realities. 
Most other schools of thought had similar takes on limits; however, neoclassical 
economics have lacked any such considerations. As for environmental economists, given 
that they rely on the pricing system, it can be said that they consider such limits in as 
much as the prices manage to account for them. Ecological economists are more explicit 
about limits but given they are narrowly focused on the environment, they tend to miss 
the broadness of the socio-material limits proposed by the new paradigm. 
Third, in the new paradigm, the allocation of resources and proceeds is contextual 
on the transformation process taking place. Each transformation is unique, as they occur 
through the simultaneous intersection of many different variables. There is no 
predetermined path offered, but a method to understand and manage the process. Instead, 
for the most part, some of the other paradigms leave it to tautological mechanisms to 
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determine such allocations: prices, markets, interest rates, profits, surplus value, and 
productivity, among others. These vary mostly in the approaches they take to either 
manage or manipulate such mechanisms, based on their understanding of how they work 
and what their influence is. 
Fourth, the new paradigm explains the impact of trade as a result of real 
exchanges of wealth that impact a country’s capacity to fulfill, intertemporally, the 
wellbeing of its citizens. It argues that, regardless of the biases introduced by prices and 
other considerations (including the overlooking or misrepresentation of any natural 
limits), any exchange of goods and services implies a real exchange of wealth that 
modifies a country’s natural relative limits. This approach is quite different from many of 
the other paradigms that rely on pricing and markets to determine the terms of an 
exchange. Even those paradigms that criticize the mechanism determining such terms 
tend to offer solutions within the same mechanism, so terms can be improved. 
Fifth, under the new paradigm, development is conceived as a continuous and 
never-ending process without exception. What changes is the scale of the portion of a 
country’s society which is behind, as well as the distance towards self-reinforcing state. 
Likewise, development is defined as a collective process that is only possible through 
concerted wealth management. In contrast, almost all other development paradigms rely 
on the conceptualization of two or more different exclusive states with no clear 
intermediate possibilities or even transitional dynamics that could allow for the switching 
of states. 
And finally, the proposed conceptual framework integrates in full the practical 
implications that social and political variables have in the process of development. 
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Through the socio-material limits that result from both existing socio-material structures 
and present policy decisions that get gradually embedded in them, these variables play a 
direct role in determining the value generating potential of all classes of assets. On the 
contrary, most alternative paradigms which have an economic basis do not consider 
social and political variables, and if they even discuss them, they do so by treating them 
as externalities, or as utility assessment modifiers that fit within the homo economicus 
paradigm. On the other side, the development paradigms inspired by the political 
economy analysis from the left, focus mostly on such social and political variables, 
although relinquishing to some degree the economic ones. They also tend to be less 
systematic and lacking of testable hypotheses that can lead to their potential falsification. 
In summary, while a detailed comparison of the proposed conceptual framework 
with existing development paradigms is not possible in principle, a comparison of the 
methodologies and of their most practical implications, shows considerable differences 
between them. The new paradigm strives to dissipate some of the fog created by 
alternative paradigms by simply avoiding debates that seldom achieve practical results, 
and by focusing, instead, on drawing attention to the areas in which the biggest impact 
can be had. 
Limitations 
Due to resource and time constraints, this dissertation had to focus only in 
producing a solid conceptual framework on which future research could be based. There 
was not sufficient time to conduct an empirical validation or to explore, more in detail, 
how to operationalize the variables required to setting reliable limits that define the 
possibility space. 
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Nevertheless, the analysis that has already resulted from it has been extremely 
encouraging. The potential shown by the conceptual framework to offer a platform for 
serious inquiries, not only about aid, but also about the process of development and 
economic growth, has been established. 
Future Research 
Given the ambitious scope of this dissertation, from the outset, it has been 
established that the main objective was to develop a basic conceptual framework that 
would shift the received understandings of economic growth, development, and foreign 
aid towards a new paradigm. 
In this light, the contribution made not only accomplished the development of 
said conceptual framework, but also provided a solid foundation for future research. 
Three main tasks are necessary in order to further substantiate the proposed 
conceptual model. The first is to fully develop the mathematics into an internally 
cohesive system of inter-linked equations that fully support all of the conclusions derived 
from the diagrammatic/geometrical analysis performed. Second is to operationalize the 
determination and setting of natural, material, and social limits through adequate variable 
proxies. Third is to rely on the previous two tasks and on relevant data, to empirically test 
the proposed model through econometric techniques. This validation could empirically 
demonstrate the validity of the assessment of the conceptual problems of old-paradigm 
aid that negatively affect its effectiveness, as theorized throughout this dissertation. 
Ultimately, the proposed research should lead to the testing of, among others, the 
following stylized hypothesis: 
 Effective relative limits tend to broaden up for some while they narrow 
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down for others as the long-term cycles enter the destruction stage, and 
narrow down and broaden up, as well, for different groups, as they enter 
the creative consolidation stage. 
 When compared to those of worse-off countries, the possibility space of 
better-off countries is broader and closer to the class of assets’ natural 
limits, and have less or no classes of assets constraining the value 
generating potential of other classes. 
 The function gradients of most classes of assets possessed by worse-off 
countries, in particular human capital, are less conducive to value 
generation than those of better-off countries. Furthermore, their function 
gradients are on average, proportionately farther away from their assets’ 
natural limits than those of better-off countries. 
 Better-off countries’ resilience against the disruptive effects of both the 
destruction and creation stages of the long-term cycles, has consistently 
improved with time and is considerably better than that of worse-off 
countries. 
 Natural, material, and social limits are stochastically related to each other. 
These, in turn, are stochastically related to the process of social, economic, 
and political change that takes place within the possibility space they 
delimit. 
 Changes in the intertemporal value generating capacity of the classes of 
assets that compose a country’s wealth are more accurate and stable 
predictors of a country’s capacity to attain wellbeing than sustained 
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changes in economic growth. 
 Countries which economic output consistently require exceeding the 
optimal value extraction levels that characterize the self-reinforcing state, 
are less able and less likely to sustain, intertemporally, the levels of 
wellbeing being enjoyed by the majority of their citizens in present time. 
 At a given stage of the long-term cycles, there are higher average levels of 
matching and synchronicity between better-off countries’ cohort of classes 
of assets’ lifecycles and characteristics and the characteristics that are 
rewarded during that stage of the cycles, than between the latter and those 
characteristics and lifecycles of the classes of assets’ cohorts belonging to 
worse-off countries. 
 Better-off countries are more effective and efficient at matching the local 
and global demand for classes of assets with specific characteristics, as 
well as at matching the global socio-material structures, than worse-off 
countries are. 
 Natural, social, economic, and political shocks, as well as inter-country 
flows, in the case of worse-off countries, have a more than proportional 
negative impact on their intertemporal value generating potential, than 
they have on that of better-off countries. 
 Worse-off countries for which the function gradients for human capital 
have been closer to those of better-off countries for a longer period of 
time, have outperformed other worse-off countries (over the same period) 
in terms of multi-dimensional indexes like the Human Development 
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Index. 
 Minority and disadvantaged groups in developed countries showcase 
similar function gradient differences against their countries averages than 
those that exist between worse-off and better-off countries. In-country 
convergence dynamics mimic those between-countries. 
 Countries with a more stable and better-featured (i.e., better 
characteristics) possibility space outperform those with a less stable and 





This dissertation contributes to the literature by confirming that when looked at 
from a different point of reference—in this case, the alternative paradigmatic conception 
of economic growth and development advanced throughout the previous chapters, in 
itself, a considerable contribution to the literature—a conceptualization of aid that is not 
only different but also much richer, emerges. Furthermore, this dissertation also 
contributes to the literature by demonstrating that, when the current paradigm of aid is 
evaluated through a comparison to the proposed new paradigm, clearer reasons 
explaining its problematic effectiveness emerge as well. 
While these two are considerable contributions to the field of international 
development studies, perhaps an additional third and last one has the most relevance due 
to its strictly practical nature. This last contribution consists of the idea of pushing for the 
implementation of already viable and tested modified national income accounting 
standards, as well as new accounting, trading, and labelling practices, both as part of a 
potential Trojan horse that, in conjunction with the proposed conceptual framework, 
could do more to change the aid and development enterprise, and humanity’s addressing 
of environmental issues, than sixty years of circular debate have been able to do so far. 
Armed with new measurements and the proposed conceptual framework, humanity will 
have better information and tools to realistically, and more successfully, aim at ensuring 
its long-term survival and wellbeing. 
But how do these contributions and this vision for the future fit into the world of 
aid today? How are the current institutions, actors, and praxis of aid supposed to be 
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influenced and changed towards adopting such a vision? To answer these questions, is 
advisable to restate the core of the arguments made throughout this dissertation. 
The proposed conceptual framework is both pragmatic and relevant because its 
overarching purpose is to contribute to the intertemporal fulfillment of the wellbeing of 
the majority of human beings. Figure 6.1 below and the next few paragraphs illustrate 
how the new paradigm is aligned with such overarching purpose. 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Concerted wealth management, the self-reinforcing state, and the attainment 
of wellbeing 
 
In this dissertation, it is argued, the overarching moral human objective of 
fulfilling the wellbeing of the majority, can be realized through a two-tiered, three-
purposes formulation. Given that the realization of wellbeing is dependent on the 
















citizenry, the second tier of the formulation focuses on “optimal value extraction” (first 
purpose) and “optimal value allocation” (second purpose). This is represented on the 
right side of Figure 7.1.  
The first tier, represented by the “self-reinforcing state” ensures that the previous 
two purposes in the second tier (i.e., optimal value extraction and optimal value 
allocation) are not disjointed. This is a key logical requirement given that the identity, 
value equals wellbeing, is one of the axiomatic principles on which the proposed 
conceptual framework is built. This means that optimal value extracted from wealth but 
unevenly distributed would not really equal wellbeing; and that, likewise, optimal 
allocation of value when such nominal value is too low, would not allow for value to 
equal wellbeing, as everyone might die of starvation rather than at least a few surviving. 
Hence the formulation of the self-reinforcing state, Ζ ∵ Ξ ≊ 1 ≊ Ρ, which is meant to 
bring us closer to the overarching purpose described above of fulfilling the wellbeing of 
the majority. 
The third purpose, and hence the choice of “self-reinforcing” to qualify the “state” 
or condition represented by the above formulation, is that of empowering or enabling the 
group of individuals living within the possibility space (in whatever choice of unit of 
analysis—e.g., community, country, global) to act towards the attainment of wellbeing 
through a process of development (i.e., “actions” on the right side of Figure 7.1). These 
acts are the result of dispositions and conditions by which they are bound. In turn, 
wellbeing leads to better dispositions and conditions, which reinforce better actions, thus 
creating a virtuous circle. In this view, such virtuous circle is one in which wellbeing 
begets wellbeing: the self-reinforcing state. 
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Nothing of the above can truly be achieved if it does not come from the will and 
determination of groups of individuals; and this can only come from within, not from 
imposition or from social, economic, and political manipulation. The idea that such a 
group has to rely on themselves and themselves only to come up with the collective will 
to achieve such a task is the ultimate enabler of the realization of potential wellbeing. 
One could think, for example, of an idealistic world order in which there is global 
agreement to fully respect perfectly calculated and accurate natural and socio-material 
limits, but in which the population within smaller units of analysis is failing at resolving 
their own coordination and control problems of cooperating among them, and are, 
therefore, unable to simultaneously approximate optimal value extraction and optimal 
value allocation. Without such will and resolve from within, the rest is ornamental; even 
that beautiful and idealistic orderly world suggested above would be useless. Conceiving 
the process of development, concerted wealth management, and their ultimate purpose of 
attaining the intertemporal wellbeing of the majority, makes it impossible to deny or 
obviate that, in the final analysis, it is because of us, human beings, that development 
doesn’t often work and, hence, it is only us who can make it happen. There are no magic 
formulas, no short-cuts, or short-circuits that can relieve us from our responsibility 
towards changing ourselves and towards, together, changing our collective. 
Finally, Figure 7.1 illustrates another building block on which the proposed 
conceptual framework and its resulting paradigm rest. In the context of our ecosystem, 
people’s dispositions and actions influence the conditions that human collectives impose 
on themselves. Through the interaction of the ecosystem and these dispositions and 
conditions, as well as the actions these beget, bounds are created: the natural and socio-
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material limits that define the possibility space. Within this space, people act and their 
actions determine the outcome of their efforts in achieving wellbeing. Dispositions, 
conditions, and actions are then intrinsically linked to each other; they not only influence 
but determine each other. They also interact with the ecosystem through a two-way 
relationship in which the ecosystem bounds them, and through which the ecosystem is 
cared for or destroyed due to them. In the end, this relationship between people’s 
dispositions, conditions, and actions, and their ecosystem, determines how well humanity 
caters to their own wellbeing needs and wants. This is the nature of the self-reinforcing 
dynamic through which the new paradigm claims to be central to the achievement of 
wellbeing. 
This delineation of limits resulting in the logical definition of a possibility space 
is one of the main outcomes of having adopted a Wittgensteinian epistemological and 
ontological approach. The purpose of such separation between what is inside and outside 
of such space, aims, in the same fashion Wittgenstein did for philosophy, to separate for a 
reimagined new aid paradigm, what should or should not be the subject of its praxis (or at 
least to separate those subjects on which we know enough to make a difference—in a 
Wittgensteinian way this means our praxis leads to its intended results—from those for 
which the history of our praxis has demonstrated our lack of real knowledge—given it 
does not necessarily lead to its intended results). 
The natural and socio-material limits proposed throughout this dissertation 
recognize that we live in a material world in which everything around us has material 
consequences. This approach does not deny in any way that an immaterial reality might 
exist, or that if it does, it may have an impact on the material dimensions of life within 
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the ecosystem. However, the approach followed in this dissertation does set a limit 
between this potential immaterial world and the material one, again, in the same fashion 
Wittgenstein advocated for philosophers to move away from their obsession to find 
metaphysical answers to everything. It does so because the existence of the former would 
have the logical consequence that we can know it only by approximation and that as such, 
our experiences and rationalizations of it would be axiomatic and therefore prone to 
endless disagreement. The riddle of the immaterial world, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, lies 
outside space and time (Wittgenstein, 1922, p. 89 para. 6.4312).  
In practice, this means that while not denying that there might be immaterial 
variables that could play a role in the process of development, and while recognizing that 
on many occasions, development decisions can be driven by them, there is always a 
moment in which such drive faces the realities of the material world: praxis require 
resources that are bound by space and time; its interventions and outcomes are also bound 
by considerations of space and time. Of these material realities, we can say and do 
meaningful things. In fact, we possess considerable practical knowledge to be meaningful 
in our actions about them. Of the immaterial ones, we know little, at least in the 
Wittgensteinian conception of knowledge as expressed through practice. Furthermore, the 
point at which these immaterial aspects and the praxis of development merge, are highly 
contextual and therefore problematic in leading to any kind of universal knowledge that 
could be prescribed from the outside of the possibility space. In line with Wittgenstein’s 
ideas about words and meanings, as well as the relationship between rules and routines, 
the working out of those issues that emerge in the praxis of development through the 
immaterial, can only take place within the confines of a possibility space. In the same 
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way that laws have to be general enough in order to be applied (and therefore, a social 
process of interpretation and internationalization through the setting of stable rules and 
routines is required for them to be adopted and upheld), development praxis could only, 
in the best case, share knowledge, leaving it to the inner logic that reins in each 
possibility space to interpret and internalize it. This means that the outcomes of such 
sharing will not only vary in terms of their internalization timelines but also in terms of 
their emerging outcomes and characteristics. 
The immaterial realities are then those things about which, preferably, aid’s praxis 
should remain silent. If we insist in not doing so, at the very least, we should do so after, 
and only after, the other things about which we do really possess knowledge have been 
taken care of. 
The possibility spaces that are delineated within the proposed natural and socio-
material limits, are accordingly, non-normative, except perhaps and only partially, with 
regards to the characteristics that due to our human nature are engrained in the ways in 
which we relate to and collaborate with others (this relates to Wittgenstein’s idea of 
“forms of life”).  
At the core of this extremely important distinction on which the proposed 
conceptual framework is built (i.e., the limits of what should and should not be the 
subject of aid’s praxis), are the ideas of dispositions, conditions, and actions introduced in 
Chapter 4 and illustrated in Figure 7.1. above. In Chapter 4 it was argued that a 
possibility space is not a black box. Just because we cannot manipulate or fully capture 
the causalities between actions and outcomes within such space, this does not mean that 
we do not possess knowledge about the nature of human interaction to foster the 
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improvement of the characteristics or dispositions within such space that can potentially 
lead to better actions and outcomes. Throughout this dissertation, it has been argued that 
setting clear limits and improving the characteristics of the possibility space these limits 
create, both lie on the side of what development praxis should say and do something 
about (i.e., setting the conditions and fostering better dispositions). On the contrary, 
throughout this dissertation, it was argued that the impression that we could manipulate 
what happens within such spaces (e.g., actions) is an illusion that needs to be dissolved, 
and that such manipulating attempts should not be the subject of aid praxis. In a sense, it 
has been implied that a considerable part of the ineffectiveness of development efforts, 
and more specifically aid, has resulted from our obsession to control an inner logic and 
process that cannot be (e.g., the unrealistic timeframes behind the change expected from 
aid interventions; the transfer of knowledge and institutional forms that fail from being 
internalized, etc.). It is in fact highly contradictory that even when many times we 
recognize how much there is still to know about the social, economic, and political realm, 
we believe that we can perform an action that would lead to a specific result, as if the 
space where human action takes place was a vacuum in which mechanical laws applied 
over mechanical beings, resulting in invariable outcomes. There is only so much we can 
expect from this kind of praxis. Moreover, when it comes to these kinds of 
manipulations, many times the biggest risks lie, not on the realm of what we know, but 
on that of what we do not know. The real dimensions on which our existence has come 
into what is today are beyond our limited comprehension even if only because our 
knowledge of the past cannot ever be perfect or complete. Therefore, intervening in the 
present in ways in which nature itself has intervened in the past through thousands or 
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even millions of years, opens up a Pandora box that not only tests the limits of our 
knowledge, but it is very likely to throw our ignorance back in our faces.  
Consequently, and as argued above and throughout this dissertation, our efforts 
should only be allocated to this kind of manipulative action only after we have focused 
on the conditions (e.g., limits) and on fostering better dispositions. Likewise, it is 
suggested that we should only attempt these kinds of manipulations on very specific 
cases in which we are looking to achieve very specific and short-term objectives. 
An analogy could be used to illustrate this dynamic between limits and the spaces 
they delineate. We could think of riverbeds and the rivers that flow through them. In 
nature water flows from high to low elevations, following the path of least resistance, 
which is given by the geological conditions of the land through which it flows, as it 
relates to the characteristics of the body of water flowing. As the water flows, it creates 
and consolidates, with the passage of time, a riverbed. As the riverbed is consolidated 
into the ground, it bounds more and more the flow of water. As long as there is an 
equilibrium between the riverbed characteristics that were created by the interaction of 
the geological conditions, and the volume and force of the flow of water, the riverbed 
will contain the flow within itself, and the flow will further consolidate the riverbed. 
Changes in one will undoubtedly lead to changes in the other. 
A similar relationship exists between the natural and socio-material limits and the 
possibility space they delineate. The force of natural and social forces that flow through 
the possibility spaces follow their own logic, the possibility space is just a reflection of 
such logic within the limits imposed that created such space in the first place (an iterative 
process). In time, however, given that such possibility space and limits exist in unison, 
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one influenced by the other (as riverbeds and flows of water), the possibility space starts 
embedding rigidities that accumulate through time and that tend to constrain the forces, 
although only within certain ranges (just as the riverbed contains the river as long as the 
volume and force of the water remains within certain parameters). Changes in the natural 
and social forces will change the possibility space, but these changes will be more or less 
transformational depending on how the balance between limits, space, and forces remain, 
or are altered by changes in one or the other that alter, in turn, the original relationship. 
This illustrates the rationale behind the proposed conceptual framework: it makes 
more sense to focus on the delineation of the limits and the improvement of the 
characteristics within the spaces they create, than changing the inner logic of what flows 
through them. Doing the opposite would almost equate to trying to change the 
watercourse of a river by changing the properties of the water in them, rather than 
through changing the riverbed. Would it not make more sense, as humanity does, to 
change the riverbed and let the same water flow through the new course? 
Changing the riverbed, as scientifically based as it can be, will nevertheless 
generate unintended, unforeseen, and emergent consequences. The specifics of the 
interaction between the water and the new riverbed will likely point to limitations in 
knowledge and the analysis, and to required adjustments to deal with such limitations, as 
well as with emergent characteristics resulting from the real, not theoretical, interaction 
of water and riverbed. Still in this situation, it would be hard to think that it is advisable 
to focus on changing anything in the water itself, rather than focusing on the riverbed. 
At this point, we can finally address the questions presented at the beginning of 
this section: how do the ideas proposed throughout this dissertation fit into the world of 
471 
aid today? How are the current institutions, actors, and praxis of aid supposed to be 
influenced and changed towards adopting the ideas proposed? 
With respect to the first question, as discussed in Chapter 5, the consequences of 
adopting the proposed conceptual framework as a substitute of the current paradigm, 
impose considerable changes in the praxis and institutional basis of aid. For example, the 
new paradigm would require rebalancing the inferior priority that emergency related aid 
has vis-à-vis development aid. The new paradigm argues it is more cost effective to 
ensure that wealth is not deteriorated or destroyed, than investing in its formation (as 
described in Chapter 3, the costs of natural disasters considerably exceed the flows of 
aid). Such rebalance between emergency and development related aid would also be 
called for given that a sizeable portion of what is considered development aid is spent in 
actions that directly or indirectly aim at manipulating dispositions and actions, rather than 
at changing and improving the conditions, and at forming dispositions. 
The new paradigm is based on an alternative formulation of the ideas of economic 
growth and the tools that are based on them (i.e., development planning and national 
income accounting), which are an essential part of the current aid paradigm. This means 
that a considerable change in the approach to volume, allocation, and delivery decisions 
would result from the adoption of the new paradigm (see Chapter 5). For example, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, the World Bank, other international financial institutions, as well 
as some bilateral donors still use the Revised Minimum Standard Model (RMSM) and the 
World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) to make or at least 
inform (but nevertheless, heavily influence) the broader debate about the volume and the 
allocation of aid. Given that decisions about delivery are bound too by available funding, 
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these models and the ideas of the old paradigm that underlie them have also considerable 
influence over them. These tools are incompatible with the new paradigm and therefore 
would need to be substituted, resulting, as stated above, in important changes in the 
decisions that the aid enterprise makes about volume, allocation, and delivery. For 
example, rather than growth targets, the proposed conceptual framework requires 
considering, simultaneously, the optimization of value extracted from wealth and the 
allocation of such value among the population. 
Finally, the new paradigm requires a very different approach from the current one 
in terms of the delivery of aid. Given the consideration of the critical-paths that are also 
central to the proposed conceptual framework, the timelines of traditional aid 
interventions would have to change. This may imply that certain interventions would 
have to span several political cycles both within the aid-receiving and the aid-giving 
countries. This means that to be able to achieve realistic results, donors and their 
stakeholders may be required to change the way in which they monitor and evaluate 
success, and particularly how they do such evaluations in time, that is, which timeframes 
they use. Similarly, the delivery of aid would have to change, as expressed above, from 
the manipulation of short-term actions aiming to achieve shorter-term successes, towards 
conditions setting and disposition formation focused interventions which provide limited 
opportunities for short-term success but that can ripe larger and more stable internalized 
change. Likewise, the delivery of aid would have to stop focusing only on the 
endogenous limitations of the aid-receiving countries, to also address the exogenous 
factors that affect their capabilities and freedom to move towards the self-reinforcing 
state. 
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In terms of the institutional foundations of aid, the current fragmentation that 
exists would need to be addressed. To facilitate the adoption of the new paradigm, this 
could be done by rerouting most of the funding towards unified multilateral mechanisms 
and towards addressing the asymmetries introduced by aid-giving countries that 
negatively impact aid-receiving countries. Given the need to unify the motivations behind 
aid, other than relying on a multilateral scheme will invariably introduce as many 
motivations and variations of them as bilateral donors exist. The rules of the multilateral 
mechanisms would also need to change, as well as their operations. Moreover, the 
institutions of aid would have to take over the task of ensuring that new national income 
accounts, as well as the proposed accounting, labelling, and trading requirements are 
implemented without exception and as soon as possible across those countries that are 
better-off, and gradually across worse-off countries. Finally, efforts to unify aid 
institutions into the least number possible, would be required. These institutions would 
have to finally be designed following a set of standards that, once and for all, address the 
problematic of aid that has been identified for several decades now, but have yet to be 
solved. 
With respect to the second question, that is, how such radical changes can be 
pushed through the current institutions so they can finally be adopted, offering other than 
the proposed strategy of introducing a new Trojan horse, would be logically inconsistent 
and epistemologically and ontologically impossible under the proposed conceptual 
framework. As it has been argued through this dissertation, at different levels of 
aggregation, each social collective functions within the possibility spaces created by 
natural and socio-material limits, which are in turn affected by the actions that such 
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collectives take within such spaces. How these collectives solve the problems of 
coordination and control that their cooperation present is an emerging result of their 
characteristics and the inner logic that at any given time drives their dynamic. Suggesting 
a specific course of political action that allegedly could lead to the implementation of the 
proposed framework would not only go against the core of the epistemological and 
ontological basis of the framework proposed; more importantly, it will simply mean 
joining the countless analyses and the many proposals for reform that have failed over the 
last few decades, as was showcased in Chapter 2. As stated at the end of the same 
chapter, even if the cleverest ideas ever were proposed, why would these new ideas be 
more successful than those that have already been waiting for fifty years or more to be 
implemented? The answer already given is that they won’t because the architecture and 
knowledge base on which aid relies will not allow it, just as it has not allowed any of the 
countless previous proposals to succeed. Our only hope is changing the way we see our 
world—so our actions may change—through new national income accounting and new 
accounting, trading, and labelling standards. Seeing the world anew would provide for 
different points of reference, alternative analyses, and, hopefully, different actions. 
As for the institutional capacity that worse-off countries have to their avail to 
adopt the proposed conceptual framework, it is important to dissect the different facets 
that the impact of such adoption could have on them.  
First, the implementation of accounting, labelling, and trading standards would be 
meaningful worldwide as long as they cover a considerable portion of, initially, the most 
common kinds of goods and services that exists, and consequently, of the actual goods 
and services exchanged locally or globally. Given that economic activity is highly 
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concentrated in better-off countries and in multinational corporations, implementing new 
accounting, labelling, and trading standards only within those countries and corporations 
will already cover a sizeable proportion of all global activity. Furthermore, the 
information available in better-off countries would help initially estimate the information 
related to worse-off ones. Given that the accounting and labelling is to be done in 
physical units of wealth, it is likely that the content of wealth across products and 
countries will be similar for similar goods and services. Hence, while still important that 
worse-off countries also start implementing these new standards, there is no rush to go 
beyond the capacity each worse-off country have. 
Second, the implementation of complementary national income accounts based on 
physical units of wealth, while an additional burden, should not be an excessive one. 
Furthermore, the standards already exist (although perhaps some modifications might be 
needed) as the System of Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting, SEEA 
(see Chapter 2). Efforts to implement them are already underway in a few countries and 
these, interestingly enough and consistent with the argument put forward in this 
dissertation, are already functioning like a Trojan horse. Countries that might more or 
less supportive about measures to counter humanity’s environmental impact are all 
moving forward with their commitments to the United Nations in implementing such 
accounting standards. An additional push in accelerating its adoption might be needed 
and, therefore, it is likely that better-off countries would have to offer additional 
resources to worse-off countries. Nevertheless, is the kind of information generated 
through the accounting, labelling, and trading discussed in the previous paragraph, the 
one that, between these two efforts requires the most resources, and, in this last case, the 
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burden will fall mostly on better-off countries and multinational corporations, so they can 
do so in a shorter timeframe. 
Consequently, it could be expected that the capacity demands of introducing new 
national income accounts, and new accounting, labelling, and trading standards for 
worse-off countries could be minimal, while the benefits they can get from the progress 
made by better-off countries are considerable. 
As for the capacity demands in implementing the wealth management tools 
offered by the new paradigm, there shouldn’t be any incremental ones as rather than 
adding over the tools used under the existing paradigm, the new tools are meant to 
replace them. Nevertheless, there would be costs involved in transmitting, absorbing, and 
implementing the knowledge required, so in this respect additional help from better-off 
countries could be needed. 
To conclude, it is important to reiterate the objective behind this dissertation. In 
the Preface, I stated that the success of this dissertation needed to be measured by its 
influence in getting things done, right now. Why would, then, we follow the same illusion 
of the very same proposals that have been criticized as unsuccessful throughout the 
previous chapter, or morph this contribution into another offering of one of the many 
potential ways in which the problems of control and coordination from which the aid 
enterprise has suffered almost since its very inception, could be addressed. As it has been 
argued, the outcome of the aid enterprise, just as any outcome of a collective operating 
within any possibility space, can only be solved and improved from within. What this 
dissertation is offering is a strategy and the analytical tools to change the conditions that 
delimit the possibility space of the aid enterprise, so changed conditions, and the change 
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dispositions that can result from the adoption of a different conceptual framework and 
possessing different data to see the world anew, can hopefully help changing its actions. 
Introducing new national income accounts, and accounting, labelling, and trading 
standards, as well as new analytical tools used for determining the volume, allocation, 
and delivery of aid, is an attempt to shift the riverbed of the aid enterprise, hoping that the 
new watercourse will better resemble those characteristics that could guide it towards 
better results, and away from the problematic with which it has been plagued by for so 
many years now (its current watercourse). 
A central tenet of this dissertation is that while social change is a collective affair, 
social change also requires personal change. Our social, economic, and political practices 
are always looking for the short-cuts, the magic formulas, the possibility to control our 
societies; “everybody thinks of changing humanity, and nobody thinks of changing 
himself” said Tolstoy (1900, p. 75).  
The proposed conceptual framework offers is a mirror so each and every one of us 
can no longer avoid realizing that there are no short-cuts to changing ourselves, and 
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